Who are ‘we’? Implicit associations between ethnic and national symbols for Maori and Pakeha in New Zealand

Chris G. Sibley, University of Auckland
James H. Liu and Sammyh S. Khan, Victoria University of Wellington

Research examining how New Zealanders perceive their nation and its peoples remains scarce. The current study examined one specific aspect of such cognitions—that of the degree to which self-identified members of the Indigenous population (Maori) and New Zealanders of European descent (Pakeha) automatically perceive their own and each other’s language and peoples as belonging to the nation. We used reaction-time measures (the Implicit Association Test) administered to university undergraduate samples. Majority group members (Pakeha) showed minimal implicit ingroup biases, and perceived their own ingroup as belonging to the nation, while Maori peoples and culture, as equally representative of the nation. Minority group members (Maori), in contrast, perceived their ingroup as belonging to the nation, and as being more closely associated with representations of the nation. The answer to the question of who ‘we’ are then, is contingent upon ethnic group membership. These findings differ dramatically from theory and research from the United States, which predict that minority groups—especially minority groups such as Maori that are consistently disadvantaged according to national indicators of income and general well-being—should display outgroup biases at the implicit level.

In New Zealand, it seems that Maori culture helps to promote the positive distinctiveness of the nation on the world stage, and as our results suggest, Maori may therefore have considerable symbolic power to validate national identity for many majority group (Pakeha) New Zealanders.

“The era of the ethnically homogenous nation is over. Claim and counterclaim, articulation and debate are now part of the personal/political landscape of New Zealand. It is now more important than ever to describe who ‘we’ are and how we are to live our lives.” (Liu, McCleanor, McIntosh, & Teaiwa, 2005a, p. 11).

New Zealand (NZ) is relatively unique on the world stage. This is due in part to a political system that formally recognizes Maori (the Indigenous peoples of NZ) and non-Maori New Zealanders as distinct partners who share guardianship of many of NZ’s resources and ideally should contribute equally to its national identity and culture. The recognition of Maori as distinct partners arises from NZ’s unique historical and cultural context—a context that includes conflict between early European settlers and Maori, historical injustices experienced by Maori during both colonial and post-colonial periods of NZ’s history (see Liu, Wilson, McClure & Higgins, 1999), and the more recent recognition of contemporary claims for reparation based upon the Treaty of Waitangi.

Recent research suggests that these conditions have contributed to the development of a contemporary NZ society in which Maori culture is seen to have an important and unique role in the creation and definition of nationhood (Liu, 2005). Nevertheless, despite support for the symbolic contribution of Maori culture to New Zealand society (Sibley & Liu, 2004), there remain harsh disparities between Maori and Pakeha on most indicators of social and economic well-being. Maori, for example, form only 16% of the total population, but 50% of the prison population; Maori earn 16% less income, and their life expectancy is 8 years lower than other New Zealanders (The Social Report, 2005). As a consequence of these negative statistics, Maori are faced with a plethora of negative stereotypes in NZ society. And yet, prior research suggests that Maori and Pakeha are perceived by the majority group to have very similar strengths of implicit and explicit association with symbolic markers of national identity (Sibley & Liu, 2007).

There is a small but growing body of social science studies examining the construction of Maori identity, Pakeha identity, and New Zealand national identity (see Awaater, 1978; Borell, 2005; Campbell, 2004; Durie, 2003; Houkamau, 2006; McIntosh, 2005; Spoonley, MacPherson, & Pearson, 1984, 1996; Rata, Liu, & Hanke, in press; Vaughan, 1978; Walker, 1989, 1990; for important examples). Previous qualitative and the limited quantitative research in this area offer important insights into the content and construction of lived expressions of identity. However, both qualitative and quantitative research in this area
has focused on explicit, reasoned and deliberative expressions (see Liu, McCreanor, McIntosh, & Teaiwa, 2005b, for a review). Although such research is informative of people’s consciously held beliefs about who ‘we’ are as a nation (or at least those beliefs that people are willing to express), our understanding of implicit (or non-conscious) perceptions of nationalhood and the subjective belongingness of different ethnic groups to the nation remains limited (cf. Sibley & Liu, 2007; Sibley & Barlow, in press). Importantly, the attitudes and beliefs people express regarding questions of who belongs to the nation may differ dramatically from those held implicitly, as Devos and Banaji (2005) compellingly demonstrated in the United States (US).

The present research contributes to our understanding of ‘who we are’ and the cultural symbols that are seen to define ‘our’ nation by assessing people’s automatic perceptions of nationalhood in the NZ context. We adapt the design developed by Devos and Banaji (2005) to address one specific aspect of the question of who ‘we’ are posed by Liu et al. (2005a) in the opening quote—that of determining the degree to which Maori and Pakeha automatically perceive the nation as incorporating both Maori and European culture, symbols, and peoples. It is important to recognise at this point that we view Maori and Pakeha (or New Zealanders of European descent) as socially constructed identities rather than essentialised, biologically determined, immutable categories. Thus, our research examines the social cognitive processes underlying how people think about and associate attributes with socially constructed identities.

**Ethnic-national associations in the United States and Australia**

Devos and Banaji (2005) presented a series of studies examining the divergence between what people say (or explicitly rate) about who belongs in the US, and how people perceive belongingness at the implicit or non-conscious level of awareness. To assess implicit perceptions of belongingness, Devos and Banaji (2005) employed a version of the Implicit Association Test (IAT). The IAT is a computer-based reaction time task in which participants are required to match concepts from contrasting categories as quickly as possible (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). Interpretation of the IAT rests on the assumption that contrast categories are matched more quickly to the extent that they are more closely associated in the brain. Importantly, the measurement of implicit associations does not rely on participants’ motivation to respond honestly or even their conscious awareness of the associations that they hold. As Devos and Banaji (2005, p. 448) state, such associations “reflect the knowledge that an individual has acquired through repeated personal experience within a particular context” (see also Karpinski & Hilton, 2001).

Devos and Banaji (2005) reported that Americans implicitly perceived the US as monocultural. Using the IAT, they demonstrated that the national category ‘American’ was consistently more closely implicitly associated with cognitive representations of White people, be they faces of unfamiliar White Americans (relative to faces of unfamiliar African and Asian Americans), faces of famous White Athletes (relative to faces of famous African American athletes), or—compellingly—names of White actors known to be European (relative to names of Asian actors known to be American). In all instances, White American undergraduates responded more quickly when faces or names of White people were paired with symbols representing America. However, these same participants endorsed a more multicultural perspective when similar associations were assessed using explicit self-report (traditional Likert scale) measures. These results were observed using undergraduate students—a demographic that should arguably be more liberal and thus less likely to show such effects compared to members of the general population. As Devos and Banaji (2005) concluded, their findings indicate a considerable disjuncture between explicitly held discourses of equality in US society, where every US citizen is considered equal regardless of ethnicity, and more subtle implicit differences in the degree to which people of different ethnicities are seen as belonging to the nation.

The equation of American with White people is not limited to White Americans, however. Devos and Banaji (2005) reported that Asian American undergraduates expressed similar implicit biases, and viewed their own group as less American than Whites. There was a trend in their data suggesting that African American undergraduates may also have shown a slight implicit bias in favour of Whites. Thus, for both majority and minority groups in the US, it appears that White Americans form the prototypical exemplar of the national category “American.” Implicit representations of American = White are consistent with a System Justification Theory perspective (Jost & Banaji, 1994), which proposes that, like members of the majority group, members of disadvantaged groups have a fundamental (and often automatic) motivation to perceive the system as legitimate in order to reduce dissonance associated with their group’s lower status and power (Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, & Sullivan, 2003; see also Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). This often results in outgroup favoring attitudes, particularly at the implicit level, which may occur even when group boundaries are perceived as impermeable (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004).

One might argue that the American = White effects reported by Devos and Banaji (2005) could have differed had White targets been compared with Indigenous targets (American Indians). Importantly, recent research examining White Australian undergraduates indicates that a similar pattern of results occurs when comparisons are made between White Australians and Aboriginal Australians (the Indigenous peoples of Australia) (Sibley & Barlow, in press). In Australia, European Australian undergraduates implicitly associated their own ethnic group more closely with the concept of “Australians” relative to Aboriginal Australian targets. This effect, although significant, was somewhat weaker than that reported by Devos and Banaji (2005). The finding of a significant and relatively strong implicit pro-in-group bias in Australia is important theoretically because it indicates that the implicit preference of dominant relative to disadvantaged groups is not merely a function of differences in the Indigenous status of the disadvantaged group and is instead more likely to reflect differences.
in the extent to which minority or disadvantaged groups are symbolically represented in the nation (Sibley & Barlow, in press).

As both System Justification Theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994) and Social Dominance Theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) would predict, representations of American = White and Australian = White may help to promote and maintain hierarchically organized social structures, especially when they are consensually shared by both majority and minority group members. Under such conditions, appeals to national identity and values become synonymous with appeals to the identity and values of the dominant majority. As Devis and Banaji (2005) emphasized, such appeals may therefore function to reduce the opportunity of ethnic minority groups to contribute to concepts of national identity and nationhood (or in some cases marginalize or directly exclude such contributions). Consistent with predictions derived from the ingroup projection model (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999), these findings indicate that rather than representing an inclusive superordinate categorization, implicit representations of national identity in America and Australia may promote a form of exclusionary patriotism (although this trend was attenuated for African Americans in the US) (see also Sidanius & Petrocik, 2001). In addition to exclusion from representations of nationhood on the basis of observable characteristics of the individual, such as skin colour; it seems equally likely that minority groups might also be excluded from representations of the nation across a range of other characteristics, including cultural practices and arts, as these also constitute important signifiers of group membership.

The New Zealand context

What of the NZ context? Which ethnic group(s) and whose cultural practices, language, and other social idioms are perceived as most representative of NZ? Assessed at the explicit level, NZ, Australia and the US hold similar generalized ideals and values. NZ, like the US and Australia, holds liberal democratic values anchored in the ideals of Freedom and Equality as central to defining nationhood (see Liu, 2005; Sibley & Wilson, 2007, for discussion). NZ was the first country in the world to introduce universal suffrage, was one of the first welfare states, and New Zealanders have a tradition of protest against anti-egalitarian regimes. Consistent with research conducted in the US (e.g., Citrin, Haas, Muste, & Reingold, 1994), recent NZ research shows that values such as ‘treating all people of all races equally’, ‘being tolerant of other cultures’, and ‘respecting other ethic groups’ are rated by Pakeha as among the most important features defining what it means to be a ‘true’ New Zealander (Sibley, Hooe, & Liu, 2008). Indeed, Pakeha rank such features as more central to defining ‘New Zealandness’ than more objective characteristics such as having been born in NZ, lived in NZ for most of one’s life, or even being able to speak English.

However, much like the majority (White) group in the US and Australia, Pakeha also tend to embrace an ideology of equality as meritocracy, whereby everyone is construed as being equal in terms of opportunity in the here and now, regardless of ethnicity and the historical conditions experienced by one’s ethnic group (Kirkwood, Liu, & Weatherall, 2005; Sibley & Wilson, 2007; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). Pakeha express opposition toward resource-based social policies to redress material disadvantages at the group-level like affirmative action on the basis that to do so is unfair to the majority group because it violates principles of meritocracy framed as deservingness at the individual level (Sibley & Liu, 2004; Sibley, Liu, & Kirkwood, 2006; Sibley & Wilson, 2007). The positioning of “affirmative action” as “preferential treatment” is used to legitimate opposition toward policies that promote increased social equality (Sibley et al., 2006; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). When it comes to the discursive positioning of the material or resource-specific policies, then, it seems that NZ, like the US and Australia, is a nation in which ethnicity is purposefully unmarked by the dominant group. As various authors have argued, this clearly suits the dominant majority group because such an ideological form of “meritocracy” helps to maintain the actual social hierarchy of inequality (Sibley et al., 2006; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Sidanius & Petrocik, 2001; Wetherell & Potter, 1992).

NZ, however, differs quite dramatically from the US and Australia in the historical context of intergroup relations between Indigenous New Zealanders (Maori) and more recent immigrants (primarily European settlers) (Liu et al., 1999). NZ is a formally bicultural nation, which incorporates many aspects of both Maori and NZ European (or Pakeha) culture into national iconography. For instance, the NZ national anthem is sung in both English and Maori, many Pakeha wear Maori bone carvings when travelling overseas, and the label ‘Pakeha’, which is often used to refer to New Zealanders of European descent, is itself a Maori term. Indeed, the Maori language is formally recognized as an official language of the nation (along with English and sign language). Maori culture and arts are also widely employed to represent NZ overseas, with movies such as Whale Rider (set in a small Maori community) achieving international acclaim. In this respect, NZ is unique among Anglo settler states, and as Sibley and Liu (2004) have argued, this unique sociocultural context creates important psychological differences in how many New Zealanders think about and represent the social groups within their nation symbolically.

Previous qualitative research, for instance, suggests that in addition to expressions of equality-as-meritocracy, Pakeha ‘race’ talk also contains strong and persistent themes of biculturalism in principle. This theme emphasizes that aspects of both Maori and Pakeha/European culture should contribute equally to NZ national identity, and thus to what it means to be (symbolically) a New Zealander (Sibley & Liu, 2004; Sibley et al., 2006). These observations are also supported by self-report attitudinal research using both student and general population samples, which indicates that there is substantial support for the incorporation of Maori values and culture into mainstream (primarily Pakeha) NZ culture and national identity (Liu & Sibley, 2006; Sibley, Liu, Duckitt, & Khan, 2008; Sibley, Robertson, & Kirkwood, 2005; Sibley, Wilson, & Robertson, 2007).
There is considerable appeal in symbolic forms of biculturalism from the majority perspective because Maori culture is viewed as helping to define the culture of NZ in a positively distinct way (e.g., Liu, 2005; Liu & Sibley, 2006; Sibley & Liu, 2007). Without Maori, NZ culture would simply be a colonial derivative of Great Britain. The adoption of symbolic aspects of Maori culture allows Pakeha to promote positive distinctiveness for NZ identity on the world stage. However, it is difficult for Pakeha to claim bicultural heritage unilaterally; this must also be acknowledged by Maori. Liu (2005) refers to this as a system of checks and balances where Maori, the disadvantaged minority in terms of realistic resources, have symbolic power over the majority because they have the ability to validate key aspects of national identity. The need for positive distinctiveness of national identity provided by Maori culture and symbols may explain why indices of what Stephan and Stephan (2000) refer to as symbolic and realistic threat tend to be more weakly correlated in NZ than in other countries, such as the US (Sibley & Liu, 2004).

In contrast to the distinctiveness of Maori culture, the vast majority of symbols derived from Pakeha/NZ European culture are not recognizably unique to NZ. This is true of many domains, including the two sets of cultural symbols used to examine implicit perceptions in the present research: Faces of self-identified Maori versus Pakeha and common Maori words versus their approximate English Equivalents. The English language is spoken in many countries, and the faces of Pakeha New Zealanders do not have any unique characteristics that categorically distinguish them from White Europeans in many other nations, such as England, Australia, or the US. Maori cultural symbols, in contrast, are unique to NZ. Maori language is indigenous to NZ and is not an officially recognized national language anywhere else in the world. Claims made by Pakeha positioning Maori culture and peoples as distinctly representative of New Zealand as a whole are also readily apparent. The Haka, which is performed by the All Blacks before the start of all international rugby games played, is distinctively NZ, as are Maori art forms.

In sum, we argue that the motivation to maintain a positively distinct national identity should cause Pakeha to exhibit not only a minimal ingroup bias when associating symbolic aspects of Maori and Pakeha ethnic identity with concepts of NZ. To the extent that the ethnicity IAT developed by Devos and Banaji (2005) assesses representations of the symbolic (rather than realistic) contribution of different ethnic groups to the national charter (Liu & Hilton, 2005), we posit that the strong and consistent pro-majority ethnic-national associations observed in the US and Australia should be little in evidence in NZ. In an initial test of this possibility, Sibley and Liu (2007) adapted the design employed by Devos and Banaji (2005) to examine the strength of implicit associations between symbols of NZ (e.g., Maps of NZ, the silver fern, a symbol representing a Kiwi) and faces of self-identified Pakeha or Maori New Zealanders. Results indicated that the strong and consensual association between the majority (White) ethnic group and the nation exhibited in the US by Devos and Banaji (2005) and in recent Australian research by Sibley and Barlow (in press) were little in evidence in NZ amongst Pakeha undergraduates. Instead, Sibley and Liu (2007) reported that Pakeha participants tended to associate both Maori and Pakeha relatively equally with symbols of nationhood. This was in marked contrast, however, to perceptions of the belongingness of Asian New Zealanders, who were perceived as far less associated with concepts of NZ in comparison to both Pakeha and Maori. This pattern of associations was also shared by Maori participants who, like Pakeha, perceived both their own ingroup and Pakeha as more strongly representative of NZ than Asian New Zealanders. These findings indicate that Pakeha and Maori may form dual prototypical exemplars of the national category. At the symbolic level of ethnic-national associations for the majority group, this suggests that to be perceived as Pakeha or Maori is to be perceived equally as belonging to New Zealand at the symbolic level.

What of the implicit perceptions of Maori participants? We argue that it is consistent with Pakeha interests to integrate symbols of Maori culture within representations of the national category. The same reasoning does not necessarily apply to Maori. Contrary to System Justification Theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994), which posits that minority groups typically display implicit (or non-conscious) outgroup favoritism, we argue that the NZ sociocultural context creates a unique environment in which Maori should implicitly equate symbols of their own ethnic group and culture as being more strongly associated with NZ than symbols of Pakeha/European culture.

Maori culture is unique to NZ, whereas markers of European/Pakeha culture (such as language) are far less so. Common Maori symbols are cognitively accessible and widely employed to represent the nation in many domains, ranging from sport, tourism, arts and movies, to street signs and place names. Moreover, a robust anti-colonial movement is actively engaged in the process of articulating resistance to the dominant group’s efforts to maintain their hegemony over wealth and other material resources (see Awatere, 1974; Cram & Nairn, 1993; McCreanor, 2005; Rata et al., under review; Walker, 1990). Educated Maori have become acutely aware of the failure of Pakeha formulations of biculturalism to live up to their promise. They have been active and forceful in their demands for a greater share of power and resources in defining the national identity and its obligations. The separation between biculturalism in principle and resource-based biculturalism that is so comforting for Pakeha has little appeal for Maori, and indeed may be regarded as an ongoing form of colonization (see Rata et al., under review).

In such conditions, where symbols of the minority group identity are (a) cognitively accessible, (b) consensually shared by both the majority and minority group in question, (c) actively being produced in an anti-hegemonic way by the minority group and its allies, and (d) attributed a unique value in positively defining national culture by national-level institutions (including government), we argue that the minority group should be more likely to equate symbolic markers of their ethnic group with the nation than the dominant...
group.

For Pakeha, positive distinctiveness at the national level means the incorporation of symbols derived from Maori culture. Conversely, Pakeha culture may do little to promote the positive distinctiveness of NZ national identity for Maori peoples, however. For Maori, positive distinctiveness of both nationality and ethnicity means the elevation of their own cultural symbols. Such a pattern should contribute to an unambiguous favoring of ethnic ingroup symbols as part of the national identity, and may be typical of dominant ethnic groups in most countries.

The present research

The present research extends prior work in the area of implicit perceptions of nationhood by focusing in detail on similarities and differences in the perceptions of Maori and Pakeha participants' implicit perceptions. We administered two different IATs. One IAT assessed ethnic-national associations using faces of self-identified Maori and Pakeha New Zealanders to represent these two groups (as employed by both Devos & Banaji, 2005, and Sibley & Liu, 2007). A second IAT, newly developed for the present research, assessed the degree to which another important signifier of ethnic identity and culture, that of language, was associated with the national category. This language IAT employed common Maori words (e.g., Mana, Kia Ora) and similar English equivalents (e.g., Honor, Hello) to assess contrasting associations between these two categories and symbols of nationhood. Language is important for defining peoples. The Social Report (2006, p. 81), for instance, considered knowledge of Maori language as an important indicator of Maori cultural identity and "...a necessary skill for full participation in Maori society".

Consistent with our earlier research on implicit associations using faces of Maori and Pakeha (i.e., Sibley & Liu, 2007), we hypothesized that Pakeha would display minimal implicit ingroup biases in the automatic association for both types of associations. Moreover, we predicted that results across these two domains should be strongly positively correlated and yield similar patterns of results, as both IATs assessed related aspects of a generalized representation of the degree to which Maori and Pakeha/European peoples and cultural and ethnic symbols are encoded in cognitive representations of the nation.

We hypothesized that Maori participants should display a different pattern of implicit associations, because they do not need to rely on Pakeha for cultural distinctiveness, and they have good reason to mistrust the promises of national unity formulated by Pakeha. In contrast to Pakeha, for whom we argue the inclusion of symbolic aspects of Maori culture may provide a mechanism for achieving positive distinctiveness of NZ identity, we hypothesized that Maori undergraduate students would display strong and significant automatic ingroup biases. Maori participants should implicitly perceive the nation as being more centrally associated with members of their own ethnic group and common cultural icons than members of the majority ethnic group or the majority group's (European) language and culture.

Method

Participants

Participants were 64 NZ-born undergraduate psychology students who received partial course credit for participation. Forty-two participants self-identified their ethnicity as "NZ European/Pakeha" and 22 participants self-identified with the term "Maori". Participants (22 males and 42 females) ranged from 18-43 years of age (M = 21.11, SD = 4.19). Importantly, this sample of self-identified NZ European/Pakeha and Maori participants did not differ significantly in age ($F(1,62) = .22, p = .64, \text{partial } \eta^2 < .01$) or gender ($\chi^2(1, n = 64) = .27, p = .58$). Note that we use the term Maori term Pakeha when referring to participants who were New Zealanders of European descent (i.e., those who self-identified as NZ European/Pakeha). It should be recognized that this does not imply that the participants themselves identified as Pakeha, rather they indicated that their ethnic group by selecting the term NZ European/Pakeha in our survey.

Stimuli

Two versions of Devos and Banaji's (2005) ethnic-national IAT were employed: a Face IAT and a Language IAT. The Face IAT was identical to that used by Sibley and Liu (2007), and assessed the implicit association between head and shoulder photos of Pakeha targets (relative to Maori targets) and symbols of NZ (relative to foreign symbols). The Language IAT assessed the implicit association between English words (relative to approximately equivalent Maori words) and symbols of NZ (relative to foreign symbols).

The Face IAT used black-and-white head-and-shoulder photos of Pakeha and Maori targets employed by Sibley and Liu (2007). Six faces (3 men, 3 women) were used to represent each ethnic category. These faces have been previously validated for use in NZ by Sibley and Liu (2007), who reported that the faces were rated as displaying neutral facial expressions, as being of mid-to-late twenties in age, and as being easily recognizable and relatively prototypical examples of NZ-born members of their respective ethnic groups by independent groups of both Pakeha and Maori participants. All faces were 52 mm wide × 68 mm high.

The Language IAT contrasted six commonly known Maori words with their approximate English equivalents (shown in Table 1). These words were selected using two criteria: (a) they were relatively well known words that are commonly used in NZ spoken and written language (thus, these words should be highly cognitively accessible), and (b) they had clear approximate English equivalents that were of a similar number of letters (+ 2 letters), as determined by the Reed concise Maori dictionary (Reed, 2001). The words used in this research were validated using an independent sample of 100 self-identified Pakeha/NZ European undergraduate psychology students. As shown in Table 1, results from this validation sample indicated that the all six words used in this research were recognized and could be defined by a high percentage of Pakeha students.

Both IATs used the NZ and foreign symbols developed by Sibley and Liu (2007) as adapted from Devos and Banaji (2005). Six full color symbols were used to represent NZ: green and grey maps of NZ, a picture of a Kiwi
with the letters ‘NZ’ embossed below, a silver fern on a black background, a made in NZ logo, and the NZ flag. The concept ‘foreign’ was represented using four of the symbols developed by Devos and Banaji (2005): a modified version of the Kiribati flag, the Flemish version, two 90° rotated maps of Luxembourg (colored green and grey), and two additional stimuli developed by Sibley and Liu (2007): a silhouette of a fish and bird on a black and white background, and a picture of a small boat surrounded by a yellow circle on a blue background. These stimuli have been validated for use in the NZ context by Sibley and Liu (2007), who reported that an independent group of participants easily categorized the 6 NZ and 6 foreign symbols into their correct categories. Symbols ranged from 62 mm wide × 82 mm high to 64 mm wide × 44 mm wide in size.

Procedure

Participants completed the Face and Language IATs in counterbalanced orders. Consistent with Sibley and Liu (2007), participants were shown copies of the symbols and words used in the study before completing the IATs. All participants easily categorized the symbols and words into their correct categories. Participants were explicitly told that all faces were of people born in NZ who self-identified as members of their respective ethnic group, and that the study examined how quickly people could categorize these different symbols and faces. IATs were administered using PCs running Inquisit (Draine, 1998), and followed the standard procedure developed by Greenwald et al. (1998). There was a 20 minute break between each IAT, during which participants completed a brief measure of demographics and controlled filler tasks.

Each IAT consisted of seven blocks. The stimuli contained in each block were presented in a random order and displayed in the middle of the computer screen. If participants pressed the wrong response key (e.g., categorizing a foreign symbol as NZ) then a red “X” was displayed below, and participants were required to press the correct key to complete that trial. Response times were recorded from the onset of when a stimulus was displayed to when it was correctly classified using the appropriate response key. Each trial was separated by a 400-ms inter-trial interval. To encourage participants to respond quickly, median reaction time and percentage of errors were displayed after each block.

In the Face IAT, for example, the first block consisted of 25 practice trials during which participants used separate response keys (“d” and “k”) to sort faces from two ethnic groups (e.g., Pakeha vs. Maori) into their respective categories. In the Language IAT, participants completed 25 trials during which they categorized English and Maori words into their respective categories. The second block in both IATs consisted of a further 25 practice trials, during which participants used these same two response keys to categorize NZ and foreign symbols into categories as quickly as possible.

The third and fourth blocks alternately presented national symbols and Maori and Pakeha faces for the Face IAT or national symbols and Maori and English words for the Language IAT. These two blocks consisted of 25 and 40 trials, respectively. The fifth block then re-trained participants to use the alternate response keys when categorizing faces (or words). Following the recommendations of Nosek, Greenwald, and Banaji (2005), the number of practice trials included in this block was increased to 60 in order to reduce potential order effects. Finally, the sixth and seventh blocks swapped the pairing of stimuli administered in blocks three and four, so that in the Face IAT for example, Maori faces and NZ symbols were categorized using one response key, and Pakeha faces and foreign symbols were categorized using one response key. These two blocks consisted of 25 and 40 trials, respectively. The order of the pairings presented in blocks 3 and 4, and blocks 6 and 7 were counterbalanced within each IAT, and randomized across IATs.

The category labels “NEW ZEALAND SYMBOLS” and “FOREIGN SYMBOLS” were used to describe these two categories of stimuli. The category labels “NZ European faces” and “NZ Maori faces” were used to describe categories of faces in the Face IAT. The category labels “English words” and “Maori words” were used to describe these two categories. Relevant category labels were displayed at the top of the screen during each trial to indicate the requested pairing. We chose

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maori</th>
<th>Approx. English equivalent</th>
<th>% word recognition</th>
<th>% word definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kia ora</td>
<td>Hello</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whanau</td>
<td>Family</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kai</td>
<td>Food</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mana</td>
<td>Honour</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wahine</td>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waka</td>
<td>Canoe</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. These estimates are based on an independent sample of 100 self-identified Pakeha/NZ European undergraduate students.
to use the category label "NZ European faces" rather than a label such as "NZ Pakeha faces" in the Face IAT because research indicates that the majority of New Zealanders of European descent prefer this term (Liu et al., 1999).

Data analysis

IAT reaction time data was analyzed following the recommendations outlined by Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003). Trials with latencies > 10,000 milliseconds (ms) were deleted. No participants responded quicker than 300 ms on more than 10% of trials. An index of effect size (IAT D) was created separately for the Face and Language IATs by first calculating the differences between blocks 6 and 3, and blocks 7 and 4 within each IAT, dividing these two difference scores by their pooled standard deviation, and then averaging these two scores. Thus, IAT D provides an estimate of the relative difference between the two pairing conditions (Maori faces + NZ symbols – Pakeha faces + NZ symbols in the Face IAT; Maori words + NZ symbols – English words + NZ symbols in the Language IAT) adjusted for differences in the underlying variability of responses within that IAT (see Greenwald et al., 2003, for further details).

Consistent with Sibley and Liu (2007), the IAT D effect was scored so that larger (positive) values represented stronger implicit associations between Pakeha faces + NZ (relative to Maori faces), and English words + NZ (relative to Maori words). Larger negative values, in contrast, represented stronger implicit associations between Maori faces + NZ (relative to Pakeha faces), and Maori words + NZ (relative to English words). A score of 0 would indicate that participants responded equally quickly to both sets of pairings within an IAT, and hence that both categories (e.g., Pakeha and Maori faces) were equally associated with symbols of NZ.

Results

IAT D effects for the Face and Language IATs were strongly positively correlated (r(62) = .59, p < .01), suggesting that these two IATs were assessing a similar underlying implicit association between aspects of ethnicity and nationhood.

ANOVAs examining differences between Pakeha and Maori participants’ Face and Language IAT D scores indicated that, as hypothesized, Maori and Pakeha participants differed significantly in their scores on both the Face IAT ($F(1,62) = 5.45, p = .02$, partial $\eta^2 = .08$) and Language IAT ($F(1,62) = 11.61, p < .01$, partial $\eta^2 = .16$). As shown in Figure 1, these significant effects occurred because, for both the Face and Language IATs, Maori participants displayed a strong pro-ingroup implicit association in which they reacted more quickly when pairing Maori faces and Maori words with symbols of NZ relative to Pakeha faces and approximate English equivalent words, respectively. Pakeha participants, in contrast, displayed far weaker pro-ingroup associations between Pakeha faces and English words with symbols of NZ.

One-sample t-tests testing whether Face and Language IAT D scores for each ethnic group differed significantly from 0 supported this interpretation (recall that a score of 0 would indicate that participants responded equally quickly to both sets of pairings within an IAT, and hence that both categories (e.g., Pakeha and Maori faces) were equally associated with symbols of NZ).

Examining scores for the Face IAT, results indicated that self-identified Pakeha participants did not differ in their reaction time when pairing Pakeha Faces and NZ symbols using a single response key ($M = 681$ ms) and when pairing Maori faces and NZ symbols using a single response key ($M = 693$ ms). A one-sample t-test indicated that this IAT D effect ($M_{obs} = .02, SD_{obs} = .45$) did not differ significantly from 0 ($t(41) = .25, p = .81$, Cohen’s $d = .04$). Maori participants, in contrast, reacted significantly more quickly when pairing Maori faces and NZ symbols using a single response key ($M = 654$ ms) than when pairing Pakeha faces and NZ symbols using a single response key ($M = 702$ ms). A one-sample t-test indicated that this IAT D effect ($M_{obs} = - .26, SD_{obs} = .44$) was significantly different from 0 ($t(21) = -2.75, p = .01$, Cohen’s $d = .59$).

The Language IAT yielded a similar pattern of results. Pakeha participants did not differ in their reaction time when pairing English words and NZ symbols using a single response key ($M = 676$ ms) and when pairing Maori words and NZ symbols using a single response key ($M = 718$ ms). A one sample t-test indicated that this IAT D effect ($M_{obs} = -.32, SD_{obs} = .54$) did not differ significantly from 0 ($t(41) = 1.59, p = .12$, Cohen’s $d = .24$). Maori participants, in contrast, reacted significantly more quickly when pairing Maori words and NZ symbols using a single response key ($M = 644$ ms) than when pairing English words and NZ symbols using a single response key ($M = 719$ ms). A one sample t-test indicated that this IAT D effect ($M_{obs} = -.32, SD_{obs} = .44$) was significantly different from 0 ($t(21) = -3.44, p < .01$, Cohen’s $d = .73$).

Discussion

The present study used a reaction time task to examine the implicit (or automatic) associations people hold about nationhood and Maori-Pakeha relations in NZ. Using the IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998), we examined the degree to which self-identified Pakeha and Maori undergraduate students automatically equated the nation with symbols from their own ethnic group. At the unconscious level, Pakeha undergraduates associated faces of both their own ingroup (other Pakeha) and faces of Maori as belonging equally to the nation. A comparable trend was observed when examining automatic associations between nationhood and common and well known Maori words that form part of the nation’s lexicon. Pakeha undergraduate students automatically associated common Maori words (such as Kia Ora, Mana, and Whanau) with symbols of NZ to a similar degree to their approximate English equivalents (Hello, Honor, and Family). These findings suggest that across domains of both ethnicity and language, members of the majority group in NZ implicitly perceive the nation as incorporating aspects of both Pakeha/European and Maori peoples and common cultural icons in the form of words.

Maori undergraduate students, in contrast, displayed significant automatic pro-ingroup biases on these same measures of implicit association. Although these analyses were based on a relatively small sample ($n = 22$), strong and reliable effects were observed. Maori participants automatically associated
faces of other Maori as being more strongly associated with NZ than faces of Pakeha (who were of a similar age and gender, and had comparable neutral facial expressions). Likewise, Maori participants automatically associated common Maori words as being more strongly linked with concepts of NZ than approximate English equivalents. Across domains of both ethnicity and language, these results indicate that Maori undergraduates implicitly perceived the nation as being more centrally associated with members of their own ethnic group and common cultural icons compared to members of the majority ethnic group or the majority group’s (European) language and culture.

The strong positive correlation ($r = .59$) and comparable results observed using both face- and language-based stimuli suggests that the Face and Language IATs assessed a similar underlying (or latent) implicit construct. This construct likely reflects a generalized representation of the degree to which Maori and Pakeha/European peoples and cultural and ethnic symbols are perceived as belonging to the nation, which we speculate forms the basis for a generalized implicit attitude toward the symbolic aspects of biculturalism in NZ. Language in the form of familiar, simple words known by both groups provides a cultural marker that is clearly symbolic (rather than resource-specific). Explicit attitudes toward the incorporation Maori language in schools, and singing the national anthem in both Maori and English, for example, both load strongly on a single dimension along with other items assessing attitudes toward the symbolic aspects of biculturalism (Sibley & Liu, 2004; Sibley et al., 2005; Sibley et al., 2007).

Thus, the present research indicates that the majority ethnic group in NZ automatically incorporates symbolic aspects of both Maori and European culture in cognitive representations of nationhood. This seemingly bold claim should be interpreted with the important (and deliberate) caveat that our research focused on markers that we argue reflect a symbolic (rather than a resource-specific) representation of the nation. As we have argued previously, there is considerable appeal in symbolic forms of biculturalism from the majority perspective because Maori culture is viewed as helping to define the culture of NZ in a positively distinct way (Liu & Sibley, 2006; Sibley & Liu, 2007).

Research assessing the implicit ethnic-national associations of majority group members in NZ contrasts dramatically with results from similar ethnic-national associations conducted in the US and Australia. As mentioned earlier, Devos and Banaji (2005) reported that White American undergraduate students showed strong and consistent implicit associations between faces of White Americans and American symbols relative to faces of both African and Asian Americans. Furthermore, analyses of African American undergraduates...
showed a slight, although non-significant outgroup (American = White) bias.

Devos and Banaji (2005, p. 457) argued that the persistent American = White effect observed in their research reflected “sociocultural realities that have contributed to asymmetries in power, resources, and status between ethnic groups [in the US].” Ethnic group relations in NZ are also characterized by considerable differences in observed indicators of power, resources, and status: Maori are disadvantaged relative to Pakeha on most indicators of social and economic well-being. However, in NZ unlike in the US, the majority group automatically attributed markers of their own ingroup and the Maori outgroup as having a similar contribution and association with NZ culture and hence national identity. And, moreover, Maori display strong ingroup favoritism when linking their culture with concepts of NZ. As Sibley and Liu (2007) commented, this suggests that implicit ethnic and cultural associations with concepts of nationhood assessed in the present research are not based primarily on asymmetries of power and wealth. Moreover, such associations are not, as the US case might suggest, based on immutable socio-historical circumstances, but rather the social construction of nationhood in contemporary times.

In the NZ context, we argue that the present findings are a reflection of the slow progression toward a bicultural narrative of ethnic group relations in NZ. This bicultural narrative has emerged as a viable (though frequently contested) ideology organising the symbolic aspects of national identity (Liu, 2005; Orange, 2004). The Treaty of Waitangi, for example, is central and prominent in institutions ranging from the national museum to educational curricula in public schools. As Sibley and Liu (2004; Liu & Sibley, 2006) have demonstrated, there is a clear distinction between the implications of biculturalism at the symbolic level (which most Pakeha support) and the implications of bicultural policy at the resource-specific level (to which Pakeha employ elaborate repertoires when expressing opposition).

This distinction between the symbolic and resource-specific is more blurred when one considers race relations in the US, however. Measures of symbolic and realistic threat in the US have been shown to positively correlate at around $r = .70$ in the US (Stephan et al., 2002). Meta-analysis of NZ research reported by Sibley et al. (2008), in contrast, suggests that attitudes toward symbolic and realistic outcomes of bicultural policy form clearly distinct dimensions and are only moderately correlated at $r = .42$ in Pakeha samples. Thus, although the Face IAT developed by Devos and Banaji (2005) may have assessed attitudes toward symbolic aspects of ethnic-national association in the US, their results likely mirrored those that would be observed had an IAT been employed that directly assessed realistic aspects of ethnic-national association. Unlike in NZ, in the US it appears that questions of ‘who’ belongs (and resulting ethnic-national associations) are more closely entwined with issues of realistic threat, such as the distribution of power, status, and resources.

The finding that Maori display stronger pro-ingroup biases in the association between the nation and markers of ingroup culture is also at odds with the majority of research conducted in the US and elsewhere. We argue that the strong and consensual support for the incorporation of symbolic aspects of Maori culture observed in previous research (c.g., Liu & Sibley, 2006; Sibley & Liu, 2004; Sibley et al., 2006) arises from the motivation of Pakeha to promote positive distinctiveness at the national level of comparison. This has created a unique sociocultural environment which produces dramatically different patterns of implicit or automatic associations between markers of minority group culture and symbols of nationhood than would be predicted on the basis of research conducted in other nations. NZ is fortunate not to be under any realistic threats from other nations, giving it the luxury to attempt to create an inclusive sense of nationhood. Because of NZ’s status as a recent former colony of Great Britain, the dominant majority lacks symbols that are positively distinct in an international context, whereas Maori culture and symbols are unique and positive to NZ.

Caveats and future research

The present research used reaction-time based measures to examine automatic cognitive representations of nationhood. These tests were administered in carefully controlled laboratory conditions. Given the time consuming and intensive nature of this research design, we relied on an undergraduate student sample who were awarded partial course credit for participation. As such, our results cannot be considered representative of the general NZ population. However, when demographic characteristics such as gender and age were entered as covariates, Maori and Pakeha participants continued to differ significantly in their scores on both the Face IAT ($F(1,60) = 4.72, p = .03, partial \eta^2 = .07$) and Language IAT ($F(1,60) = 11.91, p < .01, partial \eta^2 = .17$). Maori continued to link faces of their ingroup and words from the Maori language more closely with concepts of nationhood, whereas Pakeha participants continued to show minimal ingroup preferences after controlling for demographic factors.

More generally, the findings of strong and significant pro-ingroup ethnic-national associations for Maori, but minimal and non-significant pro-ingroup associations for Pakeha, are particularly impressive given that data from a larger number of Pakeha (relative to Maori) were included in the analysis. The increased degrees of freedom for analyses of the Pakeha sample naturally made it more likely for smaller effect sizes to reach statistical significance for this ethnic group—a threshold which analyses of the Pakeha sample nevertheless did not achieve. In order to remain consistent with Devos and Banaji (2005) we also included the NZ Flag as one of the stimuli representing the category of ‘NZ’. One could argue that the NZ Flag is a primarily European symbol, given its association with the British Commonwealth, and as such its inclusion might have exerted a small effect that artificially heightened the Pakeha-NZ ethnic-national association. Regardless of the possible biasing effect of this specific stimulus, we nevertheless observed strong implicit pro-ingroup ethnic-national associations for Maori but not for Pakeha.

The automatic inclusion of both
Maori and Pakeha ethnic groups and cultural symbols with concepts of nationhood, combined with the high levels of support for the symbolic aspects of biculturalism in principle, has implications for understanding psychological perceptions of the legitimacy of claims that involve the redistribution of resources. At the minimum, our results emphasize that Maori are in a relatively unique position to contribute to representations of national identity. How increased acceptance of resource-specific claims amongst the majority ethnic group (Pakeha) is achieved will undoubtedly depend upon the manner in which political discourse frames and contrasts the symbolic and resource-specific aspects of biculturalism and bicultural policy (Sibley et al., 2006; Sibley & Liu 2007).

On the one hand, support for the symbolic principles of biculturalism may function as a mechanism to then legitimate opposition toward material claims for reparation, in much the same way that it is theorized that seemingly positive stereotypes of a group on one primary evaluative domain (e.g., warmth or friendliness) legitimate negative stereotypes on other key evaluative dimensions (e.g., incompetence) (Fiske, Xu, Cuddy, & Glick, 1999). As Green (2006, p. 4.2), for example, argued in a commentary of Liu and Sibley (2006), “...valuing Maori heritage may in some cases merely depict the current trend of superficial idealization of the exotic and primitive (e.g., Said, 1978).” On the other hand, the inclusion of Maori culture and values into the national category may also provide Maori with considerable symbolic power. If framed appropriately, emphasis of the symbolic might provide a mechanism through which to increase support for resource-specific bicultural policy—particularly amongst Pakeha for whom the inclusion of Maori culture in representations of nationhood fulfills a need for positive distinctiveness of national identity. Identifying and determining how such framing effects might operate and be used to influence public opinion is an important goal for future research.

Given that Maori and Pakeha are both seen (at least by Pakeha) as representing the national category, the ingroup projection model (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999) would predict that both groups should be evaluated in a similarly positive fashion. This seems to be the case with regard to certain evaluative dimensions relating to symbolic representations of Maori (Sibley & Liu, 2004). Maori, however, are still subject to considerable negative 'modern racist' evaluations relating to power, status and resource-allocation in political discourse. For instance, Jackson and Fischer (2007) recently reported that although Pakeha undergraduates rated a high achieving Maori job applicant more favorably than a similar Pakeha applicant, this trend was reversed when evaluating less qualified Maori candidates. In their low merit condition, participants recommended a lower salary and evaluated a Maori candidate more negatively than a comparable (low merit) Pakeha candidate. How might these diverging findings between symbolic and resource-specific attitudes be reconciled in light of the NZ = bicultural effect exhibited by Pakeha undergraduates in the present research?

We suggest that the national group prototype might be evaluated along two (or perhaps more) dimensions: one symbolically based (which might relate to stereotyped evaluations of warmth), and another relating to status and resource rights (which might relate to stereotyped evaluations of competence). Following Mummendey and Wenzel (1999), outgroups may be more or less positively evaluated along key dimensions depending upon the specific prototype characteristics (symbolic, resource-specific) upon which comparisons with the inclusive category are based. Thus, although the available evidence suggests that Maori and Pakeha are seen as contributing to symbolic aspects of the national prototype by the majority European/Pakeha group, we suspect that material or resource-specific aspects of the national prototype will be more strongly associated with representations of the social category European/White.

Conclusion

We began this article with a quote emphasizing the importance of describing who ‘we’ are as New Zealanders. The current paper used advanced socio-cognitive measures to address one specific aspect of this issue—that of the degree to which Maori and Pakeha automatically represent the nation in terms of both Maori and Pakeha/European culture, language, symbols, and peoples. Our results indicated that the implicit perceptions of Maori and Pakeha differed substantially in this regard. Consistent with Sibley and Liu (2007), Pakeha perceived members of their own ingroup and culture and Maori peoples and culture as being equally included in representations of the nation. Maori, in contrast, displayed a different pattern of implicit associations, and perceived their own ingroup and culture as being more representative of the nation than Pakeha peoples and culture. The answer to the question of who ‘we’ are then depends upon which ethnic group one asks. These findings differ dramatically from theoretical predictions and results based on data from the US and Australia, which predict that minority groups—especially minority groups such as Maori that are consistently disadvantaged according to national indicators of income and health—should display outgroup biases on implicit measures (e.g., Devos & Banaji, 2005; Jost et al., 2004). Instead, it seems that Maori culture helps to promote the positive distinctiveness of NZ, and Maori may have considerable symbolic power to validate national identity for many majority group (Pakeha) New Zealanders. The question now is how such symbolic power may be best employed to affect material outcomes and hence promote greater equality between advantaged and disadvantaged groups within NZ.

References


Social Psychology, 38, 542-565.


The Social Report (2005). Wellington, NZ:

Ministry of Social Development.

Ministry of Social Development.


There is continued debate in New Zealand regarding the most appropriate term describing New Zealanders of European descent. Although New Zealand European is the most popular term (Liu, Wilson, McClure, & Higgins, 1999), Pakeha is the term that most strongly implies a relationship with Maori and hence seems most appropriate for locating the ethnic group membership of New Zealand participants of European descent sampled in this paper.

Note that we did not pretest these words in a Maori sample, and therefore assume that Maori participants have a similar or greater degree of knowledge of these words.

Corresponding author:

Chris Sibley,
Department of Psychology,
University of Auckland,
Private Bag 92019,
Auckland,
New Zealand.
E-mail: c.sibley@auckland.ac.nz