The Psychology of Intergroup Discrimination*
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The acts of inhumanity of our species are legion, and a modern technological
age seems no better equipped to deal with them. Older psychological theories
stressed a genetic explanation of prejudice and discrimination, and some poli-
tical regimes fostered these beliefs to justify oppression. Although later
theories argued that attitudes can be learned, there was a residual dependence
on holding that extreme prejudice was psychopathological. Milgram, however,
demonstrated that ordinary people will carry out orders which can harm
others. Sherif, and later Tajfel, pointed to the power which a group can exert
over its members, and to the dependence of many discriminatory acts upon the
nature of the intergroup relationship. Such acts are triggered by competition
for resources, according to Sherif, and by the very existence of groups and the
consequent need to preserve social (group) identity, according to Tajfel.
Vaughan developed a social-psychological model of the relationship between
personal identity, social identity and self-concept, which can be applied to
positive aspects of behaviour, and which emphasizes the role of the social
structure in relation to both "positive" processes (e.g., identity) and negative
processes (e.g., discrimination). An application is included which accounts for
change in intergroup choices recorded over a ten-year period in studies of eth-
nic preferences in Maori and Pakeha children in New Zealand.

People of the world, unite and defeat the
U.S. aggressors and all their running
dogs! People of the world, be cour-
ageous, dare to fight, defy difficulties
and advance wave upon wave. Then the
whole world will belong to the people.
Monsters of all kinds shall be destroyed.

These were the words of Mao Tse-Tung in
1964, supporting the people of the Congo
against what he called "the U.S. aggressors
and all their lackeys" (Quotations from
Chairman Mao Tse-Tung, 1972, p. 82). Con-
sider the next excerpt:

Those who came hither are generally the
most stupid of their nation, and as igno-

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ance is often attended with great cred-

ity, when knavery would mislead it ... it is almost impossible to remove any
prejudice they may entertain ... Not being used to liberty, they know not how
to make use of it ... now they come in
droves and carry all before them.

The writer was Benjamin Franklin in
1753 (cited in Klineberg 1954, pp. 522-523)
concerning the Germans then migrating
into Pennsylvania. Here is a third sample.

These "Ocean Men" are tall beasts with
deep sunken eyes and beak-like noses ... Although undoubtedly men, they seem
to possess none of the mental faculties of
men. The most bestial of peasants is far
more human ... It is quite possible that
they are susceptible to training, and
could with patience be taught the modes
of conduct proper to a human being.

The beasts in question were Jesuit
priests, seen through the eyes of a Confucian scholar in the Sixteenth Century (cited in LaPiere & Farnsworth, 1949, p. 228).

The choice of time scale in these quotations is deliberate. It illustrates that unfavourable views about others has a considerable history, that they can be expressed by respectable figures, and that the target groups are not always racial or religious minorities. In fact, our past suggests that the varied phenomena of prejudice, discrimination, aggression, and extermination are part of the human condition. It was Charles Lamb (cited in Allport, 1954, p. 3) who wrote:

For myself, earth-bound and fettered to the scene of my activities, I confess that I do feel the differences of mankind, national and individual ... I am, in plainer words, a bundle of prejudices — made up of likings and dislikes — the veriest thrall to sympathies, apathies, antipathies.

Allport added the further thought: “No corner of the world is free from group scorn. Being fettered to our respective cultures, we, like Charles Lamb, are bundles of prejudices” (Allport, 1954, p.4).

Before proceeding, three central terms should be defined: (a) Attitudes — Enduring clusters of feelings, beliefs, and behaviour tendencies directed towards specific ideas, institutions, people, and groups; prejudice — An attitude towards members of a specific group, leading to a negative evaluation of them on the basis of that membership; discrimination — A set of voluntary acts with unfavourable outcomes directed against members of a specific group. In its mildest form, discrimination can consist of negative forms of language concerning members of an outgroup, and the deliberate avoidance of contact with them. It can mean more: The exclusion of outgroup members from employment, housing, schools and other social institutions. In an even stronger form, it can lead to segregation, by law or by custom.

People in our community, and in others, are rightly concerned at the disregard some have for their physical environment, at the acts of cruelty against animals; and yet the worst acts of inhumanity are committed against humanity itself. Intergroup violence, and even warfare, are not possible without a supporting psychological structure involving the beliefs and emotions of a people. If such a structure is lacking, national leaders will create one by way of propaganda. Both the boys at the front and the people at home need to have a “good morale.”

The present author has written elsewhere:

... prejudice is a continuing human tragedy. It affects not only the persons towards whom prejudice may be directed but also those who hold the beliefs in question. Among the latter, the process may be a slow and corrosive one acting upon the holder’s very individuality ... or it may strike rapidly, as when a group discriminated against restrain themselves no longer and strike back. At any given moment in time, in a global sense, the deceptive appearance of groups in balance disintegrates into tension and intergroup hostility. Such behavioural manifestations do not ... pop up at random. They are always linked to antecedent conditions of intergroup attitudes. (Vaughan, 1972)

Although those words were penned 15 years ago, they could be applied to most time periods. One way of glimpsing the continuing tragedy is to consider the incidence and severity of wars. In World War I, for example, 4 million died directly from the conflict. The figure was 15 million in World War II, even disregarding acts of genocide such as the six million Jews exterminated during the holocaust, or deaths in concentration camps. Table 1 includes interstate wars since World War II, and only those in which more than 1,000 deaths have been documented. Even these estimates (Dupuy & Dupuy, 1977; Hartman & Mitchell, 1984; Singer & Small, 1972) are conservative; and the list does not include fatal casualties in civil wars, and wars of independence, during the period covered.

This paper is concerned with the psychology underlying prejudice and discrimi-
nation. Older explanations concerned with genetics and personality are briefly dealt with, along with insights gained by experimental research into the nature of obedience to authority. It will be stressed that a purely psychological approach, which ignores the reality of the existing social structure in a community, cannot account satisfactorily for a wide variety of research findings. The present author's research, largely carried out in this country, bears on this issue. Reference is made to American research, carried out some thirty years ago, which pointed to a rational solution to intergroup discrimination. However, later work will lead to the conclusion that, since people's identities are at stake, rational solutions will probably fail. Intergroup discrimination exists because groups exist.

Older Explanations

Some commentators, dealing with the history of racial prejudice, have pinpointed a correlation between its incidence and the onset of European colonial expansion in the Nineteenth Century. Conquered people could be branded as "inferior", a "lower form of evolution", and even a "burden requiring protection". This notion of genetic inferiority has sometimes been viewed as a rationalization for the exploitation of the vanquished by a ruling class. This is a Marxist interpretation, and can be applied to such contexts as the role of slavery in the perception of the Negro in the Southern United States, and the need for Black labour by the ruling Whites in South Africa throughout this century.

Within social science, however, a genetic viewpoint included the further view that outgroup rejection was inborn or instinctive, derived from "consciousness of kind" according to Giddings in 1896 (cited in Klineberg, 1954), and "dislike of the unlike" according to Sumner in 1906 (cited in Klineberg, 1954). Humans, like animals, were thought to possess a biologically-controlled fear of strangers, and, for example, an innate sense of race. It did not suit the purpose of those holding this view to deal with instances in which curiosity of the strange or of the novel could lead to approach responses. Both ingroup and outgroup awareness was therefore inborn, and according to the sociologist Trotter (1916), national behavioural characteristics were as well. He drew upon the events of World War I to argue that it was obvious that the British were like industrious ants and the Germans like a ravenous wolf pack, qualities endowed by Mother Nature. Within the realm of scientific enquiry, however, this edifice was shaken by Lasker (1929), who found that Whites had no innate prejudice towards Blacks, at least in America! Although his work was marred by relying on what adults could recall of their childhood experiences, he made the provocative (though groundless) inference that prejudice developed from a child's unfavourable contact with one or more members of an outgroup. Later work was to show that contact is not an essential ingredient in the development of prejudice.

A belief in genetic inferiority was a cornerstone in the Nazi programme directed against Jews. Open antagonism expressed by Hitler led to German citizens avoiding all Jews, sometimes neighbours and friends. This climate paved the way to the enactment of the Nurnberg laws of discrimination. It was an easy step to the burn-

| Table 1. Interstate wars 1946-79 with deaths exceeding 1,000. |
|------------------|-----------------|--------------|
| War              | Period          | Deaths       |
| Palestine        | 1948-49         | 16,000       |
| Korea            | 1950-53         | 2,000,000    |
| Hungary          | 1956            | 39,000       |
| Sinai            | 1956            | 4,000        |
| Sino-India       | 1962            | 5,000        |
| First Kashmir    | 1947-49         | 1,000        |
| U.K.-India       | 1946-48         | 800,000      |
| Yugoslavia       | 1946-48         | 45,000       |
| Egypt            | 1948-59         | 8,000        |
| Indo-China       | 1946-54         | 105,000      |
| Madagascar       | 1947-49         | 1,000        |
| Laos             | 1953-73         | 10,000       |
| Algeria          | 1954-62         | 115,000      |
| Tibet            | 1956-59         | 14,000       |
| Suez             | 1957            | 3,500        |
| Lebanon          | 1958-81         | 45,000       |
| Vietnam          | 1961-75         | 1,000,000    |
| Second Kashmir   | 1965            | 14,000       |
| Six-day (Israel) | 1967            | 20,000       |
| Honduras-Salvador| 1969            | 2,000        |
| Bangladesh       | 1971            | 17,000       |
| Cambodia         | 1975-79         | 2,500,000    |
| Angola           | 1961-75         | 38,000       |
| Angola           | 1979            | 6,000        |
| China-Vietnam    | 1979            | 70,000       |
ing of synagogues and street attacks upon Jews. The horrific last link in the chain was genocide. Following the Second World War, a group of scientists, including the German sociologist Adorno, spread a research net dealing with anti-Semitism beyond the frontiers of Germany (cf. Allport, 1954). Initially, this work explored the concept that Fascism was not confined to Germany. An American pro-Fascist was thought to possess the following characteristics: Anti-Semitism, and in the predominantly Protestant areas, anti-Catholicism; being anti-foreigners, anti-refugees, anti-alien; nationalism; totalitarianism, or adherence to a one-party system.

Although the trigger for the research was anti-Semitism, the focus became the search for a syndrome of characteristics located in the individual — the authoritarian personality. Such a person was: Intolerant of ambiguity, narrow-minded, dogmatic, submissive to legitimate authority, and dominating over those further down in a chain of command. It also appeared that the source of these characteristics was in an individual's early experience. A recurring theme among subjects participating in the research was a childhood marked by punitiveness and rigidity, in a household dominated by the father. A latter-day Freudianism is patent: The source of authority is the father, and the criterion of the childish fidelity is unquestioning obedience.

By extension, a whole society may engender authoritarian attitudes. Nazi Germany needed only the arrival of an appropriate leader to take an entire nation along this track. Rokeach (1960) fine-tuned the concept of authoritarianism to include the belief structures of adherents of the political Left, emphasizing the role that a totalitarian structure plays in moulding its citizens into rigid and intolerant beings.

More recent explanations

The treatment so far, has touched on views of prejudice and discrimination ranging from a genetic-deterministic explanation of outgroup rejection to a cultural-learning view, where genetics may be a component in the belief structure of the prejudiced individual. The latter view can be applied to democratic as well as totalitarian societies, since it allows that, within any system, certain individuals may develop a prejudiced personality. A country such as the United States, which vehemently espouses the principles of democracy and the rights of the individual as the foundation of its constitution, should be relatively free of prejudice. Kurt Lewin (1936/1948), himself German Jewish, distinguished clearly between modal American and German personalities, the one being democratic and the other autocratic. Decision making in the former is group-centred and in the latter, leader-centred. Yet we know that prejudice and discrimination flourish within the American democracy.

What did seem to make sense to decent people, for a time, was that the atrocities of war were the prerogative of the Axis forces during the 1940s. The torture and execution of soldiers and civilians were common-place items in newspapers of the Free World, both during and after the war. The perpetrators were Germans and Japanese. The essential ingredient in this argument is that a totalitarian system breeds unquestioning obedience to authority, and that extermination of outgroup members will follow from an order by an appropriate figure. The obedient follower is still responsible for the act, since it is part of that individual's personality. The explanation of the behaviour is person-centred.

In the early 1960s, this line of reasoning came under scrutiny in a series of experiments carried out by Stanley Milgram (1974) at Yale University. By this time, the use of the experimental method in understanding social action had come under attack. Objections included: The poor fit which laboratory experimentation must have to a real social world; the lack of experimental sophistication; the bias which the experimenter can bring to the process of testing an hypothesis; the expectations of the subjects, which can distort (or artificially confirm) the experimental aim; and the failure to attend to ethical considerations in employing techniques of deception, a tendency which was becoming a hallmark of an experimental social psychology (Argyris,
1975; Gadlin & Ingle, 1975; West & Gunn, 1978).

Milgram’s work possessed the attributes required to bring these issues into an arena of both scientific and public debate. He advertised in a local newspaper, calling for volunteers to participate in an experiment dealing with memory. His method thereby avoided one other criticism of contemporary social psychology, namely, that it was a science based on the study of the behaviour of the American college sophomore. Ostensibly, the task of the subject was to help the experimenter in the study of punishment insofar as it can help memory. The subject was asked to deliver an electric shock to a learner (victim) each time he made an error in a verbal learning task.

The subject would shock the victim, via an electrode attached to his hand, while the latter was strapped to a chair. The authenticity of the experience was impressed upon the subject by giving him or her a sample shock at a “mild” voltage level, prior to the commencement of the experiment proper. The victim in most of these studies was a mild, pleasant, middle-aged male, to all intents and purposes, a business executive. The instructions included the directive to increase the level of shock for each error committed by the learner-victim. These levels were clearly marked on the control panel of the generator, there being 30 steps, each with a switch. There were also verbal labels: varying all the way from “Slight Shock” up to “XXX — Danger”.

Without knowledge of any experimental results, various samples predicted where they would break off, and refuse what was a direct order from the experimenter to continue delivering shocks of increasing intensity to the victim. Psychiatrists, college students, and middle-class adults mostly judged that they would desist at about level 10, in the range of Strong Shock. None felt they would go beyond level 20, Intense Shock. It was the view of the psychiatrists consulted, that only a rare individual would administer level 30 or 450 volts, and that person would by definition be a psychopath.

The results of the first experiments were startling. When the victim was in another room and could not be heard (Remote Con-

dition), 65% of subjects went to level 30, and a similar effect was noted even when the victim’s voice could be heard. This still held true when the victim yelled with pain, said he had a heart condition, and pleaded to be released. The effect lessened slightly when the subject was in the same room (Proximity Condition), and when required to hold the victim’s hand against the electrode (Touch Proximity Condition). Are we to conclude that a large number of psychopaths were roaming loose in the community about Yale University, when these experiments were carried out?

Milgram carried out further variations on this experimental theme. In one condition, the learner-victim asked to receive the shocks whenever the subject hesitated to deliver a punishment. In another, the experimenter (dressed in a laboratory coat) delegated his authority to a stranger, an ordinary man, dressed in street clothes. In the former case, subjects behaved in terms of the earliest modal predictions, not exceeding a level of Strong Shock, that is, there was no authority figure to obey. In the latter case, the effect of the ordinary man as order giver was to re-establish a degree of obedience to authority in the subjects. In yet another condition, the subject was initially supported by two peers, who subsequently refused to carry on with the experiment and left the room. Even when authority had been “weakened” in this way, some subjects continued to obey the experimenter to the end. As a final twist, Milgram required the subject to relay the order from the experimenter to another peer, who in turn delivered the shock. In this condition more than 90% of subjects moved into the “XXX — Danger” zone. Not wishing to deliver unnecessary pain, Milgram had in all of these experiments arranged that a confederate play the role of the victim. The initial, mild “warm-up” shock delivered to the subject was real enough to convince that the apparatus worked, but subsequently the power was turned off, so that no shocks were delivered. The victim played a convincing role with his comments, pleas, cries of anguish, and so on. The peers used were also confederates of the experimenter.

Cries of indignation quickly followed the publication of Milgram’s results. Psychol-
ogists criticized him for deceiver subjects, thereby leading them into committing immoral acts. The artificiality of psychology experiments also became a feature for comment. Press reports found this criticism particularly satisfying, since it exonerated Americans from implication in the macabre. Milgram said that he had been stimulated by Adolf Eichman’s defence, when finally brought to trial for his war crimes. The former Nazi had claimed that he was only following orders; and that in any case, he personally had not executed one Jew. Milgram was ridiculed for suggesting that his experiments had anything to do with real life, let alone pointing the finger at Americans for being capable of committing atrocities. Though some saw scientific merit in his work, Milgram felt the sting of these criticisms. He carried the marks of a scientific leper for a time. Then came the news of a massacre of men, women, and children in Vietnam in 1969, at a village called My Lai. This war scared the American Psyche more than any other, and this incident has acquired a uniqueness by exploding the myth that atrocities are only committed by the other side.

Reference has already been made to an explanation of prejudice and discrimination founded on person characteristics. The use of an individual level of explanation is clear in the views of Berkowitz (1962) in his account of the causes of aggression:

Granting all this, the present writer is still inclined to emphasize the importance of individualistic considerations in the field of group relations. Dealings between groups ultimately become problems of the psychology of the individual. Individuals decide to go to war; battles are fought by individuals; and peace is established by individuals. It is the individual who adopts the beliefs prevailing in his society, even though the extent to which these opinions are shared by many people is a factor governing his readiness to adopt them, and he transmits these views to other individuals. Ultimately, it is the single person who attacks the feared and disliked ethnic minority group, even though many people around him share his feelings and are very important in determining his willingness to aggress against this minority. (p. 167)

The social psychologist Tajfel, working at Bristol in the early 1970s, regarded this view as typical of the restricted level of explanation offered by American social psychology. Tajfel (unpublished paper, 1974) deliberately re-wrote Berkowitz’s words as follows:

Granting all this, the present writer is still inclined to emphasize the importance of considering the field of group relations in terms of social structure. Dealings between groups cannot be accounted for by the psychology of the individual. Governments decide to go to war; battles are fought by armies; and peace is established by governments. The social conditions in which groups live largely determine their beliefs and the extent to which they are shared. Ultimately, a single person’s attack on an ethnic minority group that he dislikes or fears would remain a trivial occurrence had it not been for the fact that he acts in unison with others who share his feelings and are very important in determining his willingness to aggress against this minority.

The social structure
Ironically, a break-through in melding the theoretical component of the individual to a group level of analysis took place in the United States in 1949, although the proponent was a Turk, Sherif. In his earlier work, he had demonstrated that the individual will turn readily to input from others when in doubt in decision making (Sherif, 1935). Even when decisions are concerned with fact and not opinion, most people are susceptible to social influence when the facts are unclear or ambiguous. Sherif proceeded from this base to a series of studies carried out in boys’ summer camps (Sherif & Sherif, 1953). Ostensibly, the context was natural; the boys were there to learn, enjoy, and participate in a “normal”, middle-class, White, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant camp. From Sherif’s point of view, the camp context was a social laboratory. The
twenty four 12-year-old boys were given a
couple of days to get to know each other.
When friendship patterns were beginning
to form, they were allocated to two groups
and separated into two bunk houses, in
such a way that naturally occurring friend-
ship ties were mostly severed. The boys
were told that the groups had been formed
at random. The experiments then pro-
ceeded through three typical phases:

**Ingroup formation.** The development
of interpersonal relations goes hand-in-hand
with the development of a group structure,
with the differentiated status positions and
roles. “Togetherness” is concomitant with
the emergence of group norms which regu-
late behaviour. It was Sheriff’s view that this
phase was important to intergroup re-
lations only so that ingroup solidarity could
be formed. It is the present author’s view
that there can be no ingroup without an
outgroup, the one implying the other. In
fact, Sheriff reported in his first study, that
one group chose the colour red and the
other blue as identifying markers during
the ingroup formation phase, a period in
which no intergroup contact was possible,
but one in which there was always im-
plicitly another group “out there”. Furthe-
rmore, some epithets and name-calling of
outgroup members, seen at a distance
across the camp, took place during this first
phase:

**Intergroup friction and conflict.** Now, the
two groups were brought together to take
part in a series of competitions over several
days. Sheriff felt that this was the critical
stage for the development of intergroup
prejudice and discrimination. Although he
did not believe that face-to-face contact
was an essential ingredient for conflict, he
did argue that intergroup tension was de-
rived from a social structure in which there
was competition for limited resources.
These competitions consisted of athletic
and other contests, such as tug-of-war, or
cleaning the cook house. Points were ac-
cumulated from these encounters, there
were prizes to be won, but these depended
on being a member of the victorious team.
Sherif found that one group, the Bull Dogs,
felt provoked enough by the events to de-
stroy the food of their adversaries, the Red
Devils. Posters were constructed showing
ingroup triumphing over outgroup. On
another occasion, the Bull Dogs raided and
did moderate damage to the bunk house of
their rivals. In a second study of groups
called the Eagles and the Rattlers, the
Eagles captured and burnt the Rattlers’
flag; the Rattlers meantime hoisted an
Eagle’s pants aloft in derision. The boys
groups were therefore mirroring real life,
where intergroup conflict derives from an
objective clash of interests, be it minerals,
oil deposits, water or land. The wider im-
plementation was that the world needs to be re-
structured to avoid such conflicts. The ulti-
mate conclusion to Sheriff’s logic would
seem to be to break down group barriers,
but to do this the groups themselves would
need to be dissolved.

**Reduction of intergroup conflict.** This was
attempted in the first study by removing
the competitive element from occasions of
intergroup contact. Mealtimes and other
casual activities were now shared, the boys
were encouraged to play with each other,
but an impasse seemed to have been
reached: Group divisions were mostly
maintained. Sheriff tried to mould a new
group identity by, pitting the camp as a
whole, in baseball, against another camp.
This proved to no avail. When the camp
dispersed, the friendship choices of phase 2
had overridden the choices of phase 1.
Time had run out: Once a Bull Dog, always
a Bull Dog.

In a follow-up study, Sheriff explored
another hypothesis more carefully: Groups
might pull together if they could recognize a
common goal, rather than a common
enemy. This goal must be accepted as
superordinate; it must be mutually ben-
eficial, and only attainable by cooperation.
So, when the camp water tank becomes
inexplicably blocked (arranged by the ex-
perimenters), many hands would be needed
to unblock it; and when the camp attendant
clumsily drove the only camp truck into the
camp swamp, the tug-of-war could be di-
rected against the truck, with both groups
manfully pulling.

Sherif had taken a significant step
towards an understanding of intergroup
discrimination by emphasizing the role of
the intergroup relationship, and ignoring
the myriad of idiosyncratic events which
Identity and the social structure

Sherif had rightly demonstrated that a groups-in-competition situation is a sufficient condition for a groups-in-conflict outcome, involving the growth of negative outgroup stereotypes and acts of discrimination. It was left to Tajfel (1970) to undermine this premise. The simple division of people into groups, “We” and “They”, was proposed as the necessary and sufficient condition for intergroup discrimination and prejudice to ensue. Before dealing with this line of research, however, attention is given to the topic of children’s perception of interethnic relations in New Zealand, and to trace the evolution of the present author’s thinking over the years as it evolved from an individual level to a societal level of analysis.

The beginnings of this research were founded in American studies of the development of ethnic awareness and attitudes in Black and White children. Most of the early studies, conducted in the 1930s and 1940s, required children to select from pictures and dolls having different ethnic cues the ones which looked most like themselves. Responses to such tests were thought to indicate what the children actually thought they were, that is, their ethnic self-identification. A common finding in these early studies was that Black children selected White pictures and White dolls as looking most like themselves.

The remainder of this paper deals with the concept of ethnic identity, attempting to explain it first by an Individual-Psychological model, and then by a Social-Psychological model. The latter model is applicable not only to an understanding of ethnic identity development, but also to Maori-Pakeha relationships, and to an analysis of other intergroup contexts.

An individual-psychological model

In line with the thrust of modern social psychology, this model views the person as an information processor (Vaughan, 1986a). The term “perceptual act” indicates that the child can attend to the percept (another real person) or even to a representation (e.g., a photograph) of another person and of self. “Cognitive Process” refers to the growing capacity of the child to learn about everyday objects, people, and even abstractions, which follow from interactions with the environment. The child not only learns to differentiate between elements, but also to generalize about them, to categorize them, and to verbally label them — as apples, boats, Pakehas, and so on.

The model allows for the interplay of an “Affective Process”, to refer to response classes in which the child treats stimuli in evaluative terms, basically liking some things more than others.

The child is also simultaneously making comparisons with others, and these provide information about self. In Figure 1, the attribute is ethnicity. Over time, the individual acquires information about a variety of ethnic groups, including the ingroup, which allows an ethnic concept to form. The output, gradually crystallizing, is one’s ethnic identity. The following illustration, based on data gathered in this country, shows how this model can be used.

In the research commenced at the beginning of the 1960s (Vaughan, 1963a, 1963b, 1964a, 1964b), Maori and Pakeha children responded to a series of ethnic awareness and attitude tests administered by own-race interviewers. In all, four major studies were carried out during that decade, and more than 1,000 children were involved. There were seven tests of awareness of ethnic difference and of self-identification, and three tests of interethnic attitudes.

The materials used included:

1. Monochrome pen sketches of children, presented in sets of three and used to assess the capacity of the child to differentiate “which one is different from the other two?” A set consisted either of one Caucasian face with two Polynesian faces, or vice versa. These materials were also used to determine self-identification (“which one of these looks most like you?”).

2. A doll assembly task, in which the child pieced together 12 skin-coloured parts to make up manikin figures (two boys or two girls). The research questions were the same as in 1, but the test concentrated
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Figure 1. An individual psychological model of ethnic identity development.

on the child’s sensitivity to skin colour as a cue.

3. Three dimensional dolls, pink skinned versus brown skinned, blue-eyed versus brown-eyed; wearing Western clothing versus traditional Maori clothing. The test was designed to measure the child’s capacity to use ethnic (e.g., “Maori”) or other physical (e.g., “brown”) referents.

As a group, these tests dealt with the child’s ability to self-identify using ethnic cues, to differentiate between figures on the basis of such cues, and to categorize the figures as belonging to some known group (perhaps Maori or Pakeha).

The results of the earliest study highlighted the earliest age at which each of the seven awareness tests were mastered by a significant majority of children in a given age group. Two crucial points emerged. First, in Pakeha children, the development of awareness of ethnic differences and ethnic identity followed a tidy sequence. In order, children mastered (achieved significant success in): (a) self-identification tests (“which one looks like you?”); (b) discrimination tests, or the differentiation of the “one that is different”; and (c) classification tests where a verbal categorization such as “Maori” or “Pakeha” was employed. This trend suggested a steady, cognitive growth of an ethnic concept. Second, in Maori children, the overall pattern of growth was similar, with a notable exception; they did not identify with Maori figures until much older, at 9-10 years compared with 4-5 years for Pakehas.

The overall results are shown in Figure 2. Test level (1-7) orders the tests from identification (1,2), through discrimination (2,3,4), to classification (6,7). For Pakeha children, the seven tests constituted a Guttman scale. The apparent, delayed self-identification in Maori children echoed already published data for young American Blacks. A critical concept in understanding this phenomenon is the affective process incorporated in Figure 1. Sensitivity to race can be awareness of privilege, so that self-identification tests using ethnic materials can involve a child in dealing with the question of how the child evaluates members of both the ingroup and the outgroup. The answer to the riddle of delayed self-identification lies, therefore, in the nature of the attitudes held by the children towards the two comparison groups.

The New Zealand data were unique in their time by their link with the same children’s attitudes to each ethnic group. Attitudes were measured by three tests, two being of ethnic preference. In one, the child selected a doll, ostensibly as a gift for another child. In another, a playmate was chosen from a series of pictures of children’s faces. In the third test, the child

Figure 2. Delayed ingroup identification in Maori children.
made a series of forced choices of favourable and unfavourable stereotypes in pairwise comparisons of Maori and Pakeha faces. Pakeha children consistently favoured their own group on these tests. This trend peaked at six years, at which age there was nearly a total rejection of Maori figures. By 12 years, own-group choices were still clear, but a process of stereotype differentiation had commenced, so that the Maori may be “lazier”, but also “kinder”.

The Maori results were nearly a mirror image. Preference for Pakeha figures was strongest at six years of age, whereas at 12, ingroup preference was detected for the first time in the age range. However, up to 10 years of age Maoris favoured Pakeha figures, and it was in this age range that they also identified with Pakehas on the awareness tests referred to earlier. Porter has observed that “Racial self-identification is a poor measure of awareness, for [American] black children who are highly aware of racial differences may identify as white because they dislike their racial status” (Porter, 1971, p.23). The present author’s interpretation of the New Zealand data in the context of the 1960s, was that ethnic self-identification tests were virtually attitude tests; that cognitive and affective processes were entwined; and that the young participants were sensitive to the existing social structure, to the existing privilege which demarcated majority-minority relationships.

A social-psychological model

This model incorporates both the individual and the social structure, each providing inputs to psychological processes. The upper portion (see Figure 3) retains elements from the Individual model. The essential differences are:

1. The existing social structure appears as an input via path b.

2. Persons can be dealt with at two levels: As individuals, and as individuals-in-categories.

3. There are two levels at which the individual can compare self with others: interpersonal and intergroup, which promote two aspects of identity, personal and social. The output is self-concept. This is a general model which could be applied to ethnic identity, gender identity, national identity, political identity, and so on.

The thrust of thinking about path a1 has been explored by Festinger (1954), who proposed that individuals use each other as a context for comparing thoughts, feelings and actions, which in turn provides a locus for self. Cross (1986) has applied this path to an analysis of conflicting research findings about the existence of negative self-esteem in American Blacks. Most researchers have failed to distinguish between methods which elicit comparisons with others-in-general, (path a1) relying on universal behavioural, or internal state, indices found in individuals and methods which require the individual to orient to own group compared with an ethnic outgroup. Cross calls the latter “Reference Group Orientation”, and it fits well with the output of paths a2 and b in Figure 3.

Now consider the box “Individuals-in-categories”. The underlying process here is social categorization, according to which attributes perceived in people lead the individual to render them functionally equivalent, and to respond to them in terms of class membership instead of uniqueness. Social categories have one or more of the following characteristics: Practical, oversimplified, gross, emotional, and irrational (cf. Allport, 1954).

Path a2 indicates that the individual finds it natural to classify people into groups. For example, they can be shorter or taller, younger or older, male or female.

The key concept in Tajfel’s (1978) theory of intergroup relations is social identity, which is the most important product of one’s group memberships. Just as Festinger (1954) had suggested that social comparison with other individuals allows the person to strive towards a satisfactory image of the self, so do social groups allow the person to share the attributes which go with membership, and which mark one group off from another. A person’s self-image is critically dependent on the degree to which the attributes of membership are positively perceived. The groups of importance to the person are membership groups (ingroups) and the relevant groups with which these are compared (outgroups). Knowledge of group boundaries derives from the process
of social categorization. The ease with which categories can be formed, and used, was demonstrated in an experiment where adolescent boys were divided randomly into two groups, though the boys believed it was their preference for the work of different artists that led to their grouping. Later, acting as individuals, they were highly biased in giving more rewards to ingroup than to outgroup members. Further, they tended to maximize the difference in reward size in favour of ingroup members.

This research paradigm was extended in a study of younger children, 7- and 11-year-old boys and girls (Vaughan, Tajfel, & Williams, 1981). The children were allocated at random to two groups, one Red, and the other Blue. The children did not know which of their classmates had been categorized along with them, as Red or Blue group members. Tested individually, they were later given the opportunity to give sets of coins to members of the Red or the Blue group over a series of trials. As with Tajfel’s earlier study, these young children also showed a high level of ingroup bias. Not only did they give more coins to children from their own group, but also maximized the difference between the rewards given to ingroup and outgroup members. It seems that the profit motive, even in small children, is heavily tempered by a need to maintain a relative advantage. There is another term for this kind of distancing: discrimination.

Three other points emerged from this study: First, the discriminatory effect was very strong, and it was not possible to make it stronger when the ingroup/outgroup dichotomy (an intergroup manipulation) was dropped, and a “best friend” vs. “enemy” one (an interpersonal manipulation) was introduced. Second, outgroup discrimination was powerful at seven years of age, and did not increase thereafter. Third, girls showed it as strongly as boys.

Why is discrimination so pervasive? Distancing an outgroup keeps the intergroup boundary distinct, and the clearer one’s own group is, the clearer one’s picture of self becomes. Knowing who one is, through intergroup comparisons, provide crucial definitions to self-concept.

Path b in Figure 3 indicates that a social structure precedes the existence of any given individual. The child enters an environment where the relations between ingroup and relevant others are already specified. When the context is ethnic, there will be an ingroup and a relevant outgroup. The consequent intergroup comparison will mould an aspect of social identity, and contribute to self concept. In the New Zealand studies, young children of both ethnic
groups identified with Pakeha figures, reflecting their awareness of an existing social structure — one which they could not influence. For the Maori children, Pakehas served temporarily as a positive reference point.

Since society can change, the input from path b is not static. For example, the abolition of slavery in the United States created an enormous problem in restructuring Black-White relationships, for the Blacks as well as Whites. Changes in the role of minority groups has accelerated since the civil rights movements in the United States and in other parts of the world. We tend to think of a “minority” as a small group in a community. Population, however, is not the key. Access to power is. Disadvantage in education, health, and wealth can be other markers. Today, challenge to the status quo can occur in any country. The lesson of equal opportunity is disseminated worldwide, with images of an alternative future for any underprivileged group, for any oppressed nation.

The New Zealand research referred to in this paper were drawn from four studies, and have been re-analyzed to reflect this change of mood (cf. Vaughan, 1978). They were separated in time and in region (Horowhenua — Rural 1963; North Auckland — Rural 1965; Wellington Urban — 1961; Auckland — Urban 1971). The overall results are shown in Figure 4. In the two rural areas, both ethnic groups favoured Pakehas. While Pakehas in the cities continued to favour their own-group, this was less marked than in the rural samples. The biggest change, however, was the shift to own-group favouritism by Auckland Maoris tested in the 1970s. All of these effects were more marked in older children (not shown separately in Figure 4). Two factors probably account for these results, urbanism and time period. Urbanism is likely to make inroads into the relatively static majority-minority relationship found in many rural communities. The shift to the city for many Maoris signalled the destruction of the extended family, introduced a degree of ethnic competition into the urban labour force, and signalled the possible end of a language for an entire culture. The second factor relates to the last sample tested; it was in the early 1970s that the (Maori) Brown Power movement was born, modeled on the American Black Power movement. The significance of both factors is discussed in more detail elsewhere (Vaughan, 1978, 1986b).

Conclusions

1. Prejudice, discrimination, large-scale aggression, and war continued as part of the human condition, and an increasingly technologically-oriented civilization seems no better equipped than a more primitive one in eliminating these phenomena.

2. Older theories of prejudice and discrimination stressed real, genetic differences between groups of people. Some regimes fostered these beliefs to justify oppression and genocide.

3. Even explanations which emphasized that attitudes can be learned tended to also argue that prejudice and discrimination resided in extreme or deviant personalities. Milgram demolished the substance of this view; most people will carry out orders which can harm others, especially when the authority seems legitimate.

4. Sherif contributed by showing that groups exert power over their members, and support discriminatory acts against an outgroup. However, it seems he erred in arguing that discrimination will only flower when the objective interests of groups are in conflict.

5. Tajfel pointed to the very existence of groups as the essential cause of prejudice.
and discrimination. Outgroups provide a reference and must be kept at bay.

6. Vaughan developed a social-psychological model of the relationship between personal identity, social identity and self-concept. In this sense, the model deals with “positive” processes. However, the model also deals with the concept of group boundaries, which can be maintained by acts of discrimination (a “negative” process) against the outgroup. In applying it to a series of New Zealand intergroup studies, Vaughan found that both ethnic groups showed a strong ethnic preference for Pakehas in the earliest work. In later work, Maoris became more ingroup-oriented. The model, therefore, emphasizes the role of social-structural relationships in determining the course of attitudes, prejudice and discrimination against outgroup members.

7. Social inequality presents members of minorities with the impossible task of maintaining self-esteem. Presently, there are movements in many countries for the underprivileged to get a more equitable deal. Unfortunately, even when groups are perceived to be equal, the maintenance of psychological boundaries can lead to distrust, prejudice, and discrimination. The challenge for the psychologist is to contribute to an understanding of how a group can preserve its integrity, contribute to positive self-esteem amongst its members, but to prevent the inevitable intergroup comparison process from leading to negative outgroup evaluations.

References


Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung (1972). Peking: Foreign Languages Press.


