Pakeha Attitudes Toward the Symbolic and Resource-specific Aspects of Bicultural Policy in New Zealand: The legitimizing role of collective guilt for historical injustices

Chris G. Sibley, Andrew Robertson & Steve Kirkwood
Victoria University of Wellington

A culture-specific model integrating research on collective guilt and the perception of historical injustices, within the context of Duckitt's (2001) more universal dual process model of ideology and prejudice, is proposed. As expected, a majority of self-identified Pakeha (New Zealanders of European descent) sampled from the New Zealand population supported the symbolic principles of bicultural policy (66% support, 3% opposition) but opposed its resource-specific aspects, such as affirmative action policies (21% support, 37% opposition). Pakeha opposition toward the symbolic aspects of Maori-Pakeha intergroup relations was predicted directly by motivations for intergroup dominance and superiority (high Social Dominance Orientation); whereas the relationship between Social Dominance Orientation and opposition to resource-based issues, such as support for Maori claims to the foreshore, was notably weaker and fully mediated by both the refutation of responsibility for and absence of collective guilt for historical injustices, which is argued functioned as a legitimizing myth justifying social inequality in this context. This model illuminates the role of group-based motivational goals (competitively-driven dominance and superiority, threat-driven control and conformity) and legitimizing myths (in this instance the refutation of responsibility for historical injustices) theorized to underlie Pakeha opposition toward different aspects of bicultural policy at a time when debate surrounding the legitimacy of Maori claims to the areas of the foreshore and seabed was beginning to intensify in early 2004.

There has been considerable debate regarding how bicultural policy, in particular the allocation of resource rights, should be implemented in contemporary New Zealand (NZ) society (see King, 2003, for a historical review). In NZ, biculturalism reflects the ideal of a partnership between Maori (the indigenous peoples of NZ) and Pakeha¹ (NZers of European descent) that is deemed fair and equitable by both parties (Ritchie, 1992). This ideal is often justified with reference to the Treaty of Waitangi, signed in 1840 (Orange, 1992). Of course, how one defines terms such as fair and equitable is itself the subject of considerable debate (Billig, 1991; Billig, Condor, Edwards, Gane, Middleton, & Radley, 1988). This is particularly true with regards to the interpretation of the finer points of the Treaty concerning Maori claims for reparation for historical injustices, resource rights and titles (e.g., Nairn & McCreaor, 1990, 1991, 1997; Tuffin, Pratt, & Frewin, 2004). This issue has been under the spotlight in recent times due to Maori calls for Pakeha to recognize the legitimacy of Maori claims to areas of the foreshore (the land between the high and low tide), to which Maori have argued they are legally entitled under common law.

From a psychological perspective, one key line of enquiry for research examining this issue is the development of models allowing us to identify both the underlying motives, and understand their relation to, individual differences in Pakeha opposition or support for different aspects of bicultural policy.

The present research seeks to develop a culture-specific model predicting individual differences in Pakeha attitudes toward Maori-Pakeha intergroup relations and different aspects of bicultural policy. In order to do so, we firstly outline Sibley and Liu's (2004) culture-specific research distinguishing between Pakeha attitudes toward the symbolic and resource-specific aspects of bicultural policy. We then seek to explain individual differences in support/opposition for these two aspects of biculturalism using Duckitt's (2001) dual process model of the cognitive and motivational processes underlying intergroup attitudes. Finally, we review research on the concept of collective guilt for historical injustices (Steele, 1990; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998), and argue that the refutation of collective responsibility and the absence of guilt for historical injustices against Maori may serve to legitimize opposition to resource allocations benefiting Maori, especially those that are framed in terms of reparation. In this sense, the refutation of collective guilt may function as a culture-specific legitimizing myth that mediates the relationship between the motivations for intergroup dominance
and security discussed by Duckitt (2001) and Pakeha opposition toward different aspects of bicultural policy.

**The structure and content of Pakeha attitudes toward bicultural policy**

Guided by Stephan and Stephan’s (2000; Stephan et al., 2002) taxonomy of integrated threats, Sibley and Liu (2004) identified two themes underlying Pakeha attitudes toward bicultural policy and Maori-Pakeha relations in NZ. The first theme referred to the symbolic principles of biculturalism, defined as the degree to which Pakeha are supportive of the incorporation of Maori values and culture into mainstream (primarily Pakeha) NZ culture and national identity. The second theme referred to resource-specific aspects of biculturalism, defined as the degree to which Pakeha are supportive of policies that aim to redistribute resources in favour of Maori on a categorical basis. Sibley and Liu (2004) reported that although the majority of Pakeha students expressed considerable support for the symbolic principles of biculturalism (e.g., Maori language, Marae greetings, the Haka, wearing bone carvings), mean levels of support for its resource-specific aspects (e.g., land claims, resource-allocation favours Maori) were far lower. Expressed in simple percentages, 53% of Pakeha supported the symbolic principles of biculturalism (3% opposed; 44% neutral), whereas only 3% supported its resource-specific aspects (76% opposed; 21% neutral).

In sum, these results emphasize that (a) there is considerable (within-group) variation amongst Pakeha in support for different aspects of bicultural policy, while at the same time indicating that (b) such variation may mapped along two different dimensions reflecting representations of the symbolic aspects of bicultural relations on the one hand, and the more resource-oriented aspects on the other.

**Existing models predicting Pakeha attitudes toward bicultural policy**

Existing models attempting to predict Pakeha prejudice in general, and individual differences in Pakeha attitudes toward different aspects of bicultural policy specifically, have focused primarily on the roles of Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA; Duckitt, 2001; Sibley & Liu, 2004). Between them, these two constructs have been shown to predict the lion's share of variance in a range of negative intergroup attitudes, ranging from sexism and racism to homophobia, across numerous cultures (Altermeyer, 1998; McFarland & Adelson, 1996; Whitley, 1999). Traditionally, these two variables have been conceptualised as personality dimensions that predispose an individual to hold negative intergroup attitudes (Altermeyer, 1996; 1998; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, Malle, 1994). However, drawing upon the notion that the items contained within these scales are ideological in nature, Duckitt (2001; Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, & Brum, 2002) conceptualised SDO and RWA as two ideological/attitudinal dimensions that express group-based motivational goals, rather than as personality dispositions in and of themselves.

High levels of SDO are thought to reflect an expression of the motivational goal for group-based dominance and superiority, activated by perceptions of the world as a competitive place, which is in turn influenced by the personality dimension of tough-mindedness. In contrast, low levels of SDO are an expression of goals of egalitarianism and altruistic social concern, which is made salient by a personality disposition low in tough-mindedness (high tender-mindedness) and the perception of the world as a cooperative harmony (Duckitt, 2001). RWA, on the other hand, is an expression of the motivational goal for social control and security, which is activated by a personality disposition high in social conformity and a perception of the world as a dangerous and threatening place (see Glassner, 1999 for related commentary on this issue). Low levels of RWA, in contrast, reflect motivational goals of independence and autonomy made salient by a personality disposition low in social conformity (high autonomy) and a perception of the world as a safe and secure place.

Duckitt et al. (2002) argued that SDO should predict attitudes toward outgroups when intergroup relations are based on inequality and competition. RWA, in contrast, should predict attitudes toward outgroups when intergroup relations are characterized by high levels of threat to ingroup values and security. In NZ, various researchers have argued that general political ideology, and hence the issues surrounding Maori-Pakeha relations, tend to be anchored in issues of equality-inequality and intergroup competition versus harmony, rather than issues of danger and threat (see for example, Duckitt, 2001; Liu, Wilson, McClure, & Higgins, 1999; Wilson, 2004). Duckitt (2001), for example, reported that White Afrikaners were markedly higher than Pakeha in RWA, whereas when differences in RWA were controlled for, Pakeha were higher in SDO. The high levels of opposition toward the resource-specific aspects of biculturalism (relative to its symbolic aspects) reported by Sibley and Liu (2004) further supports this interpretation, suggesting that representations of Maori-Pakeha relations in NZ may be characterized by perceptions of resource-based competition and concerns over inequality rather than perceptions of threat to ingroup (Pakeha) security and social values. Accordingly, we argue that SDO should be highly predictive of attitudes surrounding Maori-Pakeha relations in NZ, whereas RWA will add little, if any, additional explanatory power on top of that already predicted by SDO.

Those Pakeha motivated toward egalitarianism and altruistic concern (low SDO) should therefore be more likely to support the principles of biculturalism because it allows Maori symbols and values (e.g., the haka, marae greetings, singing the national anthem in both languages) to be incorporated as a win-win (non-zero sum) situation complementing mainstream (Pakeha) national identity and culture. Those motivated toward intergroup dominance and superiority (high SDO), in contrast, should be more likely to perceive the incorporation of the general principles of biculturalism as competing with, rather than complementing, the dominant European culture and identity in NZ's socio-cultural hierarchy. Consistent with this interpretation, Sibley and Liu (2004) reported that SDO was highly predictive of Pakeha opposition toward
the general principles of biculturalism. RWA, in contrast, was unrelated to Pakeha opposition to both the resource-specific aspects and general principles of biculturalism once SDO had been controlled for, presumably because the issues surrounding biculturalism and Maori-Pakeha relations were not perceived as threatening to Pakeha values or identity per se.

In contrast, research suggests that the majority of Pakeha were opposed to the resource-specific aspects of biculturalism regardless of their motivations for intergroup dominance (SDO) or superiority (RWA; Sibley & Liu, 2004). In countries like NZ, where biculturalism has been incorporated into systems of governance at every level, and where substantial amounts of the nation’s resources have been transferred to Maori in compensation for historical grievances, concerns regarding the allocation of resources to Maori at the potential expense of one’s own ethnic group may be experienced by the majority of Pakeha. Thus, although those Pakeha motivated toward dominance and superiority expressed opposition toward resource allocations favouring Maori, it seems that so too did the majority of other (low SDO) Pakeha. Consistent with this perspective, Sibley and Liu (2004) reported that SDO predicted opposition to affirmative action policies favouring Maori only in the absence of material self-interest. In conditions of high self-interest, low and high social dominators were equally opposed.

The legitimization of opposition to bicultural policy: The role of collective guilt

Although Duckitt’s (2001; Duckitt et al., 2002) dual process model provides insight into the primary factors that may motivate opposition toward biculturalism, it does not elaborate upon the potential role of societal discourses and attitudes that may be used to justify expressions of such opposition. Sidanis and Pratto (1999, p. 104) defined such justifications, or legitimizing myths, as “values, attitudes, beliefs, causal attributions, and ideologies that provide moral and intellectual justification for social practices that either increase, maintain, or decrease levels of social inequality among social groups.” According to Sidanis and Pratto (1999; Sidanis, Levin, Federico, & Pratto, 2001), legitimizing myths mediate the relationship between SDO and discriminatory outcomes. As such, legitimizing myths may be thought of as the stepping stones between primary ideologically-based motivations, such as SDO and RWA, and discriminatory attitudes and outcomes. They help maintain stable hierarchical social structures through societally elaborated discourses and social representations legitimizing inequality (Sidanis & Pratto, 1999).

Research on the practises and social representations surrounding societally contested intergroup issues provides a key resource for the identification of legitimizing myths (McCreanor, 1997; Van Dijk, 1991, 1993). In our view, the legitimizing myths that people draw upon may be largely culture-specific and depend upon the discourses and debates surrounding the contested social issue(s) of interest (Liu & Hilton, in press). Examples of the discursive strategies or standard stories used to renegotiate and deemphasize Pakeha collective guilt are prevalent in both the NZ media and in everyday Pakeha discourse (Nairn & McCreanor, 1990, 1991; Barclay & Liu, 2003; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). In the NZ context, we argue that Pakeha may draw upon such discourses in order to legitimize expressions of opposition to bicultural policy, particularly opposition to those resource-specific aspects of biculturalism that are framed in terms of reparation or historical grievance (see LeCouteur & Augustinos, 2001).

North American research further emphasizes the importance of considering the presence or absence of collective guilt in models predicting intergroup attitudes where the groups in question have a history of inequality and injustice. Collective guilt for historical injustices, defined here as the experience of guilt due to the past negative actions of one’s ingroup (e.g., Pakeha/European settlers) toward an outgroup (e.g., Maori), has been shown to predict pro-compensatory attitudes, such as support for resource-allocations favouring the outgroup across a range of contexts (e.g., Doosje et al., 1998; Swim & Miller, 1999; Iyer, Leach & Crosby, 2003). Doosje et al. (1998) for example reported that Dutch students who experienced collective guilt for their group’s negative historical actions toward Indonesians were more supportive of both personal and group-based reparation. Conversely, ingroup members who fail to identify as an ingroup member, refute their group’s responsibility for historical injustices, or refute that such actions were indeed negative should fail to experience collective guilt and hence be less likely to support compensatory practises and resource-allocations favouring the wronged outgroup (Branscombe, Doosje & McGarty, 2002).

Overview and Guiding Hypotheses

The present research sought to integrate measures of collective guilt for historical injustices within Duckitt’s (2001) more universal model of the motivational expressions underlying intergroup attitudes in order to predict individual differences in Pakeha attitudes towards both the symbolic and resource-specific aspects of biculturalism. We argue that the absence of collective guilt should predict opposition to Maori claims to the foreshore – claims which are framed in terms of the rights legally guaranteed to Maori which, it has been argued, Pakeha of the past and present have failed to honour. Furthermore, we propose that collective guilt should mediate the relationship between SDO and opposition to both the general principles and resource-specific aspects of bicultural policy. That is, the absence of felt responsibility for historical injustices and lack of collective guilt will function as a legitimizing myth justifying contemporary inequalities between Maori and Pakeha. These predictions are detailed in the following four hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1 predicted that Pakeha would display higher levels of support for the symbolic principles of biculturalism than they would for both its resource-specific aspects and for Maori rights and claims to the foreshore.

According to Sibley and Liu (2004) however, SDO should correlate with opposition toward these
three aspects of bicultural policy at differing magnitudes. Stated formally, Hypothesis 2 predicted that SDO would be a significantly better predictor of Pakeha opposition toward the symbolic principles of biculturalism than it would of opposition toward the more general aspects of resource-specific biculturalism, and opposition toward Maori claims and rights to the foreshore in particular.

Hypothesis 3 predicted that threat-driven control and the need for security (RWA) would fail to predict unique variance in both Pakeha collective guilt and attitudes toward bicultural policy in addition to that already explained by competitively driven dominance and the need for superiority (SDO).

Finally, Hypothesis 4 predicted that the relationship between SDO and opposition to Maori rights and claims to the foreshore would be fully mediated by the absence of Pakeha collective guilt, and partially mediated by attitudes toward resource-specific biculturalism at a more general level (see Figure 1). In this sense, we argue that the refutation of collective guilt functions as a legitimizing myth that justifies expressions of opposition toward biculturalism, rather than as a motivating factor in its own right.

Method

Participants and Procedure

Participants were 176 members of the general NZ population who were born in NZ and who self-identified as NZ European/Pakeha. Participants (79 males and 97 females) ranged from 16-62 years of age ($M = 27.27, SD = 10.01$).

People seated in public places (e.g., parks, beaches, bus stops, seated areas in malls) around the cities of Wellington and Auckland, and their surrounding suburbs, were randomly selected and approached by a Pakeha research assistant who asked if they were interested in participating in an anonymous study examining opinions of NZ culture. Participants were offered a movie voucher (worth approx. NZ $14) for participation. This research was conducted in November and December of 2003 and early January of 2004, before the controversial political Nationhood speech made on January 27th 2004, which outlined proposed National Party policy regarding Maori rights to the foreshore and seabed of NZ (Brash, 2004).

Of the 240 people approached, 238 agreed to participate of whom 230 completed the survey, a response rate of 95.8%. As in the general population, nearly a quarter (24.3%, Statistics NZ, 2001) of the participants (54, 23.5%) did not identify as NZ European/Pakeha. Data from people who identified with an ethnicity other than NZ European/Pakeha were excluded from all analyses.

Materials

Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) was measured using the balanced 16-item SDO scale (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), which included items such as “Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.” Consistent with Duckitt et al. (2002), Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) was measured using 16 balanced items randomly selected from Altemeyer’s (1996) scale, which included items such as “The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get back to our traditional values, put some tough leaders in power, and silence the troublemakers spreading bad ideas.” Both scales displayed adequate reliability in the current sample (SDO $a = .81$, RWA $a = .84$), which were consistent with those observed in previous research (e.g., Pratto et al., 1994; Altemeyer, 1998). Items were rated on a scale ranging from 0 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). Higher scores indicated higher mean levels of SDO and RWA, respectively.

Drawing upon Branscombe, Slugoski and Kappen (2004), six Likert items were used to assess respondents’ endorsement of Pakeha collective guilt and reparation: “I feel guilty about the negative things NZ Europeans/Pakeha have done to Maori”; “I believe that I should take part in the efforts to help repair the damage caused to Maori by NZ Europeans/Pakeha in the past”; “I can easily feel guilt about the bad outcomes received by Maori that were brought about by NZ Europeans/Pakeha in the past”; “I feel regret about things NZ Europeans/Pakeha did to Maori in the past”; “If our ancestors have acted unjustly in the past, then it is our responsibility to see that those acts are corrected in the present”; “We should not have to pay for the mistakes of our ancestors” (reverse scored). Items were rated on a scale ranging from 0 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). Higher scores indicated higher mean levels of collective guilt. The scale displayed acceptable reliability in the current sample, $a = .90$. Some items referred explicitly to collective guilt as operationalised by Branscombe et al. (2004), whereas others referred to beliefs about the legitimacy of reparation. Although these two factors may be considered theoretically distinct, a scree plot (Cattell, 1966) showed a steep drop in eigenvalues after the first factor (4.40, .73, .50, .44), thus supporting a single factor solution. This single factor accounted for 62.86% of the scale variance.

Pakeha attitudes toward the symbolic principles, $a = .79$, and resource-specific aspects, $a = .86$, of biculturalism were assessed using a revised version of Sibley and Liu’s (2004) Pakeha Attitudes toward Biculturalism Scale (shown in Table 1). Attitudes toward the legitimacy of Maori rights and claims to the NZ foreshore and seabed were assessed using items that were drawn from letters and opinion pieces printed in NZ newspapers, $a = .77$ (refer to Table 1), and was designed to assess overall attitudes toward the resource-based aspects of Maori claims to the foreshore. Items were rated on a scale ranging from 0 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). Higher scores indicated higher mean levels of support for these different aspects of bicultural policy.

A principal components exploratory factor analysis with oblimin rotation assessed the factor structure of items assessing biculturalism in principle, resource-specific biculturalism and attitudes toward the foreshore. Three factors were extracted with eigenvalues over 1 (5.93, 1.81, 1.24), which explained 59.83% of the total variance. Interpretation of the Scree plot further supported a 3-factor solution, as the eigenvalues displayed a steeply decreasing trend that leveled
out after the third value (Cattell, 1966). As shown in Table 1, the first factor contained items assessing Pakeha attitudes toward the resource-specific aspects of bicultural policy in NZ. The second factor reflected Pakeha attitudes toward the general principles of biculturalism in NZ, and the third factor contained items assessing Pakeha attitudes toward the legitimacy of Maori rights and claims to the foreshore and seabed.

The order of the questionnaire sections assessing SDO and RWA, and collective guilt and attitudes toward biculturalism and the foreshore were counterbalanced. The survey also contained a separate section which was unrelated to the current research.

**Results**

**Hypothesis 1: Main effects.**

Consistent with Hypothesis 1, a repeated measures ANOVA with post-hoc comparisons suggested that self-identified Pakeha respondents displayed significantly more support for biculturalism in principle $(M = 4.30; \ SD = 1.13)$ than they did for resource-specific biculturalism $(M = 2.62; \ SD = 1.44)$. Attitudes toward both of these aspects of biculturalism were, in turn, higher than support for the legitimacy of Maori claims and rights to the foreshore and seabed $(M = 1.96; \ SD = 1.09), F(2,173) = 354.27; \ p < .001, \ \eta^2 = .67$.

In order to present these results in categorical terms, scores of 2 or below on a 7-point scale ranging from 0-6 were classified as opposing, scores of 3 were classified as neutral, and scores of 4 or above were classified as supporting biculturalism. Expressed in this way, 66% of respondents expressed support for the general principles of biculturalism, 29% scored in the 'neutral' midrange of the scale, and 5% were opposed. In contrast, only 21% of respondents expressed support for resource-specific biculturalism, 42% were neutral, and 37% were opposed. Opposition to Maori claims to the foreshore and seabed were even more pronounced, with only 4% of respondents supporting such claims (39% neutral, 57% opposed).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. Factor loadings for the Pakeha Attitudes toward Biculturalism Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pakeha attitudes toward the resource-specific aspects of biculturalism in New Zealand</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. I find the idea of giving priority or special privileges to one group appalling, minority or otherwise. (r)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. I feel that although Maori have had it rough in past years, they should still be treated the same as everyone else. (r)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. It is racist to give one ethnic group special privileges, even if they are a minority. (r)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. We are all New Zealanders, and Maori should not get special privileges. (r)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. It is only fair to provide additional resources and opportunities for underprivileged minorities, such as Maori.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pakeha attitudes toward the symbolic principles of biculturalism in New Zealand</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The New Zealand national anthem should be sung in both Maori and English.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. New Zealand should be proud of its cultural diversity and embrace biculturalism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Maori language should be taught in all New Zealand schools.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Maori culture should stay where it belongs—with Maori—because it has nothing to do with the rest of New Zealand as a whole. (r)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Maori culture should not be pushed on the rest of New Zealand. (r)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pakeha attitudes toward Maori rights to the New Zealand foreshore and seabed</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The foreshore belongs to all New Zealanders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Granting Maori ownership of the foreshore discriminates against non-Maori.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Maori claims over the foreshore that go beyond concepts of guardianship in an attempt to gain economic benefits are unjust.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Maori should not have special rights over the foreshore just because they were here first.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The foreshore claims are legitimate as Maori have not yet been sufficiently compensated for the dispossession of their land. (r)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. (r) = Item is reverse scored; only factor loadings above .35 are reported.*
Table 2. Descriptive statistics and correlations between self-identified Pakeha respondents' attitudes toward bicultural policy, SDO, RWA, and collective guilt.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>1.</th>
<th>2.</th>
<th>3.</th>
<th>4.</th>
<th>5.</th>
<th>6.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Dominance Orientation (SDO)</td>
<td>.51&quot;</td>
<td>.39&quot;</td>
<td>.51&quot;</td>
<td>.23&quot;</td>
<td>.18'</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA)</td>
<td>-.23&quot;</td>
<td>-.32&quot;</td>
<td>-.23&quot;</td>
<td>.12'</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective guilt</td>
<td>.71&quot;</td>
<td>.66&quot;</td>
<td>.62&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biculturalism in principle</td>
<td>.48&quot;</td>
<td>.46&quot;</td>
<td>.64&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td>.96'</td>
<td>.77'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource-specific biculturalism</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>.77'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes towards the foreshore</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td>4.30</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>1.96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( \text{M} \) = p < .05; " = p < .01; n = 176 for all correlations. Scale scores ranged from 0 to 6. Higher levels of SDO and RWA reflect higher motivations for intergroup dominance and superiority, and social conformity and security, respectively. Higher levels of Pakeha collective guilt reflect the endorsement of guilt for one's group's negative historical actions toward Maori. Higher levels of biculturalism in principle, resource-specific biculturalism, and Maori rights to the foreshore reflect higher levels of support these aspects of bicultural policy.

**Hypothesis 2: Differences in the magnitude of SDO correlations.**

Correlations between self-identified Pakeha respondents' attitudes toward biculturalism in principle, resource-specific biculturalism, Maori rights and claims to the foreshore and seabed, SDO, RWA, and collective guilt are displayed in Table 2. All correlations presented in Table 2 remained comparable when the order in which the sections of the questionnaire were presented was controlled for (r's did not change by more than .02). All effects remained comparable when collective guilt was assessed using only the items referring to guilt/regret.

Consistent with Hypothesis 2, and as can be seen in Table 2, the negative correlation between SDO and support for biculturalism in principle, \( r = - .51 \), was greater in magnitude than the negative correlations between SDO and support for resource-specific biculturalism, \( r = -.23; t = 5.26(173), p < .001 \), and SDO and support for the legitimacy of Maori rights and claims to the foreshore and seabed, \( r = -.18; t = 6.81(173), p < .001 \). In contrast, the negative correlations between SDO and support for resource-specific biculturalism, and SDO and support for Maori rights and claims to the foreshore and seabed did not differ significantly in magnitude, \( t = 1.14(173), p > .05 \). In sum, SDO predicted opposition to biculturalism in principle better than it predicted opposition to resource-specific biculturalism and opposition toward Maori rights and claims to the foreshore.

**Hypotheses 3: Unique effects of RWA**

As also shown in Table 2, there was a similar although less pronounced trend in the magnitude of the negative correlations between RWA and support for biculturalism in principle, \( r = -.32; RWA \) and support for resource-specific biculturalism, \( r = -.23, \) and RWA and support for the legitimacy of Maori rights and claims to the foreshore and seabed, \( r = -.12. \) However, consistent with Hypothesis 3, and as can be seen in the structural equation model described below, the effects of RWA were no longer significant when considered in tandem with SDO.

**Figure 1. Structural equation model of observed means predicting Pakeha attitudes toward the legitimacy of Maori claims to the foreshore with standardized path coefficients**

\( \beta = .51" \) (66)
\( \beta = -.39" \) (11)
\( \beta = .61" \) (06)
\( \beta = .35" \) (60)
\( \beta = .42" \) (56)

\( \text{Pakeha collective guilt} \)

\( \text{Biculturalism in principle} \)

\( \text{Social Dominance Orientation} \)

\( \text{Right-Wing Authoritarianism} \)

\( \text{Attitudes towards the foreshore} \)

\( \text{Resource-specific biculturalism} \)

\( \text{Note: } *= p < .001; \text{ standard errors displayed in brackets}. \)
Hypothesis 4: An integrative model predicting Pakeha attitudes toward bicultural policy.

Model fit indices. Hu and Bentler (1999) argued that it is important to consider both the standardized Root Mean square Residual (sRMR; a residual-based fit index) and one or more index of comparative fit, such as the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), Comparative Fit Index (CFI) or Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI), when considering the overall adequacy of a model. CFI and NNFI indices above .95, and RMSEA and sRMR values below .06 and .08, respectively, are indicative of good-fitting models (Hu & Bentler, 1999). According to these criteria, the proposed model provided an excellent fit to the data $\chi^2 (8, n = 176) = 6.68$; NNFI = 1.01; CFI = 1.00; sRMR = .03; RMSEA < .01; 90% confidence interval $= .00 <$ RMSEA < .08.

All paths reported in the model were statistically significant, $z > 4.76$. Post-hoc model modification indices using the Lagrange multiplier failed to reveal any other significant paths which improved the model fit. Further analyses showed that removal of any of the paths in the hypothesized model reduced the model fit.

Strength of effects. The hypothesized model (see Figure 1) performed well, and accounted for a large proportion of the variance in self-identified Pakeha respondents’ attitudes toward different aspects of bicultural policy. The effects identified by the model accounted for large proportions of the variance in support for both the general principles, $R^2 = .57$, and resource-specific aspects of biculturalism, $R^2 = .43$. Overall, the effects identified by the model accounted for a similar proportion of the variance in attitudes toward the legitimacy of Maori rights and claims to the foreshore and seabed, $R^2 = .48$.

Direct effects. As can be seen in Figure 1, SDO and RWA were significantly positively correlated, $\beta = .51; z = 5.95, p < .001$. SDO was also directly related to opposition to biculturalism in principle, $\beta = -.27; z = -5.00, p < .001$, and lower levels of collective guilt, $\beta = -2.39; z = -5.60, p < .001$. However, RWA was unrelated to collective guilt. Collective guilt was in turn directly related to biculturalism in principle, $\beta = .61; z = 11.18, p < .001$. Collective guilt was also directly related to attitudes toward both the legitimacy of Maori rights and claims to the foreshore and seabed, $\beta = .35; z = 4.76, p < .001$, and resource-specific biculturalism, $\beta = .66; z = 11.46, p < .001$. Resource-specific biculturalism was in turn directly related to attitudes toward Maori rights and claims to the foreshore and seabed, $\beta = .42; z = 5.75, p < .001$.

Indirect (mediated) effects. Indirect effects were then examined in order to assess mediation in the model (refer to Table 3). Consistent with Hypothesis 3, the relationship between SDO and biculturalism in principle was partially mediated by collective guilt, $\beta$ for indirect effect = -.24, $z = -5.01, p < .001$. The relationship between SDO and resource-specific biculturalism was fully mediated by collective guilt, $\beta$ for indirect effect = -.26, $z = -5.03, p < .001$. These results suggest that people higher in SDO experienced lower levels of collective guilt, which in turn led to lower levels of support for both the general principles and resource-specific aspects of biculturalism.

Attitudes toward the resource-specific aspects of biculturalism mediated the relationship between collective guilt and attitudes toward Maori rights and claims to the foreshore and seabed, $\beta$ for indirect effect = .27, $z = 5.14, p < .001$. This suggests that people who experienced high levels of collective guilt expressed increased support for resource-specific biculturalism, which in turn led to higher levels of support for Maori rights and claims to the foreshore and seabed. There was also an indirect effect between SDO and attitudes toward the legitimacy of Maori rights and claims to the foreshore and seabed, $\beta$ for indirect effect = -.93, $z = -.493, p < .001$. This suggests that people higher in SDO expressed lower levels of collective guilt and lower levels of support for the resource-specific aspects of biculturalism, which in turn predicted lower levels of support for the legitimacy of Maori rights and claims to the foreshore and seabed.

Discussion
Consistent with Sibley and Liu (2004), SDO proved a significantly better predictor of Pakeha respondents’ opposition toward the symbolic principles of biculturalism than it did of opposition to both resource-specific biculturalism and the legitimacy of Maori rights and claims to the

| Table 3. Indirect (mediated) effects predicting attitudes toward biculturalism and bicultural policy |
|-----------------------------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|
| | Total Effect | Indirect (mediated) Effect | |
| | $\beta$ | $z$ | $\beta$ | $z$ | % of total effect |
| SDO $\rightarrow$ Biculturalism in principle (partially mediated by Pakeha guilt) | -.51 | -7.77* | -.24 | -5.01* | 47% |
| SDO $\rightarrow$ Resource-specific biculturalism (mediated by Pakeha guilt) | -.26 | -5.03* | -.26 | -5.03* | 100% |
| SDO $\rightarrow$ Foreshore attitudes (mediated by Pakeha guilt and resource-specific biculturalism) | -.24 | -4.93* | -.24 | -4.93* | 100% |
| Collective guilt $\rightarrow$ Foreshore attitudes (partially mediated by resource-specific biculturalism) | .62 | 10.37* | .27 | 5.14' | 44% |

*Note. * $= p < .01$; SDO = Social Dominance Orientation

New Zealand Journal of Psychology Vol. 34, No. 3, November 2005 • 177 •
foreshore and seabed (which were both similarly low regardless of individual differences in SDO). These results suggest that opposition toward the symbolic principles of biculturalism was indeed driven by one of the key motivational goals (SDO) thought to underlie prejudice and related negative intergroup attitudes, at least in our sample of (primarily) urban and suburban residents who self-identified as NZ European/Pakeha. In contrast, opposition to the resource-specific aspects of biculturalism such as Maori claims to the foreshore and seabed appeared to be only partially motivated by this same goal. These results raise the possibility that statements labelling Pakeha opposition toward resource-based issues favouring Maori as racist or as being motivated primarily by racism may be too simplistic, as they fail to adequately represent the interrelationships between the motivations and attitudes driving such opposition. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that the outcomes of such opposition may serve to legitimate past discrimination against Maori and discredit attempts to address Maori disadvantage, which may in turn perpetuate the gap between Maori and Pakeha in contemporary New Zealand society.

As detailed in Figure 1, the results outlined here point to a complex interplay of factors involving motivations for group-based dominance and inequality (SDO) justified through the refutation of collective guilt and responsibility for historical injustices, along with realistic concerns for one's own material interests, at both a personal and group level as identified by Sibley and Liu (2004). Consistent with the model outlined in Hypothesis 4, opposition toward the general principles of biculturalism was driven directly by motivations for intergroup dominance and superiority (high SDO) on the one hand, and the failure to experience collective guilt on the other. Furthermore, those Pakeha who were high in SDO did not experience collective guilt (hence the negative relationship between these two variables); and this refutation of collective guilt was in turn a driving factor behind opposition toward the general principles of biculturalism. We contend that collective guilt functions as a legitimizing myth that those Pakeha motivated toward intergroup dominance and superiority draw upon in order to justify opposition toward different aspects of bicultural policy. These empirical findings complement previous qualitative work identifying standard discourses of equality and reparation underlying the construction of opposition to Treaty settlement processes (McCreanor, 1997; Nairn & McCreanor, 1990, 1991, 1997).

The finding that RWA failed to predict additional variance in opposition toward both the symbolic and realistic aspects of biculturalism and collective guilt on top of that already predicted by SDO further suggests that Maori-Pakeha ethnic group relations in NZ tend to be anchored in issues of (SDO-based) equality and intergroup competition, rather than issues of (RWA-based) danger and threat to ingroup values. This provides an interesting contrast to Duckitt (2001, study 3), who reported that SDO, $\beta = .39$, and RWA, $\beta = .18$, both predicted unique variance in a measure of relatively homogenous anti-minority attitudes that included items referring to Maori, Pacific Nation and Asian peoples. These contrasting findings raise the possibility that Pakeha prejudice toward different ethnic outgroups may be driven by differing motivational goals. Specifically, the results presented here and by Sibley and Liu (2004) suggest that perceptions of Maori-Pakeha intergroup categorizations may be characterized primarily by motivations for dominance and superiority, fostering perceptions of "us," who are superior, strong, competent, and dominant (or should be) and "them," who are inferior, incompetent, and worthless" (Duckitt et al., 2002, p. 88). Future qualitative research could more closely examine this possibility and compare the prevalence of such SDO-based social categorizations in discourses referring to ethnic group relations in NZ with RWA-based categorizations centering on issues of morality and ingroup threat.

Although there is a compelling body of research demonstrating that SDO and RWA reflect the fundamental cognitive-motivational processes that together encompass a wide range of prejudices and related intergroup attitudes (e.g., Duckitt, 2001), the content of legitimizing myths used to justify expressions of such prejudice may be more heavily dependent upon societally elaborated discourses and other cultural idioms. We hope that our proposed integration of Sidanius et al.'s (2001) concept of legitimizing myths within the broader context of Duckitt's (2001) dual process model may facilitate a more detailed understanding of the various universal and culture-specific antecedents of prejudice. As Whitley and Egingdóttir (2000) have implied in their analyses, it should be possible to identify the myths used to legitimize prejudices that are motivated by threat-driven control (RWA), in the same way that previous research has identified the myths legitimizing prejudice motivated by competitive-driven superiority (SDO; e.g., Sidanius et al., 2001). Consider recent protests about civil unions. The civil union bill allows homosexual couples to form a recognized union legally equivalent to marriage in NZ. We suspect that opposition to civil unions is motivated primarily by RWA, rather than SDO. Our interpretation of this debate further suggests that such opposition is likely to be justified through reference to biblical interpretations of the morality and sinfulness of homosexual practice, which we theorize should function as a legitimizing myth in this context. We are currently investigating this possibility.

Caveats and conclusions
It should be recognized that the model outlined in Figure 1 presents a static snapshot of the empirical structure of the motives and justifications underlying self-identified Pakeha respondents’ opposition toward Maori rights and claims to the foreshore in the months leading up to Brash’s (2004) Nationhood speech. As such, these results suggest that this speech, and its subsequent presentation in the NZ media, may have appealed to a large number of Pakeha because it tapped into pre-existing wide ranging opposition amongst Pakeha to the resource-specific aspects of biculturalism (such as Maori foreshore claims), while also providing a societally elaborated repertoire for the plausible refutation of Pakeha responsibility and collective guilt for historical injustices.
However, although these results are indicative of the motives and legitimizing myths underlying opposition toward bicultural policy and Maori claims to the foreshore in late 2003 and early 2004; they do not speak to the possibility that Brash’s speech, and the resulting political debate, may have in itself altered the structure and content of Pakeha representations of biculturalism and the legitimacy of Maori claims to the foreshore. As Duckitt (2001, p. 82) commented,

“in New Zealand there tends to be periodic upsurges of outrage in the media and among the majority general population over ‘excesses’ by Maori activists… It is possible that at such times social norms of nonprejudice against minorities might weaken and the ‘tolerance’ of more socially conforming majority members evaporate.”

We suspect that Brash’s speech may have in itself altered representations of Maori-Pakeha relations through the combination of two processes: (a) by elaborating upon repertoires allowing Pakeha to further refute responsibility and collective guilt for historical injustices while still adhering to discourses of equality, and (b) by increasing perceptions of the competitive nature of Maori-Pakeha relations in NZ society (see Duckitt & Fisher, 2003). If, for example, such debate did indeed increase perceptions of a competitive worldview underlying Maori-Pakeha relations, then according to Duckitt’s (2001) dual process model, we predict that follow-up cross-sectional research should reveal a stronger association between SDO and opposition to Maori rights and claims to the foreshore independent of Pakeha collective guilt. Future research examining anchoring processes in the formation of legitimizing myths and their relation to Duckitt’s (2001) dual process model is needed in order to address these interesting possibilities and further elaborate upon the psychology of Pakeha opposition and support for biculturalism and other contested social issues.

References


3. Note that these results are presented for simple descriptive purposes and that these agree/disagree cutoff points were relatively arbitrary.

Keywords: Bicultural policy, legitimizing myths, social dominance theory, collective guilt, Treaty of Waitangi, prejudice.

Acknowledgements:
We thank James Liu, Paul Jose, Marc Wilson, and Adele Bradshaw, for helpful comments on an earlier version of this manuscript. A previous version of this manuscript was presented at the 33rd Annual Meeting of the Society of Australasian Social Psychologists (SASP) in Auckland, New Zealand, 2004.

Address for correspondence:
Chris Sibley
School of Psychology
Victoria University of Wellington
PO Box 800
Wellington
New Zealand

E-mail: Sibleychri@student.vuw.ac.nz

Notes
1. There is currently considerable debate in New Zealand regarding the most appropriate name for New Zealanders of European descent. Although New Zealand is European is the most popular term (Liu et al., 1999), Pakeha is the term that most strongly implies a relationship with Maori and hence seems most appropriate for this paper (King, 1999).

2. The measures assessing attitudes toward biculturalism used in this research were derived from Pakeha discourse and developed specifically for use with Pakeha. Consistent with Berry (1989) we therefore recommend against their use with other ethnic or cultural groups in their current form. Indeed, reanalysis of Maori data collected here and elsewhere showed that measures of both biculturalism in principle (α = .55) and resource-specific biculturalism (α = .55) displayed unacceptably low reliabilities in a Maori sample (n = 70). A single factor solution in which items assessing both the general principles and resource-specific aspects of biculturalism were combined displayed a similarly low reliability (α = .68).