White Nationalism and Multiculturalism Support: Investigating the Interactive Effects of White Identity and National Attachment on Support for Multiculturalism

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Although white nationalism is increasing globally, little is known about the interactive effects of white identity and national attachment on intergroup attitudes. We address this oversight and theorise that nationalism (i.e., an unquestioning belief in the superiority of one’s nation) should strengthen, whereas patriotism (i.e., a positive, albeit objective, attachment to one’s nation) should weaken, the negative correlation between white identity and multiculturalism support. As hypothesised, white identity and nationalism correlated negatively, whereas patriotism correlated positively, with support for multiculturalism amongst a sample of New Zealand Europeans (N = 12,815). Moreover, the negative correlation between white identity and multiculturalism support was nearly twice as strong for those high (versus low) on nationalism, but was half the size for those high (versus low) on patriotism. These results demonstrate the negative impact of white nationalism on intergroup relations, and highlight the potential for patriotism to lessen the harmful effects of white identity on support for diversity.

Keywords: white nationalism; nationalism; patriotism; multiculturalism; White identity; terrorism

Introduction

On 15 March 2019, the wave of white nationalism sweeping across the globe came crashing into New Zealand as a lone terrorist began his assault on two Mosques in Christchurch. The attack—New Zealand’s deadliest in modern history—claimed the lives of 50 people and injured 50 more. In the immediate aftermath of this atrocity, debate raged over whether the hatred espoused by the terrorist reflected deep-seated and unrecognised biases held by us as a nation (e.g., Ryan, 2019, March 24). Yet, intolerance towards Muslims (and other minorities) has long been evident in New Zealand. For example, Shaver, Sibley, Osborne, and Bulbulia (2017) reveal that New Zealanders’ warmth towards Muslims is notably low. Moreover, minorities in general report markedly higher rates of interpersonal and institutional forms of discrimination than do their New Zealand European counterparts (e.g., Harris et al., 2012; Harris et al., 2006). Collectively, research on intergroup relations in New Zealand reveals an uncomfortable reality. Namely, the intolerance laid all too bare in the recent terrorist attacks may lurk underneath a thin veneer of acceptance in New Zealand.

The current study addresses this possibility by investigating the impact of white nationalism on multiculturalism support in New Zealand. To begin, we briefly review the literature on ethnic identification amongst ethnic majority groups, paying particular attention to how white identity influences intergroup attitudes. We then discuss studies on national attachment to show that the ways in which one identifies with his or her nation of residence has distinct implications for attitudes toward ethnic minorities. Finally, building upon the reviewed literature, we propose that nationalistic attachment should exacerbate, whereas patriotic attachment should mitigate, the negative effect of white identity on acceptance for cultural diversity.

White Identity and Intergroup Attitudes

Although ethnic identification is particularly salient for low-status groups (Sidanius & Petrocik, 2001) and can protect minorities from the harmful effects of discrimination (Cronin, Levin, Branscombe, van Laar, & Tropp, 2012; Stronge et al., 2016), a newly-emerging and burgeoning literature has begun to examine ethnic identification amongst members of high-status groups. Accordingly, this research consistently reveals that the origins and implications of ethnic identification differ between low-status and high-status groups. For example, Levin and Sidanius (1999) investigated the correlates of ethnic identification amongst high- and low-status groups in the United States and Israel and found that the preference for group-based hierarchy (namely, social dominance orientation; SDO) correlated negatively with ethnic identification for low-status groups, but positively for high-status groups (also see Levin, Federico, Sidanius, & Rabinowitz, 2002). Similarly, whereas beliefs that legitimise the social hierarchy (e.g., the Protestant work ethic, conservatism, etc.) correlate negatively with ethnic identification for low-status groups, they correlate positively for high-status groups (Levin, Sidanius, Rabinowitz, & Federico, 1998). In short, ethnic identification amongst high-status groups is rooted in the preference for group-based inequality, suggesting that white identity may have nefarious consequences for intergroup relations.

Consistent with the view that white identity could have negative consequences for intergroup relations, research reveals that ethnic identificatio

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amongst whites (i.e., white identity) correlates with a number of harmful views toward minorities. For example, Lowery, Unzueta, Knowles, and Goff (2006) showed that white identity correlated negatively with affirmative action support, particularly when the policy was framed in terms of the potential losses affirmative action could imply for whites. Likewise, Major, Blodorn, and Blascovich (2018) revealed that informing whites about the changing demographics of the United States increased support for anti-immigration policies and the likelihood of voting for Donald Trump, but only for those who were already high on white identity. Finally, Osborne, Jost, Becker, Badaan, and Sibley (2019) demonstrated that white identity correlated negatively with collective action aimed at redressing inequality, but positively with collective action aimed at reinforcing the status quo. Conversely, minorities’ ethnic identification correlated positively with support for collective action to address inequality, but negatively with protests that would reinforce the status quo. Together, these studies reveal that white identity undermines support for diversity and intergroup tolerance.

The Impact of (Distinct Forms of) National Attachment

Although white identity seems to be at the centre of the current raft of intergroup conflict seen across the globe, it is important to take into account the nature of one’s attachment to his or her nation of residence. Accordingly, research distinguishes between two forms of national attachment: (a) nationalism and (b) patriotism (see Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989). Whereas nationalism reflects an unshakable and unquestionable—belief that one’s nation is superior to others, patriotism captures the simple positive affective attachment people have towards their nation. Although these constructs have been given different names including blind versus constructive patriotism (Schatz & Feshbach, 1997; Schatz, Staub, & Lavine, 1999; Spry & Horsey, 2007), nationalism versus patriotism (Blank & Schmidt, 2003; De Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003), and ethnic exclusion versus patriotism (Coendt & Scheepers, 2003), a core feature distinguishing these two forms of national attachment is rejection versus acceptance of democratic values, respectively.

Consistent with the view that nationalism and patriotism reflect distinct forms of national attachment, the two constructs have separate antecedents and consequences. As for the antecedents to nationalism, Osborne, Milojev and Sibley (2017) investigated three waves of longitudinal data from New Zealand and revealed that right-wing authoritarianism (RWA; i.e., people’s tendency to obey authorities) correlated positively with relative increases in both patriotism and nationalism. In contrast, SDO correlated positively with relative increases in nationalism, but negatively with increases in patriotism. Notably, the corresponding cross-lagged effects these two forms of national attachment had on RWA and SDO were either unreliable, or notably smaller than the reciprocal associations. Accordingly, nationalism and patriotism have distinct antecedents.

In addition to having distinct origins, nationalism and patriotism independently predict (sometimes in countervailing directions) important outcomes for intergroup relations. For example, nationalism correlates with hostile intergroup attitudes including prejudices toward immigrants (De Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003; Wagner, Becker, Christ, Pettigrew, & Schmid, 2012), anti-immigration sentiment (Ariely, 2012), and outgroup derogation (Blank & Schmidt, 2003). Conversely, after accounting for the negative effects of nationalism, the relationship between patriotism and intergroup attitudes is either positive, or reliable (De Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003). Finally, Ariely (2012) found that nationalism correlated positively, whereas patriotism correlated negatively, with anti-immigration views across 34 countries. Thus, nationalism seems to undermine support for diversity, whereas patriotism facilitates intergroup acceptance. Nevertheless, research has yet to examine the extent to which these distinct forms of national attachment moderate the effect of white identity on attitudes toward multiculturalism.

Current Study

The current study addresses this oversight by investigating the impact of distinct forms of national attachment on the relationship between white identity and attitudes toward diversity. Given that a preference for group-based hierarchy underlies ethnic identification and ingroup favouritism for high-status groups (Levin et al., 2002; Levin & Sidanius, 1999; see also Hamley, Houkamau, Osborne, Barlow, & Sibley, in press), we predicted that white identity would correlate negatively with support for multiculturalism (i.e., an ideology that promotes the acceptance of diverse cultures and opposes hierarchy). The strength of this negative association should, however, depend on the type of attachment one holds toward his or her nation of residence. Because nationalism reflects an uncritical belief in national superiority and is based on a preference for group-based hierarchy (Osborne et al., 2017; Sidanius, Feshbach, Levin, & Pratto, 1997), nationalism should strengthen the negative correlation between white identity and support for multiculturalism. Conversely, patriotism captures a positive identification with one’s nation of residence, yet nevertheless recognises that one’s nation is fallible in its pursuit to uphold democratic values (Blank & Schmidt, 2003). Thus, patriotism should attenuate the predicted negative correlation between white identity and multiculturalism support.

In order to identify the independent (and interactive) effects of white identity and national attachment on support for multiculturalism, we control for multiple key covariates. Because women are less conservative than men (Fraley, Griffin, Belsky, & Roisman, 2012), we controlled for participants’ gender. Also, given that the diversity in one’s community can influence political beliefs (Major et al., 2018; Schlueter & Wagner, 2008), we controlled for whether or not participants lived in an urban or rural setting. We also used employment status as a covariate, as the (perceived) threat from ethnic diversity may be heightened amongst the unemployed (Schlueter & Scheepers, 2010). Finally, we controlled for participants’ levels of education and conservatism, as they correlate positively and negatively (respectively) with pro-diversity attitudes (see Sarrasin et al., 2012; Sidanius, Levin, van Laar, & Sears, 2008). By adjusting for these variables, we rule out the most likely alternative explanations for our predicted results and provide a compelling examination of the impact that white nationalism has on multiculturalism support.
White nationalism and support for multiculturalism

METHOD

Sampling Procedure

Data come from Time 9 of the New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study (NZAVS), a nationwide longitudinal panel study that began in 2009.1 Sampling for Time 9 occurred on five occasions. In 2009 (Time 1), a random sample of adults from the electoral roll (i.e., a national list of registered voters) were invited to participate in a 20-year longitudinal study. This first sampling occasion yielded 6,518 participants (with a response rate of 16.6%). By 2011, 3,914 participants remained in the study (i.e., a 60% retention rate from Time 1). To address sample attrition, a non-random booster sample was recruited through the website of a major nation-wide newspaper. This second sampling occasion yielded 2,970 new participants, bringing the sample size at Time 3 to 6,884 participants.

To increase the size and diversity of the sample, we conducted three additional sets of booster sampling based on random samples (without replacement) of the electoral roll, but oversampling hard-to-reach populations (see Sibley, 2018). The first of these three sampling occasions was in 2012 (i.e., Time 4) and used multiple sample frames to recruit 5,108 new participants into the study (with a response rate of 9.98%). The second sampling occasion occurred in 2013 (i.e., Time 5) and recruited 7,581 new participants into the study (with a response rate of 10.6%), whereas the third sampling occasion occurred in 2016 (i.e., Time 8) and recruited 7,669 new participants into the study (with a response rate of 9.5%). Therefore, Time 8 had 21,937 participants (i.e., 13,779 retained from at least one prior time point, 7,669 additions from booster sampling, and 489 unmatched or unsolicited options). By 2017 (i.e., Time 9), 17,072 participants remained in the study (i.e., a 77.8% retention rate from the prior wave), 13,885 of whom were identified as New Zealand European and who are the focus of the current study.

Participants

Of the 13,885 sole-identifying New Zealand Europeans who participated in Time 9 of the NZAVS, we examine the 12,815 (Mage = 52.17, SD = 13.61; 63.0% women) who gave partial or complete responses to our variables of interest (92.3% of the sample who collected wave of data and, as such, provides the most up-to-date degree), whereas conservatism was measured by asking participants to indicate “how politically liberal versus conservative” they saw themselves on a 1 (extremely liberal) to 7 (extremely conservative) scale.

RESULTS

Table 1 displays the bivariate correlations and descriptive statistics for our variables of interest. Given the negative impact of ethnic identification on support for diversity among whites (see Lowery et al., 2006), we predicted that white identity would correlate negatively with multiculturalism support. Indeed, the negative correlation between white identity and multiculturalism support ($r = -0.12, p < .001$) shown in Table 1 is consistent with this notion. Crucially, however, we predicted that the strength of this negative association would vary by the type of attachment people have with their nation of residence. Specifically, because nationalism reflects an uncritical belief in national superiority and is rooted in the preference for group-based hierarchy (see Osborne et al., 2017; Sidanius et al., 1997), we expected that nationalism would strengthen the hypothesized negative correlation between white identity and multiculturalism support. Conversely, patriotism is rooted in a positive, but critical, identification with one’s nation and correlates positively with support for democratic values (see Blank & Schmidt, 2003). Thus, patriotism should weaken the predicted negative correlation between white identity and multiculturalism support.

To investigate these hypotheses, we entered our mean-centred and dummy-coded covariates, as well as our mean-centred predictor variables (i.e., white identity, nationalism, and patriotism), into the first block of a regression model. The second block of our regression added the (a) White Identity × Nationalism and (b) White Identity × Patriotism interaction terms to the model. The full model was then regressed onto multiculturalism support using full information maximum likelihood estimates and 95% confidence intervals (CIs).

1 We focus on data from Time 9 because it is the most recently
Table 1. Bivariate correlations and descriptive statistics for the variables included in this study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>α</th>
<th>1.</th>
<th>2.</th>
<th>3.</th>
<th>4.</th>
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<th>7.</th>
<th>8.</th>
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<tr>
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<td>0.39</td>
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<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
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<td>-0.04</td>
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<td>---</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>13.61</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.34</td>
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<td>---</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>5.32</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conservatism</td>
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<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
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<tr>
<td>White Identity</td>
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<td>1.41</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.08</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>---</td>
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<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotism</td>
<td>5.90</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.28</td>
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<tr>
<td>Multiculturalism</td>
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<td>1.42</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
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</table>

a Dummy-coded (0 = woman, 1 = man); b Dummy-coded (0 = rural, 1 = urban); c Dummy-coded (0 = unemployed, 1 = employed)

Table 2. Regression analysis predicting multiculturalism support as a function of white identity, nationalism, and patriotism, as well as their interactive effects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 2</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>β</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>95% CI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>4.54</td>
<td>(4.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-0.01*</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>(-0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>0.06***</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>0.03*</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>(-0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.19***</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservatism</td>
<td>-0.25***</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>(-0.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Identity</td>
<td>-0.09***</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>(-0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>-0.16***</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>(-0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotism</td>
<td>0.10**</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Identity × Nationalism</td>
<td>-0.03***</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>(-0.04)</td>
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<tr>
<td>White Identity × Patriotism</td>
<td>0.04***</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
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</table>

a Dummy-coded (0 = woman, 1 = man); b Dummy-coded (0 = rural, 1 = urban); c Dummy-coded (0 = unemployed, 1 = employed)
Note: Results adjust for nationalism and the White Identity × Patriotism interaction term, as well as our covariates.

**Figure 1.** Interactive effects of white identity and nationalism on multiculturalism support.

**Figure 2.** Interactive effects of white identity and patriotism on multiculturalism support.
As shown in Table 2, Model 1 reveals that participants who lived in urban settings and who were employed supported multiculturalism more than their counterparts who lived in rural settings and who were unemployed, respectively ($B = 0.21$, 95% CI [0.16, 0.27], $p < .001$ and $B = 0.09$, 95% CI [0.03, 0.15], $p = .003$, respectively). Also, education correlated positively ($B = 0.10$, 95% CI [0.09, 0.11], $p < .001$), but conservatism correlated negatively ($B = -0.25$, 95% CI [-0.27, -0.24], $p < .001$), with multiculturalism support. After adjusting for these key covariates, we found support for our hypotheses. Specifically, white identity ($B = -0.09$, 95% CI [-0.11, -0.08], $p < .001$) and nationalism ($B = -0.18$, 95% CI [-0.20, -0.16], $p < .001$) correlated negatively, whereas patriotism correlated positively ($B = 0.14$, 95% CI [0.12, 0.17], $p < .001$), with multiculturalism support.

Table 2 also displays our results for the predicted interactive effects of nationalism and patriotism on the negative association between white identity and multiculturalism support (see Model 2). As hypothesised, nationalism strengthened the negative association between white identity and multiculturalism support ($B = -0.02$, 95% CI [-0.04, -0.01], $p < .001$). Simple slope analyses at $\pm 1$ SD from the mean of nationalism demonstrated that the negative association between white identity and support for multiculturalism was nearly twice as strong at high ($B = -0.12$, 95% CI [-0.14, -0.10], $p < .001$) versus low ($B = -0.07$, 95% CI [-0.09, -0.05], $p < .001$) levels of nationalism (see Figure 1). Conversely, patriotism weakened the negative association between white identity and multiculturalism support ($B = 0.04$, 95% CI [0.02, 0.05], $p < .001$). Simple slope analyses at $\pm 1$ SD from the mean of patriotism revealed that the negative relationship between white identity and multiculturalism support was nearly half the size at high ($B = -0.06$, 95% CI [-0.08, -0.04], $p < .001$) relative to low ($B = -0.13$, 95% CI [-0.16, -0.11], $p < .001$) levels of patriotism (see Figure 2). Thus, consistent with our hypotheses, nationalism strengthened, whereas patriotism weakened, the negative association between white identity and multiculturalism support.

**DISCUSSION**

In light of the recent terrorist attack in Christchurch, it is important to understand the factors that influence white majority group members’ attitudes toward diversity, particularly in a nation where the demographics are changing rapidly (e.g., New Zealand). To these ends, the current study investigated the independent and interactive effects of white nationalism on support for multiculturalism—an issue central to the white nationalist ideology sweeping across the globe (see Bonikowski, 2016). Because a preference for group-based hierarchy underlies ethnic identification for high-status groups (Levin & Sidanius, 1999), we predicted that white identity would correlate negatively with multiculturalism support. The strength of this negative association should, however, depend on the type of attachment people have with their nation of residence. Given that nationalism reflects an uncritical belief in national superiority rooted in a preference for group-based hierarchy (Osborne et al., 2017; Sidanius et al., 1997), nationalism should strengthen the negative correlation between white identity and multiculturalism support. In contrast, patriotism captures a positive identification with one’s nation of residence, yet nevertheless recognises that the nation may be fallible in its pursuit to uphold democratic values (Blank & Schmidt, 2003). As such, patriotism should weaken the predicted negative correlation between white identity and support for multiculturalism.

As hypothesised, white identity and nationalism correlated negatively, but patriotism correlated positively, with multiculturalism support. But critically, the negative association between white identity and support for multiculturalism depended on the type of attachment people had with their nation of residence. As predicted, the negative association between white identity and multiculturalism support was nearly twice as strong for those high (versus low) on nationalism. Conversely, this same relationship was reduced by nearly half for those high (versus low) on patriotism. Together, these results highlight the harmful effects of white nationalism on support for diversity, and suggest that the ideology underlying the raft of alt-right violence sweeping across the globe is present—and impactful—in New Zealand.

**Strengths, Limitations, Implications, and Future Directions**

By assessing the independent and interactive effects of white identity and national attachment on multiculturalism support, the current study makes multiple contributions to the literature. For one, we provide one of the first investigations into white nationalism in New Zealand and show that ethno-national identities (at least partly) motivate opposition to ethnic and cultural diversity. In this sense, our results demonstrate that, despite its geographical isolation from the rest of the world, New Zealand is nonetheless susceptible to the same extremist beliefs that saw the rise of Donald Trump and Brexit (see Inglehart & Norris, 2016; Roy & McGowan, 2019, March 20; Wright, 2019, March 19). Accordingly, it is incumbent upon us, as a community, to recognise that these biases exist and to understand how white nationalism may influence our public discourse. Only by acknowledging that these prejudices exist and by recognising the potential threat this belief system holds for democracy can we begin to make New Zealand a safe place for the myriad ethnic and religious groups who call New Zealand home.

The current study also makes an important contribution to the literature on national attachment. Specifically, some have questioned the utility of treating nationalism as distinct from patriotism (e.g., Parker, 2010). While we have previously shown that nationalism and patriotism have separate antecedents (i.e., SDO has positive cross-lagged effects on both nationalism and patriotism, whereas RWA has positive cross-lagged effects on nationalism and patriotism, respectively; Osborne et al., 2017), the current study shows that these two types of national attachment also have separate consequences. Whereas nationalism correlated negatively with support for multiculturalism, patriotism fostered multiculturalism support. Together with other research conducted both locally (e.g., Greaves et al., 2017) and internationally (Blank & Schmidt, 2003; Li & Brewer, 2004; Spry & Hornsey, 2007), these results help to further differentiate nationalism from patriotism and validate their conceptual independence.

Although not the focus of this study, our results also identify numerous additional correlates of multiculturalism support. Consistent with research showing that conservative political views often correlate with opposition to minority rights (see Sears & Henry, 2005; Sidanius et al., 2008; Yogeeswaran, Verkuyten, Osborne, & Sibley, 2018), conservatism...
correlated negatively with support for multiculturalism. Indeed, conservatism was by far the strongest predictor in our model, demonstrating the symbolic nature of the multiculturalism debate. Nevertheless, education and employment status also correlated with multiculturalism support, indicating that those who are of low socioeconomic status may see multiculturalism as a threat to their (financial) wellbeing (Lane, 1962). Alternatively, it may be that education fosters democratic values of acceptance and appreciation of others (see Dee, 2004), providing a potential solution to intergroup intolerance. Likewise, consistent with the vast literature on the contact hypothesis (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Schmid, Al Ramiah, & Hewstone, 2014; Wagner, Christ, Pettigrew, Stellmacher, & Wolf, 2006), participants living in urban settings (i.e., neighbourhoods that are likely to be ethnically diverse) supported multiculturalism more than did whites living in rural areas where diversity is likely to be low. These latter potential interpretations of our data offer some hope for improving intergroup relations by suggesting that education and contact with minorities may increase New Zealand Europeans’ support for ethnic diversity.

Despite the strengths and implications of our results, it is important to note limitations to the current study. Given the cross-sectional nature of our study, inferences about the causal direction of these associations must be made with caution. That said, some longitudinal panel research reveals that nationalism and patriotism predict hostile intergroup attitudes over time, rather than vice versa (Wagner et al., 2012). Second, given our focus on white nationalism, we necessarily restricted our analyses to New Zealand Europeans. As such, our results cannot speak to the effects of ethnic identity on intergroup attitudes among minorities. Indeed, there are reasons to believe that our results would differ if we focused on minorities. For example, Osborne and colleagues (2019) reveal that, although ethnic identity correlates positively with collective action aimed at redressing inequality amongst minorities, whites’ ethnic identity predicts support for protests that seek to reinforce the status quo. That is, ethnic identity has different (and often opposing) political implications for ethnic minorities and whites. Thus, future research should investigate the extent to which our results differ for ethnic minorities in New Zealand.

We should also note that the associations observed in the current study were relatively small in magnitude. Indeed, a myriad of attitudes likely contribute to people’s views toward multiculturalism—white identity, nationalism, and patriotism only being part of a larger set of variables that correlate with multiculturalism support. Yet our results held after controlling for the most likely alternative explanations. That white identity, nationalism, and patriotism correlated with multiculturalism support after accounting for these other effects demonstrates the robustness of our findings. Still, future research should investigate other predictors of multiculturalism support alongside the variables tested here in order to replicate and extend our results (e.g., terrorism anxiety correlates negatively with warmth towards Muslims; see Hawi, Osborne, Bulbulia, & Sibley, 2019).

It is also important to note that we examined the negative impact of white nationalism on support for multiculturalism. As such, our results cannot directly speak to the motivations behind the terrorist attack in Christchurch, nor terrorism in general. Indeed, while opposition to immigration and other forms of multiculturalism is a main feature of the ideology behind white nationalism (Bonilla-Silva, 2000; Swain, 2002), we cannot, nor do we wish to, equate opposition to multiculturalism with support for terrorism. Future research must address this sensitive, albeit timely, topic.

Finally, the current study investigated the deleterious effects of white nationalism. Although this is necessary to increase understanding of how white nationalism may shape New Zealand politics in the years to come, it does little to explain why some New Zealand Europeans endorse such views. Accordingly, Sengupta, Osborne, and Sibley (in press) argued that nationalism may appeal to some members of ethnic majority groups because it offers a positive identity for those who think that their group is losing their relatively advantaged position in society. Indeed, others have noted that right-wing populist movements benefit from leaders who are able to transform whites’ objective structural advantage during times of prosperity into a narrative of (perceived) relative deprivation (e.g., Mols & Jetten, 2015). Accordingly, Marchlewksa, Cichocka, Panayiotou, Castellanos, and Batayneh (2018) show that collective narcissism about the greatness of one’s nation (i.e., arguably a form of nationalism) mediated the association between relative deprivation and support for both Brexit (Study 2) and Donald Trump (Study 3). Therefore, future research should investigate both the underlying reason(s) behind the rise in white nationalism and the consequences this alarming trend has on intergroup relations.

Conclusion

The terrorist attack on Christchurch’s Muslim community on 15 March 2019 shook the conscience of our nation and catapulted New Zealand into the international news cycle. Many openly pondered how such an atrocity could occur in an otherwise peaceful nation, whereas others noted that it was an all-too-painful reminder that racism is alive and well in New Zealand (Ryan, 2019, March 24). Regardless of the position one takes in this debate, it is impossible for us to carry on as things were before the attack—we are a nation forever changed by the vile hatred displayed towards our Muslim brothers and sisters on 15 March 2019.

The current study—and, indeed, the papers that comprise this special issue of New Zealand Journal of Psychology—sought to pay tribute to the Muslim community of New Zealand by attempting to answer a seemingly unanswerable question (namely, how could someone take the lives of 50 innocent people and injure 50 more?). While our results uncover the harmful effects of white nationalism on support for diversity, we also identify a potential solution to this problem. By emphasising the patriotic aspects of national attachment (i.e., a positive attachment to New Zealand that recognises its faults), white identity need not always conflict with the ideals of multiculturalism.
White nationalism and support for multiculturalism

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