New Zealand Journal of Psychology

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Editor’s Introduction

Today, the day of first publication of this issue of the New Zealand Journal of Psychology, marks the one-month anniversary of the terror attack on Al Noor Mosque and Linwood Islamic Centre in Christchurch. While this issue is a response to this atrocity, and the broader context in which it occurred, it is important to be explicit - this is not a ‘special issue’, because ‘special issues’ are often celebratory, something ‘special’. Instead, this can be considered a rapid response to the tragedy in Christchurch.

Psychology, as both a research enterprise and applied practice, has a long history of attempting to understand and remediate the foundations and impacts of prejudice and discrimination. This issue is not a celebration of that heritage because, in an ideal world, we would be able to celebrate using our knowledge and tools to end these phenomena. The events in Christchurch show that the most extreme forms of hatred are no longer things we observe only on the international news. Instead, the intent here is to contribute to the discussion that has exploded into our lives, in which we (and others) ask questions like “Why did this happen?”, “How could it happen to us?”, and “Will Aotearoa ever be the same?”, among others. These questions will be with us for years to come.

We believe that psychology has something to say about these, and other pressing questions. In the immediate aftermath we have seen the rapid development of at least two competing narratives. The first narrative is that this is “not us”, that New Zealand is not fertile ground for extremism. This has subsequently been pitted against arguments that this is simply an extreme manifestation of something that is always with us, an extension of everyday prejudices and plausibly deniable, and not so deniable, discriminatory acts. These are not mutually exclusive.

The commentaries, reviews, and empirical pieces contained in this issue speak to this potential contradiction, providing not just food for thought but also suggestions for where to go next. To this end, we are tremendously grateful to those people who responded to our invitation to consider preparing their work and commentary for this issue, particularly given the absurd timeframe of two weeks from invitation to submission.

We are grateful to our intellectual whānau in other countries who have responded to this invitation, and taken the time to help us understand. These include Stephen Reicher and colleagues, and the British Psychological Society, for permission to reprint their commentary published in the BPS’ Psychologist, illustrating some of the international response to our painful experience. Michael Platow, himself formerly of the University of Otago and now in Australia, describes The Prejudice Census in collaboration with his international colleagues, shedding some perspective on the nature of everyday -isms. The New Zealand Muslim community is, as we have come to know, a small one, so we are grateful to Sunnya and Nigar Khawaja from QUT for providing us with ‘an Islamic perspective on grief and loss’. Indeed, we’re pleased that they are ‘just’ two of the Muslim voices contributing to this endeavour – including people whose own lives have been devastated by this atrocity.

As well as these commentaries, this issue includes at least one practical piece – Martin Dorahy and Neville Blampied’s suggestions for screening those affected by this latest tragedy, itself tragically informed by their experience following the 2011 Christchurch earthquake.

And, of course, more traditional empirical contributions – mainly from the University of Auckland (home of the New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study) and the University of Otago, including both survey- and laboratory-based studies. These contributions speak to the context in which terror has occurred, including what it means to be a New Zealander or pākehā, and how these relate to diversity, multiculturalism, and immigration attitudes. These contributions reflect on civic engagement and resilience, how trust relates to discrimination, as well as the bread-and-butter of social psychology – intergroup attitudes at the broadest levels. Given that we (collectively) have devoted ourselves to studying these phenomena, publishing our research in international journals, it seems now is the time to consider what these mean for our understanding of our own backyard.

There is no more visceral reminder that the things that we study and practice are not a spectator sport, or a thought experiment, than the tragedy in Christchurch. We add our voices, and sadness, and hope, to that of the people whose lives have been directly or indirectly, and forever, marked.

Marc Wilson
15th April, 2019
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Understanding the Terror Attack: Some Initial Steps

Margaret Wetherell
University of Auckland, New Zealand

As I write this in early April I am incoherent as I think we all are, still reeling from the terror attack on the Muslim community in Christchurch. Once again Muslims are the victims, coerced witnesses to the twisted narratives, fantasies, and hate of white ethno-nationalism. As a Pākehā person I ruminate over our complicity, our silences, failures and histories of entitlement, the things we haven’t done. Nightmares of the physical horror of the shootings intersperse with images of the faces of those who died, Ardern’s grave dignity and serious purpose, Farid Ahmed’s extraordinary act of forgiveness, the banks of flowers, the arms of protection that too late try to circle New Zealand’s mosques.

What can we say as psychologists that might help us understand? Perhaps very little on our own. No doubt the most useful expertise will be in ways of best supporting those in trauma. In the longer term, this event will require a broad inter-disciplinary trajectory of explanation, laying down a path with Muslim colleagues and scholars, step by step, that might contribute to productive routes forward. This is not a true crime series. We know who did it and roughly why. It is now all about trying to understand the context, and the situation. Colleagues have started this process in the UK. Stephen Reicher, Alex Haslam and Jay Van Bavel have written a deeply insightful piece in the British Psychological Society in-house journal The Psychologist thinking through the toxic identity and group dynamics that produced the killer as an ‘engaged follower’. They analyse bits of his manifesto to demonstrate the way his poisonous ideology defined ‘us’ and ‘them’, dehumanising ‘them’ as a warrant for the attack, following the kind of murderous logic characteristic also of Nazi Germany.

For obvious reasons I am not going to analyse the killer’s words here and in fact we don’t need to do more of that. Why was white ethno-nationalism persuasive in the first place, and what tools can democratic social justice movements use in response? Crucially – what do these challenges mean for Aotearoa New Zealand? How does Islamophobia intertwine with older forms of racism, and with ethnic relations formed through the deep historical violence of Empire? What are the intersections between extremist violence and certain forms of masculinity? For years we have studied racism and that work continues to be relevant. But there is a danger with new atrocities if social psychologists assume familiar theory and research offer a template that can be simply layered over a new event.

I know something about the 20th century ideologies Pākehā people used to justify colonialism and Māori disadvantage (Wetherell and Potter, 1992). I think I have some handle on identity dynamics, but I don’t know enough about the new international communities of hate, I don’t know how Islamophobia works, and the ways in which these movements intertwine with what happens here, affecting all seen as ‘other’. What I can offer is simply four suggestions about possible starting points.

Let’s not evoke lone wolves and/or the universality of prejudice: It is so tempting as a psychologist to follow some familiar strategies when faced with the need to explain such as searching for a universal law of behaviour or a compelling account of individual pathology. These can lead in such contradictory directions: ‘unfortunately group-based violence is just part of human nature and to be expected’ and/or ‘he was a just a lone wolf, one evil individual’ – neither direction takes us very far. Of course, the killer was evil and he was exceptional, but this is a partial truth that obscures. Why was evil expressed in this way? How did this specific kind of evil become thinkable? How does ‘exceptional evil’ become banal, normative and routine as it did in Nazi Germany, for instance? The rhetoric of human nature, meanwhile, is often combined with the view that both ‘sides’ are blameworthy – Islamic fundamentalists and far right white supremacists – both have engaged in terror. But again this does not get us very far. The more urgent questions are always – why this, why now, what does it mean, and what to do next?

In their 2012 edited collection Beyond Prejudice, John Dixon and Mark Levine pull together a collection of critical articles describing social psychology’s reliance on the concept of prejudice as a general catch all explanation for racism, sexism, homophobia, and so on. The authors argue that this approach has run its course, and explore what can be put in its place. Applied to the terror attack in Christchurch, a classic prejudice argument might be that categorising and distinguishing between groups is part of our biological inheritance. Once the world is categorised in terms of groups, human irrationality and cognitive limitations lead to stereotypes and over-generalisation. In this account, we are all vulnerable to being prejudiced, and in this sense ‘normal’ prejudice is on a continuum with the extreme prejudice shown by the Christchurch killer. For emotionally disturbed individuals, ‘everyday’ prejudice will fuel active hatred and violent aggression. The solution recommended by prejudice theorists, from the Enlightenment onwards, has been education, or the assumption that ‘learning to tolerate’ will avoid the ‘mischief of irrationality’.

As Michael Billig (1988) points out, however, my rationality is often your irrationality. Enlightenment rationalism, too, has been used to justify acts of barbaric violence. After all, many Enlightenment philosophers owned slaves or participated in the slave trade. Tolerance as a kind of ‘largesse of the powerful’ is no solution either. To understand the terror attack in Christchurch we need to get specific. Why is it normative for some groups in some contexts to turn to violence while other groups do not see that as legitimate? What is the social history of our current group categorisations? What kinds of differences between people become noticeable and who benefits from that? How do some groups become empowered to act out? And, if most people in a society insist on their
rationality, and that they are not prejudiced, why are those ‘tolerant’ societies still racist and unequal? Prejudice explanations are too individualistic; we need to hear from social historians, sociologists, anthropologists and economists to build a deep picture of why them, why now.

Focus on ideological flows and identity dynamics: The other day I heard some fascinating commentary on Radio New Zealand about the terror attack from UK based journalist and social activist, Laurie Penny. There were two points that struck me in particular. First, Penny argues that our image of fascism is out of date – we imagine a political party, soldiers marching in massive public spaces, uniforms and insignia, and the iconography of Hitler salutes – in other words a highly visible political phenomenon with a figurehead and ideologue, one-party government and dictatorship. Instead, she suggests that the fascism and white ethno-nationalism mushrooming globally on the internet are relatively invisible, and almost mainstream in new ways which are hard to combat. Many of the classic features of fascism can be found – authoritarianism, ultra-nationalism, attempts to forcibly silence critics, misogyny, advocacy for violence towards those outside the core group - but dispersed in thousands of places across the global internet.

Leaders such as Trump aid and abet, through their dog whistles, their unwillingness to call out white supremacist movements, their demonizing of Muslims and through their hostile environments for migrants but the ideological flow is dispersed, everywhere and nowhere, there in the millions of views of YouTube rants that do not seem to add up to much individually, in the connections between torrents of abuse directed at women, the links between movements such as Incel, Islamophobia, Identitarianism, and so on. Penny goes on to argue that most of us like to think that we would have known what to do in the 1940s, we would have known to fight back, and whose side to be on, but that is much less clear when fascism is hidden in plain sight. How does this new hate construct its recipients? And, a question from further back in the process - how did the effective practice of aggressive, violent, ‘righteous’ indignation become so normalised? How do affect and particular discourses combine and intensify? The post war period in the global North saw an unprecedented banishment of violence from the public sphere, now it is slowly creeping back.

Maybe there is a slow radicalisation going on of not just a pathological few but whole cultures, and it is this level of cultural change that produces the extremist few? This relates to Penny’s second point. She didn’t use this terminology but it is one I find useful for thinking about cultural shifts – Raymond Williams’ (1977) notion of a ‘structure of feeling’. Williams argued that a community, a culture, a generation are distinguished by what he described as a kind of practical consciousness, a common sense of values, notions of how the world works, dominant feelings, debates and forms of experience. For Aotearoa New Zealand, we could contrast the structure of feeling of Pākehā New Zealand in the 1950s, for instance, with the structure of feeling of the 2000s. The ‘characters’ of each period are different, what is taken for granted, the hopes, ambitions and horizon of expectations. There are no clear boundaries in structures of feeling, some themes continue, others disappear, change is gradual and often difficult to articulate.

Penny is interested in exploring how the window of public discourse and public emotion has shifted in recent years to a greater acceptability for hate and white ethno-nationalism. Maybe the attack in Christchurch will bring some reflexivity and some transparency to this shift in what is seen as acceptable discourse. But, in terms of explanation, it seems to me that it is this territory of new ideological flows, and the identities these offer, that we have to grasp. These new settlements are key to understanding the radicalisation process and the ways in which emotions, subjectivities, group norms, and systems of justification can begin to intertwine in hugely harmful ways.

Supporting Muslim and Māori scholars in gazing back: The notion of ‘gazing back’ I want to highlight here comes from Alice Te Punga Somerville’s blog post on Brexit (see also Te Punga Somerville, 2012 and Borell, 2017). She describes obsessively watching the UK Brexit referendum results on television - a Māori woman and her Fijian partner engrossed by the unfolding drama. She is thinking about an illustration by Gustav Dore that depicts Thomas Babington Macauley’s imagining of a future to come where a New Zealander will sit on a broken arch of London Bridge to sketch the ruins of St Pauls. (In 1840, when Babington Macauley was writing, ‘New Zealander’ meant Māori.) Te Punga Somerville brilliantly unpicks Dore’s image and uses it as a device to reflect on the potential gaze back from indigenous people in the former colony to the ruined empire.

The point in gazing back is to reverse and disrupt the normal direction of analytic traffic, from the white British or Pākehā researcher to the migrant and indigenous subject, and to understand differently. Ann Phoenix (1991) has argued that too often black British people, for example, are ‘a pathologised presence and a normalised absence’ in psychological research, and the same could be said of Muslim and Māori, and other ethnic minority groups in Aotearoa. The support needed, therefore, is about finding the spaces, funds and jobs for Muslim and Māori researchers to keep on going with their work, discovering ways of healing, understanding trauma, and registering what it is like to live in hostile environments typified by micro-aggressions, the impacts and life-long consequences. This entails difficult research by Māori and Muslim researchers on Pākehā racism and Islamophobia – difficult because, as Belinda Borell (2017) describes, the emotional labour involved in recording and listening to privilege when that privilege is not yours is enormous. Borell’s thesis is an important starting point. She used kaupapa Māori methods to explore Pākehā privilege and the kinds of justifications offered for white colonial entitlement, analysing the uncomfortable hesitations, the everyday discourses, and the distancing and defensive rationales.

Understanding the fine lines of leadership: Jacinda Ardern has received global admiration for her leadership in this crisis and rightly so. But I also want to understand what she did and why it was so effective, and that’s important for the future. Many accounts pick up on the ways in which Ardern focused on spreading aroha, trying to mitigate hate through love, empathy and compassion. This was key, but as the Australian social theorist, Ghassen Hage (2019), has commented, love alone is never enough. It is the way love is mobilised and, I would add, how positive emotion is
organised with the making of meaning and identity.

Not long after the event, I saw a tweet from the UK that said: ‘why are we making so much fuss about a white woman just doing her job?’ The tweeter was making the point that we need to change the conversation from Ardern’s noble acts, and focus on the lives of those who were killed. This was before we did find out more about those who died, and indeed must be centre-stage, not the homogeneous attacked, but people with histories, with lives, and with reasons to live. As many have noted, this should not be about making white people feel better.

But there are ways and ways of doing one’s job. Understanding the fine lines of leadership in this case, and the political choices, involves grasping that the identity Ardern chose to speak from was not ‘white woman’ but New Zealander, defined as a person from this place. She spoke from an inclusive national identity, and as the representative of a country with, as she described in an interview with Waleed Aly (New Zealand Herald, 2019), 200 ethnicities and 160 languages (more ethnicities than there are countries in the world). What was compelling was the way Ardern drew identity boundaries in the hours after the attack – ‘they are us, he is not us’. Aroha was not indiscriminate, it would flow from the collective to those so deeply wounded, and white supremacists were placed outside this collective.

In her speech at the memorial event two weeks after the killings, Ardern described the open-heartedness of the Muslim community who ‘had every right to express anger but instead opened their doors for all of us to grieve with them.’ She described their stories of seeking refuge and arrival, and for some these are stories of long establishment in Aotearoa, noting that: ‘these stories, they now form part of our collective memories.’ She also said, ‘we can be the nation that discovers the cure’ for hate and racism and, of course, with these words offered the people from this place a particular kind of national identity to take up and use to define who we are in this moment, in addition to shame and misery.

Effective leaders work with events and the material conditions determining people’s lives, and they supply narratives that make sense of these. But, crucially, to be persuasive, these narratives must contain logics and lines that are already present, tacit and sometimes explicit, in the nation’s communal structure of feeling. Ardern, then, drew on a New Zealand exceptionalist discourse of ‘best little nation in the world’, where best here came to mean welcome, warmth, openness and caring. In an odd way, after the attack, I was reminded of the time when New Zealand hosted the Rugby World Cup. I was newly returned to New Zealand, and it was so striking after the anomic of London and the UK the ways in which people cared about being good hosts in very immediate and personal ways, rushing to the airport to greet arriving teams, making sure tourists were properly fed, housing them in their own homes when beds ran short, exemplifying and modelling the welcoming and collective generosity so pervasive in Māori and Pacifica cultures, and flying the flags of all the rugby nations from their cars.

A number of colleagues read an earlier draft and I am grateful for their time. I hope that what she might have accomplished is a decisive resetting.

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REFERENCES


Political leaders often try to do this kind of discursive work, supplying energising national narratives, but they are persuasive and effective only to the extent they mobilise existing identity trajectories, and if they act skillfully. It is important to be clear here. I am not arguing that the nation’s dominant response of shock and aroha was inevitable, and I am not buying into New Zealand’s sense of exceptionalism, but suggesting that, fortunately, this was one of the emergent ways of being that happened to be possible right here, right now. Structures of feeling are complex, dynamic and contradictory. It would have been easy, perhaps, for Ardern to pull on other threads in our national common sense and set up narratives for exclusion, tit for tat, violent expulsion, marginalising and minimising the victims. Those logics were waiting also in the wings.

Ardern’s political work and constructive choices don’t change overnight a hostile climate, a colonial history, or make white ethno-nationalists think again, but they are likely to reinforce and bolster some positive paths and may have significant material effects, worked through everyday actions. I think that what she achieved was an intervention in the flow of ideology/identity/affect, the flow which authorises and legitimates feelings and actions, and which formulates common sense. If the world is drifting to fascism and hate, self-consciously she tried to remind us of other imaginings and other configurations of identity, emotion and sense making. I hope that what she might have accomplished is a decisive resetting.

Acknowledgement

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Understanding the terror attacks

Coping with loss and bereavement: An Islamic perspective

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Queensland University of Technology

The aim of the present commentary is to inform mental and allied health professionals about Islamic perspectives on life and death in the context of recent events. Further, religious and cultural factors that may help bereaved Muslims cope with their grief and make meaning of their loss are discussed. The tragic deaths of 50 Muslim worshippers at the Al Noor Mosque and Linwood Islamic Centre, Christchurch has not only shaken the World, it has triggered immense debate and reflection at an international level. New Zealand is a multicultural society. Muslims from all over the world call New Zealand home and live amongst other ethnic communities. At this difficult time New Zealand mental and allied health professionals, experienced in dealing with emotional responses of people, are keen to support the families of the deceased. However, these health professionals may have varying levels of information about Islamic perspectives associated with death and coping, therefore, it is expected that this commentary would assist the professional in their endeavors to assist Muslims in a culturally appropriate and safe manner.

Key Words: Coping; Death; Grief; Healing; Islam; Life; Loss; Muslims.

The tragic event on 15 March, 2019, on Al Noor Mosque and Linwood Islamic Centre at Christchurch, has shaken this peaceful nation and shocked the international community. On this day the Muslim community of Christchurch gathered to offer their Friday (Jumma) prayers. However, 50 innocent Muslim people lost their lives at the hands of a terrorist gunman with right wing extremist views (BBC, 2019). This islamophobic attack, the horrific massacre of innocent Muslims, in a place of worship, has left Christchurch and the international community distraught and mourning the loss of their Muslim brothers and sisters. The general population and the Muslim community in Christchurch is trying to come to terms with this event. Although all stakeholders are in the midst of trying to understand and make sense the cause of this tragedy in order to prevent such events, mental and allied health professionals are trying to assist the grieving individuals and families. Thus, it is paramount to understand Muslims’ religious and cultural beliefs about bereavement and healing.

New Zealand is a diverse country with people from various ethnic and religious backgrounds. Although New Zealand has a population of 4.3 million people, it is estimated that one in four individuals identify as culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD) (Victoria University of Wellington, 2011). With a substantial amount of the population born overseas, there is an increase of multiculturalism and religious diversity. Further, this diversity is expected to rise in the future due to an increasing indigenous population and increased uptake of people from refugee and migrant backgrounds across the globe (Berry & Sam, 2014; Ward & Mascogre, 2008). Many of these relocated individuals and families are Muslims. Islam, which originated in Arabia in 570 AD, rapidly spread to all neighbouring regions. The mass movement of people, across centuries, has taken Muslims to all corners of the globe including New Zealand.

The number of Muslim people in New Zealand has increased significantly over the last three decades (Victoria University of Wellington, 2011). Muslim people make up approximately one percent of the total population. Most Muslims living in New Zealand were born overseas (Victoria University of Wellington, 2011). New Zealand Muslims come from a range of ethnic backgrounds. The most prominent ethnicities are Indian and Middle Eastern including Arab, Iranian and Iraqi (Victoria University of Wellington, 2011). It is important to note that although Muslims have different ethnic origins, they are connected through one common thread that is their Islamic faith. Despite subtle differences among their cultures, most of the Muslim communities share collectivistic features. Members of the collectivistic cultures lead interdependent lives, where group membership is prioritised over one’s self (Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995). In collectivistic cultures, members of a family and extended community interact regularly with each other. Families and communities are intertwined and act as each other’s support network and system. Holistic approaches, which may involve multiple family and community members are often adopted to resolve psycho-social, financial and personal matters (Gregg, 2007).

The term Muslims is used for those who follow the religion of Islam. Islam, the second largest religion in the World shares beliefs with Judaism and Christianity. It is based on Abraham’s beliefs of one God (Esposito, 2009). Its followers respect and believe in all prophets and regard Mohammad (peace be upon him) as the last of the prophets sent by the God. In order to understand the Islamic perspective on death, it is important to first understand the importance of life, followed by death and then the afterlife. Muslims believe that all people and all living organisms originate from God, belong to God and will return to God at the time of death (Rubin & Yasien-Esmail, 2004). A person’s life is considered to be sacred. The birth and death of a person is considered very precious in Islam as God bestowed life and only God has the ability to take it away (Rubin & Yasien-Esmail, 2004). Islam encourages Muslim people to lead a decent and fulfilling life undertaking good deeds. A Muslim can live a decent life and accomplish good deeds throughout his/her life by following the foundations of Islam known as the ‘five pillars of
Islam’ (Hitchcock, 2005). These basic beliefs are the building blocks of Islam: faith, prayer, charity, fasting and pilgrimage (Hitchcock, 2005). Faith refers to Muslims’ belief in one God and his messenger the Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him). Prayer refers to the act of praying five times in a day. Charity refers to the act of making a contribution to the underprivileged and impoverished. Fasting refers to the act of abstaining from food and drink during the month of Ramadan, one of the holiest months in the Islamic calendar. Pilgrimage refers to the act of going to Mecca for hajj. Mecca is the holiest city as it is the origin of Islam.

Being a good Muslim and living a life fulfilled with good deeds is considered to bring an individual closer to God (Yasien-Esmael, Eshtel, & Rubin, 2018). Prayer is considered one of the most important pillars of Islam as Muslims are encouraged to pray five times a day. Engaging in prayers is considered sacred: it is a way of connecting and getting closer to God on a spiritual level (Yucel, 2010). It becomes even more significant if prayer is offered in a mosque, the house of God. A prayer offered at the mosque is considered more important and rewarding (Gilliat-Ray, 2005). Further, prayers offered on a Friday, the Sabbath day in Islam, are the most rewarding as this day is considered the holiest day of the week. It is a day to be celebrated as God took rest after creating the Universe. It is an important custom and blessing to pray at the mosque on a Friday (Haeri, 2013; Möller, 2005). Friday midday prayer is an important occasion for communities to gather at the mosque and pray together. As women may often be busy with domestic duties, it is a common practice for men to attend this prayer with their sons to teach them this important ritual (Sayeed, 2001). This was a feature observed at the massacre in Christchurch.

In Islam, death is considered an inevitable part of life. In order words, death is a normal part of an individual’s life (Rubin & Yasien-Esmael, 2004; Yasien-Esmael & Rubin, 2005). Muslims believe that death is a result of God’s will (Rubin & Yasien-Esmael, 2004; Sarhill, LeGrand, Islamboul, Davis, & Walsh, 2001). The time and manner of an individual’s death has already been determined by God (not including an act of suicide). Therefore, believers accept the actions of God and believe that God has his reasons for taking the life of a person. Further, Muslims believe in life after death (Hedayat, 2006; Sarhill et al., 2001). It is believed that the spirit of a deceased individual leaves the physical body at death. Although an individual may be physically deceased, their spirit lives on. Additionally, another important Islamic belief is associated with the concept of heaven and hell (Khalil, 2013). What happens to a person after death depends on how they have lived their life (Rubin & Yasien-Esmael, 2004). The Islamic faith promotes individuals to take responsibility for their actions throughout their lives (Rubin & Yasien-Esmael, 2004). It is believed this decision will be made by God on the day of Judgement (Hedayat, 2006; Sarhill et al., 2001).

It is believed that the Muslims’ actions will be assessed by God after death on the Day of Judgement. This evaluation by God will determine whether a Muslim will go to heaven or hell (Hedayat, 2006; Sarhill et al., 2001). It is believed that Muslims, who have undertaken more good deeds than bad, will be rewarded by God by acquiring a place in heaven. While those individuals, who have lived an immoral or evil life, would be required to face the negative consequences after death, being placed in hell by God. The religious beliefs promote that notion of engaging in good deeds as these actions will please God and translate into a place in heaven after death.

Coming to terms with the death of a family member or friend is a very painful and emotional process for a grieving individual (Mayers-Elder, 2008; Romaniuk, 2014). Further, there is a bulk of literature that indicates the importance of meaning making (Pritchard & Buckle, 2018). Meaning making has emerged as a very important way of processing and dealing with grief (Neimeyer, Klass, & Dennis, 2014). It is particularly critical after a traumatic death. It is possible that at the time of hardship, bereaved individuals may turn to their religious and cultural views as a support system and a way of making sense of the ordeal. Bereaved Muslims may use religious principles to help cope with the loss of loved ones (Mohamed Hussin, Guaridia-Olmos, & Liisa Aho, 2018). The belief that Muslims return to God after death can bring comfort to grieving family members or friends. The thought that death is God’s will, may help them externalise the painful loss (Rubin & Yasien-Esmael, 2004). They may interpret it as a sign that their deceased family member is in a safe place (Yasien-Esmael, & Rubin, 2005). In the same way it is possible that the idea that the spirit of the deceased lives on; beliefs in an afterlife may be reassuring for the family members (Chapple et al., 2011; Hedayat, 2006). In the case of the Christchurch mosque attack, the belief that death occurred on a Friday in the midst of prayers can bring some relief to the families. Families may interpret the tragedy as a sign that their loved ones may become close to God as they lost their life while worshipping (Yucel, 2010). They may also feel some comfort in the idea that their loved one may be granted a place in heaven. Cultural values and rituals also play an important role at the time of grief. Generally, grief and loss can become a communal affair.

Driven by collectivism the wider community takes the responsibility of offering emotional, social and instrumental support to the grieving individuals and families (Suhail, Jamil, Oyebode, & Ajmal, 2011). Prayers are offered and Quran is recited to comfort the soul of the departed. These events provide an opportunity to further reiterate and reinforce the religious beliefs. Further they also provide a closure and a chance to move on with one’s life, a notion strongly supported by Islamic principles (Esposito, 2009). Compared to any other loss, death provokes the most significant emotional response. Further, traumatic deaths, like those witnessed in Christchurch, are no doubt intense and complex. However, we hope that the religious beliefs may assist the bereaved in their meaning making process. Further, we hope that this commentary assists mental and allied health professionals, who may like to enhance their capacity to understand and assist traumatised individuals form different faiths. Finally, we hope that irrespective of our religious backgrounds we can all reflect and learn about the beliefs that help human beings in making sense of the grief and loss.
Coping with loss and bereavement

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In the aftermath of a slaughter like Christchurch, we are forced, once again, to confront that old question: how can people be marked for murder, not for anything they have done but simply for who they are? It is a question the killer asks himself in his so-called manifesto.

A word of warning before we proceed. Readers will note that we are not using the name of the killer in this piece. In this, we follow the argument of New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern, who said 'he sought many things notoriety – and that is why you will never hear me mention his name'. On the other hand, after considerable deliberation, we have decided to quote from his manifesto. We recognise that the content is vile and will be upsetting to many. We do not encourage people to access and read the manifesto without strong reasons to do so (which is why we do not reference the document with details of how it can be accessed). However we do provide a minimum of material which we consider essential in order to understand the actions of the killer, to demonstrate the relevance of wider Islamophobic discourses to the Christchurch massacre, and therefore to help prevent the reoccurrence of such atrocities in the future.

Back to the killer's words. 'Why did you target those people?', he asks, providing his own answer: 'They were an obvious, visible and large group of invaders, from a culture with higher fertility rates, higher social trust and strong, robust traditions that seek to occupy my peoples [sic] lands and ethnically replace my own people'.

So the victims were killed for being Muslims in New Zealand and the gunman acted on behalf of what he saw as his 'own people'. Who his own people are is not clear from this passage. But it is made explicit elsewhere, when the killer explains who he is: 'I am just a regular White man, from a regular family. Who decided to take a stand to ensure a future for my people'. And he further defines 'white' as 'those that are ethnically and culturally European'.

'The people', then, are a racialised group. Christchurch was an act rooted in a world view which divides people into antagonistic racial blocs in which the very presence of the one is at odds with the survival of the other.

In this world, the killer positions himself as just an ordinary individual who has chosen to act on behalf of his group. He is no-one special. In another of the questions he poses to himself, 'do you consider yourself a leader', he quickly dismisses the thought. 'No', he responds 'just a partisan'. In the terms we have used to explain the psychology of atrocity, the Christchurch killer is an 'engaged follower' (Haslam, Reicher & Van Bavel, 2019). That is, he is someone who knowingly and willingly inflicts harm in the belief that he is furthering a valued ingroup cause. Unlike traditional approaches which suggest that such people act through 'thoughtlessness' and even unawareness of what they are doing (see Reicher, Haslam & Miller, 2014), we argue that such people act deliberately in the belief that what they are doing is right. 'Do you feel any remorse for the attack?' asks the killer. 'No, I only wish I could have killed more invaders'.

But engaged followership is only one half of the psychology of atrocity. For if people follow, who is it who guides and leads them? If the killer is a partisan, an ordinary foot soldier of racial annihilation, who are the generals? To who are the people following, who is it who guides and leads them? We will return to this question in the next two steps.

We characterise this destructive act of creation as 'toxic identity leadership' (Haslam et al., 2019). Where identity leadership in general is about defining the group and how 'we' should act to advance the group cause (Haslam, Reicher & Platow, 2011), toxic identity leadership specifically is a matter of defining harm to others as essential to the advancement of this cause. We can only understand Christchurch – and prevent further such events – if we widen our focus from the perpetrator and bring other dimension of identity leadership into the spotlight.

A murderous logic

Before addressing who the leaders are in the case of Christchurch, let us first consider what such toxic leadership consists of. How, that is, can acts of atrocity possibly be justified as being noble or good? Elsewhere, we have analysed the process as involving five steps (Reicher, Haslam & Rath, 2008).

The first two steps involve defining an ingroup and then setting exclusive boundaries such that particular minorities are excluded from the embrace of 'us' and become 'them'. A classic example of this is to define nationhood in ethnic terms such that ethnic minorities are excluded. As a result, these minorities are denied all the forms of solidarity, trust, cooperation and influence which normally derive from being accepted as 'one of us' (Reicher & Haslam, 2009).

This denial of the positives of ingroup inclusion can be painful, marginalising and disempowering. What is more, once people become 'them', we become indifferent to their fate and disinclined to intervene when they suffer (e.g. Levine, Prosser, Evans & Reicher, 2005) But, serious though they are, such things are still a long way from perpetrating slaughter. This takes us to the next two steps.

These involve, on the one hand, representing the ingroup a noble and virtuous and the outgroup as a threat to the ingroup. These can both take more or less extreme forms. At its strongest, the argument goes that we live in a Manichean world, where the ingroup represents the sum of all good and the outgroup (which itself is the sum of all evil) threatens to destroy the ingroup. This extreme form characterises Nazi ideology which portrayed Germany as representative of cleanliness and purity (see Koonz, 2005) under deadly threat of destruction by dirty polluting Jews (see Herf, 2008).

Once one has reached this point, then everything is in place to take the final
step whereby the destruction of the other becomes permissible – indeed becomes an obligation – in order to preserve virtue. This is the logic which Robespierre used in an infamous speech of 5th February 1794 justifying the terror as a means of subduing the enemies of progress: ‘the springs of popular government in revolution are at once virtue and terror; virtue, without which terror is fatal; terror, without which virtue is powerless’ (Robespierre, 2007, p.115). It is also the logic used by Himmler, speaking to Auschwitz Guards in Poznan, praising them for having the strength to do the nasty but necessary labour of mass murder: ‘To have stuck it out and at the same time ... to have remained decent fellows. This is a page of glory in our history’ (cited by Rees, 2003, p.226).

**Warranting Islamophobia**

In some 20,000 words, the Christchurch ‘manifesto’ contains a mish-mash of right-wing Islamophobic tropes that include all five of the steps outlined above. The author constitutes a racialised ingroup to which Muslims are positioned as other in terms of ethnicity, religion and values. He constitutes Muslims as a dangerous group of rapists and drug dealers who constitute an existential threat to ‘white’ Europeans. He castigates those who are too weak to stand up to this ‘threat’ and insists that all must be eliminated, including children: ‘It will be distasteful, it will be damaging to the soul, but know that it is necessary and any invader you spare, no matter the age, will one day be an enemy your people must face.’

In more condensed form, the killer’s guns stand as symbols to his beliefs. They are scrawled with slogans. These include the names of leaders who, supposedly saved Europe from Muslim hordes (Charles Martel, Georgia’s David IV, Sebastiano Venier) the names of recent terrorists who have slaughtered Muslims and African immigrants (Alexandre Bissonnette, Luca Traini) and the names of those who are victims of the supposed Muslim invasion (Ebba Akerlund). ‘For Rotherham’ re...

The road to Christchurch: A tale of two leaderships

...
been uncontrollable, even if they had to tear up the rails [to the death camps] with their teeth’.

What Ardern achieved in her initial statements was precisely to orchestrate a transformation from anti-Muslim scares to pro-Muslim care. And she didn’t stop there. Ardern’s inclusive identity leadership took on a performative dimension when, the day after the massacre, she visited Christchurch. Dressed in black, wearing a hijab and visibly moved, she physically embraced members of the Muslim community.

In this simple human gesture, much is accomplished. Through her dress, Ardern (as representative of the nation) signals that Muslims, as Muslims (and without any need to assimilate), are of the nation. Through her sorrow, she indicates that the sorrow of the Muslim community is the sorrow of the nation.

Through her embrace, she demonstrates that the entire nation – Muslim and non-Muslim – is (as she put it) ‘united in grief’. The words, though, are superfluous. The silent performance of an inclusive community of solidarity is sufficient.

What is more, Ardern’s acts of solidarity and inclusion have not just been symbolic. She has acted to enshrine her arguments in policy and practice. She has pledged to pay funeral costs, provide assistance to bereaved families and to reform gun laws. To use the terms we use to analyse effective identity leadership (Haslam et al., 2011), Ardern has not only been a skilled entrepreneur of identity (building and mobilising a sense of ‘us’) but also an impresario of identity (translating collective norms and values into material lived realities).

She has made a great start in healing the divisions and the hurt. But the greatest challenges still lie ahead – most notably how Ardern now deals with her coalition partners, New Zealand First, who believe that migrants should have to submit to test of ‘Christian-based’ New Zealand values (Ewing, 2018).

CONCLUSION

Intergroup hatred and massacres like Christchurch don’t just happen all on their own. They cannot be explained by focusing on the perpetrator alone. For when someone decides to kill for a cause one must ask who created that cause and how they built up the notion that it could be a noble act, a heroic sacrifice for one’s people, to inflict pain, suffering and even death upon others.

If there is just one thing we can learn from Christchurch, it is that leadership matters and that the form of leadership that is exercised is critical to what happened. Moreover, the question of leadership turns on what sorts of identities are mobilised. Is it a matter of excluding minorities from the ‘us’ and demonising them to the extent that we are given a choice between ‘them’ and ‘us’? Or is it rather a matter of including minorities within the ‘us’ and making their fate our own?

As if to exemplify that contrast, Jacinda Ardern was asked if she agreed with Donald Trump’s denial that white supremacy and right-wing terrorism were problems, she replied with a simple undiplomatic ‘no’. Pushed to say how the US could help in the fight against atrocities like Christchurch, she said ‘Sympathy and love for all Muslim communities’. And that won’t happen as long as these communities are portrayed as unwanted invaders from the outside, rather than valued constituents of the inside.

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The study of prejudice has a long and proud history within social psychology. But despite the hundreds if not thousands of empirical papers, we still have not seemed to “crack” the problem. Daily expressions of both subtle and hostile prejudice still occur and, more tragically, violence too, as we have seen in New Zealand (and elsewhere). In the aftermath of the horrific mosque attacks in Christchurch, it is perhaps time to take stock and re-evaluate the collective wisdom our profession has produced in understanding prejudice. In this paper we argue that psychologists’ efforts toward this end have unfortunately led to an excessive focus on the psychological failings on the part of individuals. Instead, we believe that a more productive approach is to focus on collective values in the form of social norms, and how these can be used in the service of fighting prejudice.

Indeed, in the aftermath of the Christchurch murders we witnessed the explicit display of such collective values by New Zealanders in their near unanimity in restating their collective values as New Zealanders. This was modelled most eloquently by the New Zealand prime minister who effortlessly and genuinely engaged in identity leadership (Haslam, Reicher, & Platow, 2011) by clarifying, reaffirming and modelling the values and norms that define the nation she led. This was also done on a daily level by ordinary Kiwis, with both large scale and public gestures and smaller micro-kindnesses expressed to all people, but particularly the New Zealand Muslim community. So while it may make us feel better simply to point toward this end have unfortunately led to an excessive focus on the psychological failings on the part of individuals. Instead, we believe that a more productive approach is to focus on collective values in the form of social norms, and how these can be used in the service of fighting prejudice.

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We see this analysis to be of value as people who believe their own attitudes are not prejudiced are likely to remain immune to anti-prejudice appeals. In fact, they are unlikely to see their attitudes in need of change, instead seeing them as accurate, truthful, legitimate and even shared among other rational people. In this manner, we heed Billig’s (2012, p. 142) claim that, “any analysis of modern racism…should include an analysis of what modern people understand by the very concept of ‘prejudice’.” Surprisingly, this is an area of empirical and conceptual work to which scant social-psychological attention has been paid. Indeed, Billig (p. 152) continued his call by confirming that, “there is little social scientific work…to demonstrate what people consider to be prototypical examples of prejudice.” Undoubtedly, as with many concepts used in daily discourse, most people are likely to have a basic understanding of what prejudice is. Yet no understanding appears to be universally accepted, and each fluctuates with contextual changes, as exemplified above.

Prejudice is about Collective Values, not a Biased Psychological System

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Prejudice is about Collective Values, not a Biased Psychological System

The study of prejudice has a long and proud history within social psychology. But despite the hundreds if not thousands of empirical papers, we still have not seemed to “crack” the problem. Daily expressions of both subtle and hostile prejudice still occur and, more tragically, violence too, as we have seen in New Zealand (and elsewhere). In the aftermath of the horrific mosque attacks in Christchurch, it is perhaps time to take stock and re-evaluate the collective wisdom our profession has produced in understanding prejudice. In this paper we argue that psychologists’ efforts toward this end have unfortunately led to an excessive focus on the psychological failings on the part of individuals. Instead, we believe that a more productive approach is to focus on collective values in the form of social norms, and how these can be used in the service of fighting prejudice.

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Notably, but not surprisingly, people see their own intergroup attitudes as normative, legitimate and correct (e.g.,...
Prejudice is about collective values

Crandall, Eshleman & O’Brien, 2002); at minimum, they typically fail to see them as prejudiced. For example, very low levels of self-reported prejudice were observed among university student samples; it was other people who respondents saw as prejudiced, not themselves (O’Brien, Crandall, Hortsman-Reser, Warner, Alsbrooks, & Blodorn, 2010). Moreover, a prejudice-reduction intervention procedure (Devine, Forscher, Austin, & Cox, 2012) includes the confrontation of participants with their own prejudice as measured with the Implicit Association Test. This intervention assumes people do not know that they are prejudiced. However, if people must be told by experts that they are prejudiced, then appropriate and inappropriate intergroup attitudes become the purview of these experts who impose their normative standards on others. This may well be a political state of affairs that is sought. Psychologically, however, people are likely to have intergroup attitudes as blithely as they have attitudes toward cars or vegemite.

If people truly do not know (or believe) their own attitudes to be prejudiced and need social psychologists to “confront” them, then we can reasonably ask: What is it that people believe are and are not prejudiced attitudes? Under what circumstances will people identify their own and others’ attitudes as prejudiced? How will these beliefs fluctuate with dynamic changes in group and intergroup relations? Answering these questions shifts the empirical focus away from the content and nature of people’s attitudes about groups, to people’s beliefs about these attitudes. It becomes an analysis of lay beliefs about prejudice.

Psychological analyses of lay beliefs explicitly eschew presuppositions of an association between researchers’ understandings of the concepts under examination and those of their respondents. Within this research domain, as we noted above, analyses of lay understandings of prejudice, per se, are relatively few. In one early study (Dyer, 1945), however, participants ranked a series of statements about groups and intergroup relations on the “degree of prejudice” (p. 221) exhibited. Intercorrelations of the rankings were interpreted as a degree of consensual understanding about the prejudice concept. Although correlations were observed, they varied between attitude contexts. Higher levels of agreement, for example, were observed in the context of “segregating races and nationalities” than in “attitudes toward occupations” (p. 223). Three broad conclusions can be made from this work: (a) there are shared lay understandings of the concept of prejudice, (b) there are also disagreements, and (c) the degree of consensus varies as a function of the context in which it is examined.

More recent work has taken one of two approaches, both of which have revealed similarities between lay and social-psychological understandings of prejudice. One approach is discourse-analytic. This work has revealed that the negative component of prejudice in many (but not all) formal accounts is also held in lay accounts, with people often at pains to preface their intergroup attitudes with “I’m not prejudiced, but...” (Billig, 2012, p. 142). Indeed, Billig describes how people rhetorically separate intergroup attitudes from prejudiced attitudes. He notes that people have clear expectations about listeners’ own views on prejudice, so they work to place themselves in a rhetorically non-taboo position. Such rhetorical distancing occurs for others as well: Condor, Figgou, Abell, Gibson, and Stevenson (2006) showed that people construct and reconstruct close others’ intergroup attitudes as non-prejudiced. Other discourse-analytic work reveals how lay understandings of prejudice also include elements of bias and irrationality. For example, Figgou and Condor (2006, p. 238) observed that prejudice was accounted for, in part, as a “problem of rationality” or “a failure to exercise...self-control.” In a separate paper, Wetherell (2012) demonstrated how, like social scientists, lay speakers consider prejudice to be a human failing emerging from values overriding facts.

In a second approach to examining lay understandings of prejudice, participants were asked to define prejudice and offer potential “solutions” to it (Hodson & Esses, 2005). Most participants (but certainly not all) considered prejudice to “involve group memberships”, while a substantive minority (42%) included some form of negativity. Smaller minorities, yet, focused on “prejudgement” (39%) and errors (17%). Participants’ proposed “solutions” also mirrored formal social-psychological analyses, highlighting education (69.2%) and other social influence attempts (i.e., “media influence,” 23.1%) as well as intergroup contact (23.1%). In a subsequent paper (Sommers & Norton, 2006), participants generated traits of the social category “White racist” instead of “prejudice per se.” Generated traits had both similarities to social-psychological understandings (e.g., ignorant, uneducated) but also remarkable differences (e.g., opined, American Southern). When a separate set of participants then rated these traits on the degree to which they attributed them to the category “White racist,” the ratings factored into evaluative (e.g., morality), psychological (e.g., ignorant), and demographic (e.g., again, American Southern) dimensions.

The Prejudice Census

Our research group has continued this line of work by, among other things, recording instances that people describe as “prejudice”. In 2016, we launched our Prejudice Census. This is an on-line questionnaire allowing people anywhere and at any time to report instances of prejudice that they have experienced. At its most basic level, our goal is to accumulate people’s experiences according to their own subjective understandings of the concept. The data are quite rich, both qualitatively and quantitatively (as we have measured a variety of attitudes). For the current discussion, we simply present some illustrative examples of the instances of prejudice that our respondents report. In presenting these, we note several patterns. First, like previous work, nearly all instances of prejudice report negative intergroup attitudes and behaviours, some of which were directed toward others and some of which were directed toward respondents themselves. Examples include:

Prejudice Example 1:

...[someone] began extolling the reasons that Australia's "apology" to Indigenous peoples was unnecessary and that the affirmative action used to close the gap between whites and blacks was in fact favoritism, that Indigenous Australians were simply inherently lazy and needed to stop using their history as an excuse.

Prejudice Example 2:

We were meeting with some other Latin American friends at the hostel we were staying in New Zealand. The hostel's owner kicked us out because "you f...
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latins speak so bloody loud”.

Prejudice Example 3:

I am a muslim female and have recently moved to australia. ... my daughter ... gave my cell no to one of her friends...her friend never called and told my daughter that she cant hang out with her...as her mother said she doesn't like people with head covering...

Prejudice Example 4:

Walking down the street with my girlfriend, and i was yelled at for being gay. (“Fucking Dyke”)

In some ways, there is nothing particularly remarkable about these examples, as they are likely to conform to a broadly consensual view about what prejudice is. At the same time, and consistent with Gordon Allport’s (1954) original view, we also observed occasional instances of “positive” prejudice.

Prejudice Example 5:

People assumed i was rich and smart because i am chinese.

Example 5, as well as aspects of Example 1, are particularly informative, as respondents seem more to be describing stereotypes than prejudice, per se. There is clearly a conflating in people’s minds between the two concepts, a belief that they actually refer to the same process.

Second, while most of the negative intergroup behaviour were hostile, some were more subtle, as shown in the two examples below.

Prejudice Example 6:

...[a] slightly older, white man...refused to acknowledge my presence...directing his questions and complaints to my male colleague....Eventually I managed to get a word in. He was so surprised I actually had something intelligent to say, he stared at me in disbelief before once again turning to my male colleague...

Prejudice Example 7:

I ordered coffee. A much younger more attractive woman also ordered coffee. The barista fawned over her, drawing artwork on her cup, while only giving me the most cursory attention.

Here, overtly negative or hostile (“old fashioned”) prejudice is replaced more by behaviours that are somewhat passive, as the instigator ignores the target more than actively derogates the target. Third, although most instances targeted traditional sociological “minorities” (as in the examples above), there were occasional instances where people describe being the target of prejudice – both negative and positive – despite being in a societally high status or powerful group.

Prejudice Example 8:

I am tall, good looking, white professional. ...I needed to take the bus to work ...Multiple times ...the bus will pass with not stopping even in rain and more severe weather and the bus was always driven by a black woman. If the bus was driven by a black man it always stopped.

Prejudice Example 9:

...whenever you go to a developing country everyone thinks you’re far more wealthier because of your skin colour and bother you about buying their products or donating.

Prejudice Example 10:

...I was the only white...person [in my job], and I experienced significant favouritism from the (white) manager. This was in the context of subtle but clearly (to me) prejudiced remarks being made about the other [workers]....

These examples are particularly noteworthy, as they demonstrate the breadth with which the prejudice concept is understood. What is striking, too, is that each respondent’s own social category was clearly cognitively salient in each instance. Moreover, in Example 8, it is unclear why or how racial/ethnic background was relevant given the instance described; the author seems to suggest that it is only African American women (this was in the United States) – not women in general (presumably, White women), and clearly not African American men. Why this categorization became salient to the respondent (and not, say, the time of day or capacity of the bus) is unclear, but intriguing.

Fourth, responses on a separate question in the Prejudice Census revealed that 70% of respondents at least “agreed somewhat” that they personally had been prejudiced at some time in the past. Despite this unexpectedly high percentage (particularly in light of previous research showing the people deny being prejudiced), in nearly every instance the prejudice that was reported was enacted by someone other than the actual respondent. We did, however, observe two exceptions.

Prejudice Example 11:

...there were concerns about people buying large quantities of baby formula and sending it to China. I...found myself becoming instantly suspicious of people of Asian appearance in the [supermarket] aisle with baby products, which also contained a range of other products.

Prejudice Example 12:

... walking up to the train station I was mildly harassed by a group of teenage ...Aboriginal guys. ...I just sat down...and tried to ignore them. ...later an Aboriginal teenage girl...walked up to me. “Oh no!” I thought... “they HAVE followed me over here, I’m still alone on the station, this isn’t good...”. But what she said was, “hi. I’m so glad there’s another female here. I was scared of those guys so I was waiting down the road. Can I sit with you please?”

Again, these examples seem to be more descriptions of stereotyping than prejudice, particularly Example 11. Finally, we did, of course, observe the “I’m not prejudiced, but...” claim noted by Billig (2012):

Prejudice Example 13:

I have a distinct memory of my mother saying “i’m not racist, but bloody Asians”....

In the Prejudice Census, after respondents provide examples of prejudice, we ask them to explain why it is prejudice. Some explanations are simply restatements of the actual incident; others consider group-based judgements, in and of themselves, to be prejudice; while still others invoke irrationality, unfairness, lack of education, and simply “prejudging”. There was one explanation that simply essentialized prejudice into human biology. Examples explanations are presented in Table 1.

While many of the examples and explanations of prejudice we have observed in our Prejudice Census share broad similarities with each other, any consensus among our respondents exists only at this broadest level of abstraction.
There is disagreement about how prejudice is expressed and why it is expressed; and, as noted above, many examples were more of stereotypes and stereotyping, while still others were more of group-based discrimination. What consensual view there is suggests that prejudice is about groups and it is bad (and maybe that it is primarily expressed by others and not self). Even the example of “positive” prejudice was reported as unwanted. Worthy of note, however, is that there does seem to be one additional form of consensus by omission: no respondent (thus far, at least) reported institutionally-based prejudice. Either the respondents are unaware of this form of behaviour, or simply do not recognize it.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanation</th>
<th>Type of Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assuming that someone is a thief purely by their race and using derogatory</td>
<td>Restating Incident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>racist terms shows a prejudice by the storekeepers in my opinion.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pretty self explanatory really: abusing someone verbally about their race</td>
<td>Restating Incident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The negative attitude towards a whole group of people--he was painting</td>
<td>Group-Based Judgements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“black people” with a single brush.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holding a view of people … based not on your direct experience of that</td>
<td>Group-Based Judgements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>person, but on an arbitrary characteristic (e.g. Their skin colour or</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sexuality).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>…Her reasons to worry were not based on any facts but an irrational belief,</td>
<td>Irrationality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>whose validity she didn’t even attempted to check.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holding a view of people…based not on your direct experience of that person,</td>
<td>Irrationality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>but on an arbitrary characteristic (e.g. Their skin colour or sexuality).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It was prejudice, as I was unfairly targeted, harassed and threatened in a</td>
<td>Unfairness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>way that was designed to make me feel unsafe based on my minority status….</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It was textbook racial prejudice on my behalf because I pre-judged her based</td>
<td>Prejudging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on her race. I assumed she was with the guys because she was Aboriginal.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>She pre-judged me as safe due to my gender, but at least her assumption was</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>correct, mine was wrong. [From Example 12]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lack of understanding about the capabilities of people from different</td>
<td>Lack of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cultures.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I think prejudice is an extension of neurological function….</td>
<td>Human biology</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unfortunately, social psychologists, too, seem to have difficulty agreeing precisely what prejudice is. Social psychologists variously define prejudice as an “attitude” (Allport, 1954), or an “attitude or feeling” (Crisp & Turner, 2014), or just “feelings” (Kassin, Fein, & Markus, 2014), or simply an “affective prejudgement” (Sutton & Douglas, 2013). For other researchers, prejudice is an “evaluation” (Smith & Mackie, 1995) or a “negative response” (Baron, Branscombe, & Byrne, 2008). For still other researchers, prejudice is a non-conscious differential association of value-laden attributes with specific targets (Banaji & Greenwald, 1994). And while, for many, prejudiced attitudes, emotions or responses must be negative, in Allport’s (1954) classic analysis (see also Smith & Mackie), prejudiced attitudes or emotions can also be positive (a view held in at least some lay views, as we saw above).

As for explanations, our respondents seemed to have hit on key processes also considered by social psychologists. Yet variability remains in both the lay views and our profession. Social psychologists typically assume that prejudice is an outcome of bias, error or, alas, prejudgement (Augoustinos, Walker, & Donaghey, 2014), although this view is remarkably absent from many formally stated definitions (as a review of social psychology textbook glossaries will show). But the uniform assumption that prejudice is bad is coupled with suggested means to overcome it – most of which entail some form of “more appropriate” learning, such as explicit education (e.g., Devine et al., 2012) or appropriate contact (e.g., Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008). In this way, social psychologists understand prejudice as, effectively, the wrong attitudes/emotions/responses/associations about groups and group members. Claims of prejudgement presuppose more appropriate or correct forms of...
judgement. For attitudes\(^1\) to become prejudice, they therefore must diverge from a normative set of standards identifying correct attitudes. Some normative standards, for example, suggest that attitudes about people should be determined only with reference to their unique individuality (e.g., Amodio, 2014). Within this latter framework, any attitude based upon group membership becomes inappropriate (if not error-driven and biased) – a view that, we should note, is strongly contested among other social psychologists (e.g., Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994).

Our view about prejudice, however, is different. Indeed, we disagree with key features of both formal social psychological analyses and the broadly held lay views exemplified in our Prejudice Census. First, let us consider the view that prejudice is, simply, prejudging. Unfortunately, we view the concept of prejudging to be psychologically contentless when interrogated even slightly. Prejudging implies that there is also “judging”, and that, somehow, this judging is more appropriate or accurate than judging before one judges (i.e., prejudging). We see this view as flawed, however, given there is no psychological process that differentiates judging from judging-before-judging. There is no psychological point at which prejudging simply becomes judging. One might argue, of course, that prejudging ceases once people learn more about others (typically, others as unique individuals and not group members). Although there is an air of lay-logic to this, it falters again because it fails to identify the psychological point where the learning itself ceases. How much do we have to know about someone before prejudging turns into judging? Will 10 minutes do? Ten days? 24/7 for 10 years? The answer is, there is no answer. Of course, as scientists, we could reasonably draw a cut-off when, for example, our views and understandings begin to plateau with each new piece of information. This is completely reasonable – but it remains the value judgement of scientists, and not an actual psychological process: scientists could reasonably place the cut-off elsewhere.

In our view, claims of “prejudging” are simply rhetorical claims that others have not reached the same conclusions that we have.

A second problem with both lay views and formal views of prejudice pertains to the near universal (if not completely universal) agreement that negative intergroup attitudes are prejudiced. In some ways this appears non-contestable. If we were to claim that Aboriginal Australians were dirty and disgusting, there is no question that we would be (rightfully) labelled prejudiced. But if we were to claim that child molesters were dirty and disgusting, we suspect that most others would nod their heads in agreement. Yet both claims express (identical) negative intergroup attitudes. Of course, there is a clear difference in these two examples: child molesters have engaged in specific behaviours that place them into their group, while Aboriginal Australians have done no such thing. But even here the argument runs into difficulty. If we claim it is not prejudice if we express negative intergroup attitudes on the basis of behaviours that have placed people into their respective groups, then we should all be satisfied that claims that Jews or Muslims are dirty and disgusting are, in fact, not prejudiced. After all, people can opt into these latter social categories on the basis of their specific behaviours.

The reply, of course, is that child molesters have actually engaged in reprehensible behaviour, behaviour that we sensually view as illegitimate and warranting our negative intergroup attitude. In this way, we see our negative intergroup attitude as relatively true. While in agreement with the values expressed here, we still have concern as psychologists. This is because finding a behaviour to be “reprehensible” is simply a reflection of people’s collective values about its relative legitimacy. To the extent that this is true, then prejudice no longer represents a psychological process, per se, but is the outcome of a disjuncture between our (socially shared) values and some form of behaviour (a process which is, of course, subject to psychological analysis).

It is worth pausing here to clarify our argument thus far. We do not deny the presence of negative intergroup attitudes and the social harm they can yield: both are unquestionable realities. However, our claim is that not all negative intergroup attitudes are identified as prejudice. Indeed, negative intergroup attitudes that, in any given (intergroup or historical) context, are seen as truthful rather than prejudiced, can also be seen as prejudiced with changes in the (intergroup or historical) context. Psychology itself is not immune to such changes. For example, Floyd Allport (1924, p. 386) claimed that “the intelligence of the white race is of a more versatile and complex order than that of the black race.” Allport undoubtedly spoke truth as he understood it in his historical context, despite our contemporary abhorrence to his blatant prejudice. In contrast, our own historical context allows us to claim as truth differences in intelligence between the prejudiced themselves and the non-prejudiced (Hodson & Busseri, 2012).

Claims of prejudice can thus be made if we collectively believe – as a shared, in-group norm – one or both of the following: (a) attitudes about groups and/or individuals as group members should not be expressed, and (b) differential attitudes about groups or group members that are otherwise collectively believed to be equal on the attitude dimension should not be made. Violations of these should not statements incur the label prejudice. By labelling a target individual or group as prejudiced, an actor identifies the target as behaving counter-normatively with regard to the actor’s own group membership and, possibly, the group membership of the actor’s intended audience. Prejudice labelling thus becomes a claim of counter-normative behaviour and often includes (or is itself) an attempt to change the target’s attitude and/or the criteria (normative or not) against which the target’s attitude is formed.

What we are claiming is that prejudice is actually not a psychological concept at all. It is a political/value concept. When I say, “you’re prejudiced”, I am saying that you are expressing negative (typically) intergroup attitudes that are inconsistent with the norms and values of my group. If you’re in my group, then I am saying, “Hey, shape up!” If you are not in my group, you are likely to reply, simply, “No I’m not; I’m telling the truth.” And if I say to you, “they’re prejudiced,” then I am trying to reaffirm a shared social identity between you and

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\(^1\)From this point, we will use the term “attitudes” as shorthand for the variable definitional characterizations.
me. Ultimately, however, what we are experiencing in claims of prejudice is an argument over shared values and what the claimants collectively understand to be truth. In our research program, we demonstrated aspects of this normative component in one of our recent papers (Lee, Platow, Augoustinos, Van Rooy, Spears, & Bar Tal, 2019). Here participants read an anti-fat statement, followed by a subsequent interpretation that it was “truth” or it was “prejudice”. First, participants’ perceptions of truth and prejudice were strongly negatively correlated, loading negatively on a single factor: the more the statement was seen as true, the less it was seen as prejudice. Second, when the interpretation was made by a medical doctor (an expert), participants saw the claim as relatively prejudiced when it was described as prejudice but as relatively true when it was described as truth. Participants’ perceptions of the identical negative intergroup statement varied as a function of this social influence attempt. No such influence occurred, however, when the interpretation was made by a retail (non-expert) worker.

In this way, our analysis has a strong social constructivist element. Our claim, ultimately, is that there is nothing inherent in specific attitudes that make them prejudiced and others not. We realize, of course, that, for some readers, we now simply appear to be apologists for prejudice. We understand such a claim, but we disagree. In fact, we see our analysis as freeing both social psychologists and social change agents from the shackles of supposedly inherent biases permeating the psychological system. By recognizing that prejudice is about shared values and norms about intergroup attitudes and behaviours, it allows us to work collectively to shape the values and norms we seek and to negotiate with others who disagree. This is the same argument that Oakes et al. (1994, p. 206) made about stereotypes, per se: “When we reject stereotypes...this is a political act....” When we reject negative intergroup attitudes as prejudice, this too is a political act. And when we embrace negative intergroup attitudes as not prejudice – as, more likely, true – this, too, is a political act, one that expresses our individual and (more often) collective values.

With this framework, we can now make a number of observations directly relevant to the horrific Christchurch murders of 50 people because they were Muslims. First, although a lone gunman, it is clear from his actions (e.g., broadcasting his actions to a real or imagined in-group) that the murderer had a psychological understanding of himself as a group member, that he understood his attitudes and behaviours to be normative for that group, and even that he saw his attitudes and behaviours as worthy of celebration within that group. Second, his attitudes led to murder (as opposed to more “mundane” negative intergroup acts exemplified in our Prejudice Census) specifically because they were delegitimizing. They implied categorization of others as separate “from the sphere of human groups that act within the limits of acceptable norms and/or values, since this group is viewed as violating basic human norms or values and therefore deserves maltreatment” (Bar-Tal & Hammad, 2012, p. 30). This delegitimization served as a rationale for the murders by placing others categorized as an out-group in a position of lesser moral and existential worth (see also Tileaga, 2007). Indeed, the murderer expressed no regret or guilt, instead making hand gestures in court associated with his psychological in-group. In his mind, he performed a desirable act consonant with the norms and values of his psychological in-group. Finally, we note that people are, of course, not born with the supremacist views held by the murderer. As we have argued throughout, the legitimization of negative intergroup attitudes and delegitimization of others are learned and developed in the group and intergroup contexts in which people live (Bar-Tal & Avrahamzon, 2017). The learned content of these attitudes reflect in-group norms, and collective values and beliefs that serve as a positive reference for those who hold them (Bar-Tal, 1990).

Once again, we do not want to be mistaken as providing justification for the horrors witnessed in Christchurch, let alone the daily expressions of negative intergroup attitudes found in our Prejudice Census (and beyond). We find these abhorrent, as we are members of groups that do have specific norms and collective values that lead us to label these acts as prejudice (if not worse). Although we are psychologists and scientists, we also remain members of the body politic, and so can express – and will continue to express – political attitudes. But as psychologists and scientists, we need to evaluate and re-evaluate our understandings of (negative) intergroup attitudes and the reasons they are held and expressed. While we may pursue education and contact to change others’ negative intergroup attitudes, we must recognize that we are seeking to persuade others that our specific understandings of reality are, in fact, truthful. We must recognize that we seek to instil the norms and values of our groups. Claiming that “we” have truth while “they” have faulty psychological processes will undoubtedly garner claims of prejudice from the “thems” about whom we so pejoratively speak. And, of course, there will undoubtedly be times when still others will challenge our norms and our truths, and we must be ready and willing to recognize that these challenges may ultimately be forms of positive social change, in and of themselves (Dixon, Levine, Reicher & Durrheim, 2012).

Indeed, we must be willing to have our norms and values challenged by others as we negotiate and re-negotiate our understandings of the social world we inhabit. What we see as truth today may well be challenged as prejudice tomorrow. But if we seek a world of intergroup tolerance and acceptance, we must develop collective values and a shared definition of who we are that will enable this to come to fruition. We must seek to instil our groups with the norms and values that will realize our goals. And we must work to ensure that these collective norms and values do not place others outside the sphere of human groups as the Christchurch murder did. As a wise leader recently noted in observing specific intergroup relations, “they are us.”
Prejudice is about collective values

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References


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In order to efficiently deploy scarce professional resources in the aftermath of a disaster, it is important to differentiate 1) those distressed individuals who will recover given time for natural psychological healing processes to effective operate from 2) those who may require more immediate and substantial psychological interventions. Following the fatal 2011 Christchurch, NZ earthquakes, a brief screening measure was developed to help practitioners and those actively engaged with survivors and support services to flag those who needed immediate intervention versus those who could be monitored for signs of improvement without immediate provision of ongoing support. This instrument has been adapted for use following the March, 15th, 2019 Christchurch Mosque shootings. The paper outlines the developments of this measure and the adaptations made.

A natural or man-made disaster, and its immediate unfolding, whether a single incident that was predicted (e.g., a hurricane; flood surge, pre-signalled terrorist attack) or unpredicted (e.g., an active-shooter situation, tsunami), or a more protracted sequence that struck with warning (e.g., droughts) or by-surprise (e.g., earthquake and immediate aftershocks; multiple coordinated terrorist attacks), almost always involves members of the general population. These may be direct victims of the unfolding event/s, those caught up by virtue of their proximity in helping the injured or deceased, or those coming into contact with perpetrators. The number directly affected may be very large, such as the case of a city struck by an earthquake with multiple collapsed and damaged buildings, and vast numbers of casualties and fatalities (e.g., the 2011 Christchurch earthquake) or a tourist areas engulfed by a giant swell of water (e.g., the 2004 Indonesian tsunami). In other cases victims and those civilians directly involved may be limited, such as in the case of a factory explosion or an active shooter situation with targeted victims (e.g., the 2015 Bataclan nightclub shooting in Paris, the March 2019 Christchurch Mosque attack). Such events inevitably draw on the expertise of emergency services and first-responder professions, as well as hospital and medical/nursing staff. Increasingly, clinical psychologists may be mobilised to offer their expertise while an event is ongoing, for example, in the service of assisting victims coming into emergency settings or being present amongst first responder groups to act as an adjunct to what they provide or as monitors of the immediate well-being of such staff.

Yet, typically the skills and expertise of a clinical psychologist are more pertinent and effectively initiated at a later point in the time-course of the disaster, in the days, weeks and months that follow. Early in this post-event phase families and friends of victims, and the community at large, are becoming aware of the event - its magnitude, its implications, and their personal connection. Make-shift sites for medical, psychological and social provision may be set up for victims and families, including those waiting to learn of a loved-ones’ fate. From this point on a psychologist might be looking for those most in need of immediate support with a view that intervention then may halt the development of more severe problems. There is a tension here between allowing a person to go through the natural process of healing after exposure to a catastrophic event and detecting those whose natural propensity to make sense of their experience and recover from the disaster is compromised and who may especially benefit from early intervention.

It is generally understood that in days and weeks following a disaster taking a conservative approach to detecting those in need of more intense support is best practice (Hobfoll et al., 2007; NICE, 2005). Sleep difficulties, mood fluctuations, increased anxiety, feeling numb or confused, having trouble remembering what happened, feeling isolated or fearing separation, losing motivation and experiencing guilt, sadness, disbelief and anger, are all part of the natural response in the hours, days and sometimes months that follow a disaster (Disaster Response & Resilience Research Group, 2012). Such responses should not be pathologized or seen as indicators of weakness, vulnerability for prolonged or increased suffering or the development of psychopathology. It is typically recommended that basic psychological first aid involving physical and emotional support along with education about normal responses to overwhelming events should be engaged in (Disaster Response & Resilience Research Group, 2012; Kim, 2011), while there is a ‘watch and wait’ period, where, over eight to ten weeks, the person is invited to monitor themselves for signs of worsening difficulties (Hobfoll et al., 2007; NICE, 2005). Should symptoms persist over several months, or worsen, the person should be further assessed with a view to more formalised interventions to reduce psychopathology or halt its further development.

Thus, following in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, three groups of people might be identified:

1) Those that show no or little distress;
2) Those who appear symptomatic at least to a moderate level. Here the ‘watch and wait’ period will allow, either:

2a) The natural process of psychological healing to take place and the person will steadily recover
their psychological equilibrium, motivation and appetite for life.

2b) The natural healing process will be disrupted and distress will be prolonged or worsened.

3) Those with high and diverse symptoms, where the natural healing process is immediately compromised, and has no chance of operating to promote recovery. Here a ‘watch and wait’ period would leave the person suffering without the likelihood of recuperation, and interventions would best not be withheld.

Tools have been developed to assist psychologists, emergency support agencies, counsellors, and those providing psychosocial support to assist in the detection of these groups. For example, Carlson, Palmieri, and Spain (2017) developed a measure based on known risk factors (e.g., post-trauma social support, trauma cognitions, acute stress symptoms) for the development of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) following overwhelming events. It contains 21 items in an easy to complete tickbox response format that can be used in various settings. They suggest that if a person responds positively to three or more of the six risk factors assessed, they should be referred for more specialist psychological intervention; i.e., they are in category 3 above. Brewin et al. (2002) developed a short 10-item measure (The Trauma Screening Questionnaire; TSQ) assessing re-experiencing and arousal symptoms following an overwhelming event. It was designed to be used one or more months after a trauma (i.e., following a period to allow natural recovery to take hold) and has a very simple yes/no response format enquiring about the experience of each symptom at least twice in the past two weeks. It can be used in different settings and was found to be helpful following the 2005 London bombings in the detection of those most likely to have PTSD. Scores of 6 or more prompt more thorough assessment, which might ultimately lead to the detection of categories 2b or 3 above.

Mass shooting in Christchurch, March, 15th, 2019

The mass shootings in Christchurch represented a unprecedented event for the city and for the nation as a whole. Unlike the earthquakes that started in 2010, reached their height of destructiveness and human cost in 2011 and remained a constant threat over many years via persistent aftershocks, the mass shootings were targeted at a specific minority group within the city, were of human design and conducted by a single person who was not from the city nor had any affiliation with it. These two disasters were different on multiple levels: One was natural, the other man-made; One left wide-spread infrastructure damage and mass scars on the built environment, the other impacted on two buildings, where the remnants of the events were etched into walls, floors, doors and ceilings in the form of bullet marks, but no structural damage ensued; One persisted following the initial turmoil for several years, with ongoing large aftershocks and the multiple stresses associated with insurance claims, etc; The other ended quickly following the initial turmoil. Yet, both led to significant loss of life, both arose without warning, both led to massive community responses that spread from the city to the country and onto the international community, and both tore at the social and spiritual heart of the city in terms of a sense of felt safety, moving out from an individual’s psychology to communal identity.

The earthquakes required a massive psychosocial and community response, as every aspect of life was affected, and everyone in the city was impacted. For some this was limited to needing to change work or school routines, adopt new travel routes, change social and sporting outlets, and live with the anxiety of the uncertain and unpredictable. For others the impact was more costly, losing family members, homes, jobs, pets and neighbours, and needing to start again. For many the psychological effect of the earthquakes remain, and a considerable proportion of people are still working to settle insurance claims and are living in broken or unsatisfactory housing. Nevertheless, as one consequence of this experience, the Christchurch community has gained considerable experience in coping with and organizing responses to disasters.

As one example of this, in the immediate aftermath of the 2011 earthquakes, a group of clinical psychologists acting together under the auspices of the New Zealand College of Clinical Psychologists, looked at various tasks and initiatives that could be developed to assist the human response to earthquake recovery. One project was to develop a short measure of psychological function that could be used to assist in decision-making around the three categories of response outlined above (i.e., those individuals who evidenced little distress about the earthquake, those who were in the watch and wait group, on account of having symptoms and risk factors for more severe problems but where the natural process of healing might arrest the development of ongoing and more chronic distress, and those who needed more immediate engagement with more psychologically sophisticated interventions beyond psychosocial or physical support, to target symptoms and reduce pathological distress or its development).

Following the March 2019 mass shooting this measure was adapted to be more fit-for-purpose for the signal event. The measure is short (two pages) with Likert-type response formats. It includes Brewin et al.’s (2002) 10 item TSQ (see Appendix, part A), which was found to be effective at detecting those most prone to posttraumatic stress symptoms after the London bombing. In addition, as psychopathology has been a consistent risk factor for posttraumatic problems (Ozer, Best, Lipsey, & Weiss, 2003), three separate items from the Generalised Anxiety Disorder-7 scale (Spitzer et al., 2006) and two discrete depression items from the Patient Health Questionnaire-9 (Spitzer et al., 1999) were utilised (see Appendix, part B). Further, as persistent dissociation has been shown to be a solid predictor of ongoing distress after potentially traumatic experiences (e.g., Hooper, Dohaly, Blampied, & Jordan, 2014), and Briere and colleagues (2005) found that four persistent dissociation items from the Detailed Assessment of PTSD (Briere, 2001) were good predictors of individuals who had more severe posttraumatic concerns, these four items were also included (see Appendix, part C).

The three different risk variables so far discussed for the development of more severe problems were included in the earthquake screening measure. The remaining questions were either designed to be more fit-for-purpose for the current situation (a mass shooting targeting the Muslim community), more specific to Christchurch residents particularly, or to assess the risk factor of lack of social support. The first new item assessed whether the respondent feels that people around them support their religious and cultural beliefs and practices (see Appendix, part D). Literature on mass shootings routinely shows that immigrants are more vulnerable to
develop posttraumatic problems in the aftermath of a shooting (Lowe & Galea, 2017). For example, being a migrant was one of the best predictors of the development of more severe problems following the Utøya shooting in Norway (Dyd, Jensen, Nygaard, & Ekeberg, 2014). The second new question addressed whether the March 15th shooting brought back distressing memories of the earthquake or other painful events (see Appendix, part E). Research persistently shows previous trauma is a good predictor for disruptions of the healing response following a potentially traumatic event (Carlson et al., 2017, Ozer et al., 2003). Finally, an item adapted from the earthquake version of the screening instrument assessed access to social support (see Appendix, part F), as again, this has been routinely shown to be a risk factor for post-trauma failure to recover (e.g., Frazier et al., 2011).

Each part of the instrument (i.e., from part A to part F) produces a yes/no score based on whether the participant is positive for each one. A traffic light system is adopted, which either reflects 1) scoring for those assessed within the two month period following the shooting, or 2) scoring that occurs if the instrument is completed at least two months after the attack. For individuals assessed in the first two months, those who score positively on two or fewer of the six areas are in the green zone. They may be offered some psychological first aid to assist full recovery, but require no further attention unless symptoms increase (category 1 above). Those affirmative on three or four of the six areas, are in category 2 above, or the orange zone. They are the watch and wait group, and following receipt of any psychological first aid on offer and any basic information or specific low-level intervention (e.g., sleep hygiene) they should be invited to recontact services (or can be followed-up, depending on service provision and procedures) if difficulties persist or increase. Those scoring above 4 – in the red zone - are offered more assessment and more specific and targeted intervention for distress. More immediate action is needed for these individuals to reduce distress or stop the development of more severe problems. Here, specific psychological therapy may be engaged in to target symptoms or address the person as a whole, if more complex and pervasive difficulties are present.

For those completing the screening tool beyond two months after the event, the scoring is the same, but the decision making ‘traffic light’ system is altered. The green zone now reflects those with a zero score, the orange zone captures those with a score of 1 or 2, and those who have a score of 1 or more on parts A, B and C (symptom measures) plus a score of 1 or more on parts D, E and F (support & reactivation measures) are identified in the red zone (see Appendix for scoring and decision making guidance).

The scoring scheme or categorisation has not been empirically tested and should not trump sound clinical decision making. It is based on reviewing the literature and on anecdotal reports from when the related tool was used in clinical services during the Christchurch earthquakes. It is unknown how culturally sensitive it may be, and at this stage there is only an English language version, but it could be translated. In short, it requires further assessment but may be of assistance to services dealing with the current crisis, or it could be adapted and adopted to fit future disasters or traumatising events.

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References
Appendix

BRIEF TRAUMA SCREENING INTERVIEW
The following questions are designed to be asked by a GP, clinician or health professional of people who may be distressed by the March 15th 2019 mass shootings in Christchurch. The questions are designed to help understand people’s responses and reactions and identify those who might require more psychological support.

- I am going to ask you some questions about reactions that people sometimes have after an event such as the recent shootings in Christchurch.
- My questions are concerned with your personal reactions to the March 15th 2019 events.
- Can you indicate whether or not you have experienced the following AT LEAST TWICE IN THE PAST WEEK

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Upsetting thoughts or memories about the event that have come into your mind without your intention</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Upsetting dreams about the event</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Acting or feeling as though the event were happening again</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Feeling upset by reminders of the event</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Bodily reactions (such as fast heartbeat, stomach churning, sweatiness, dizziness) when reminded of the event</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Difficulty falling or staying asleep</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Irritability or outbursts of anger</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Difficulty concentrating</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Heightened awareness of potential dangers to yourself and others</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Being jumpy or being startled at something unexpected</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A. Total score on items 1-10 ≥ 6: NO YES

© C.R. Brewin et al., 2002
As a result of the attacks, how often have you been bothered in the past week by the following problems?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Several days</th>
<th>More than half the days</th>
<th>Nearly every day</th>
<th>Every-day</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11. Feeling nervous, anxious or on edge</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Not being able to stop or control worrying</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Feeling afraid as if something awful might happen</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Feeling down, depressed, or hopeless</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Feeling bad about yourself — or that you are a failure or have let yourself or your family down</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Mean score on items 11-15 ≥ 1.5:  NO     YES

As a result of the attacks, how much in the last week has the following happened?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Slightly</th>
<th>Somewhat</th>
<th>Very</th>
<th>Extremely</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16. Feeling like you were walking around in a dream or a movie.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Things not feeling completely real.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Going around in a daze, not noticing things.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Times when you felt separate from your body.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. Mean score on items 16-19 ≥ 2:  NO     YES

Since the attacks, to what degree have you:

20. Felt people around you have understood and supported your spiritual and religious beliefs, and culture?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0 (Constantly)</th>
<th>1 (often)</th>
<th>2 (sometimes)</th>
<th>3 (occasionally)</th>
<th>4 (Not at all)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

D. Score on item 20 ≥ 3:  NO     YES

21. Has this event reactivated painful feelings of the Canterbury Earthquakes or other distressing events?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

E. Score “Yes” on 21:  NO     YES

22. Have you got people around that you can talk to openly about what you have experienced during and since the attack?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0 (Not at all)</th>
<th>1 (occasionally)</th>
<th>2 (sometimes)</th>
<th>3 (often)</th>
<th>4 (Constantly)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

F. Score on items 21 ≤ 1:  NO     YES

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A screening instrument for assessing distress following disasters

**Brief Screening Scoring Key**

1a: Scoring in the 2 months following the disaster

Add up items for each part (A-F) to determine if YES (criterion met) or NO (criterion not met):

- **A**: Sum total of items 1-10 = 6 or above
- **B**: Mean of items 11-15 = 1.5 or above
- **C**: Mean of items 16-20 = 2 or above
- **D**: Item 20 = 3 or above
- **E**: Item 21 = YES
- **F**: Items 22 = below 2

1b: Decision making in the 2 months following the disaster

**Green** (no further immediate action), **orange** (watch and wait – invite to contact again if no improvement), **red** (continue psychological support, assessment, & move into therapy)

- If 2 or less, psychological first aid, education. No further action unless requested.
- If 3 or 4, education, support, watchful wait. Invite further contact if no change in a fortnight
- If > 4, continue ongoing psychological support with specific treatment of symptoms or the person, or referral to appropriate person/service

2a: Scoring beyond 2 months following the disaster

The same as scoring above.

2b: Decision making beyond 2 months following the disaster

**Green** (no further immediate action), **orange** (watch and wait – invite to contact again if no improvement), **red** (continue psychological support, assessment, & move into therapy)

- If 0, Invite further contact if any difficulties arise
- If 1 or 2, education, support, watchful wait. Invite further contact if no change in a fortnight
- If ≥ 1 on parts A, B, and C, AND ≥ 1 on parts D, E and F, continue ongoing psychological support with specific treatment of symptoms or the person, or referral to appropriate person/service
Exploring New Zealand National Identity and Its Importance for Attitudes toward Muslims and Support for Diversity

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1 University of Canterbury, New Zealand, 2 San Diego State University, USA, 3 University of Auckland, New Zealand

In the aftermath of the horrific terrorist attack against Muslims in Christchurch, it is important to examine what psychological factors predict positive attitudes toward Muslims and acceptance of diversity, more broadly. The present work examines how beliefs about national identity predict attitudes toward Muslims and support for diversity in New Zealand. Using a national sample, we first describe the extent to which New Zealanders rate various characteristics as important for being a ‘true’ New Zealander. We then examine how such beliefs about national character predict attitudes toward Muslims and diversity. Results revealed that the more people believe that having specific ancestral heritage and certain cultural characteristics are important for being a ‘true’ New Zealander, the more negatively they expressed about Muslims and the more opposition they expressed toward diversity. However, endorsement of more civic characteristics (e.g., respect for the nation’s institutions and laws) was unrelated to attitudes toward Muslims and support for diversity. Taken together, this work reveals that how we define who we are as a nation influences how we feel about Muslims and diversity. Broader implications for the future of cultural diversity in New Zealand are also discussed.

Keywords: national identity; New Zealand; national character; diversity; Muslims

Introduction

In the immediate aftermath of the horrific attack against Muslims in Christchurch on March 15, 2019, New Zealand’s Prime Minister, Jacinda Ardern, told a shocked public: “Many of those who will have been directly affected by this shooting may be migrants to New Zealand, they may even be refugees here. They have chosen to make New Zealand their home, and it is their home. They are us. The person who has perpetuated this violence against us is not.” While there has been debate on whether the perpetrator of the hateful terrorist attack reflects something about ‘us’ (e.g., Ghumkhor, 2019; McLachlan, 2019), Ardern’s words serve to define New Zealand national identity in a way that echoes the inclusive language of the nation’s Prime Minister? And how do beliefs about what it takes to be a ‘true’ New Zealander account for diversity attitudes and attitudes toward Muslims in particular, the group directly targeted by this terrorist attack? The present research examines these questions using a large nationally representative sample. Here we argue that lay beliefs about the ‘true’ New Zealander having specific ancestry or certain cultural characteristics may predict negative attitudes toward Muslims and opposition to diversity. In contrast, lay beliefs about national identity that encompass civic participation may predict neutral to positive attitudes toward Muslims and diversity.

National identity and intergroup relations

For many years, political scientists have argued that national identity can be characterised along ethnic or civic dimensions (Brubaker, 2009; Citrin, Reingold, & Green, 1990; Smith, 1991). Ethnic national character refers to national identity defined by shared ancestry or heritage in specific linguistic, ethnic, or religious traditions. According to such a conception of national identity, only people of certain descent or ancestral bloodlines can claim national identity, while all others simply cannot be considered ‘true’ members of the nation, thereby remaining ‘visitors’ regardless of whether or not they are born and raised in the country and contributing to the nation (Bloemraad, Korteweg, & Yurdakul, 2008; Pehrson & Green, 2010; Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014). By contrast, civic national character defines national identity by political membership and participation along with a shared commitment to certain ideals and principles. By such a definition, anyone regardless of their cultural, religious, linguistic, or ethnic heritage can be ‘true’ members of the nation as long as they subscribe to core ideals or principles (e.g., respecting individual liberties and freedoms) and participate in society (Bloemraad et al., 2008; Pehrson & Green, 2010; Schildkraut, 2007; Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014).

While nations possess legal definitions for who counts as one of ‘us’ through citizenship laws (Dasgupta & Yogeeswaran, 2011; Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014), psychological
conceptions of national identity can include ethnic, civic, or combination of both these conceptions simultaneously. For example, while Americans tend to endorse many civic characteristics of national identity (e.g., the importance of respecting the nation’s institutions and laws, freedom of speech, working for the betterment of the country), they sometimes simultaneously show signs of ethnic national character (e.g., emphasising the importance of speaking English, being Christian; (Citrin et al., 1990; Devos & Banaji, 2005; Schildkraut, 2003, 2007). The simultaneous endorsement of both civic and ethnic national characters is further evident when exploring automatic or implicit associations using reaction-time tools alongside more explicit self-report measures as people can consciously endorse inclusive civic characteristics of their national identity, while implicitly or automatically perceiving some groups as more ‘authentic’ members of the nation than others (for reviews, see Devos & Mohamed, 2014; Yogeeswaran, Devos & Nash, 2016).

Why should we care about people’s conceptions of national identity? Extensive research within the social sciences shows that whether people define their national identity in terms of ethnic or civic characteristics has important implications for how we see other groups. For example, Wakefield and colleagues (2011) experimentally tested whether making salient the ethnic or civic aspect of Scottish national identity would differentially impact the inclusion of ethnic minorities and prosocial tendencies. Across three studies, they found that framing Scottish national identity as normatively ethnic led White Scottish participants to be less accepting of criticism about Scotland by a Chinese-Scot (i.e., a Scottish person of Chinese descent), decreased their willingness to include a Chinese-Scot within the national identity, and reduced their willingness to help a Chinese-Scot person in need, all relative to those in a control condition. By contrast, when Scottish national identity was framed as normatively civic in nature, White Scots were more willing to accept a Chinese-Scot’s criticism of Scotland, more willing to include such an ethnic minority within the national identity, and increased their willingness to help a Chinese-Scot target who was in need, all relative to controls.

Similarly, in research from the USA, exposing participants to biographical descriptions of Asian Americans and Hispanic Americans who work for the betterment of the country (thereby highlighting their fit with civic national character) increased the explicit and implicit inclusion of both Asian and Hispanic Americans within the national identity (Yogeeswaran, Dasgupta, & Gomez, 2012). However, making salient the ethnic identification of Asian Americans and Hispanic Americans (thereby highlighting the lack of fit with ethnic national character) decreased explicit and implicit inclusion of these groups within the national identity (Yogeeswaran et al., 2012). Taken together, even ethnic minorities who are born and raised in the country, but of specific ethnic heritage, can be excluded from the national identity based on how the national identity is defined.

The distinction between ethnic and civic national identity has also been important in explaining how identification with the nation can have diverging implications on attitudes toward newer groups. For example, Pehrson, Vignoles, and Brown (2009) used data from 31 countries to show that the strength of national identification among majority group members predicts anti-immigrant sentiments, but only in countries where people define their national identity in terms of ethnic characteristics, and not in those nations with a more civic national identity. Data such as these highlight the importance of better understanding lay definitions of national identity and their implications for attitudes toward minorities and immigrants. In fact, going beyond the specific framing of national identity as ethnic-civic, Smeekes, Verkuyten, and Poppe (2011) revealed that making the Christian roots of the Netherlands salient increased opposition to Muslim expressive rights among Dutch participants that were both high and low in national identification relative to a control condition. However, making the humanistic and tolerant history of the Netherlands salient led Dutch participants who were weakly identified with the country to show greater acceptance of Muslim expressive rights relative to those highly identified with the country.

While much psychological research has been done on national identity in other parts of the world, there is limited work on how people define New Zealand national character (see Sibley, Hoverd, & Liu, 2011; Sibley & Liu, 2007) and whether these beliefs predict attitudes toward minority groups and diversity. Therefore, the present work examines two important research questions: (1) to what extent do New Zealanders rate various ethnic and civic characteristics as defining of New Zealand national identity?; and (2) to what extent do people’s beliefs about what it means to be a ‘true’ New Zealander predict attitudes toward Muslims and support (versus opposition) for diversity? Here we specifically focus on attitudes toward Muslims as it is important to understand how everyday beliefs about national identity can contribute to prejudice toward this group in the aftermath of the horrific terrorist attack of March 15, 2019.

METHOD

Sampling Procedure

The current study utilised data from Time 7 of the New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study (NZAVS). The NZAVS, which began in 2009, is a longitudinal national probability study that investigates social attitudes, personality, values, among other factors. The Time 7 data were collected in 2015. Sampling occurred by randomly selecting individuals from the New Zealand Electoral Roll who were over the age of 18 years. Participants drawn from the New Zealand Electoral Roll are New Zealand citizens and permanent residents who are eligible to vote. A copy of the questionnaire was posted to participants, and a second postal follow-up was sent two months later. Participants were invited to complete an online version of the questionnaire if they provided an email address. A prize draw was offered to participants for their participation in the study (see Sibley, 2018, for further details about sampling).

Participants

The Time 7 (2015) NZAVS data contained responses from 13,944 participants. In total, 13,794 participants provided responses to the relevant measures and were therefore included in the current analysis. The mean age of participants was 50.80 years (SD = 13.89), with 62.7% identifying as female and 37.3% identifying as male. Of these participants, 80.3% identified as New Zealand European, 12.2% identified as Māori, 2.6% identified as Pasifika, and 2.5% identified as being of Asian descent.
Measures

Demographics
Participants provided answers to a range of demographic variables such as gender, age, religiosity, household income, whether they lived in an urban/rural area, relationship status, parental status, level of education, and employment status. Neighbourhood deprivation was measured on a scale of 1 (most impoverished) to 10 (most affluent), using the NZ Deprivation Index 2013 (Atkinson, Salmond, & Campton, 2014).

Political Orientation
Participants also completed a one-item measure from Jost (2006), asking them to rate how politically left-wing versus right-wing they saw themselves as being. This item was rated on a 7-point scale which ranged from 1 (extremely left-wing) to 7 (extremely right-wing). This variable was included as a control variable similar to the demographic factors above.

National Character
Participants completed four items which asked them about whether there are certain qualities that make someone a ‘true’ New Zealander. These items were adapted from Citrin et al. (1990) and asked participants to rate how important they thought each quality was for being a ‘true’ New Zealander. The items were: (a) “To have New Zealand citizenship”, (b) “To respect New Zealand’s political institutions and laws”, (c) “To be able to speak English”, and (d) “To have Māori or European ancestry”. While the first two items relate to civic national character, the latter two relate to ethnic national character. However, as the internal consistency of the two ethnic and civic national character items was too low to justify combining the items into composite measures (α < .46), we examined these four items independently. These items were rated on a 7-point scale which ranged from 1 (not important) to 7 (very important), with a mid-point of 4 (somewhat important).

Warmth toward Muslims
Participants completed attitude ratings modelled on affect thermometer items included in United States National Election Study. These items asked participants to rate their feelings of warmth toward Muslims on scales ranging from 1 (feel least warm toward this group) to 7 (feel most warm toward this group), with 4 indicating neutral feelings toward the group.

Diversity attitudes
Participants completed three items (α = .75) which assessed diversity attitudes, taken from Breugelmans and van de Vijver (2004). Participants were asked to indicate how strongly they agreed or disagreed with three items: “The unity of NZ is weakened by too many immigrants” (reverse-coded), “I feel at ease when I am in a city district in NZ with many immigrants,” and “There are too many immigrants living in NZ” (reverse-coded). The items were rated from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Larger numbers indicate more support for diversity, while smaller numbers indicate opposition to the same.

RESULTS

Descriptive Analyses:
We first descriptively examined participants’ ratings of the importance of each of the national character items (see Figures 1a-1d for details). As evident in Figures 1a-1d, nearly 90% of New Zealanders believed having New Zealand citizenship was somewhat to very important for someone to be considered a ‘true’ New Zealander (i.e., responded 4 or above on the measure; M = 5.64, SD = 1.63). Similarly, approximately 92% thought that being able to speak English was somewhat to very important for someone to be considered a ‘true’ New Zealander (i.e., responded 4 or above, M = 5.76, SD = 1.45), and more than 97% reported that respecting New Zealand’s political institutions and laws was somewhat to very important for someone to be considered a ‘true’ New Zealander (M = 6.22, SD = 1.10). Finally, approximately 35% of New Zealanders reported that having Māori or European ancestry was somewhat to very important for one to be considered a ‘true’ New Zealander (M = 2.80, SD = 1.89).

Warmth toward Muslims, and Support for Diversity
Multiple regression analyses were conducted to examine how different beliefs about what it takes to make someone a ‘true’ New Zealander predicted attitudes toward Muslims, and support for diversity, while controlling for a number of important demographic factors and even participant’s political orientation (see Table 1 for full model). After adjusting for these factors in our model, results revealed that the more people believed that being able to speak English was important to be considered a ‘true’ New Zealander, the less warmth they reported towards Muslims, B = -.194, SE = .010, p < .001, and the less they supported diversity, B = -.230, SE = .009, p < .001. Similarly, the more participants believed that having Māori or European ancestry was important for someone to be considered a ‘true’ New Zealander, the less warmth they reported towards Muslims, B = -.111, SE = .009, p < .001, and the less they supported diversity, B = -.243, SE = .008, p < .001. On the other hand, believing that having New Zealand citizenship was important to be a ‘true’ New Zealander did not predict warmth toward Muslims, B = .002, SE = .009, p = .85, nor support for diversity, B < .001, SE = .008, p = .997. However, believing that respect for New Zealand’s political institutions and laws was important for being a ‘true’ New Zealander predicted a relatively minor increase in warmth toward Muslims, B = .024, SE = .009, p = .008, and a slight increase in support for diversity, B = .025, SE = .008, p = .003. Collectively, this regression model accounted for 13.2% of the variance in warmth towards Muslims, (R² = .132), and 27.3% of the variance in support for diversity (R² = .273), with the four national character items alone accounting for 8.8% of the variance in warmth toward Muslims (R² = .088), and 20.6% of the variance in support for diversity (R² = .206).
Figures 1a-1d. The figures presented display the distribution of responses as percentages from participants when asked how important do they personally think the following qualities are for being a true New Zealander, where 1 = not important, 4 = somewhat important, and 7 = very important.
New Zealand national identity and attitudes towards Muslims and diversity

Table 1. Multiple regression analyses examining the predictors of Warmth towards Muslims and Support for Diversity. Focal predictors (i.e., To have NZ Citizenship, To be able to speak English, To respect NZ’s political institutions and laws, and To have Māori or European ancestry) are emphasized in bold.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Warmth towards Muslims</th>
<th>Support for Diversity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b (SE)</td>
<td>p</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To have NZ Citizenship</td>
<td>0.002 (0.009)</td>
<td>&lt; 0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To be able to Speak English</td>
<td>-0.194 (0.010)</td>
<td>&lt; 0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To Respect NZ’s Political Institutions and Laws</td>
<td>0.024 (0.009)</td>
<td>0.025 (0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To have Māori or European Ancestry</td>
<td>-0.111 (0.009)</td>
<td>&lt; 0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender^a</td>
<td>-0.071 (0.008)</td>
<td>&lt; 0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Householder Income</td>
<td>0.004 (0.010)</td>
<td>0.041 (0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic status</td>
<td>-0.003 (0.009)</td>
<td>-0.018 (0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity^b</td>
<td>0.029 (0.009)</td>
<td>0.017 (0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parental Status^c</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.009)</td>
<td>-0.018 (0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship Status^d</td>
<td>-0.015 (0.009)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Status^e</td>
<td>0.020 (0.009)</td>
<td>0.002 (0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban versus Rural^f</td>
<td>0.015 (0.008)</td>
<td>0.022 (0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Māori (1=yes; 0=no)</td>
<td>0.037 (0.008)</td>
<td>&lt; 0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific (1=yes; 0=no)</td>
<td>0.031 (0.008)</td>
<td>&lt; 0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian (1=yes; 0=no)</td>
<td>-0.011 (0.008)</td>
<td>&lt; 0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political orientation^g</td>
<td>-0.137 (0.009)</td>
<td>&lt; 0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education^h</td>
<td>0.080 (0.009)</td>
<td>0.139 (0.008)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^a Gender (0 = female, 1 = male). ^b Identify with a religion and/or spiritual Group (0 = no, 1 = yes). ^c Parental status (0 = not a parent, 1 = a parent). ^d Relationship status (0 = not in a relationship, 1 = in a relationship). ^e Employment status (0 = not employed, 1 = employed). ^f Urban versus rural (0 = rural, 1 = urban). ^g Political orientation (extremely left-wing = 1, extremely right-wing = 7). ^h Education (0-10 NZ Qualifications Authority ranking)

DISCUSSION

The present research uses data from a nationally representative sample to explore how New Zealanders define what it means to be a ‘true’ New Zealander, and then tests how such beliefs predict prejudicial attitudes toward Muslims and support for diversity in New Zealand. Data revealed that a vast majority of New Zealanders believe that respecting New Zealand’s political institutions and laws, having New Zealand citizenship, and being able to speak English are somewhat to very important for someone to be considered a ‘true’ New Zealander. While the first two represent more civic characteristics of national identity where no specific cultural traits or heritage is placed above any other, the third characteristic is argued to represent an ethnic conception of national identity (e.g., Citrin et al., 1990; Schildkraut, 2003; 2007) by placing higher importance on an Anglo characteristic of national identity. With that said, the ability to speak English is an achievable characteristic as anyone regardless of their heritage can learn the language. By comparison, a sizeable minority (35%) believe that having European or Māori ancestry is somewhat to very important for someone to be a ‘true’ New Zealander, making it impossible for anyone outside of these ancestral bloodlines to ever be considered a ‘true’ New Zealander. Overall, these findings suggest that people tend to endorse both ethnic and civic aspects of national character simultaneously, although there appears to be greater consensus around civic aspects of national character.

However, as these data show, beliefs about what makes someone a ‘true’ New Zealander are not just confined to people’s general beliefs – they also have important bearings on how others in society feel about minority groups, and diversity more broadly. Specifically, the more people believe that having certain ancestral bloodlines or certain cultural characteristics are defining of what it means to be a ‘true’ New Zealander, the more negatively they evaluate a minority group like Muslims, and the more negatively they express toward diversity. These relationships emerge even when controlling for a range of demographic factors and participant’s political orientation, accounting for approximately 9% and 20% of the variance in people’s attitudes toward Muslims and opposition to diversity, respectively. This implies that changing these beliefs about what defines ‘us’ to be less exclusive is an important step for forging positive relations in our increasingly diverse nation.

Broader Implications

While the present work reveals beliefs about what makes someone a ‘true’ New Zealander and how such beliefs that define national identity in terms of specific ancestral heritage or prioritising certain cultural characteristics can negatively predict attitudes toward Muslims and diversity, it is also important to consider the broader implications of these findings for New Zealand. For example, by a sizeable minority (35%) believing that having European or Māori ancestry is required for someone to be a ‘true’ New Zealander, it implies that anyone who is not of European or Māori ancestry simply can never become a ‘real’ New Zealander, even if they are born and raised in the country, participate and contribute to the country, and the same would apply to their children and grandchildren in the future. As evidenced by research on identity denial, ethnic minorities (especially Asian westerners) who have their national identity denied to
them experience a host of negative emotions, reduced life satisfaction, hope, and increased depressive symptoms (Cheryan & Monin, 2005; Huyhn, Devos, & Smalarz, 2011; Wang, Minervino, & Cheryan, 2013). Moreover, identity denial increases compensatory behaviours and unhealthy eating in order to try fitting in (Guendelman, Cheryan, & Monin, 2011). The experience of identity denial might be especially harmful for ethnic minorities who are second-generation New Zealanders and those beyond as these individuals do not have a sense of connection to any other place and expect to be accepted in nations that claim to possess inclusive and egalitarian ideals (e.g., Wang et al., 2013). This, we argue, is a significant challenge for New Zealand going forward. As the nation has experienced large increases in the ethnic diversity of its populace including people from East Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, the Americas, and Pacific Nations, the national inclusion of these groups will be a critical issue for the country in the coming decades. Defining national identity in ways that allows people of diverse backgrounds to feel fully accepted into society will be critically important for these individuals’ health, well-being, and participation in wider society. In fact, some of our own recent research (YogeEswaran, Shurmer, & Hewstone, 2019) reveals that when Asian New Zealanders are exposed to video messaging that frames New Zealand national identity as normatively civic, they show greater national belonging, and in turn a stronger desire for civic participation and engagement with wider society. However, video messaging that frames New Zealand national identity as normatively ethnic in nature reduces Asian New Zealanders’ sense of national belonging and decreases their desire for civic participation, as well as reduces their desire for engagement with wider society. Collectively, such work suggests that more attention is needed to consider how national identity is framed in order to examine its impact for both majority and minority groups.

An additional challenge going forward is that national inclusion needs to be internalized in order to create a more equitable society. Many studies have shown that even when people explicitly perceive certain racial/ethnic groups as equally defining of the national identity, they may implicitly possess prototypes that certain groups are more authentic than others. For example, in the USA, Devos and Banaji (2005) demonstrated that while participants of all races implicitly perceived African Americans and White Americans to be equally American, at an implicit or automatic level, reaction-time measures revealed that White Americans were perceived to be more American than African Americans (for reviews, see Devos & Mohamed, 2014; YogeEswaran & Dasgupta, 2014). In New Zealand, Sibley and Liu (2007) demonstrated that both explicitly and implicitly, New Zealanders perceived both Māori and Europeans to be equally defining of New Zealand national identity suggesting that Māori were rightfully included at both the implicit and explicit levels, unlike in Australia where Aboriginal peoples were implicitly perceived as less ‘Australian’ (Sibley & Barlow, 2009). However, even in New Zealand, New Zealanders of Asian descent who participants were explicitly told were New Zealand citizens born and raised in the country were still not considered to be New Zealanders as evidenced by both implicit and explicit measures (Sibley & Liu, 2007).

Beyond the implications such exclusion may have for minority group members’ psychological health, well-being, and emotions (see Cheryan & Monin, 2005; Huyhn et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2013), research demonstrates that such implicit beliefs also predict discriminatory behaviours and judgments (Dasgupta & YogeEswaran, 2011; Devos & Ma, 2013; YogeEswaran & Dasgupta, 2010). For example, in the USA, implicit beliefs that ‘real’ Americans are White predicts discriminatory job-hiring in contexts that require national loyalty, and more negative evaluations of public policy promoted by an Asian American (YogeEswaran & Dasgupta, 2010). Similarly, implicit conflation between Whiteness and American identity predicted reduced willingness to vote for Barack Obama during the 2008 Presidential election (Devos & Ma, 2013). Such studies reveal that how we define who belongs in the country and who counts as a ‘true’ member has direct implications for our own behaviour and judgment, including who we are willing to vote for and who we are willing to hire for certain jobs. Moreover, such beliefs also negatively impact psychological outcomes for minority groups experiencing national exclusion making it an important issue for future work. Taken together with the present data, we argue that it is important to recognize that defining national identity in exclusive terms that prioritize specific cultural characteristics or specific ethnic heritage can have negative implications for creating an inclusive and equitable nation.

References
Ghumakh, S. (2019). The hypocrisy of New Zealand’s ‘this is not us’ claim: Is Brenton Tarrant really an aberration?
New Zealand national identity and attitudes towards Muslims and diversity


A Critical Narrative Review of Research about the Experiences of being Muslim in New Zealand

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The paper reviews and integrates findings from our programme of research on acculturation and intercultural relations with, for and about members of New Zealand’s Muslim community. Our objectives are to act as a conduit for Muslim voices, sharing findings about their experiences, aspirations and challenges, while increasing overall awareness about diversity-receptiveness in New Zealand. We describe how New Zealand Muslims see themselves in terms of their religious, ethnic and national identities; the challenges they face, including coping with discrimination and cultural change; the resources they access, particularly religion, family and community; and their pathways to positive psychological and social outcomes. We also examine how New Zealanders perceive and receive Muslims in the wider community.

Keywords: Muslim; acculturation; identity; discrimination; adaptation; immigrant; attitudes

The recent tragedy in Christchurch, the brutal slaying of 50 Muslim New Zealanders at prayer, has led not only to a national outpouring of grief, but also to a sombre reflection about who we are as a nation and if we should have anticipated this act of terrorism. Emerging public discourses on white supremacy, hate crimes, gun control, Islam and Islamophobia have left a strong impression that as a nation we have been largely unaware of the insidious, divisive forces that are at work in our society. These discourses also suggest that there is limited knowledge about Muslims and Islam in New Zealand. The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of findings, both published and unpublished, from our broader programme of research on Acculturation and Intercultural Relations with, for, and about members of New Zealand’s Muslim community. Our objectives are to act as a conduit for Muslim voices, sharing research findings about Muslims’ experiences, aspirations and challenges, while increasing overall awareness about diversity-receptiveness in Aotearoa/New Zealand.

The Muslim community in New Zealand is a small, but growing group, having increased by 28% between the 2006 and 2013 census, but still making up only 1.2% of the national population (Statistics New Zealand, 2013). This is a smaller proportion of the population than is generally found in Europe (e.g., 6.1% in Germany, 6.3% in the United Kingdom, and 8.8% in France), but is similar to the United States (1.1%; Pew Research Center, 2017, 2018). About three-quarters of New Zealand Muslims are overseas-born, and they are highly diverse in terms of ethnicity and national background. The largest group is of Asian origin (26.9%), with around a quarter having African and Middle Eastern backgrounds (23.3%), as well as smaller numbers of both Māori and Europeans, comprising the community. A substantial proportion of New Zealand Muslims come from a refugee background: Afghans, Pakistanis, Syrians, Palestinians, and Myanmar’s Rohingyas are among the groups currently being resettled in New Zealand with earlier settlements of refugees from Iran, Iraq, and Somalia (Beaglehole, 2013; Immigration New Zealand, 2019). Overall, New Zealand’s Muslim community is young, with those aged 15-29 years making up 29% of the population, and the community is unevenly dispersed throughout New Zealand, with about two-thirds living in Auckland (Statistics New Zealand, 2013).

In the following sections we discuss how New Zealand Muslims view themselves, particularly in terms of their identities as Muslims and as New Zealanders; the challenges they face, including discrimination and coping with cultural change; the resources they access, particularly religion, family and community; and their pathways to positive psychological and social outcomes. We also discuss how New Zealanders perceive and receive members of the Muslim community. These discussions are based on a compilation of qualitative and quantitative studies, using mixed methods (interviews, focus groups, workshop exercises, identity mapping, surveys), and designed for various purposes and outcomes (e.g., social action, theory testing). A summary of the projects is presented in Table 1. In some instances the survey research is complemented by comparative data from international sources; in particular the research on Pathways to Positive Development includes a comparative sample of 142 young British Muslims, and the work on Identity, Acculturation and Adaptation is part of a larger national study with Korean, Indian, Chinese, Samoan, Māori and Pākehā youth, which make up the New Zealand data in the 13-nation International Comparative Study of Ethno-cultural Youth (ICSEY; Berry, Phinney, Sam, & Vedder, 2006).
Striving for Balance: Identity and Integration

Acculturation and Integration

Acculturation theory points to two key issues that individuals and groups face when they settle in a new country; these involve decisions about the extent to which traditional cultural heritage is or should be maintained and the extent to which participation in and adoption of the culture of the wider society is desired or achieved (Berry, 2001, 2005). Whether examined in real or ideal terms, research has shown these two issues are conceptually and empirically distinct (Navas et al., 2005; Ryder, Alden, & Paulhus, 2000; Ward & Kus, 2012). Framing acculturation in terms of these two orthogonal dimensions permits the identification and classification of four acculturation strategies or orientations: separation (cultural maintenance only), assimilation (participation/cultural adoption only), marginalisation (neither cultural maintenance nor participation/cultural adoption) and integration (both cultural maintenance and participation/adoption).

Although acculturation preferences and outcomes vary as a function of socio-political contexts, research has suggested that integration is generally preferred by new settlers (Phinney, Berry, Vedder, & Liebkind, 2006; Ward, Fox, Wilson, Stuart, & Kus, 2010), and our research has indicated that this is the case for both Muslims and non-Muslims in New Zealand (Ward, 2009; Ward, Liu, Fairbairn-Dunlop, & Henderson, 2010). The essence of integration involves engagement with both heritage and national cultures. The process of being and becoming integrated has been articulated by young Muslims in terms of “balance,” which has been described both as a pathway to positive development and a key indicator of success (Stuart & Ward, 2011a).

Achieving a good balance, being a Muslim and being a member of a non-Muslim society and not compromising on faith, but still being able to be comfortable (p. 259).

Balance is seen as a means of minimising the risks of managing multiple cultural affiliations and competing demands. Efforts are made to “fit into” New Zealand culture, but neither at the expense of compromising the self, nor by shedding one’s values and beliefs.

Being true with myself, who I am and where I am from. Being able to balance out the two different cultures, mine and theirs (p. 260).

Balance is also seen as fostering positive intergroup relations, assisting in building better relationships with non-Muslims as well as cultivating virtues that are aligned to religious beliefs.

Tolerance, learning about the New Zealand culture and way of life, seeing things from others’ point of view, being honest, understanding and having empathy. Balancing my culture with New Zealand culture (p. 260).

Moreover, the young Muslims who participated in our research appeared highly skilled in broadly achieving balance. I feel a sense of belonging and connection to both my religion and culture as well as to New Zealand society, I do not see them as conflicting (p. 260).

These expressions of balance were further elaborated in the exercise of identity mapping, a technique developed by Sirin and Fine (2008) in their work with young Muslims in the United States. Using this technique participants illustrate their identities pictorially, prompted by a request to draw all of the elements of the self. Sirin and Fine (2008) uncovered three profiles from identity mapping: integrated (Muslim identity and national identity blended in a non-conflicting way), parallel (both identities depicted as separate) and conflicted (representations of tension, hostility or irreconcilability of identities). As in Sirin and Fine’s (2008) research, we found that the majority of identity maps generated by young adults in our workshop sessions portrayed integration; however, both the process and the

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Table 1. Overview of Projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Participants</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pathways to Positive Development</td>
<td>25 young Muslim adults (19-27 years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young Muslim Leaders: <em>Qaadah Muslimoona Shabaab</em></td>
<td>36 young Muslims (15-25 years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young Muslims: Needs and Challenges</td>
<td>94 young Muslims (15-27 years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building Bridges: <em>Jusoor Tawaasul</em></td>
<td>24 ethnically diverse, Muslim and non-Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>students (13-14 years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity, Acculturation and Adaptation</td>
<td>180 Muslim youth (13-19 years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pathways to Positive Development</td>
<td>155 Muslim youth (16-27 years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acculturative Stress and Muslim Religious Coping</td>
<td>167 Muslim adults  (mean age = 31.5 years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Identity, Visibility and Well-being</td>
<td>153 Muslim women (aged 16-60 years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acculturation, Adaptation and Intercultural Relations</td>
<td>100 Muslims (16-71 years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes to Immigrants</td>
<td>2020 New Zealand households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes to Muslims</td>
<td>295 New Zealanders (18-65+ years)</td>
</tr>
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content were represented. Figure 1 depicts one such identity map (Ward, 2013); while Islam is central to the self, as shown in the outstretched hand and the mosque, the map also depicts national identities in the adjacent flags of New Zealand and Pakistan. In addition, both English and Arabic (shafaq, compassion) scripts are present. The Sunni path, in conjunction with family (caution lights) and friends (bumps), suggests that acculturation is experienced as a process or journey. Figure 2 illustrates the extent of integration at one point in time (Stuart, Ward, & Adam, 2010). Multiple identities, roles and relationships are brought together in the folds of a woman’s hijab. A pin, labelled Islam/Allah, represents how her faith is holding multiple identities together while her nose is illustrated by an inverted question mark labelled “balance” and her smile is “thankful or trying to be.”

Findings from our survey research converge with those from the qualitative studies. Overall, we found evidence of strong religious, ethnic and national identities. We also found positive associations between young Muslims’ ethnic and national identities (Stuart, 2012; Ward, Adam, & Stuart, 2011; Ward, Liu et al., 2010). Broadly speaking, a positive association between ethnic and national identities in immigrant and minority groups has been seen to be an indicator of a multicultural or diversity-receptive environment where individuals are not forced to choose between heritage and national cultures. This pattern is more often observed in settler societies such as New Zealand and Australia as opposed to the “Old World” societies such as France, Germany and the Netherlands (Phinney et al., 2006).

Although the relationship between religious and national identities has been relatively neglected in the international literature, work by Verkuyten and Yildiz (2007) addressed this issue with Turkish-Dutch in the Netherlands. Their findings indicated that Turkish and Muslim identities were strongly inter-related and that both were negatively related to Dutch identity. As Muslim identity was also associated with Dutch dis-identification, the researchers argued that Dutch Muslims see their religious and national identities as largely incompatible. In line with Verkuyten and Yildiz (2007), we also found a positive relationship between ethnic and religious identities in New Zealand Muslims; however, in contrast to the Dutch study, Muslim and New Zealand identities were unrelated, undermining the suggestion that these identities are seen as incompatible in the New Zealand context. Indeed, many of the voices we have heard from the Muslim community after the horrific attacks in Christchurch mosques have expressed the sentiment of being “a proud Muslim, and a proud New Zealander.”

Identity, Acculturation and Well-being

On one hand, managing multiple cultural identities can be stressful, precipitating identity conflict and crises (Baumeister, Shapiro, & Tice, 1985; Stuart & Ward, 2011b; Ward, Stuart, & Kus, 2011). On the other hand, achieving an integrated cultural identity is associated with positive psychological outcomes, including a higher level of well-being and a lower level of depression (Lam, Nguyen, & Benet-Martinez, 2011). The links between integration and well-being were examined in greater detail in Nguyen and Benet-Martinez’s (2013) meta-analysis, which investigated biculturalism (i.e., two integrated cultural identities) in association with psychological, sociocultural and health outcomes. Their results indicated that the relationship between integration and positive adaptation was stronger than the relationship between either ethnic or national identity on their own and the adaptive outcomes. Along these lines, our research shows that Muslim youth are largely achieving integration with 85% (N = 180) categorised as integrated on the basis of having both strong Muslim and national identities (Ward, Liu et al., 2010), and they are well adapted with
young Muslims reporting higher levels of life satisfaction, fewer symptoms of psychological distress, better school adjustment and fewer behavioural problems than their Māori and Pākehā peers (Ward, Liu et al., 2010; Ward, Adam et al., 2011).

The high level of resilience and adaptability found among Muslim youth was also reported in the International Study of Ethno-cultural Youth where Muslim immigrants displayed higher levels of psychological well-being and better social functioning than their Christian, Jewish and Buddhist immigrant peers. In the ICSEY project both national and ethnic identities were associated with positive psychological (e.g., life satisfaction) and behavioural (e.g., better school adjustment and fewer behavioural problems) outcomes (Sam, Vedder, Ward, & Horenczyk, 2006). In the extension of this research to New Zealand Muslims we also included a measure of Muslim identity. While we found evidence that Muslim, ethnic and national identities all predicted greater psychological well-being in terms of life satisfaction, only Muslim identity predicted better school adjustment and fewer behavioural problems (Ward, Liu et al., 2010; Ward, Adam et al., 2011). The importance of Muslim identity and religious practices are discussed in more detail in the following sections.

**Risks, Resources & Resilience**

Beyond managing multiple cultural identities, new settlers confront a variety of challenges as they adjust to their new living arrangements and unfamiliar social context. These may involve learning a new language, dealing with homesickness, facing discrimination and marginalisation, managing family pressures, and establishing new networks for friendship and social support. In many cases challenges such as these present risks that induce acculturative stress (Berry, 2006a; Ward & Szabo, in press), which is associated with decrements in well-being and increased psychological symptoms, including depression, anxiety, and psycho-somatic problems (Berry, 2006a; Jibeen & Khalid, 2010; Miller, Kim, & Benet-Martínez, 2011; Romero & Roberts, 2003; Ward & Szabo, 2019). One of the most common risks that young Muslims face in New Zealand is discrimination (Stuart, 2014). This manifests itself in terms of everyday racism, negative stereotypes based on lack of knowledge about Islam, and unfavourable media portrayals of Muslims, as well as discrimination in educational and employment contexts (Ward, Lescelius, Naidu, Jack, & Weinberg, 2016). Although discrimination is the most commonly cited risk that young Muslims confront, the overall level of perceived discrimination appears to be moderately low and more often apparent as prejudice towards the group in general rather than towards specific individuals. When this occurs, it is most likely to be at the less violent end of the spectrum, such as being insulted as opposed to being threatened (Ward, Liu et al., 2010). Our research has shown that young Muslims are no more likely to report perceived discrimination than Indian, Chinese, Korean, Samoan and Māori youth. In terms of the prevalence of discrimination, 8% of young Muslims indicated they had been threatened or attacked, compared to 25% who had been teased or insulted. Moreover, 8% said that they did not personally feel accepted by New Zealanders, although 39% agreed that Muslims as a group have been treated unfairly. This appears consistent with Shaver and colleagues’ contention that relationships between New Zealand’s Muslims and other ethnic communities are generally peaceful and at least until the recent terrorist attack have been largely non-violent (Shaver, Troughton, Sibley, & Bulbulia, 2016).

Beyond discrimination, Stuart (2014) found that cultural differences presented significant risks. The differences were frequently described in terms of interpersonal or social interactions and the challenges of “fitting in” while maintaining Muslim norms and values. Differences were often discussed with regard to alcohol, gambling, halal food, and female dress, especially the hijab.

*And I always feel that I am different. I always feel that I look different, I have an accent. I’m not like everyone else; I don’t drink, I don’t go clubbing, I don’t have a boyfriend. I’m not allowed to* (p. 34).

This sentiment overlapped to a large extent with the needs identified by Ward et al. (2016), broadly referred to as issues of Integration and Inclusion. These needs emphasised the importance of cultural and religious maintenance and the desire to participate in the wider society, which are dependent upon increasing acceptance and accommodation of cultural and religious diversity in New Zealand. Challenges of participating in public life included access to prayer spaces during school or work hours, availability of halal food, exposure to alcohol and limited options for modest dress for young women at school.

Young Muslims in Stuart’s (2014) study also identified three major resources in dealing with risks: religion, family and the wider intercultural environment. Religion impacted all aspects of life, informed attitudes and behaviours, and influenced the way the young people defined themselves.

*I really, truly believe every single thing that is good about me is because I am a Muslim and every single thing that is not so good about me is because of my innate problems as a person, as a human being* (p. 31).

Family provided the most significant context for cultural transmission as well as ongoing support for maintenance of values in everyday life.

*(Family) is important for understanding who you are, your identity . . . family support and knowledge are the most important to be a successful Muslim here* (p. 28).

Diversity and multiculturalism were acknowledged as important aspects of the intercultural environment that are conducive to positive adaptation, fostering openness and acceptance and allowing young Muslims to be their authentic selves. They were also seen as supporting connections among ethnically diverse Muslims.

*We feel we are connected with them because of our religion and . . . we all are the same. Even though they have different backgrounds like Indian and Arab, still we’re the same* (p. 30).

These resources are discussed in greater detail in the following sections.

**Religion**

There is a robust literature on the positive relationship between religiosity and mental health, including enhanced quality of life (Hackney & Sanders, 2003; Sawatzky, Ratner, & Chiu, 2005). Findings from research with New Zealand Muslims are in accordance with these trends. Both Muslim identity and Muslim practices are associated with greater psychological well-being (Stuart, 2012; Ward, Liu et al., 2010). In addition, religion has been recognised as an important mechanism by which people cope with stress (Ano & Vasconcelles, 2005), and a study with Muslim students in New Zealand found that positive religious coping was linked to lower...
levels of stress and a higher quality of life (Gardner, Krägeloh, & Henning, 2014). In a series of studies we have examined the impact of Islam on managing acculturative stress, both in terms of discrimination and cross-cultural differences. Adam and Ward (2016) identified three domains of Muslim religious coping: cognitive (interpreting stressful situations as Allah’s will), behavioural (performing religious rituals) and social (seeking help from the Muslim congregation) in a sample of highly religious Muslim adults. Each of these forms of religious coping were frequently used, and each predicted greater life satisfaction, suggesting the importance of faith-based coping strategies in building resilience.

Racism is known to exert a widespread and negative influence on mental health (Harris, Stanley, & Cormack, 2018), with ethnic and religious discrimination linked to poor psychosocial functioning, including more depression, anxiety, and psychological distress as well as lower levels of self-esteem and life satisfaction (Schmitt, Branscombe, Postmes, & Garcia, 2014). However, Islamic practices can buffer the detrimental effects of discrimination on life satisfaction. Jasperse, Ward and Jose (2012) found not only that wearing hijab as an expression of visible Muslim identity predicted greater life satisfaction, but also that religious practices buffered the negative effects of discrimination on well-being among Muslim women. Similarily, Adam and Ward (2016) reported that behavioural forms of Muslim Religious Coping, such as making dua, seeking guidance from the Quran, and increasing prayers to Allah, buffered the detrimental effects of acculturative stress on life satisfaction.

However, these results were not replicated in Stuart and Ward’s (2018a) study with Muslim youth. Although religious practices predicted greater life satisfaction, those who were highly engaged in Islamic practices were more susceptible to the detrimental influences of discrimination stress. It is difficult to tease out the variable effects of Muslim religious practices across these three studies as they were based on highly varied samples (Muslim adults, youth and women), examined Muslim practices as a generic resource versus a specific coping mechanism, framed perceived discrimination in terms of its occurrence versus the distress it generated, and were confined to cross-sectional studies, which did not permit analyses of the temporal sequence of these relationships. Nonetheless, in general the findings suggest that religion contributes to enhanced resilience and plays a positive role in coping with distress and fostering well-being.

These findings have important implications for supporting vulnerable members of New Zealand’s Muslim community. Faith-based therapeutic interventions in counselling and clinical settings are likely to prove useful. Not only should these be culturally sensitive and appropriate, but they also need to reflect an understanding of the importance of religion amongst our local Muslim population. This is likely to be particularly important in response to the events in Christchurch, given that the brutality and specificity of the attack have led many to turn to spiritual understandings and practices to try and make sense of the tragedy and seek comfort.

The international literature advocates an integrated therapeutic approach, incorporating religion, when working with Muslim clients (Abu Raiya & Pargament, 2010) and has suggested that cognitive therapies provide a good fit for a wide range of religious traditions (Hodge, 2006). More specifically, previous attempts to develop Islamically-integrated interventions have focussed on cognitive restructuring techniques that encompass a religious worldview (Hodge & Nadir, 2008). These suggestions may present challenges to New Zealand’s secular mental health system, but are worth consideration in light of increasing demands for responsiveness to cultural diversity amongst the clientele.

Family

Families have the capacity to foster well-being and provide a context in which individuals resolve acculturative stress (Oppedal, 2006). Conversely, families can be a major source of conflict, particularly when there is difference in the acculturation strategies of parents and children (Telzer, 2010). For young people, functional and supportive family relationships serve as a foundation for successful engagement in the social world, whereas dysfunctional family relationships potentially leave young people unprepared to meet challenges in other social contexts (Crosnoe & Elder, 2004). Furthermore, because young people tend to relocate with their family units, there are reciprocal influences between the individual’s acculturation experience and the experiences of other family members.

One of the most important protective factors for immigrant youth is a shared set of beliefs, values, and expectations among family members. This is demonstrated by research on intrafamilial congruence, or the perception that there is a similarity in behaviours and beliefs between oneself and the members of the family. High levels of congruence alleviate the stress of migration for children (Stuart & Ward, 2011b; Stuart, Ward, Jose, & Narayanan, 2010; Ying, Lee, & Tsai, 2004), whereas incongruence between parents and children, sometimes referred to as the “acculturation gap,” has been associated with depression, anxiety and gang involvement in adolescents, and to depression and anger in parents (Dinh, Weinstein, Tein, & Roosa, 2013; Ying et al., 2004). Research also indicates that family obligations, or the extent to which family members feel a sense of duty to assist one another and to take into account the needs and wishes of the family when making decisions, is associated with positive outcomes for acculturating youth (Fuligni, Tseng, & Lam, 1999).

Extending research on familial acculturation, we examined the roles that family congruence and family obligations play in connection with acculturative stress and positive adaptation in adolescents and young adults in New Zealand’s Muslim community (Stuart, Ward, & Robinson, 2016). More specifically, we tested a model whereby family congruence and family obligations exerted both direct and indirect effects on psychological well-being (life satisfaction) and social functioning (behavioural problems) with the indirect effects mediated by acculturative stress. The findings indicated that family congruence exerted a direct effect on young Muslims’ social functioning, predicting a lower level of behavioural problems. Likewise, family obligations were associated with positive outcomes, predicting both greater life satisfaction and fewer behavioural problems; however, family obligations also predicted greater acculturative stress, which in turn, predicted lower levels of life satisfaction and more behavioural difficulties.

Overall, these findings are consistent with earlier qualitative studies. Families provide resources that young people need to thrive and flourish. Not only do
cohesive families ensure the transmission of cultural norms and values, they also provide a sense of connection.

Sometimes it feels like I am losing the connected part of me. But I can keep this alive just by being with my family here (Stuart, 2014, p. 28).

Moreover, social support from families and family congruence are linked to a wide range of positive outcomes for youth, including greater life satisfaction, fewer psychological symptoms and fewer behavioural problems (Ward, Liu et al., 2010).

Family obligations encourage behaviours that are in line with cultural and religious norms and values; however, this can be a source of stress for young immigrants who are navigating more than one culture. The challenges of achieving balance can take a psychological toll, particularly when impacted by family obligations.

I’m the oldest and have to set an example for my sisters, which I find really hard, extremely hard. Sometimes I just want to let it go, but I’m like nah, you have to do this for your family (Stuart, 2012, p.28).

Ultimately, the goals, aspirations, and experiences of young Muslims must be interpreted in context. Family provides the most proximal and influential context, but the intercultural context and national diversity climate are also important.

The Intercultural Context

Success following resettlement is not only dependent upon the individual’s efforts, family support and community contributions; it is also dependent upon the nature of the receiving community. Schwartz et al. (2014) discussed this in terms of contexts of reception, which have been conceptualised and operationalised as “an immigrant’s perception of welcomeness, opportunity structure, and availability of social supports in the receiving community” (p. 2). Negative contexts have been shown to be detrimental to new settlers’ psychological and social wellbeing, predicting higher levels of depression and more antisocial behaviours among youth (Forster, Grigsby, Soto, Schwartz, & Unger 2015; Schwartz et al., 2014; Ward, Szabo, & Stuart, 2016). An important feature of the context of reception is the degree to which immigrants perceive their environment to be multicultural; that is, characterised by culturally diverse groups in contact with one another, a general appreciation of cultural diversity, and policies and practices that support and accommodate diversity (Stuart & Ward, 2018b).

Stuart (2012) examined the influence of young Muslims’ perceptions of a multicultural environment (PME) on psychological well-being in both New Zealand and the United Kingdom. She hypothesised and found that PME predicted positive outcomes, lower levels of depression in New Zealand and both lower levels of depression and higher life satisfaction in the United Kingdom. Controlling for age, gender, generation and refugee background, Stuart (2012) reported that there were significant differences in perceptions of a multicultural environment in the two countries with New Zealand Muslims viewing the national context in more favourable terms. Moreover, British Muslims reported more discrimination stress, depression and behavioural problems than their New Zealand peers.

These results led to further exploration of country-level factors that might impact psychological adaptation and social functioning in young Muslims. To these ends, Stuart (2012) utilised data from the 13-nation International Comparative Study of Ethno-cultural Youth, extracting survey responses from young Muslims and supplementing this with New Zealand data. This resulted in a nine country study that examined country-level indicators: % of Muslims in the population, a national index of diversity (see Berry, Westin, Virta, Rooney, & Sang, 2006) and national-level positive and negative attitudes toward immigrants as predictors of the individual-level outcomes of perceived discrimination, life satisfaction, psychological symptoms and behavioural problems. Multi-level modelling revealed that neither the percentage of Muslims in the population nor the national diversity indices were significant predictors; however, attitudes toward immigrants affected all of the outcomes. Specifically, positive national-level attitudes toward immigrants predicted less perceived discrimination and greater life satisfaction while negative national-level attitudes toward immigrants predicted more psychological symptoms and behavioural problems. The findings highlight the significance of the context in which Muslims settle, particularly the impact of pervading attitudes on immigrant acculturation and well-being (Stuart & Ward, 2015; Ward & Geeraert, 2016).

The broader international literature shows that multicultural policies also have implications for immigrant wellbeing and social cohesion. The presence of national multicultural policies is not only associated with more positive intergroup perceptions, including attitudes toward Muslims, but also with greater integration and better social functioning in immigrant youth and more positive indicators of immigrant health and wellbeing (Guimond et al., 2013; Marks, McKenna, & Garcia Coll, 2018; Vedder, van de Vijver, & Liebkind, 2006). For Muslims specifically, multicultural policies are associated with lower levels of discrimination and greater life satisfaction (Jackson & Doerschler, 2016). This leads to the more serious consideration of multicultural policies, diversity-receptiveness and attitudes toward immigrants in general and Muslim immigrants more specifically in New Zealand, which are discussed in the next section.

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Multicultural New Zealand?

Is New Zealand a diversity-receptive environment for immigrants? The answer depends on the context and basis for comparison, but in general New Zealand performs well on indicators of multiculturalism (Sibley & Ward, 2013). The 2010 analysis of the Multiculturalism Policy Index for immigrant minorities in 21 countries ranked New Zealand fourth equal with Finland after Australia, Canada and Sweden (Multiculturalism Policy Index, 2010). New Zealand was more recently ranked a close second to Iceland as the most immigrant-accepting country based on the Migrant Acceptance Index used in a Gallup poll of 138 countries. While this may sound very impressive, it is noteworthy that the index was based on three questions: whether immigrants living in the country, an immigrant neighbour, and an immigrant marrying into your family is a good thing or a bad thing (Esipova, Fleming, & Ray, 2017). International Ipsos (2017) polling showed less favourable results. New Zealand was ranked 18th among 25 countries when it came to agreeing with the statement that there are too many immigrants in the country; 44% of New Zealanders (in a range 15-83% across countries) agreed this was the case. However, it is difficult to develop a nuanced interpretation of these data given the marked variation in the actual number of immigrants across the participating countries. For example, New Zealand’s response adjoins that of Great Britain (45% agreement) while New Zealand has one in four persons overseas-born compared to 14.4% in the United Kingdom (Migration Observatory, 2018).

Data reported by Ward and Masgoret (2008) indicated that 89% of the 2020 participants in their national survey agreed that It is a good thing for a country to be made up of different races, religions and cultures, significantly more than found in Australia (85%) and the European Union (36-75%). Relatedly, 80% agreed that It is important to accept a wide variety of cultures in New Zealand, and 82% endorsed integration, a cornerstone of multiculturalism, compared to only 21% agreeing with assimilation and 28% with separation. However, not all immigrant groups are perceived in equally positive terms. Favourability ratings of immigrants from seven countries of origin showed that immigrants from white, English-speaking countries (e.g., Australia, Great Britain) were viewed most favourably, followed by Jews, Christians and Muslims, with different faiths, Christia

![Figure 3. Favourability ratings of migrants (in general) from various source countries.](image-url)

Indeed, there is a marked split in the favourability ratings with immigrants from all and only Muslim majority countries receiving an average evaluation falling on the unfavourable side of the 50.0 midpoint. Moreover, when asked about perceptions of immigrants of different faiths, Christians were viewed most favourably, followed by Jews, Buddhists, Hindus and Muslims, with each group significantly differing from the other. Overall, these findings seem to converge with research by Shaver and colleagues that reported markedly warmer feelings toward “immigrants” compared to Muslims, although tests for significant differences were not included (Shaver et al., 2016; Shaver, Sibley, Osborne, & Bulbulia, 2017).

The survey also examined perceptions of threat in connection with Muslims in New Zealand. Perceptions of realistic threat (i.e., threat and competition over tangible resources) were low; 18% and 19% of respondents, respectively, agreed that immigrants from Muslim countries have a negative effect on the country’s economy and take jobs away from New
Zealanders. Perceptions of symbolic threat were markedly higher with 44% agreeing that Muslim values are not compatible with New Zealand values and 52% agreeing Muslims do not share our worldview. While New Zealanders positively value diversity as a general principle, there is a noticeable difference between principles and practices. Maintaining heritage cultures and sustaining cultural diversity require accommodation by majority groups, and New Zealanders appear at best only moderately accommodating. Forty-four per cent of the respondents would not want a mosque in their neighbourhood, and 47% agreed there was no place for *burqas* in New Zealand— even though 64% believed we should recognise Muslim holidays and celebrations. This principle-practice gap is what Yogeeswaran and Dasgupta (2014) refer to as abstract versus concrete construals of multiculturalism, noting that abstract construals are less threatening and less likely to fuel prejudice.

Beyond these descriptive analyses, we also tested integrative models of attitudes toward immigrants. In the earlier study of national households, we hypothesised and found support for a model whereby multicultural ideology and contact exerted both direct and indirect (via threat) effects on attitudes toward immigrants. More specifically, in addition to predicting more positive attitudes, multicultural ideology and contact also predicted lower perceived threat, and threat in turn predicted more negative attitudes toward immigrants (Ward & Maggoret, 2008). In the latter study with participants sampled from the electoral roll, we went beyond integrated threat theory (Stephan & Stephan, 2000) and the multiculturalism hypothesis (Berry, 2006b) and introduced Intergroup Emotion theory (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000), proposing and confirming that the effects of threat on attitudes toward Muslims were partially mediated by the negative emotions of anger and fear (Lesclelius, Ward, & Stuart, 2019). Overall, the models demonstrate that both situational factors, such as intercultural contact, and individual differences (such as a general acceptance of diversity), contribute to more positive attitudes toward immigrants in general and Muslim immigrants more specifically; however, perceived threat and negative emotions adversely impact these attitudes.

**Moving Forward**

Prior to the Christchurch tragedy young Muslims in Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch offered suggestions on how to move forward in managing the risks associated with racism and discrimination and in meeting the challenges of achieving belonging and inclusion. Their comments were highly insightful and reflected a keen sense of social accountability, with many of their recommendations in accordance with intergroup theory and research. The widespread perception of Muslims as terrorists and the stereotyped view of oppressed Muslim women were often cited hardships. Pervasive ignorance, reflected in a lack of basic knowledge of Islamic concepts, such as “halal” and “haram,” was seen as a marker of social exclusion and as impacting negatively on relations between Muslims and non-Muslims. These misconceptions and misunder-standings brought out a sense of social responsibility in youth to act as Muslim ambassadors and to “represent Islam in the right way.” Accordingly, the community recommended and initiated various outreach activities, including open days at mosques, dialogues between government and the Muslim community, and sharing the celebration of Eid. In short, increasing contact between Muslims and non-Muslims was strongly encouraged (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006, 2008), with members of the Muslim community leading such initiatives (Ward et al., 2016). The merit of these recommendations was borne out in our Jusoor Tawaasul: Building Bridges workshop that brought together 24 ethnically diverse Muslims and non-Muslims aged 13-14 years at a Wellington girls’ school. When the students discussed the most important things that they learned at the workshop, unity emerged as a key theme. As one participant noted “We may look different, but we can all have the same problems and we are the same on the inside.”

Other recommendations for moving forward were seen to require more widespread and proactive commitment to accommodating diversity in New Zealand. For Muslims to participate in the wider community, socially and economically, in educational, recreational and workplace settings, it is important to ensure access to *halal* food and prayer spaces, as well as alternatives for modest dress for Muslim women. Paraphrasing one of our workshop participants, “if we can have vegan and gluten free food in restaurants, why can’t we have *halal* options?” Beyond providing opportunities for Muslims to practice their religion freely, it is essential for New Zealanders to critically appraise and ultimately minimise the negative and stereotypic portrayal of Islam and Muslims in the national media (Ward et al., 2016). Although Muslim youth have suggested the use social media to promote positive representations, it is not solely their responsibility to do so. Indeed, Stuart’s (2012) research indicates that there are feelings of helplessness, at least to some degree, and an insidious belief that negative portrayals are “inevitable” in light of socio-political circumstances.

But I can’t do much about it. It’s not like I can go to newspaper and tell them to stop doing that. That’s why I think if you want to correct that I should lead by example. If the media says that Islam is violent then I should not be violent. I think that if we are misunderstood, then we correct them, that is all (Stuart, 2012, p. 38).

Nevertheless, youth are right to be concerned about media portrayals. Research by Rahman and Emadi (2018) found a growing number of narratives linking Islam to “terrorism” and “jihad” so much so that by 2016 New Zealand news outlets reported on “Islamic terrorism” almost seven times more often than on Islam more generally. This provides further insights into the research by Shaver et al. (2017), which examined exposure to news among a national sample of over 16,000 New Zealand residents. In support of media-induced Islamophobia, their results indicated that greater news exposure was associated with increased anger and reduced warmth towards Muslims.

Beyond the positive influence of contact and the negative outcomes linked to the portrayal of Muslims in the media, social psychological theory and research tell us that a sense of shared identity reduces perceived threat (Rousseau & Garcia-Retamero, 2007) and induces more positive intergroup emotions (Ray, Mackie, Rydell, & Smith, 2008). This is in line with the guiding theme of the recent memorial service in Christchurch: 'We are one. But we need to understand, then we correct them, that is all' (Stuart, 2012, p. 38).
enhancing inclusion, which require effort and commitment from everyone. It is now time to put the means of achieving unity into action, to share the responsibility for change and to create an environment where everyone feels safe and all communities work together. We must not seek to simply react to violence when it occurs, but to destroy the seeds of hate before they take root.

After the terrorist attack, the public rallied together finding comfort in the common belief “this is not us.” Yet, what we thought would never happen did; a group of innocent people who were a part of our community were killed indiscriminately, solely on the basis of their religious beliefs. These people felt safe, but they were not protected. We can no longer ignore prejudice and hate, nor the fact that Islamophobia is a real threat to social cohesion for everyone in a multicultural society. So how do we move forward as a community after the flowers that were left in solidarity wilt? How do we build upon our emerging awareness for the future, rather than looking back and wondering why things have not changed? Once the shock, anger, and grief have passed, this is the challenge all New Zealanders must face. Hopefully, the voices from our Muslim community offer some signposts as to how we can move forward together.

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References


Beyond tokenistic solidarity in the wake of the Christchurch terrorist attacks: Insights from psychology, and practical suggestions for action

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The Christchurch terrorist attacks of March 15th, 2019 revealed the deadly consequences of Islamophobia and anti-Muslim sentiment. In the wake of the attacks, there were vast outpourings of support and inclusion towards Muslims from the non-Muslim community in New Zealand and Australia. In the absence of concrete action aimed at reducing Islamophobia, and making society a safer, fairer, and more inclusive place for Muslims, however, the promise of such messages cannot be fulfilled. In the current paper we outline the need for allyship with Muslims, and highlight issues associated with acts of tokenistic inclusion. We recognize barriers to engaging in solidarity, before discussing practical suggestions for solidarity that those wishing to support Muslims may take.

On March 15th 50 Muslims were killed in a brutal terrorist attack in Christchurch, New Zealand. The attacks were carefully and callously planned, perpetrated across two Mosques as Muslims set to prayer and reflection. This act of terrorism sent shock waves across the world, showing the deadly power of White supremacy, and bringing into sharp focus the sometimes frightening climate in which Muslims in the West currently live (and in this case, were murdered). Across New Zealand and Australia (indeed, the Western World), White and non-Muslim peoples rallied in the thousands, to express their shock, grief, and anger – publicly countering the message sent by the terrorist. Messages were generally simple, emphasizing points such as: we are sorry, you should have been safe, you are welcome, and we are one ("Christchurch shootings: New Zealand falls silent for mosque victims," 2019). The first author of this manuscript has noted that around Brisbane, Australia (where both authors live), mosques are still being inundated with flowers. A vast body of individuals clearly wish to express solidarity with Muslims. The examples listed above represent symbolic solidarity. Those posting messages on Facebook or leaving flowers are trying to send a social message of inclusion; a message that is both necessary and valued. In the current paper, however, we argue that support for Muslims in the West must move beyond symbolic solidarity to concrete action. In the absence of concerted, deliberate, inclusive, and sometimes effortful action, symbolic solidarity risks becoming tokenistic. In the following paper we outline why this is the case and make practical suggestions for how to act as allies to Muslims in the West.

Emoting in the wake of the Christchurch terror attacks

We are strongly embedded in, and influenced by, the groups to which we belong (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). These include large scale categories such as the nation we reside in, our ethnicity or race, and our religion. We look to these groups to figure out how to think, feel, and behave, and are deeply connected to them; our group memberships help make up who we are. This means that we often feel emotions in response to what happens to our group, even if we are not personally involved (Mackie, Maitner, & Smith, 2009; Mackie, Silver, & Smith, 2004). We can be moved to tears of joy if our rugby team wins (common for New Zealand, less so for Australia), or feel proud when a fellow countryperson wins an Oscar. Group based emotions can also be negative: following the Christchurch terror attacks many non-Muslim New Zealanders and Australians, as well as White people in general, expressed feelings of guilt, grief, and anger.

As might be expected, experiencing negative emotions is unpleasant, and people are often motivated to act to relieve them (Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003). The messages of solidarity shown by non-Muslims to Muslims after the attacks then, likely not only reflect a general desire to explicitly define the group norm (e.g., “We are a nation that likes Muslims”), to reject the terrorist, and to support the Muslim community, but also to express and purge negative emotion. There is evidence to show that this can work. People who receive social support after crying report experiencing catharsis, and gain a new understanding of the event that caused them to cry (Bylsma, Vingerhoets, & Rottenberg, 2008). Consequently, it is possible that those who expressed grief and anger in the wake of the attacks and received support and thanks may have experienced alleviation of distress, signalling the end of an emotional experience. The problem with this is that 1) for Muslim people, the distress is ongoing, and 2) these attacks did not occur in a vacuum, and the societal factors that give rise to Western Islamophobia, White nationalism, and intergroup violence have not been eliminated.

Ongoing, active solidarity is needed

Muslim people living in the West face substantial levels of prejudice and discrimination. A meta-analysis from 30 countries in Europe reveals that antipathy towards Muslim people is higher than prejudice towards “immigrants” in general, and that prejudice towards Muslims was substantive well in advance of 2001 (Strabic & Listhaug, 2008). On September 11, 2001 members of the terrorist group Al-Qaeda coordinated a series of attacks in the United States. Attacks were widely condemned by Western Muslim groups (Hashmi, n.d.; Kurzman, 2018). Despite this, following the attacks, hate crimes against Muslims in the U.S. increased by 1600% from the previous year (Selby, 2018). In 2016, the year of the U.S. presidential election, the numbers of attacks on Muslims on record

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for that year surpassed the number of attacks on Muslims the year following 9/11 (Kishii, 2017). The issue of Islamophobia is not just one relegated to the U.S., however. The week after the Christchurch terrorist attacks, hate crimes against Muslims rose by 593% in the United Kingdom, 89% of which made direct reference to the New Zealand attacks (Dodd, 2019).

Returning to New Zealand, there is evidence that media coverage of Muslim people may be contributing to anti-Muslim sentiment in New Zealand. Shaver, Sibley, Osborne, and Bulbulia (2017) found that the number of hours people report watching the news every week was related to increased anger and prejudice towards Muslims. This was true regardless of people’s education, age, gender, socio-economic status, and political orientation. This finding may reflect the unbalanced treatment of Muslims in the media. For example, in the U.S. violence by Muslims receives 357% more media attention than violence by non-Muslims (Kearns, Betus, & Lemieux, 2019). In sum then, Islamophobia is prevalent across the Western World, and if anti-Muslimness and xenophobia are pervasive we need pervasive solidarity.

Symbolic support matters, but is not enough

In the face of such widespread Islamophobia, symbolic support may help to set a less prejudiced societal norm, increasing the extent to which prejudice is seen as unacceptable, and communicating a message of inclusion. This matters a lot, as exposure to prejudice is linked to distress and ill-health (for reviews see Schmitt, Branscombe, Postmes, & Garcia, 2014; Yip, 2018), and messages of acceptance may help to counter these ill effects on Muslims (and eventually even reduce the amount of prejudice Muslims are exposed to). Words and gestures of support, however, are only one part of the solution. If our actions do not move beyond these gestures, they are tokenistic. Tokenism has been defined as the symbolic inclusion of certain groups to give an appearance of diversity, in the absence of actual behaviour that promotes diversity (Grant, 2017). In this case, tokenistic solidarity would be the symbolic inclusion of, or solidarity with, Muslim people, in the absence of further action that makes society a fairer, more inclusive, safer space for Muslims.

Symbolic solidarity offers a promise of fair treatment and equity that simply cannot be fulfilled without concerted effort and change in society. To understand this point, we invoke a comparison with an interpersonal relationship. Imagine a situation where a man finds out that his romantic partner has been unfaithful (the offence). His partner apologizes for the offence vociferously, hugs him, and swears undying love and future fidelity. Two months later the man finds out that his partner has continued to cheat on him. At first glance, it may seem that this interpersonal example has little to do with a complex intergroup situation, but as we highlighted earlier, what happens at the group level is deeply meaningful and impactful at the personal level. In both the case of the cheating partner and the tokenistic ally, the words offer comfort and safety, but the actions allow an environment of threat to flourish. Past intergroup research also suggests that (unfound) expectations of fair treatment from majority group members can have a sedative effect on minority group members, reducing their support for collective action to address inequality (Dixon, Tropp, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2010). The message, for the ally (or the cheating partner, for that matter), is to follow through on promises with action. Hands-on allyship and solidarity, however, is hard. A practical look at how to move beyond tokenistic solidarity must acknowledge this, and deal with the problem head on.

Barriers to active allyship and solidarity

The flowers and messages of support offered to Mosques and Muslims after the March 15th terrorist attacks reveal a large body of support for Muslims in New Zealand and Australia, and indeed across the world. Given this, it might be imagined that concrete activism and improved social conditions for Muslims in the West will naturally follow. This is unlikely to be the case, however. Activism is generally difficult, and there are countervailing pressures that will make it easier for potential allies to express support and move on, rather than engage in creating actual change. As illustrated above it is vital that pervasive long-term solidarity is deployed. Long term solidarity involves not looking over, but rather, overcoming the normal barriers associated with being an ally, which we outline below.

Dealing with interracial (or interreligious) issues is stressful

Many White people in Western nations are highly motivated to appear non-prejudiced when interacting with minority group members (Richeson & Shelton, 2007; Shelton, 2003). In general, while minority group members struggle to be respected in intergroup interactions, members of majority groups are concerned about being liked (Shelton, 2003). In part because of this, some studies suggest that majority group members get nervous and uncomfortable when meeting members of minority groups (Vorauer & Kumhyr, 2001). In one study White participants showed increased cardiovascular reactivity when interacting with a Black confederate (Blasovich, Mendes, Hunter,lickel, & Kowai-Bell, 2001). Richeson and Shelton (2007) similarly found that Whites are concerned with appearing prejudiced. They carefully monitor feelings, behavior, and thoughts when around non-White people, leaving them feeling depleted after interracial interactions. White people also display anxiety about discussing racial issues, especially if they think that they are going to have to discuss these issues with people of color (Marshburn & Knowles, 2018). It should be noted that discomfort in interracial interactions is also evident for minority group members (Clark, Anderson, Clark, & Williams, 1999), and as discussed in a later section, is just one part of the burden minority group members face in majority group spaces. This body of research highlights how intergroup interactions can be uncomfortable and stressful for those that engage in them.

While Muslims do not represent a homogenous ethnic group, they are often non-White. In New Zealand a large percentage of Muslims are Indian and Middle Eastern (Ward, 2011); in the United States, the largest racial sub group is Black (Mogahed & Chouhoud, 2017). Muslims also often have visible markers of Muslimness (e.g., wearing a hijab). There is also considerable evidence that non-Muslim people feel nervous about interacting with Muslim people or issues specifically (Hutchison & Rosenthal, 2011; Velasco González, Verkuyten, Weesic, & Poppe, 2008). Consequently, one barrier to engaging in meaningful solidarity with Muslims is likely to be stress and anxiety about what to do and say, and how to behave. Like most anxieties or fears, exposure is important.
There is evidence that people who have more positive contact with Muslims (Hutchison & Rosenthal, 2011), or read narrative fiction with Muslim protagonists (Johnson, Jasper, Griffin, & Huffman, 2013), experience less intergroup anxiety. Thus, the more we engage with Muslim people and their experiences (as told by Muslims, not the news; see Shaver et al., 2017), the less stressful and anxiety provoking these interactions will become.

**People often dislike those who stand up to prejudice and discrimination**

In general, people who draw attention to inequality and injustice are often disparaged. People who confront prejudice are often seen as complainers and exaggerators, and may face social costs for speaking up (e.g., exclusion and teasing (Shelton & Stewart, 2004)). People who attribute negative outcomes to discrimination are also liked less than those who do not make these attributions (Garcia, Reser, Amo, Redersdorff, & Branscombe, 2005). In general, it is much more comfortable to think of our world as just and fair, and by extension it is uncomfortable and unpleasant to confront the grim realities of social inequity (Lerner, 1980), particularly when our group is benefiting from it (e.g., Lowery, Knowles, & Unzueta, 2007). This research highlights the fact that there will likely be social costs of confronting prejudice towards Muslims. People find it hard to conceive of their world, let alone themselves, as being prejudiced or contributing to harm to another group. It is OK to be scared about the social consequences of confronting prejudice; this is a normal part of becoming an ally, and indeed, ongoing solidarity. The important thing, however, is that personal fears do not prevent important and concrete allyship.

**We will get things wrong, and be criticized for it**

One social consequence of engaging in allyship not previously discussed is the fact that no ally is perfect – all people engaging in solidarity based action will make mistakes, and be criticized for them. The problem is that we typically see ourselves as good and moral, and there is evidence that the same is true at the group level. In fact, it is more important to us that groups to which we belong are seen as moral than either sociable or competent (Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007). When our group has treated another group poorly we are motivated to restore our group’s moral image. We may do this, for example, through a group apology or a gesture of remorse. One problem, however, is that we are sensitive to any criticism of these gestures of goodwill. A series of Australian studies found that when intergroup apologies were rejected, people felt morally damaged, and consequently withdrew their support for reconciliation (Barlow et al., 2015). It is easy to see the obstacles we face as allies; if we engage in helping, we will make mistakes, and if we are called out on the mistake, we will be inclined to withdraw our support. Furthermore, if we are rejected or criticised, the emotional pull will be to reposition ourselves as victims (e.g., stating: “I was trying to help!”). It is easier thinking about ourselves and our group as being victimized, rather than being the perpetrator of a wrong (Bar-Tal, Chernyak-Hai, Schori, & Gundar, 2009).

The vital thing here is not avoiding mistakes (it is impossible), but persevering through them. If you belong to a majority group (e.g., are a White New Zealander or Australian) it is likely that you might be especially sensitive to criticism about doing the wrong thing when it comes to race or religion. White people in the West, as the dominant majority group, are not used to thinking about their own race. Consequently, even small reminders of whiteness, racial privilege, or lack of consideration for people from other groups, can feel like severe attacks (Di Angelo, 2018). Again, the easiest path is to shy away from situations that remind you of your race, and position as part of a dominant majority group (i.e., your privilege). Two common responses are to: 1) deny the existence of privilege, or 2) distance oneself from the group (e.g., by stating: “I don’t really see myself as White”, or “I just see everyone as an individual”) (Knowles, Lowery, Chow, & Unzueta, 2014). The problem with either approach is that in the absence of a fair society, both responses contribute to ongoing inequality. The final option is to work to increase intergroup equity (Knowles et al., 2014). In this case, this would involve working to ensure that Muslims are included, safe, and respected in our societies.

**Activist burnout is rife**

For the reasons listed above, as well as many others, people who engage in long term activism are prone to burnout (Gorski & Chen, 2015). This burnout can result in disengagement from the movement or cause for which they are fighting (Klandermans, 2009). Other causes of burnout include stress, feeling overworked, and experiencing failure, as well as working in a culture that demands selflessness, and the resultant lack of self-care (Gorski & Chen, 2015). People have outlined the symptoms of activist burnout as the deterioration of physical and emotional wellbeing, and feelings of disillusionment and hopelessness (Gorski & Chen, 2015). Engaging in genuine solidarity with a group that is disenfranchised can be hard and draining. Again, this is normal, and a cost most often born by the disenfranchised themselves. Consequently, acknowledging the strain that solidarity can take is important. We know from clinical psychological research that acknowledgment and labelling of difficult emotions helps people to cope (Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & Lillis, 2006; Hayes, Piretello, & Levin, 2012). We recommend this alongside ensuring that you engage in appropriate self-care.

**The draw of inaction is strong**

Not all barriers to engaging in genuine solidarity concern the difficulty of talking about or engaging with inequality, or even being an activist. There is also the fact that we live busy and stressful lives, and the temptation will often be to procrastinate, and leave the difficult work of inclusivity to another day. Leaving aside work, family, and health commitments, there is Netflix, Facebook, Tinder, gaming, socializing, and so on, all of which offer us immediate gratification or distraction from otherwise uncomfortable realities. Solidarity requires prioritizing allyship – at least some of the time. Here, we believe that the concrete actions that can help to overcome procrastination, such as setting small and tangible goals, may be useful (Owens, Bowman, & Dill, 2008; Wieber & Gollwitzer, 2010).

**Overcoming barriers is important and possible**

The aim of this section is not to provide a laundry list of reasons not to participate in meaningful solidarity. Rather, we aim to normalize the difficulties associated with activism, and in doing so, give people the capacity to recognize issues that they may go through, and advocate for self-compassion and resilience in the face of such barriers. Research suggests that developing a strong and consolidated
activist identity is a good predictor of engaging in collective action. More generally, group-based identification is protective, and enhances wellbeing (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; Haslam, Reicher, & Levine, 2012; Jetten, Haslam, Cruwys, & Branscombe, 2018). Further to this, those who have a conviction that there is a moral issue at stake, or are angry about inequality, are again likely to feel compelled to act (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). Identification, moral conviction, and anger over injustice in this tragedy are all seeds that have been sown for the development of strong, effective allyship. People are enraged about the attacks and acknowledge that a great moral violation has occurred. The next step is translating this energy into creating a society in which Muslims are safe and included, and not just seen as outsiders to be tolerated. Of course, an easy alternate option would be to withdraw from the situation or stay silent. Doing this, however, is far from apolitical; it is deciding to lay the onus of both the tragedy and societal change at the feet of Muslims. Muslim people (and minority group members in general) do not have the luxury of disengaging with prejudice and Islamophobia and are often put in the position where they have to defend themselves, their religion, their group, and their existence. As we know from the Civil Rights Era in the U.S., to bring about equality for those most vulnerable in our society, true solidarity and engagement is needed.

Impact on minority people

Members of minority groups are rarely, if ever, insulated from race-based or minority-based stress (Jones & Norwood, 2017). They are perpetually reminded of their minority status, whether through being the only member of their group in their workplace or school (e.g., being the only Muslim academic in a department), being repeatedly asked to define and defend their group, (e.g., “Yes, I am a Muslim woman. I choose to wear a headscarf, and for me it represents freedom and faith, not oppression”), or facing race or religion based stereotyping, aggression or prejudice (Jones & Norwood, 2017). Minorities in general have a heightened sense of their visibility in majority spaces. Research shows that they feel social isolation in these spaces, as well as the pressure to assimilate, and to perform emotionally, resulting in psychological burnout (Erickson & Ritter, 2001; Evans, 2013; Evans & Moore, 2015; Gustafson, 2008; Kanter, 2008; Krimmel & Gormley, 2003; Wingfield & Alston, 2013). To be accepted by mainstream society, additional expectations are placed on minority group members. They are expected to behave more morally than majority group members in the same circumstances (Fernández, Branscombe, Saguy, Gómez, & Morales, 2014).

Muslim people in the West are keenly aware of religious discrimination, and societal anti-Muslim sentiment (Rippy & Newman, 2008). As many Muslim people in the West are also immigrants, these stresses are often combined with the pressure of adapting to a new culture. Lower levels of English proficiency and recent immigration are associated with depression in young Muslim women in the US, for example (Khuwaja, Selwyn, Kapadia, McCurdy, & Khuwaja, 2007). Post 9/11 Muslim youth in the West have been repeatedly asked to define and defend themselves, their religion, their group, and Islamophobia and are often reported feeling that they have to hide their Muslim identity in order to fit in, or police themselves and other group members in order to be seen as a “good” Muslim by non-Muslim people (Sirin & Fine, 2007).

There is also evidence to suggest that Islamophobia is gendered. Muslim women are more likely to be the victims of anti-Muslim hate crimes in Australia, the UK, and the U.S., than are Muslim men (Abu-Ras & Suarez, 2009; Dreher, 2006; Githens-Mazer & Lambert, 2010; Perry, 2014). Muslim men, on the other hand, are stereotyped as being violent, threatening, sexist, and dangerous to women (Ewing, 2008). Muslim women who wear a hijab, niqab, or burqa are instantly identifiable as Muslim. These articles of dress are often portrayed as threatening, oppressive, dangerous, or “othering”, particularly in media depictions (Bullock & Jafri, 2000). Given the rates of hate crimes Muslim women in the West face, as well as the prejudice associated with their dress, they have a fear of violence and harassment, and a reduced sense of belonging. These fears restrict their freedom of movement in public spaces; Muslim women report being hesitant to go out alone because of Islamophobia (Abu-Ras & Suarez, 2009; Kwan, 2008; Listen: National consultations on eliminating prejudice against Arab and Muslim Australians, 2004; Islamic Women’s Welfare Council of Victoria Inc., 2008) In addition to all of this, Muslim people who publicly challenge Islamophobia and inequitable treatment will face the same derogation that any disadvantaged group member faces when attributing outcomes to prejudice.

From the rates of hate crimes reported by Muslims, to the everyday stresses associated with Islamophobia, to the terrorist attacks of March 15, it should now be evident that choosing not to stand in solidarity with Muslims amounts to acceptance of a society in which Muslims are excluded and targeted. Again, the support shown by swathes of non-Muslim New Zealanders and Australians suggests that there is an appetite for solidarity. Below we outline 13 practical suggestions (see Figure 1) for how to act as a practical ally to Muslims.

Practical Suggestions

It can be confusing trying to work out how to best act as an ally. Advantaged group members may have ideas about how to support disadvantaged groups, for example, but this may not align with how these disadvantaged groups want to be supported (Droogendyk, Wright, Lubensky, & Louis, 2016; Louis et al., 2019). Below we offer practical suggestions for inclusivity that move beyond tokenism to create structural change that impacts the everyday lives of Muslims. Before we begin, a few caveats are necessary. The list below is not exhaustive, and where possible you should ask minorities how they can be accommodated. Creating lasting structural change is a long-term endeavour, and one that many others have written about more fully (e.g., Louis, Barlow, & Greenaway, 2012; Louis et al., 2019). It is our hope, however, that the implementation of even a few of these suggestions might provide relief and support for Muslims in the West. We also note that none of the actions listed below is intended to replace symbolic support, but rather to be implemented in concert with it. Finally, we recognise that many of the suggestions require sacrifice, or changing something about your behaviour, program, or structure.

1. For Children & Adolescents

According to a poll by The Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, 43% of Muslim families with kids in K-12 schools report they have a child that has been a target of bullying because of their faith – a quarter of the time, the bully was an adult (Mogahed & Chouhoud, 2017). This rate is compared to 23% of Jewish children, and 6% of Catholic children.
that report being bullied because of their faith. Negative stereotypes of Islam are often also targeted at Muslim children, who are keenly aware of being different from their peers (Ramarajan & Runell, 2007). Here we make suggestions to help children and adolescents:

1a. Talk to your children

If you are expressing open Islamophobia, or stereotyping and othering Muslims in the home, it is likely that your child will adopt these attitudes and take them to school. Outside of this, however, children exist in a society in which Muslim people are routinely dehumanized (Viki, Osgood, & Phillips, 2013). Thus, it is possible that while parents assume a lack of prejudice and Islamophobic bullying, it may exist. In this instance, it is not enough to not display prejudice. Rather, it is important to talk clearly and openly about the inclusion and acceptance of Muslims, as well as standards of behaviour. There is some evidence that parenting factors can contribute to the development and cessation of bullying (Cohn & Canter, 2003; Hazlerr, Carney, Green, Powell, & Jolly, 1997; Smith, Twemlow, & Hoover, 1999), and thus intervening in the home may be successful.

1b. Include Muslim Narratives

One way that schools can be more inclusive of Muslim students is through representation of Muslim narratives and experiences. Parents can help in this by taking them to libraries in the United States that are inclusive of Muslim students. Donating books to school and public libraries that represent Muslim stories is another practical way of increasing diversity. A list of books representing Muslim stories is provided here (Murlas, 2019). Girls of the Crescent, an American non-profit organization, aims to increase diversity and representation by collecting books with female Muslim main characters and donating them to school districts and libraries in the United States (Nasiri & Nasiri, 2019). To our knowledge neither New Zealand nor Australia currently has an organization akin to Girls of the Crescent, and thus another act of solidarity might be to create one.

1c. Inclusion of Muslim Teachers and Administrators

Another way to ensure Muslim representation and inclusion at school is to be inclusive and open to Muslim teachers. We are aware, however, that in New Zealand, only 1% of the population identifies as Muslim (Ward, 2011), and so not all schools will have a full-time Muslim teacher, Muslim administrator, or a Muslim person on the school board. If this is the case, Muslim voices can still be included in schools. A first step might be to encourage or be open to Muslim volunteers. There may be, for example, local Muslim professionals or parents (or both!) who would be willing to come and talk to children about their work. Meaningfully including a diverse range of people in positions of leadership and expertise may serve to humanize Muslims, show Muslim role models, and thus send a clear message of inclusion of Muslims to both Muslim and non-Muslim children.

1d. Ramadan Lunch space

During the month of Ramadan (note that the dates change year to year, see below), kids from the age of nine can start to fast. Recess and lunch hours can be challenging for children, as they can be singled out for not eating. In addition to the attention that there is diverse religious education that lets non-Muslim children learn about Ramadan, we suggest creating a space – an unused classroom for example – for Muslim kids, and others who want to join, to do crafts, read, or nap during breaks.

2. For Academic & Organizational Settings

As stated above, public spaces (including workplaces) can often feel hostile or isolating to Muslim people in the West. There are simple and concrete steps you can take, however, to make your workplace more welcoming for Muslims.

2a. Halal dietary restrictions

Many Muslims observe halal dietary restrictions. Including halal meal options at cafeterias and canteens, and at special, catered events, will not only allow Muslims to eat, but also send a message of respect and inclusion.

2b. Alcohol

Muslims generally do not drink alcohol and may find it inappropriate to attend events where intoxicants are served. The interpretation and implementation of this ruling varies; some will not attend an event at all if alcohol is served, while others will attend but need to be at a table where alcohol is not consumed. This presents a challenge for office parties, networking and social activities, as it is normative in New Zealand and Australia for these events to include alcohol.

If you have Muslim colleagues or students at your event, a simple solution is to ask what they are comfortable with. Depending on their comfort-level it may be possible to set up sober tables at events, or to not serve alcohol for the first portion of the event, or to create networking and social opportunities throughout the year that are alcohol free (e.g., if Friday evening drinks occur fort nightly, a non-alcoholic morning tea could be organized on alternate weeks). Initiatives like this need not disrupt work events serving alcohol, but rather simply ensure that there are opportunities for Muslim and non-Muslim colleagues to mingle, collaborate, and enjoy functions together.

2c. Prayer Space

Muslims typically pray 5 times daily. For the many who work and learn in spaces that do not accommodate them, they end up praying in empty corridors, car parks, behind buildings, or in restrooms. Aside from these spaces not being quiet or clean, it often draws the attention of passers-by. There have been reports of law enforcement being called in response to praying Muslims, whose behaviour is interpreted as “suspicious activity” (Armstrong, 2015; Salingar, 2016).

We suggest providing a clean, quiet, and safe space for Muslims and people of other faiths to pray and meditate. Ideally, prayer spaces would be provided as long-term spaces in organizations, but such spaces are also needed in the short term to ensure Muslims are safe and comfortable. For short-term events like conferences and day seminars hotels will often provide prayer spaces if asked, and some even have prayer rugs. Note that these spaces need not exclusively be used for prayer. A quiet and clean space, such as an empty meeting room that can be used for prayer would also do. Having prayer spaces at schools, universities, businesses, conferences, and so on, sends a message of inclusion and provides a practical space for Muslims to conduct their prayer.

2d. Handshaking, hugging, and touch

Some Muslims (and Orthodox Jews) follow theological rulings that don’t allow for touching people of another gender, outside of one’s immediate family. This practice is not related to sexism, or antipathy towards other
genders (Nazeer, Cila, Lalonde, & Mirmajafi, 2018) but is rather to do with etiquette, respect, modesty, and humility. If you meet a Muslim (or Orthodox Jew), simply ask, “Do you shake hands?” If they say no, try not to take this personally, remembering that it is a religious custom rooted in respect. Think about how you can warmly greet them without touch (an enthusiastic hello always works well!). While it may seem strange at first to ask if someone shakes hands, given how normative handshaking is in the West, it will become more natural over time. Think of it as obtaining consent before reaching out to touch someone – be it hugging or shaking someone’s hand. Including this information in workplace cultural training is another way of making institutions inclusive spaces for Muslims.

2e. Recognition of holidays
While holidays are governmentally mandated for Christian traditions such as Easter and Christmas, Muslims often have to work through holy celebrations. Recognition of Muslim holidays is important in the workplace as it both signals inclusivity and allows people to take time off. Returning to the example of Ramadan (for which no time off is required bar the day that marks the end of Ramadan, known as Eid), organizations may benefit by recognizing this period. It may be possible to ensure that work retreats, or energetic work activities are planned (where possible) when Muslim employees are not fasting. Note, the Islamic calendar is a lunar calendar meaning the dates rotate every year – so if Eid is in June one year, it may not be in June the following year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>For Children &amp; Adolescents</th>
<th>In Organizational &amp; Academic Settings</th>
<th>More Broadly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Talk to your children about inclusion and acceptance</td>
<td>Inclusion of Halal options in cafeterias and catered events</td>
<td>Educate yourself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donate books with Muslim protagonists to libraries</td>
<td>Inclusion of alcohol free events</td>
<td>Speak up against Islamophobia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representation of Muslims in schools as speakers and role models</td>
<td>Creating a prayer space</td>
<td>Push for Muslim representation in the media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramadan lunch spaces</td>
<td>Ask “Do you shake hands?” when meeting a Muslim</td>
<td>Complain when you see or hear Islamophobia in the media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognize Muslim holidays</td>
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</table>

### Figure 1. A guide to inclusivity and practical suggestions for being an ally to Muslims

3. In General: Challenge Islamophobia

One final point of practical solidarity is that to maximize your impact, you can work to challenge anti-Muslim sentiment when you see it. Doing so can be difficult, for the reasons outlined in the barriers section, but it is worthwhile. Part of challenging systemic Islamophobia is through symbolic solidarity – modelling positive and inclusive attitudes to your social circle and beyond. Part will also involve actively challenging people and organizations when they engage in behaviour that is prejudiced or discriminatory. Small things you can do are:

3a. **Educate yourself**

In order to be able to factually challenge stereotypes, and counter false notions about Muslims you need to learn about Islam, Islamophobia, and Muslim people. Of course, there is no singular Muslim person, but exposing yourself to diverse Muslim stories, narratives, and points of view will be useful. [An in-depth exploration of common questions about Muslims and Islam can be found here.](#)

3b. **Speak up when people express Islamophobia**

People often use racial or religious slurs about Muslim people, make sweeping generalizations, or dehumanize Muslim people (Kteily & Bruneau, 2017). When confronted with this behavior you have an opportunity to speak up, defend Muslim people, express social disapproval of prejudice, and in the best case, change the mind of the person expressing prejudice. Sometimes this person will be your family, your partner, or your friend, and this can be challenging. [Amnesty International has outlined how to talk to a loved one when they're prejudiced](#)(Gillan, 2019). We also recommend this guide [outlining anti-racism strategies and conversations based on psychological literature](#)(Louis, Barlow, Greenaway, & Macchia, 2013).

3c. **Agitate for increased representation of Muslim people**

It is not just children’s books that suffer from lack of representation of Muslim people and voices. Muslim people are often simply not depicted in Western films, TV shows, books, magazines, or even advertisements. When they are represented it is often in a negative way (e.g., as a terrorist) (Alsultany, 2012; Said, 2008; Shaheen, 2003). As highlighted earlier, exposure to negative Muslim stereotypes and tropes is linked to increased prejudice (Shaver et al., 2017), while reading Muslim narratives can reduce intergroup anxiety and prejudice (Johnson et al., 2013). If you think that your favourite show would benefit from the inclusion of a Muslim family or character, write to the producers, or start a petition. There is also a large body of films made, and books written, by Muslim creatives. You can ask your local cinema to play these films, read books by Muslim authors in your local book club, and ensure that children at your local school are being exposed to stories from a diverse (not to mention
interesting, informative, and fun) range of people. To support Muslim books, film, and media projects, you may also choose to explore crowdfunding efforts on site such as Launchgood.

3d. Complain when the media reports on Muslim affairs in a prejudiced way

In a similar vein, it can be useful to write and complain if you feel that media coverage of Muslim issues or affairs is promoting racial or religious intolerance or hatred, or bolstering stereotypes. You may make complaints to media regulating agencies (in New Zealand: The Broadcasting Standards Authority and in Australia: Australian Press Council), report the behaviour to the human rights commission, write opinion letters, or write letters of complaint. Small changes on the way in which Muslim people are portrayed in the media may lead to large net changes in how Muslim people are treated in New Zealand and Australia, and across the Western World.

Conclusion

In the present paper we have made the case that while symbolic displays of support for Muslim people are necessary and valued, they are not sufficient to overcome pervasive Islamophobia, anti-Muslim sentiment, and social exclusion of Muslims in the West; deliberate and persistent solidarity and allyship is needed. We have outlined challenges to solidarity and allyship, and made the case for why these must be overcome. We end with practical solutions that we hope each reader will integrate into their school, workplace, and life. While such actions will take effort, it is through action that we can (and must) work together to ensure that Muslims in the West feel safe to pray, to go out and eat and shop, to study, to work, to have fun, and to be valued, equal, and included members of the nations that they call home.

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News headlines or ideological beliefs: What affects readers’ interpretations of news stories about immigration, killing in the name of religion and other topical issues? A cross-cultural analysis

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University of Otago

The tragedy that shook the entire nation on 15 March, 2019, compels researchers to try and understand the factors that perpetuate stereotypes and prejudice against minority groups. While in the past, New Zealand was thought of as a welcoming and inclusive nation, events in Christchurch challenge that view. Anti-immigrant prejudice is rooted in attitudes captured by self-report scales measuring mindsets such as a Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) across various age groups and ethnicities (Matić & Bratko, 2018; Caricati, Mancini & Marletta, 2016). In New Zealand, RWA is found to be most strongly related with anti-immigration attitudes and SDO with low warmth toward people of Chinese origin (Satherley & Sibley, 2016).

SDO and RWA are closely related to prejudice (e.g., Sibley & Duckitt, 2008), but the underlying motive varies for each (Halkjelsvik & Rise, 2014). RWA is based on the belief that the world is perilous and encourages orthodoxy, whereas SDO views the world as a fight for power and a struggle to sustain or increase hierarchical inequities (Duckitt, 2001). These ideological beliefs also affect how incoming information, including news, is processed. Tausch and Hewstone (2010) found that SDO was negatively associated with stereotype change. This suggests that people are more likely to process information in line with their pre-existing beliefs and can discard any contradictory information presented to them. In contrast, when individuals lack prior information about an event, they are more likely to depend on headlines and story content when interpreting news information (Blair & Banaji, 1996; Bodenhausen et al., 1999).

Sensational headlines have long been a topic of interest for researchers. In 1949, Steigleman called American readers “a shopper of headlines” (p.389). Tannenbaum (1953) found that using positive, negative or neutral headlines affected the views of the reader regarding the guilt of a defendant in a murder trial. Participants who viewed a positive headline most commonly rated the accused as ‘innocent’ while those who read negative headlines rated him ‘guilty’. Those who viewed the neutral headline said they had ‘no opinion’. However, this effect was not observed consistently and mostly occurred when the participants quickly scanned through the news article. Pfau (1995) obtained similar results when the use of ‘black riot’ instead of ‘union riot’ resulted in an event being perceived as more violent by American students. Additionally, Pfau found increased prior knowledge about the outgroup appeared made participants susceptible to stereotypical distortion.

In contrast, some other studies have found that headlines have not affected news story interpretation. For instance, Leventhal and Gray (1991) found that when crime articles were paired with headlines that were either neutral or positively framed towards the accused or the victim, the manipulation had no effect on assessment of crimes or memory for the article. Similarly, Condit et al. (2001) found that varying the headline had no role in shifting beliefs regarding genetic determinism.

These ideas are relevant to the Christchurch attack in that the alleged perpetrator is thought to have been radicalised through a combination of meetings while travelling abroad as well as through online sources. For instance, the alleged perpetrator posted his “manifesto” on 8chan, “a popular website where many right-wing users discuss ‘white genocide,’ among other apocalyptic concerns” (https://www.theringer.com/2019/3/15/18268015/christchurch-new-zealand-shooter-social-media-internet). The implication is that information on the web can distort thinking in new directions. An alternative is that one seeks information on the web that simply confirms or intensifies pre-existing views.

We examined these ideas in the present study by presenting news stories about topical issues in four conditions. The stories were preceded by headlines that were positive, negative, both positive and negative, or were not preceded by a headline. Nearly all prior research studies used news articles constructed purely for the experiment, with no studies that we are aware of exploring the effect of SDO and RWA on ‘real’ headline perception. Thus, we aimed to fill this gap in literature, that is, to understand what happens when a reader is exposed to a strongly-worded, real headline about a familiar topic. For example, this set of contrasting headlines was published on the website Stuff (https://goo.gl/R8exBT) and The Telegraph (https://goo.gl/ck2gTM), respectively: ‘Immigration good news for NZ business’ versus ‘Immigration damages house prices, say Home Office advisers’. The question was whether the headline changes their opinion or do readers interpret the news in line with their own pre-existing beliefs?

We tested participants in two countries: America and Pakistan. These countries were chosen because participants were expected to have divergent opinions about the four issues we examined (killing in the name of Islam, honour killing, Donald Trump’s travel ban for certain countries and immigration). For this reason our initial analyses examined cultural differences in attitudes about the four topics.

METHOD

Participants

American and Pakistani undergraduate students (N = 429) completed the experiment using the Qualtrics® online survey (212 from Pakistan and 217 from the USA). Six attention questions were included in the experiment to ensure that the respondents were paying attention to the presented stimuli. Two hundred participants from the USA and 122 from
Pakistan demonstrated an acceptable level of attention and comprehension (at least 5 of 6 attention questions correct). Only these 322 participants were included in the data analysis to ensure accuracy of the results while retaining the maximum number of participants. On average, participants were 22.99 years old (SD = 4.99). There were 137 male, 183 female and 2 gender fluid participants. In the entire sample, there were 151 who reported they were religious (92 who identified as Muslim, 53 as Christian and 6 from other religions).

**Materials** Participants completed 6-item versions of the RWA ($\alpha = .70; M = 1.11, SD = .80$) and SDO scales ($\alpha = .79; M = 1.06, SD = .90$) by rating items on a 7-point scale (0, strongly disagree; 6, strongly agree; Pratto et al., 1994; see Appendix A). After this, the participants were presented with four news stories that focused on political, religious and social issues, with the stories preceded by headlines as described above (positive, negative, both, no headline) (see Appendix B). The crux of all the news stories was to highlight the difference between the ideas of two groups or individuals. Since the experiment was conducted in America and Pakistan we chose stories of relevance to each country: Donald Trump, honour killing (justifying killing a young woman accused of bringing dishonour to a family), killing in the name of Islam (justifying taking another person’s life because they belong to or support a different religion), and immigration. Each of the four stories had two different headlines that were presented in four conditions: positive headline, negative headline, both, or no headline. When there was a headline, it (they) always preceded the text. In each condition, the text for a particular story was exactly the same. For each story, after reading the headline and article, participants were given three questions in which they reported their feelings towards the story characters or issue on a feelings thermometer (see Appendix C) from 0 (highly unfavourable) to 10 (highly favourable).

**RESULTS**

First, we used univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) to test the effects of gender, age, nationality and experimental group on the participant’s outcome feelings (4 stories x 3 questions each). Only the effects of nationality were significant (see Table 1), so we analysed American and Pakistani participants separately for all further analyses.

**Effect of headline manipulation**

For each story, we then examined whether assignment to an experimental group had an effect on reported outcome feeling towards the main subject (question a in Table 1) using a one-way ANOVA with condition as the between-subjects variable (4 levels). The experimental group did not affect outcome feelings towards Donald Trump, Asian Immigrants, Qandeel Baloch (the woman killed by her brother for posting “scandalous” videos on social media), or Mumtaz Qadri (the man who killed the governor Salman Taseer to take revenge for supporting a Christian) (see Table 2). For each story, we then used identical one-way ANOVAs for the two other questions (questions b and c in Table 1), with the results indicating no significant effect of experimental group for any of the eight questions (all $p$s > .05).

Next, we used multiple regression to examine whether SDO and RWA affected feelings for the main subject of each story (question a in Table 1). To be as thorough as possible, we also included whether the headline had been positive or negative (see Table 3). As above, the valence of the news headline (whether positively worded or negatively worded) was not a significant predictor of the outcome feelings for any of the four stories. In contrast, SDO significantly predicted 3/4 outcome feelings in the USA and 1/4 in Pakistan. Likewise, RWA significantly predicted 3/4 feelings in the USA and 2/4 in Pakistan.

**Table 1.** Mean and Standard Deviation of all 12 outcome feelings, as well as SDO and RWA in Pakistan and the USA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>USA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Feelings towards:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1a. Donald Trump</td>
<td>1.70 (2.60)</td>
<td>1.16 (2.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1b. Muslim countries</td>
<td>3.34 $^a$ (3.66)</td>
<td>4.99 $^b$ (3.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1c. Ban</td>
<td>1.80 (2.61)</td>
<td>1.59 (2.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2a. Asian Immigrants</td>
<td>6.91 (2.38)</td>
<td>7.29 (2.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2b. Immigration</td>
<td>7.01 (2.14)</td>
<td>7.22 (2.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2c. New Zealand</td>
<td>7.11 (2.17)</td>
<td>7.09 (2.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO</td>
<td>1.33 (.80)</td>
<td>1.05 (.90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWA</td>
<td>2.75 (.688)</td>
<td>1.10 (.80)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. For each of the 12 questions, means in Pakistan and the USA were compared with t-tests, and corrected with the Holms-Bonferroni correction. $^a,b$ $p<.004$ (means for Pakistan versus USA were significantly different after correction).*
Table 2. One-way ANOVAs showing effect of headline manipulation for the main subject of each story

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feelings for:</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
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<th>η²</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>F</th>
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<td>Donald Trump</td>
<td>10.45</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>11.87</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asian Immigrants</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>26.55</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.05</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qandeel Baloch</td>
<td>19.34</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>17.22</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.02</td>
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<td>Mumtaz Qadri</td>
<td>8.02</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>60.29</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>.18</td>
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<td>1.08</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qandeel Baloch</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>1.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Immigrants</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>1.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donald Trump</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>1.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Note.</td>
<td></td>
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<td>.05</td>
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<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>.05</td>
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<td>c</td>
<td>.05</td>
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<td>.05</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.05</td>
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<td>.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Multiple regression analysis with SDO, RWA, and positive headlines as predictors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donald Trump</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Immigrants</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qandeel Baloch</td>
<td>-.23</td>
<td>.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mumtaz Qadri</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Note.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4a. Correlations between SDO, RWA and Question Composites in USA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Pro- Trump</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>-.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. SDO</td>
<td>.428</td>
<td>.500</td>
<td>.500</td>
<td>.500</td>
<td>.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. RWA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.337</td>
<td>.285</td>
<td>.285</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4b. Correlations between SDO, RWA and Question Composites in Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Pro- Trump</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>-.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Anti-Immigration</td>
<td>-.012</td>
<td>-.039</td>
<td>-.039</td>
<td>-.039</td>
<td>-.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Pro-Honour Killing</td>
<td>-.020</td>
<td>-.012</td>
<td>-.012</td>
<td>-.012</td>
<td>-.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Pro-Killing for Religion</td>
<td>-.003</td>
<td>.119</td>
<td>.086</td>
<td>.309</td>
<td>-.309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. SDO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.119</td>
<td>.086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. RWA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.067</td>
<td>-.087</td>
<td>.217</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. a<p<.05, b<p<.01.

DISCUSSION

In this study, sensational news headlines did not have a significant effect on attitudes regarding the four key issues studied. Instead, ideological belief systems – RWA and SDO – had a much greater influence on how a reader perceived the news and how they felt about the main subject. Amongst participants from the USA, we found that individuals who scored higher on RWA were more likely to endorse Donald Trump, Mumtaz Qadri, and Qandeel’s brother. Those who scored high in SDO tended to rate Donald Trump more positively, but Asian Immigration in New Zealand and Qandeel Baloch negatively. These findings make sense in light of Feldman and Johnston’s (2013) definition of RWA (submitive, conservative, religious) and SDO (dominant personality, seeking socioeconomic superiority of their in-group and less concerned with preserving traditional values).

For instance, Pettigrew (2017, p.108) notes the following: “Trump’s speeches, studded with such absolutist terms as “losers” and “complete disasters,” are classic authoritarian statements. His clear...
distinction between groups on the top of society (Whites) and those “losers” and “bad hombres” on the bottom (immigrants, Blacks and Latinos) are classic social dominance statements”.

Other recent studies have reported that individuals scoring high on RWA and SDO tend to exhibit more favourable feelings towards Trump and a higher intention of voting for him (Choma & Hanoch, 2017). Our story focussed on Trump’s stated aim to protect Americans from attacks by Muslims. The solution proposed by Donald Trump is to establish dominance over America and curtail the entrance of individuals from Muslim countries who may pose a threat to the Americans. These are essential features of both RWA (minimising diversity, the influence of ethnic minorities, and external threat) and SDO (domination of low status groups by higher status groups), and it therefore makes sense that participants who scored higher on SDO were pro-Trump and pro-banning of Muslim countries. The results of the present study are consistent with previous findings and provide additional evidence to show that participants who already had pro- or anti-Trump feelings could not be swayed differently when presented with a contrary headline.

Cohrs and Stetzl (2010) found that SDO and anti-immigration feelings were most popular in countries which have foreign-born people who are either unemployed or in a disadvantaged position. Our second story was about locals who have to compete for houses because of immigrants, and is therefore consistent with the characteristics of RWA and SDO, that outgroup members are perceived as presenting the threat of economic competition (Duckitt, 2006).

An interesting finding of this study is that amongst participants from Pakistan, only two issues appeared to be significantly correlated with SDO and RWA. These two issues were both highly relevant in Pakistan (i.e., honour killing and killing in the name of religion). The case of Qandeel Baloch, a young Pakistani model who was murdered by her brother for indulging in modelling photoshoots, reflects the idea that men have more autonomy and women must follow basic restrictions (SDO) and that they must not step out of conventional roles (RWA). Christopher and Wojda (2008) found that participants higher in SDO held negative beliefs about women in managerial roles. Likewise, Fraser, Osborne and Sibley (2015) found a positive correlation between SDO and opposition to gender-based affirmative action. Likewise, Altemeyer (1988; cf. Smith & Winter, 2002, p.306) claims that authoritarian personalities hold “a ‘law and order’ mentality that legitimizes anger and aggression against those who deviate from social norms and conventions.” In this case, the penalty was death by her brother, which participants high in RWA and SDO were more likely to endorse.

Killing in the name of religion presented a unique case as it was one issue for which SDO and RWA were consistent predictors in both the countries. While the story concerned an issue that took place in Pakistan, even American students high in RWA and SDO rated it as more acceptable. This is a striking finding because a subsection of college students in two diverse countries, with different religious views and not much else in common, showed more tolerance for murder as justified by religion. This finding makes clear that violence toward others of differing beliefs is not simply a Muslim issue or an American issue, but rather, is an issue that is not restricted to a particular religion or cultural/national context. Although the mean approval for killing in the name of religion (see Table 1) still tended to be low overall, even in a mainstream, non-extremist college sample, there is more tolerance for killing in the name of religion in those high in SDO or RWA. As such it is inopportune to blame a particular culture, national group or religion for promulgating hatred toward another group. Clearly, this is a human propensity that is possible for a wide range of ethnographic groups, and depends on more general attitudes such as SDO or RWA. Future research could replicate the same study in other cultures to examine the role of SDO and RWA in shaping attitudes toward other phenomena, and potentially, the role of the media in developing such attitudes in the first place. It could also examine whether repeatedly slanted headlines or news story biases might change attitudes even if one-off headlines do not. This, for instance, could explain some of the general differences in attitudes in Pakistan versus the USA (see Table 1).

In conclusion, the present study suggests that one-off sensational headlines do not cause a significant change in an individual’s perceptions about people and issues, at least in a university-educated audience. Instead, RWA and SDO are the main influences for how such individuals interpret incoming information regarding a known topic. Moreover, based on the sample from Pakistan, it appears that issues that one is most familiar to are the ones most strongly predicted by SDO and RWA.

References


Eberhardt, J. L., Dasgupta, N., & Banazynski, T. L. (2003). Believing is seeing: The effects of racial labels and


Appendix A: Questionnaires

SDO Short version
1. It is OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others.
2. Inferior groups should stay in their place.
3. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes okay to step on other groups.
4. We should have increased social equality.*
5. It would be good if all groups could be equal.*
6. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.*

RWA Short version
1. It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government and religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create doubt in people’s minds.
2. It would be best for everyone if the proper authorities censored magazines so that people could not get their hands on trashy and disgusting material.
3. Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at our moral fibre and traditional beliefs.
4. People should pay less attention to The Bible and other old traditional forms of religious guidance, and instead develop their own personal standards of what is moral and immoral.*
5. Atheists and others who have rebelled against established religions are no doubt every bit as good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly.*
6. Some of the best people in our country are those who are challenging our government, criticizing religion, and ignoring the "normal way" things are supposed to be done.*

*Reversed

Appendix B: Headlines for the experimental groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group 1</th>
<th>Group 2</th>
<th>Group 3</th>
<th>Group 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Trump renews call for 'travel ban' to protect against 'dangerous Muslim countries'</td>
<td>Trump’s Muslim Ban 3.0 Is Just as Inhumane — and Even More Frightening.</td>
<td>No headline</td>
<td>Both headlines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Asian Immigration good news for NZ business.</td>
<td>Asian Immigration damages house prices, say Home Office advisers.</td>
<td>No headline</td>
<td>Both headlines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Qandeel Baloch died a feminist hero</td>
<td>Qandeel Baloch died a prostitute, not a hero</td>
<td>No headline</td>
<td>Both headlines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Mumtaz Qadri Hero of Islam &amp; Pakistan.</td>
<td>Mumtaz Qadri: the cowardly murderer we hail as an Islamic saint.</td>
<td>No headline</td>
<td>Both headlines</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix C: Questions following each story and Scale for measuring feeling towards sensitive topical issues

Using the thermometer (where 0 is least favourable and 10 is highly favourable) indicate your feelings towards:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Story 1</th>
<th>1a</th>
<th>Donald Trump</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1b</td>
<td>Muslims from banned countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1c</td>
<td>Trump’s travel restrictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Story 2</td>
<td>2a</td>
<td>Asian Immigrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2b</td>
<td>Immigration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2c</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Story 3</td>
<td>3a</td>
<td>Qandeel Baloch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3b</td>
<td>Qandeel’s brother</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3c</td>
<td>Honor killing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Story 4</td>
<td>4a</td>
<td>Mumtaz Qadri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4b</td>
<td>Salman Taseer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4c</td>
<td>Killing in the name of Islam</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Combination of outcome feeling questions to form issue clusters
Pro Trump =1a+1c-1b
Anti- Immigration =-2a-2b-2c
Pro Honour Killing =3b+3c- 3a
Pro Killing for Religion =4a+4c-4b
White Nationalism and Multiculturalism Support: Investigating the Interactive Effects of White Identity and National Attachment on Support for Multiculturalism

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¹ The University of Auckland, New Zealand, ² University of Canterbury, New Zealand, ³ Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, Qatar

Although white nationalism is increasing globally, little is known about the interactive effects of white identity and national attachment on intergroup attitudes. We address this oversight and theorise that nationalism (i.e., an unquestioning belief in the superiority of one’s nation) should strengthen, whereas patriotism (i.e., a positive, albeit objective, attachment to one’s nation) should weaken, the negative correlation between white identity and multiculturalism support. As hypothesised, white identity and nationalism correlated negatively, whereas patriotism correlated positively, with support for multiculturalism amongst a sample of New Zealand Europeans (N = 12,815). Moreover, the negative correlation between white identity and multiculturalism support was nearly twice as strong for those high (versus low) on nationalism, but was half the size for those high (versus low) on patriotism. These results demonstrate the negative impact of white nationalism on intergroup relations, and highlight the potential for patriotism to lessen the harmful effects of white identity on support for diversity.

**Keywords:** white nationalism; nationalism; patriotism; multiculturalism; White identity; terrorism

**Introduction**

On 15 March 2019, the wave of white nationalism sweeping across the globe came crashing into New Zealand as a lone terrorist began his assault on two Mosques in Christchurch. The attack—New Zealand’s deadliest in modern history—claimed the lives of 50 people and injured 50 more. In the immediate aftermath of this atrocity, debate raged over whether the hatred espoused by the terrorist reflected deep-seated and unrecognised biases held by us as a nation (e.g., Ryan, 2019, March 24). Yet, intolerance towards Muslims (and other minorities) has been evident in New Zealand. For example, Shaver, Sibley, Osborne, and Bulbulia (2017) reveal that New Zealanders’ warmth towards Muslims is notably low. Moreover, minorities in general report markedly higher rates of interpersonal and institutional forms of discrimination than do their New Zealand European counterparts (e.g., Harris et al., 2012; Harris et al., 2006). Collectively, research on intergroup relations in New Zealand reveals an uncomfortable reality. Namely, the intolerance laid all too bare in the recent terrorist attacks may lurk underneath a thin veneer of acceptance in New Zealand.

The current study addresses this possibility by investigating the impact of white nationalism on multiculturalism support in New Zealand. To begin, we briefly review the literature on ethnic identification amongst ethnic majority groups, paying particular attention to how white identity influences intergroup attitudes. We then discuss studies on national attachment to show that the ways in which one identifies with his or her nation of residence has distinct implications for attitudes toward ethnic minorities. Finally, building upon the reviewed literature, we propose that nationalistic attachment should exacerbate, whereas patriotic attachment should mitigate, the negative effect of white identity on acceptance for cultural diversity.

**White Identity and Intergroup Attitudes**

Although ethnic identification is particularly salient for low-status groups (Sidanius & Petrocik, 2001) and can protect minorities from the harmful effects of discrimination (Cronin, Levin, Branscombe, van Laar, & Tropp, 2012; Stronge et al., 2016), a newly-emerging and burgeoning literature has begun to examine ethnic identification amongst members of high-status groups. Accordingly, this research consistently reveals that the origins and implications of ethnic identification differ between low-status and high-status groups. For example, Levin and Sidanius (1999) investigated the correlates of ethnic identification amongst high- and low-status groups in the United States and Israel and found that the preference for group-based hierarchy (namely, social dominance orientation; SDO) correlated negatively with ethnic identification for low-status groups, but positively for high-status groups (also see Levin, Federico, Sidanius, & Rabinowitz, 2002). Similarly, whereas beliefs that legitimise the social hierarchy (e.g., the Protestant work ethic, conservatism, etc.) correlate negatively with ethnic identification for low-status groups, they correlate positively for high-status groups (Levin, Sidanius, Rabinowitz, & Federico, 1998). In short, ethnic identification amongst high-status groups is rooted in the preference for group-based inequality, suggesting that white identity may have nefarious consequences for intergroup relations.

Consistent with the view that white identity could have negative consequences for intergroup relations, research reveals that ethnic identification...
amongst whites (i.e., white identity) correlates with a number of harmful views toward minorities. For example, Lowery, Unzueta, Knowles, and Goff (2008) showed that white identity correlated negatively with affirmative action support, particularly when the policy was framed in terms of the potential losses affirmative action could imply for whites. Likewise, Major, Blodorn, and Blascovich (2018) revealed that informing whites about the changing demographics of the United States increased support for anti-immigration policies and the likelihood of voting for Donald Trump, but only for those who were already high on white identity. Finally, Osborne, Jost, Becker, Badaan, and Sibley (2019) demonstrated that white identity correlated negatively with collective action aimed at redressing inequality, but positively with collective action aimed at reinforcing the status quo. Conversely, minorities’ ethnic identification correlated positively with support for collective action to redress inequality, but negatively with protests that would reinforce the status quo. Together, these studies reveal that white identity undermines support for diversity and intergroup tolerance.

The Impact of (Distinct Forms of) National Attachment

Although white identity seems to be at the centre of the current raft of intergroup conflict seen across the globe, it is important to take into account the nature of one’s attachment to his or her nation of residence. Accordingly, research distinguishes between two forms of national attachment: (a) nationalism and (b) patriotism (see Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989). Whereas nationalism reflects an unwavering—and unquestionable—belief that one’s nation is superior to others, patriotism captures the simple positive affective attachment people have towards their nation. Although these constructs have been given different names including blind versus constructive patriotism (Schatz & Staub, 1997; Schatz, Staub, & Lavine, 1999; Spry & Hornsey, 2007), nationalism versus patriotism (Blank & Schmidt, 2003; De Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003), and ethnic exclusion versus patriotism (Coendert & Scheepers, 2003), a core feature distinguishing these two forms of national attachment is rejection versus acceptance of democratic values, respectively.

Consistent with the view that nationalism and patriotism reflect distinct forms of national attachment, the two constructs have separate antecedents and consequences. As for the antecedents to nationalism, Osborne, Milojev and Sibley (2017) investigated three waves of longitudinal data from New Zealand and revealed that right-wing authoritarianism (RWA; i.e., people’s tendency to obey authorities) correlated positively with relative increases in both patriotism and nationalism. In contrast, SDO correlated positively with relative increases in nationalism, but negatively with increases in patriotism. Notably, the corresponding cross-lagged effects these two forms of national attachment had on RWA and SDO were either unreliable, or notably smaller than the reciprocal associations. Accordingly, nationalism and patriotism have distinct antecedents.

In addition to having distinct origins, nationalism and patriotism independently predict (sometimes in countervailing directions) important outcomes for intergroup relations. For example, nationalism correlates with hostile intergroup attitudes including prejudices toward immigrants (De Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003; Wagner, Becker, Christ, Pettigrew, & Schmidt, 2012), anti-immigration sentiment (Ariely, 2012), and outgroup derogation (Blank & Schmidt, 2003). Conversely, after accounting for the negative effects of nationalism, the relationship between patriotism and intergroup attitudes is either positive, or unreliable (De Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003). Finally, Ariely (2012) found that nationalism correlated positively, whereas patriotism correlated negatively, with anti-immigration views across 34 countries. Thus, nationalism seems to undermine support for diversity, whereas patriotism facilitates intergroup acceptance. Nevertheless, research has yet to examine the extent to which these distinct forms of national attachment moderate the effect of white identity on attitudes toward multiculturalism.

Current Study

The current study addresses this oversight by investigating the impact distinct forms of national attachment have on the relationship between white identity and attitudes toward diversity. Given that a preference for group-based hierarchy underlies ethnic identification and ingroup favouritism for high-status groups (Levin et al., 2002; Levin & Sidanious, 1999; see also Hamley, Houkamau, Osborne, Barlow, & Sibley, in press), we predicted that white identity would correlate negatively with support for multiculturalism (i.e., an ideology that promotes the acceptance of diverse cultures and opposes hierarchy). The strength of this negative association should, however, depend on the type of attachment one holds toward his or her nation of residence. Because nationalism reflects an uncritical belief in national superiority and is based on a preference for group-based hierarchy (Osborne et al., 2017; Sidanious, Feshbach, Levin, & Pratto, 1997), nationalism should strengthen the negative correlation between white identity and support for multiculturalism. Conversely, patriotism captures a positive identification with one’s nation of residence, yet nevertheless recognises that one’s nation is fallible in its pursuit to uphold democratic values (Blank & Schmidt, 2003). Thus, patriotism should attenuate the predicted negative correlation between white identity and multiculturalism support.

In order to identify the independent (and interactive) effects of white identity and national attachment on support for multiculturalism, we control for multiple key covariates. Because women are less conservative than men (Fraley, Griffin, Belsky, & Roisman, 2012), we controlled for participants’ gender. Also, given that the diversity in one’s community can influence political beliefs (Major et al., 2018; Schlueter & Wagner, 2008), we controlled for whether or not participants lived in an urban or rural setting. We also used employment status as a covariate, as the (perceived) threat from ethnic diversity may be heightened amongst the unemployed (Schlueter & Scheepers, 2010). Finally, we controlled for participants’ levels of education and conservatism, as they correlate positively and negatively (respectively) with pro-diversity attitudes (see Sarrasin et al., 2012; Sidanious, Levin, van Laar, & Sears, 2008). By adjusting for these variables, we rule out the most likely alternative explanations for our predicted results and provide a compelling examination of the impact that white nationalism has on multiculturalism support.
White nationalisms and support for multiculturalism

METHOD

Sampling Procedure

Data come from Time 9 of the New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study (NZAVS), a nationwide, longitudinal panel study that began in 2009. Sampling for Time 9 occurred on five occasions. In 2009 (Time 1), a random sample of adults from the electoral roll (i.e., a national list of registered voters) were invited to participate in a 20-year longitudinal study. This first sampling occasion yielded 6,518 participants (with a response rate of 16.6%). By 2011, 3,914 participants remained in the study (i.e., a 60% retention rate from Time 1). To address sample attrition, a non-random booster sample was recruited through the website of a major nation-wide newspaper. This second sampling occasion yielded 2,970 new participants, bringing the sample size at Time 3 to 6,884 participants.

To increase the size and diversity of the sample, we conducted three additional sets of booster sampling based on random samples (without replacement) of the electoral roll, but oversampling hard-to-reach populations (see Sibley, 2018). The first of these three sampling occasions was in 2012 (i.e., Time 4) and used multiple sample frames to recruit 5,108 new participants into the study (with a response rate of 9.9%). The second sampling occasion occurred in 2013 (i.e., Time 5) and recruited 7,581 new participants into the study (with a response rate of 10.6%), whereas the third sampling occasion occurred in 2016 (i.e., Time 8) and recruited 7,669 new participants into the study (with a response rate of 9.5%). Therefore, Time 8 had 21,937 participants (i.e., 13,779 retained from at least one prior time point, 7,669 additions from booster sampling, and 489 unmatched or unsolicited opting). By 2017 (i.e., Time 9), 17,072 participants remained in the study (i.e., a 77.8% retention rate from the prior wave), 13,885 of whom solely identified as New Zealand European and are the focus of the current study.

Participants

Of the 13,885 sole-identifying New Zealand Europeans who participated in Time 9 of the NZAVS, we examine the 12,815 (Mage = 52.17, SD = 13.61; 63.0% women) who gave partial or complete responses to our variables of interest (92.3% of the sample who identified as New Zealand European).

Measures

Time 9 of the NZAVS included measures of white identity, nationalism, patriotism, and multiculturalism support. Along with demographic covariates (and other variables outside the scope of the current study). Unless noted, items were rated on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale.

White identity was assessed using three items from Leach and colleagues’ (2008) identity centrality subscale: (a) “I often think about the fact that I am a member of my ethnic group”, (b) “The fact that I am a member of my ethnic group is an important part of my identity”, and (c) “Being a member of my ethnic group is an important part of how I see myself”. Items were averaged together to form a measure of white identity (α = .72).

Nationalism was assessed using two items from Kosterman and Feshbach’s (1989) 8-item scale: (a) “Generally, the more influence New Zealand has on other nations, the better off they are” and (b) “Foreign nations have done some very fine things, but they are still not as good as New Zealand”. Items were averaged together to form a measure of nationalism (r = .32).

Patriotism was assessed using two items from Kosterman and Feshbach’s (1989) 12-item scale: (a) “I feel great pride in the land that is our New Zealand” and (b) “Although at times I may not agree with the government, my commitment to New Zealand always remains strong”. Items were averaged together to form a measure of patriotism (r = .57).

Multiculturalism support was assessed using these three items: (a) “The unity of New Zealand is weakened by too many immigrants”, (b) “I feel at ease when I am in a city district in New Zealand with many immigrants” (reverse-coded), and (c) “There are too many immigrants living in New Zealand”. Items were averaged together to form a measure of multiculturalism support (α = .77).

RESULTS

Table 1 displays the bivariate correlations and descriptive statistics for our variables of interest. Given the negative impact of ethnic identification on support for diversity among whites (see Lowery et al., 2006), we predicted that white identity would correlate negatively with multiculturalism support. Indeed, the negative correlation between white identity and multiculturalism support (r = −.12, p < .001) shown in Table 1 is consistent with this notion. Crucially, however, we predicted that the strength of this negative association would vary by the type of attachment people have with their nation of residence. Specifically, because nationalism reflects an uncritical belief in national superiority and is rooted in the preference for group-based hierarchy (see Osborne et al., 2017; Sidanius et al., 1997), we expected that nationalism would strengthen the hypothesized negative correlation between white identity and multiculturalism support. Conversely, patriotism is rooted in a positive, but critical, identification with one’s nation and correlates positively with support for democratic values (see Blank & Schmidt, 2003). Thus, patriotism should weaken the predicted negative correlation between white identity and multiculturalism support.

To investigate these hypotheses, we entered our mean-centred and dummy-coded covariates, as well as our mean-centred predictor variables (i.e., white identity, nationalism, and patriotism), into the first block of a regression model. The second block of our regression added the (a) White Identity × Nationalism and (b) White Identity × Patriotism interaction terms to the model. The full model was then regressed onto multiculturalism support using full information maximum likelihood estimates and 95% confidence intervals (CIs).
Table 1. Bivariate correlations and descriptive statistics for the variables included in this study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>α</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Gender&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Urban&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Employed&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Age</td>
<td>52.17</td>
<td>13.61</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Education</td>
<td>5.32</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Conservatism</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. White Identity</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Nationalism</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Patriotism</td>
<td>5.90</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Multiculturalism</td>
<td>4.77</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>.77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>Dummy-coded (0 = woman, 1 = man); <sup>b</sup>Dummy-coded (0 = rural, 1 = urban); <sup>c</sup>Dummy-coded (0 = unemployed, 1 = employed)

Table 2. Regression analysis predicting multiculturalism support as a function of white identity, nationalism, and patriotism, as well as their interactive effects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>β</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>95% CI Lower</th>
<th>95% CI Upper</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>4.54</td>
<td>(4.47)</td>
<td>4.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.01*</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>(-.09)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.06***</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>(.16)</td>
<td>(.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.03*</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>(.03)</td>
<td>(.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>(-.00)</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.19***</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>(.09)</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservatism</td>
<td>-.25***</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>-.25</td>
<td>(-.27)</td>
<td>-.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Identity</td>
<td>-.09***</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>(-.11)</td>
<td>-.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>-.16***</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>(-.20)</td>
<td>-.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotism</td>
<td>.10**</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>(.12)</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Identity × Nationalism</td>
<td>-.03***</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>(-.04)</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Identity × Patriotism</td>
<td>.04***</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Model Summary

| R²    | .18*** |

<sup>a</sup>Dummy-coded (0 = woman, 1 = man); <sup>b</sup>Dummy-coded (0 = rural, 1 = urban); <sup>c</sup>Dummy-coded (0 = unemployed, 1 = employed)
Note: Results adjust for nationalism and the White Identity × Patriotism interaction term, as well as our covariates.

**Figure 1.** Interactive effects of white identity and nationalism on multiculturalism support.

**Figure 2.** Interactive effects of white identity and patriotism on multiculturalism support.
As shown in Table 2, Model 1 reveals that participants who lived in urban settings and who were employed supported multiculturalism more than their counterparts who lived in rural settings and who were unemployed, respectively ($B = 0.21$, 95% CI [0.16, 0.27], $p < .001$ and $B = 0.09$, 95% CI [0.03, 0.15], $p = .003$, respectively). Also, education correlated positively ($B = 0.10$, 95% CI [0.09, 0.11], $p < .001$), but conservatism correlated negatively ($B = -0.25$, 95% CI [-0.27, -0.24], $p < .001$), with multiculturalism support. After adjusting for these key covariates, we found support for our hypotheses. Specifically, white identity ($B = -0.09$, 95% CI [-0.11, -0.08], $p < .001$) and nationalism ($B = -0.18$, 95% CI [-0.20, -0.16], $p < .001$) correlated negatively, whereas patriotism correlated positively ($B = 0.14$, 95% CI [0.12, 0.17], $p < .001$), with multiculturalism support.

Table 2 also displays our results for the predicted interactive effects of nationalism and patriotism on the negative association between white identity and multiculturalism support (see Model 2). As hypothesised, nationalism strengthened the negative association between white identity and multiculturalism support ($B = -0.02$, 95% CI [-0.04, -0.01], $p < .001$). Simple slope analyses at $\pm 1$ SD from the mean of nationalism demonstrated that the negative association between white identity and support for multiculturalism was nearly twice as strong at high ($B = -0.12$, 95% CI [-0.14, -0.10], $p < .001$) versus low ($B = -0.07$, 95% CI [-0.09, -0.05], $p < .001$) levels of nationalism (see Figure 1). Conversely, patriotism weakened the negative association between white identity and multiculturalism support ($B = 0.04$, 95% CI [0.02, 0.05], $p < .001$). Simple slope analyses at $\pm 1$ SD from the mean of patriotism revealed that the negative relationship between white identity and multiculturalism support was nearly half the size at high ($B = -0.06$, 95% CI [-0.08, -0.04], $p < .001$) relative to low ($B = -0.13$, 95% CI [-0.16, -0.11], $p < .001$) levels of patriotism (see Figure 2). Thus, consistent with our hypotheses, nationalism strengthened, whereas patriotism weakened, the negative association between white identity and multiculturalism support.

**DISCUSSION**

In light of the recent terrorist attack in Christchurch, it is important to understand the factors that influence white majority group members’ attitudes toward diversity, particularly in a nation where the demographics are changing rapidly (e.g., New Zealand). To these ends, the current study investigated the independent and interactive effects of white nationalism on support for multiculturalism—an issue central to the white nationalist ideology sweeping across the globe (see Bonikowski, 2016). Because a preference for group-based hierarchy underlies ethnic identification for high-status groups (Levin & Sidanius, 1999), we predicted that white identity would correlate negatively with multiculturalism support. The strength of this negative association should, however, depend on the type of attachment people have with their nation of residence. Given that nationalism reflects an uncritical belief in national superiority rooted in a preference for group-based hierarchy (Osborne et al., 2008; Sidanius et al., 1997), nationalism should strengthen the negative correlation between white identity and multiculturalism support. In contrast, patriotism captures a positive identification with one’s nation of residence, yet nevertheless recognises that the nation may be fallible in its pursuit to uphold democratic values (Blank & Schmidt, 2003). As such, patriotism should weaken the predicted negative correlation between white identity and support for multiculturalism.

As hypothesised, white identity and nationalism correlated negatively, but patriotism correlated positively, with multiculturalism support. But critically, the negative association between white identity and support for multiculturalism depended on the type of attachment people had with their nation of residence. As predicted, the negative association between white identity and multiculturalism support was nearly twice as strong for those high (versus low) on nationalism. Conversely, this same relationship was reduced by nearly half for those high (versus low) on patriotism. Together, these results highlight the harmful effects of white nationalism on support for diversity, and suggest that the ideology underlying the raft of alt-right violence sweeping across the globe is present—and impactful—in New Zealand.

**Strengths, Limitations, Implications, and Future Directions**

By assessing the independent and interactive effects of white identity and national attachment on multiculturalism support, the current study makes multiple contributions to the literature. For one, we provide one of the first investigations into white nationalism in New Zealand and show that ethno-national identities (at least partly) motivate opposition to ethnic and cultural diversity. In this sense, our results demonstrate that, despite its geographical isolation from the rest of the world, New Zealand is nonetheless susceptible to the same extremist beliefs that saw the rise of Donald Trump and Brexit (see Inglehart & Norris, 2016; Roy & McGowan, 2019, March 20; Wright, 2019, March 19). Accordingly, it is incumbent upon us, as a community, to recognise that these biases exist and to understand how white nationalism may influence our public discourse. Only by acknowledging that these prejudices exist and by recognising the potential threat this belief system holds for democracy can we begin to make New Zealand a safe place for the myriad ethnic and religious groups who call New Zealand home.

The current study also makes an important contribution to the literature on national attachment. Specifically, some have questioned the utility of treating nationalism as distinct from patriotism (e.g., Parker, 2010). While we have previously shown that nationalism and patriotism have separate antecedents (i.e., RWA has positive cross-lagged effects on both nationalism and patriotism, whereas SDO has positive and negative cross-lagged effects on nationalism and patriotism, respectively; Osborne et al., 2017), the current study shows that these two types of national attachment also have separate consequences. Whereas nationalism correlated negatively with support for multiculturalism, patriotism fostered multiculturalism support. Together with other research conducted both locally (e.g., Greaves et al., 2017) and internationally (Blank & Schmidt, 2003; Li & Brewer, 2004; Spry & Hornsey, 2007), these results help to further differentiate nationalism from patriotism and validate their conceptual independence.

Although not the focus of this study, our results also identify numerous additional correlates of multiculturalism support. Consistent with research showing that conservative political views often correlate with opposition to minority rights (see Sears & Henry, 2005; Sidanius et al., 2008; Yogeeswaran, Verkuylten, Osborne, & Sibley, 2018), conservatism...
correlated negatively with support for multiculturalism. Indeed, conservatism was by far the strongest predictor in our model, demonstrating the symbolic nature of the multiculturalism debate. Nevertheless, education and employment status also correlated with multiculturalism support, indicating that those who are of low socioeconomic status may see multiculturalism as a threat to their (financial) wellbeing (Lane, 1962). Alternatively, it may be that education fosters democratic values of acceptance and appreciation of others (see Dee, 2004), providing a potential solution to intergroup intolerance. Likewise, consistent with the vast literature on the contact hypothesis (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Schmid, Al Ramiah, & Hewstone, 2014; Wagner, Christ, Pettigrew, Stellmacher, & Wolf, 2006), participants living in urban settings (i.e., neighbourhoods that are likely to be ethnically diverse) supported multiculturalism more than did whites living in rural areas where diversity is likely to be low. These latter potential interpretations of our data offer some hope for improving intergroup relations by suggesting that education and contact with minorities may increase New Zealand Europeans’ support for ethnic diversity.

Despite the strengths and implications of our results, it is important to note limitations to the current study. Given the cross-sectional nature of our study, inferences about the causal direction of these associations must be made with caution. That said, some longitudinal panel research reveals that nationalism and patriotism predict hostile intergroup attitudes over time, rather than vice versa (Wagner et al., 2012). Second, given our focus on white nationalism, we necessarily restricted our analyses to New Zealand Europeans. As such, our results cannot speak to the effects of ethnic identity on intergroup attitudes among minorities. Indeed, there are reasons to believe that our results would differ if we focused on minorities. For example, Osborne and colleagues (2019) reveal that, although ethnic identity correlates positively with collective action aimed at redressing inequality amongst minorities, whites’ ethnic identity predicts support for protests that seek to reinforce the status quo. That is, ethnic identity has different (and often opposing) political implications for ethnic minorities and whites. Thus, future research should investigate the extent to which our results differ for ethnic minorities in New Zealand.

We should also note that the associations observed in the current study were relatively small in magnitude. Indeed, a myriad of attitudes likely contribute to people’s views toward multiculturalism—white identity, nationalism, and patriotism only being part of a larger set of variables that correlate with multiculturalism support. Yet our results held after controlling for the most likely alternative explanations. That white identity, nationalism, and patriotism correlated with multiculturalism support after accounting for these other effects demonstrates the robustness of our findings. Still, future research should investigate other predictors of multiculturalism support alongside the variables tested here in order to replicate and extend our results (e.g., terrorism anxiety correlates negatively with warmth towards Muslims; see Hawi, Osborne, Bulbulia, & Sibley, 2019).

It is also important to note that we examined the negative impact of white nationalism on support for multiculturalism. As such, our results cannot directly speak to the motivations behind the terrorist attack in Christchurch, nor terrorism in general. Indeed, while opposition to immigration and other forms of multiculturalism is a main feature of the ideology behind white nationalism (Bonilla-Silva, 2000; Swain, 2002), we cannot, nor do we wish to, equate opposition to multiculturalism with support for terrorism. Future research must address this sensitive, albeit timely, topic.

Finally, the current study investigated the deleterious effects of white nationalism. Although this is necessary to increase understanding of how white nationalism may shape New Zealand politics in the years to come, it does little to explain why some New Zealand Europeans endorse such views. Accordingly, Sengupta, Osborne, and Sibley (in press) argued that nationalism may appeal to some members of ethnic majority groups because it offers a positive identity for those who think that their group is losing their relatively advantaged position in society. Indeed, others have noted that right-wing populist movements benefit from leaders who are able to transform whites’ objective structural advantage during times of prosperity into a narrative of (perceived) relative deprivation (e.g., Mols & Jetten, 2015). Accordingly, Marchlewksa, Cichocka, Panayiotou, Castellanos, and Batayneh (2018) show that collective narcissism about the greatness of one’s nation (i.e., arguably a form of nationalism) mediated the association between relative deprivation and support for both Brexit (Study 2) and Donald Trump (Study 3). Therefore, future research should investigate both the underlying reason(s) behind the rise in white nationalism and the consequences this alarming trend has on intergroup relations.

**Conclusion**

The terrorist attack on Christchurch’s Muslim community on 15 March 2019 shook the conscience of our nation and catapulted New Zealand into the international news cycle. Many openly pondered how such an atrocity could occur in an otherwise peaceful nation, whereas others noted that it was an all-too-poignant reminder that racism is alive and well in New Zealand (Ryan, 2019, March 24). Regardless of the position one takes in this debate, it is impossible for us to carry on as things were before the attack—we are a nation forever changed by the vile hatred displayed towards our Muslim brothers and sisters on 15 March 2019.

The current study—and, indeed, the papers that comprise this special issue of *New Zealand Journal of Psychology*—sought to pay tribute to the Muslim community of New Zealand by attempting to answer a seemingly unanswerable question (namely, how could someone take the lives of 50 innocent people and injure 50 more?). While our results uncover the harmful effects of white nationalism on support for diversity, we also identify a potential solution to this problem. By emphasising the patriotic aspects of national attachment (i.e., a positive attachment to New Zealand that recognises its faults), white identity need not always conflict with the ideals of multiculturalism.
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Encouraging flourishing following tragedy:

The role of civic engagement in well-being and resilience

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University of Otago, New Zealand

The present study explores the potential of well-being and resilience benefits for people who are civicly engaged in the context of the Christchurch terror attacks. Young people (n = 530, mean age = 20.9) completed one civic engagement, well-being, and resilience questionnaire. Results showed that people who were flourishing had significantly higher levels of civic engagement compared to those who were doing just ok. A hierarchical regression showed that civic engagement predicted 35% of the variance in well-being, controlling for age and SES. Civic intentions, community belonging, social trust, generosity, and helping a neighbour made unique contributions to well-being. A second hierarchical regression showed that civic engagement predicted 5% of the variance in resilience, controlling for well-being and age. Civic intentions, helping a neighbour, and volunteering made unique contributions to resilience. How civic engagement promotes well-being and resilience, and how to promote civic engagement following adversity, are discussed.

Keywords: Civic engagement; Well-being; Resilience

Introduction

Evidence of human excellence – generosity, love, community and flourishing - is perhaps most remarkable when evident in contexts of significant adversity and challenge (Ryff & Singer, 2003). In the aftermath of the Christchurch terror attacks on March 15th, people have reported they feel sad, angry, and fearful, but people have also reported they feel gratitude, love, respect, compassion, and belonging (Fouda, 2019; O’Connell Ripara, 2019).

While Aotearoa New Zealand continues to grieve for the 50 lives lost in the terror attack, there has also been an outpouring of support for the survivors and the Muslim community. Seventy thousand people signed a gun law reform petition, tens of thousands of New Zealanders have donated to survivor and families of victims support organisation, and organisations have formed human chains of solidarity around mosques while people prayed, and tens of thousands have attended vigils held in every centre around Aotearoa New Zealand (O’Connell Ripara, 2019). Directly following the attack, volunteers flocked to Christchurch to help (Martin, 2019), taxi drivers offered their services for free, (RNZ, 2019), people have brought food and flowers to mosques (Fouda, 2019), and organised donations of goods, vouchers, and care packages to survivors and the Muslim community (Let’s Collaborate, 2019). In the weeks following the attack people continue to offer their support to the Muslim community through donations and volunteering for organisations that support refugees and Muslims (Morris, 2019). The acts of compassion and contribution can be described as civic engagement – “individual and collective actions designed to identify and address issues of public concern” (American Psychological Association n.d.). While the Muslim community have noted and given thanks to the people of New Zealand for their leadership, help, love and compassion (Fouda, 2019), civic engagement can also benefit the people who are participating – making not just our communities and nations better places, but improving individuals’ well-being and resilience as well.

The present paper examines the types of civic engagement that can lead to higher well-being, resilience, and human flourishing. We argue that the acts of kindness and community participation shown by New Zealanders following the Christchurch terror attacks will not only “guide us to creating a more just and inclusive Aotearoa,” (O’Connell Ripara, 2019) but also improve the well-being of the people who are being good citizens.

Civic Engagement

The term civic engagement describes a collection of values and behaviours that suggest that people believe their lives and goals are connected to others, and they are committed to creating a better society (Flanagan & Christens, 2013; Sherrod & Lauckhardt, 2009). The importance of engagement to healthy societies and democracies cannot be understated - it is through civic engagement and the exercise of citizen rights and responsibilities that democracy is sustained (Hayhurst, 2017). In the present study the definition of civic engagement is left intentionally broad, as people from different groups, cultures, and countries have their own means of showing and understanding citizenship. For example, in some contexts voting is considered the highest expression of civic engagement (Vowles, 2004). In Aotearoa New Zealand, people under the age of 18 are not allowed to vote, so by some measures they would not be considered engaged. However, we know that New Zealand youth do contribute to their communities and work to address key challenges of their generation (Hayhurst, 2014). For example, on the same day as the Christchurch terror attacks, tens of thousands of young people in 40 centres around the country took to the streets demanding action on climate change – the largest youth protest in New Zealand history (Walls, 2019).

Generally, researchers and practitioners use the term civic engagement to describe a collection of values and behaviours. For the purpose of
Civic engagement, well-being and resilience

In the present study, we have selected several civic engagement variables that are relevant to Aotearoa New Zealand following the Christchurch terror attack: civic participation, civic values, civic intentions, community belonging, social trust, and interpersonal generosity. Civic participation describes diverse acts such as protesting, but also volunteering at organisations, helping neighbours, and working to make communities better (Flanagan, Syvertsen, & Stout, 2007). Civic values include believing that people can make a difference and wanting to make a difference, as well as feeling that helping other people, equality, and making the world a better place are important (Hayhurst, 2017). Civic commitment describes intending to contribute in the future, such as voting in the next election or volunteering to help people (see Sherrod et al., 2010). Community belonging is considered a “seedbed for the development of active citizenship,” as it predicts civic intentions, helping, and involvement in groups (Duke et al., 2009, p. 167). Social trust is vital to democracy, and means that people have “a positive view of humanity... the belief that most people are fair, helpful and trustworthy,” (Flanagan, 2003, p. 165). Finally, although there is a dearth of research linking interpersonal generosity to civic engagement, it does describe many of the acts of contribution and helping shown by people following the terror attacks, and is therefore included as a potential predictor of well-being and resilience.

Civic engagement & well-being

Beyond the importance of civic engagement to democracy, healthy communities, and addressing social and environmental challenges, it is also linked to individual well-being. The research on why this is remains unclear for several reasons. First, as mentioned, there are many definitions of civic engagement, making it hard to compare findings across groups, studies, and disciplines. Second, as there are diverse forms of civic expression and participation, it is likely that not all civic engagement is beneficial to well-being. People’s motivations for engagement, the sense of belonging to the group they are working with, positive emotions, as well as the success of the civic acts, may all impact the personal outcomes for people who are contributing (Stukas, Hoye, Nicholson, Brown & Aisbett, 2016; Youniss, McLellan & Yates, 1997). Third, predictors of civic engagement are strongly linked to predictors of well-being such as SES and education levels (McCollum, 2016). People who are civicly engaged are likely already on a path towards health and well-being (Ballard, Hoyt & Pachucki, 2018), and the relationship between the two is likely bi-directional (Lerner, Dowling & Anderson, 2003).

Despite these complications, there is still considerable evidence that civic engagement promotes well-being (Pancer, 2015). Civic engagement contributes to identity, sense of belonging in communities and society, purpose, positive relations to others, feelings of mastery, and personal growth— all of which are related to well-being outcomes (Duke, Skay, Pettigell, & Borowsky, 2009; Flanagan et al., 2007; Keyes, 2012; Putnam, 2001; Wilson, 2012). In this paper we look at more direct evidence that civic engagement can predict well-being, controlling for factors that often predict both, such as socio-economic status (SES). Moreover, we explore the high end of well-being— flourishing, and how it relates to civic engagement.

Civic engagement & flourishing

Flourishing describes people living within the optimal range of human functioning (Fredrickson, 2006). Individuals who are flourishing “like most parts of themselves, have warm and trusting relationships, see themselves as developing into better people, have direction in life, are able to shape their environments to satisfy their need, and have a degree of self-determination,” (Keyes, 2002, p. 208). While there are many predictors of flourishing, including positive emotions and strong support networks, contribution and civic engagement are especially relevant to the present context. Keyes (2006) has found that while youth who are languishing (with poor mental health) help people a couple times a month, youth who are flourishing help others at least once a week. Further, eudaimonia (i.e. striving toward excellence based on one’s unique potential; see Ryff & Singer, 2008) is enhanced when people work to create positive change and their behaviours are congruent with their values (Waterman, 1993), strengths (Seligman, 2002), and prosocial selves (Steger, Kashdan, & Oishi, 2008). A large research programme run by Lerner and colleagues has shown that positive youth development is both a predictor and an outcome of contribution (Lerner et al., 2005). Keyes (2012) recommends that we don’t just need to shift our attentions away from mental illness to mental health, but also away from focusing on the individual to focusing on others and communities.

Civic Engagement & Resilience

Generally, resilience is defined as the ability to react to adversity and challenge in an adaptive and productive way, and is therefore considered crucial to healthy development (Hayhurst et al., 2015; Rutter, 1987). While there is a dearth of research specifically exploring the role of civic engagement in resilience, drawing from related areas of research, we can expect that civic engagement may contribute to resilience for several reasons. For example, belonging and social support both predict resilience (Hayhurst et al., 2015) and civic engagement (Duke et al., 2009; Youniss et al., 1998). Likewise, positive emotions, such as kindness, joy and love, both motivate generosity towards others (Hayhurst, 2010), and predict resilience (Fredrickson, 1998).

Of particular relevance to the present study, Fredrickson and colleagues did an in-depth study of a small group of people following the 9/11 terror attacks in the United States (Fredrickson, Tugade, Waugh, & Larkin, 2003). They found that following the attack, positive emotions such as gratitude, interest, and love, protected resilient people from depression and promoted positive mental health.

Amidst the grief and anger following the Christchurch terror attacks, talking about the benefits of civic engagement may seem incongruous or inappropriate. However, it is when individuals and communities are tested that we learn about human strength— how it is nourished and how it is undermined (Ryff & Singer, 2003). People in Aotearoa New Zealand report feeling grateful and interested in the country’s unfolding political, social and spiritual response. But are civic responses to tragedy tokenistic or fleeting? We argue they are not. Instead, we argue that civic engagement is an active ingredient in promoting well-being and coping following adversity.

In the present study, Freddyerickson and colleagues did an in-depth study of a small group of people following the 9/11 terror attacks in the United States (Fredrickson, Tugade, Waugh, & Larkin, 2003). They found that following the attack, positive emotions such as gratitude, interest, and love, protected resilient people from depression and promoted positive mental health.
engagement distinguish those who are flourishing from those who are doing just ok or languishing, but also that civic engagement will predict well-being and resilience. We hope to show that civic engagement is salutary and important following tragedies such as the Christchurch terror attack, not just to show support and love for survivors and their community, but also as an effective coping mechanism and to promote well-being and heal a nation.

Thus, we have three main research questions:
1. Do people who are flourishing have stronger civic engagement?
2. Can civic engagement predict well-being?
3. Can civic engagement predict resilience?

**METHOD**

**Participants and Procedure**

Participants were 530 young people (192 males, range: 16-32 years, M=20.9 years, SD = 2.76) taking part in a youth event or a tertiary class (psychology, physical education, or surveying). The present participants are a convenience sample selected from a larger parent study on civic engagement in Aotearoa because they had completed a wide range of well-being and civic engagement measures.

Three hundred and sixty-seven identified as New Zealand European/Pākeha and 151 as Māori, Pasifika, Asian, or another ethnic group. For the purpose of the present analysis, people who identified as Pākehā/New Zealand European were categorised as the majority group, and people who identified as Māori, Pasifika, Asian, ‘Other’, or with more than one ethnic group were categorised as a minority ethnic group. The present method of categorisation is far from perfect as Aotearoa New Zealand is a bicultural nation that recognises Māori as the tangata whenua (first people, people of the land). Also, there are likely considerable differences in cultural conceptualisations and relationships to civic engagement between different minority ethnic groups (Jagers et al., 2017; Raihana & Walker, 2007). However, substantial civic engagement research has highlighted different levels of participation between majority and minority ethnic groups (Foster-Bey, 2008), and because of the sample size of the present study, majority/minority was the most appropriate group distinction.

One hundred and eleven participants were taking part in a youth event that focused on supporting young people to make positive change in their communities. They completed the questionnaires on the first day of their event. Four hundred and nineteen participants were tertiary students (psychology, physical education, or surveying), who completed the questionnaire on the first day of class. Only a portion of the participants (n = 147) completed the resilience scale alongside the well-being scales. They were psychology students who completed the questionnaire for course credit.

**Measures**

**Well-being**

Well-being was measured using Keyes’ (2009) 14-item Mental Health Continuum Short Form (MHC-SF, see also Keyes, 2006). This scale is designed to measure three facets of well-being: emotional (e.g., “How often do you feel happy?”), social (e.g., “How often do you feel that you had something important to contribute to society?”), and psychological (e.g., “How often do you feel that you liked most parts of your personality?”). Participants responded to items on a 1 (never) to 5 (every day) Likert scale. The present findings supported the scale’s reliability, Cronbach’s α = .87.

Resilience was measured using a 15-item (shortened) version of Wagnild and Young’s (1993), modified by Neill and Dias (2001) to measure levels of resilience in young people. Participants responded to items such as, “(w)hen you think of the next few years, how likely are you to do volunteer work to help needy people?” Answers were scored on a 1 (not at all likely) to 5 (extremely likely) Likert scale. The present findings supported the scale’s reliability, Cronbach’s α = .79.

**Civic intentions**

Civic intentions were measured using three items drawn from the CIRCLE (Centre for Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement) expectations for engagement in community issues scales (Flanagan et al., 2007). The scale included questions such as, “(w)hen you think of the next few years, how likely are you to do volunteer work to help needy people?” Answers were scored on a 1 (not at all likely) to 5 (extremely likely) Likert scale. The present findings supported the scale’s reliability, Cronbach’s α = .87.

**Civic participation**

For the purpose of the present study, civic participation was measured using three items drawn from CIRCLE’s civic behaviour scale (Flanagan et al., 2007). The items are relevant to the present exploration of the types of behaviours New Zealanders have been doing following the terror attacks. Participants responded to the question, “during the last 12 months, how many times have you: 1) helped make your city or town a better place for people to live? 2) helped a neighbour? and, 3) volunteered your time (at a hospital, day care centre, food bank, youth program, community service agency)” on a 0 (never) to 4 (5 or more times) Likert scale.

**Community belonging**

Participants’ sense of community belonging was measured using a slightly modified version of Sheldon and Bettencourt’s (2002) three-item group inclusion scale. The participant responded to three statements such as, “I feel included in my community”, on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) Likert scale. The present findings supported the scale’s reliability, Cronbach’s α = .89.

**Social trust**

Social trust was measured using two items from the CIRCLE civic measures paper (Flanagan et al., 2007). Participants responded to items such as, “(in) general,
most people can be trusted,” on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) Likert scale. The present findings supported the scale’s reliability, Cronbach’s α = .83.

**Interpersonal generosity**

**RESULTS**

**Correlations**

In order to assess the relationships between well-being, resilience and civic engagement, we performed a series of Pearson product-moment correlations (see Table 1). Well-being was positively correlated to all civic engagement measures collected in this study. Well-being was also positively correlated to age and SES (measured by level of mother’s education). Resilience was positively correlated to age, as well as civic values, civic intentions, sense of community belonging, social trust, interpersonal generosity, or helping to make the city a better place, helping a neighbour, and volunteering in the past year. Resilience was not correlated to SES.

**Table 1. Correlations between Demographic, Well-being, Resilience, and Civic Engagement Variables**

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**Note.** p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. SES = levels of mother’s education; WB = well-being; Values = civic values; Intent = civic intentions; Belong = community belonging; Trust = social trust; City/City Better = helped make the city a better place in past year; Neighbour = helped a neighbour in past year; Volunteer = volunteered in past year.

**Comparing Groups**

We performed a series of t-tests in order to explore whether there were differences between young men and young women, and people who identified with the majority or a minority ethnic group, and well-being and resilience. There were no differences between young men (M = 62.69, SD = 9.42) and young women (M = 63.71, SD = 9.00) in terms of well-being, t(441) = 1.14, p = .26. Young men scored significantly higher (M = 84.00, SD = 9.20) than young women (M = 79.66, SD = 13.34) on resilience, t(145) = 2.00, p < .05.

There were no differences between people who identified with a minority ethnic group (M = 63.06, SD = 9.14) and people who identified with the majority ethnic group (M = 63.42, SD = 9.18) in terms of well-being, t(440) = 0.39, p = .70. There were no differences between people who identified with a minority ethnic group (M = 78.18, SD = 12.39) and people who identified with the majority ethnic group (M = 82.00, SD = 12.21) in terms of resilience, t(145) = 1.66, p = .10.

**Engagement & Flourishing**

Based on Keyes’ (2002) recommendations, we split the participants into three groups as a function of their scores on the well-being scale: Languishers, moderates and flourishers. There were only five participants who fit the languishing profile, who were excluded from the following analysis due to small numbers. We were left with two groups: those who Keyes and colleagues define as people who were doing moderately well at life (neither languishing nor flourishing, n = 180) and those who were flourishing (n = 244). We performed a series of t-tests in order to compared moderates and flourishers in terms of civic engagement (see Table 2).

As shown in Table 2, there were significant differences between moderates and flourishers on every civic engagement measure included in this study, as well as resilience. Even after controlling for multiple comparisons using the Holms Bonferroni correct factor, every comparison was significantly different. Flourishers had significantly higher resilience, civic values, civic intentions, community belonging, social trust, generosity, making the city better, helping a neighbour, and volunteering.

**Civic Engagement & Well-being**

In order to assess whether civic engagement could predict well-being, controlling for common predictors of well-being such as age and SES, we performed a hierarchical regression. Mother’s education (SES) and age were entered in the first step, and civic engagement variables were entered in the second (civic values, civic intentions, community belonging, social trust, generosity, making the city better, helping a neighbour, and volunteering).
Civic engagement, well-being and resilience

Table 2. t-Test Results Comparing Differences between Flourishers and Moderates

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Note. **p < .01, ***p < .001. SES = levels of mother’s education; Values = civic values; Intent = civic intentions; Belong = community belonging; Trust = social trust; City better made the city a better place in past year; Neighbour = helped a neighbour in past year; Volunteer = volunteered in past year.

Table 3. Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Contributing to Well-being

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Note. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. SES = levels of mother’s education; Values = civic values; Intent = civic intentions; Belong = community belonging; Trust = social trust; City Better = helped make the city a better place in past year; Neighbour = helped a neighbour in past year; Volunteer = volunteered in past year.

Table 4. Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Contributing Resilience

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Note. *p < .05, ***p < .001. Values = civic values; Intent = civic intentions; Belonging = community belonging; Trust = social trust; City better = helped make the city a better place in past year; Neighbour = helped a neighbour in past year; Volunteer = volunteered in past year.
Civic engagement, well-being and resilience

Table 3 shows the unstandardised regression coefficients (B) and intercept, the standardised regression coefficients ($\beta$), the $R^2$, $R^2$ change and $F$ change at Step 1 (age and SES entered into the prediction equation) and Step 2 (with civic engagement variables entered into the prediction equation) of the hierarchical regression. The regression revealed that the overall model at Step 1 was significant, $F(2,377) = 8.72$, $p < .001$. Together, age and SES accounted for 4.4% (adjusted $R^2 = .04$) of the variation in well-being. Inspection of the beta weights revealed significantly positive effects for age, $\beta = .14$, $p < .01$ and SES, $\beta = .15$, $p < .01$.

The overall model at Step 2 was significant, $F(10,369) = 23.75$, $p < .001$. Together, age, SES, civic values, civic intentions, community belonging, social trust, generosity, making the city better, helping neighbours and volunteering, accounted for 39.2% (adjusted $R^2 = .38$) of the variation in well-being. Civic engagement explained an additional 34.7% of the variance in well-being, after controlling for age and SES, $R^2$ change = .35, $F$ change (8, 369) = 26.34, $p < .001$.

In the final model, inspection of the beta weights revealed significantly positive effects for SES, $\beta = +.09$, $p < .05$, community belonging, $\beta = +.23$, $p < .001$, generosity, $\beta = +.19$, $p < .001$, social trust, $\beta = +.30$, $p < .001$, civic intentions, $\beta = +.15$, $p < .01$, and helping a neighbour, $\beta = +.12$, $p < .01$.

In contrast, age, $\beta = +.07$, $p = .11$, civic values, $\beta = -.65$, $p = .11$, making the city better, $\beta = +.06$, $p = .06$, and volunteering, $\beta = +.01$, $p = .20$, did not make unique contributions to the model.

Civic Engagement & Resilience

In order to assess whether civic engagement could predict resilience, controlling for age and well-being, we used hierarchical regression. Age and well-being were entered at the first step, and civic engagement variables that were correlated to resilience (civic values, civic intentions, community belonging, social trust, generosity, making the city better, helping a neighbour, and volunteering) were entered at the second step.

Table 4 shows the unstandardised regression coefficients (B) and intercept, the standardised regression coefficients ($\beta$), the $R^2$, $R^2$ change and $F$ change at Step 1 (age and well-being entered into the prediction equation) and Step 2 (with civic engagement variables entered into the prediction equation) of the hierarchical regression.

The regression revealed that the overall model at Step 1 was significant, $F(2,137) = 72.94$, $p < .001$. Together, age and well-being accounted for 51.6% (adjusted $R^2 = .51$) of the variation in resilience. Inspection of the beta weights revealed significantly positive effects for age, $\beta = .14$, $p < .05$ and well-being, $\beta = +.68$, $p < .001$.

The overall model at Step 2 was significant, $F (10,129) = 16.96$, $p < .001$. Together, age, well-being, civic values, civic intentions, community belonging, social trust, generosity, making the city better, helping neighbours, and volunteering, accounted for 56.8% (adjusted $R^2 = .53$) of the variation in resilience. Civic engagement explained an additional 5.2% of the variance in resilience, after controlling for age and well-being, $R^2$ change = .35, $F$ change (8, 129) = 1.95, $p = .05$.

In the final model, inspection of the beta weights revealed significantly positive effects for age, $\beta = +.15$, $p < .05$, well-being, $\beta = +.65$, $p < .001$, civic intentions, $\beta = +.19$, $p < .05$, helping neighbours, $\beta = +.13$, $p < .05$, and volunteering, $\beta = -.17$, $p < .05$. In contrast, civic values, $\beta = -.10$, $p = .21$, community belonging, $\beta = +.07$, $p = .30$, social trust, $\beta = +.02$, $p = .77$, generosity, $\beta = +.02$, $p = .80$, and making the city better, $\beta = -.08$, $p = .26$, did not make unique contributions to resilience.

DISCUSSION

When the Al Noor Mosque Imam, Gamal Fouda, spoke to a crowd of thousands at Hagley Park in Christchurch on March 22nd, he said: “Last Friday I stood in this mosque and saw hatred and rage in the eyes of the terrorist who killed 50 people, wounded 48 and broke the hearts of millions around the world. Today, from the same place I look out and I see the love and compassion in the eyes of thousands of fellow New Zealanders and human beings from across the globe who fill the hearts of millions.”

As Gamal Fouda (2009) described, people across New Zealand and worldwide have responded with love and compassion to the survivors and those affected by the attacks. We argue that these high levels of civic engagement will not just help those in need, but also help those who are contributing. We provided evidence for this argument in three ways. First, we showed that civic engagement predicted well-being, while controlling for age and SES. In particular, civic intentions (planning on volunteering or helping others in the future), sense of community belonging, social trust, generosity, and helping a neighbour in the past year, made unique and significant positive contributions to well-being. Second, we showed that civic engagement predicted resilience, after controlling for age and well-being. In particular, civic intentions, helping a neighbour and volunteering in the past year uniquely and positively contributed to resilience. Third, we showed that people who were flourishing had significantly higher levels of civic engagement – across every variable we measured – compared to people who were just doing ok. Taken together these findings suggest that it is likely that the tens of thousands of people who contributed to help the survivors and families of victims following the Christchurch terror attacks will experience improved well-being and resilience, especially if they helped a neighbour, volunteered, showed generosity, social trust, or a sense of community belonging.

One strength of the present study is that we used measures that explored both past civic acts (e.g., helping to make the city a better place, helping a neighbour, or volunteering in the past year) as well as future civic intentions (e.g., planning to volunteer in the future). Both past engagement and future commitment predicted well-being and resilience. Civic intentions are linked to people’s civic identity – their values and beliefs about themselves as citizens. While people may not have been able to contribute in the past year for any number of reasons, simply wanting to help can make a difference to people’s well-being and resilience.

There are several reasons why civic engagement may contribute to well-being and resilience. We know that civic engagement can nurture feelings of effectiveness, an important part of well-being (Ryan & Deci, 2000) and resilience (Hayhurst et al., 2015). This may be especially crucial to deal with feelings of hopelessness in the face of senseless tragedies such as the Christchurch terror attack. Further, civic engagement
encourages a sense of belonging (Duke et al., 2009), which is another key aspect of well-being and positive intergroup behaviour (Ryan & Deci, 2000; Hunter et al., 2017). In the present study, community belonging was a unique predictor of well-being. Finally, civic engagement is one way of showing a positive social identity (Sherrod et al., 2010; Hayhurst, 2017). A compelling and growing literature explores the many health and well-being benefits of social identity (see Haslam, Jetten & Haslam, 2012) including resilience (Scarf et al., 2016). Future research should explore the potential influence of community belonging and social identity on civic engagement in terms of well-being outcomes.

Limitations & Future Research

Despite the strengths of the study, there are several limitations. First, we do not have data from the people who are presently contributing to their communities and supporting survivors following the terror attack. Instead, the present participants are a convenience sample of young people that had completed questionnaires that included behaviours such as those shown by New Zealanders following the terror attacks (e.g., helping neighbours, volunteering). There will likely be several differences between the people in the present study and the people who are contributing as this paper is written. The most important difference is that following the terror attacks people may have lower levels of well-being, or higher levels of mental health issues. Research suggests that most people recover fully following terror attacks, however some may experience persistent mental health issues such as anxiety, depression, PTSD, health issues, and behavioural changes (Braun-Lewensohn et al., 2009; DiMaggio & Galea, 2006). Importantly, this paper is not intended for people in crisis, or the survivors or families of victims of the Christchurch terror attack. Instead this paper describes one way that we can heal as a community and a nation, and the likely outcomes people will experience when they show love and support for the survivors and their community. It is also important to note that the present study found that past civic behaviours contributed to well-being and resilience – meaning that helping a neighbour now can buffer people from challenges in the future.

A second limitation is that although we had an adequate sample size who completed civic engagement and well-being measures, only 147 people also completed the resilience scale. Therefore, while resilience and well-being were strongly correlated, we were unable to show whether resilience predicted well-being. Further, participants only completed the questionnaire at one time point. While hierarchical regressions can show whether a variable can predict another variable, a longitudinal design would provide more convincing evidence.

Therefore, future research exploring the links between levels of civic engagement, well-being and resilience of people following terrorist attacks is clearly warranted, and a longitudinal design is recommended. Pursuing salutary well-being and resilience outcomes begs the questions of how to cultivate civic engagement following crises. There is mixed evidence concerning the psychological benefits of civic engagement programmes, such as community service through schools, or requests for donations following natural disasters (Hayhurst, 2010). As mentioned in the introduction, motivation may play an important role as to why some programmes are successful while others are not (Stukas et al., 2016). Other important features of successful civic engagement programmes are a sense of belonging, social identity, and positive emotions (Fredrickson et al., 2003; Hayhurst, 2017; Scarf et al., 2016), although further research is needed.

Conclusions

The present study explored the benefits of civic engagement to an individual’s well-being and resilience. Results showed that something as simple as helping a neighbour can buffer people from adversity and promote well-being. While all civic engagement measures were positively correlated to well-being, and people who were flourishing showed significantly higher levels of civic engagement, our results suggest that specific acts made unique contributions to well-being. In particular, civic intentions (planning to volunteer and help the community in the future), community belonging, social trust, generosity, and helping a neighbour were especially important to well-being. Likewise, civic intentions, helping a neighbour, and volunteering in the past year were especially important to people’s resilience. Future research should explore people’s levels of civic engagement and well-being in response to terror attacks specifically, use a longitudinal design, and explore the roles that community belonging and social identity play in civic engagement outcomes.

In times of challenge and tragedy it can be easy to consider our own well-being as unimportant or trivial, especially compared to those who directly suffered from the terror attack. However, in order to effectively support other New Zealanders, make the appropriate changes to our communities, policy, and government, and make Aotearoa safer for everyone, we need to be well and we need to be resilient. We argue, based on the literature and the results from the present study, that contributing to society and supporting our own well-being are two sides of the same coin – by being engaged and contributing we bolster our well-being and become more resilient. In short, in so much that people who are flourishing are also highly engaged, it appears that we are designed to be good to each other and care for our communities.

References


Civic engagement, well-being and resilience

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Terrorism Anxiety and Attitudes toward Muslims

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Many communities in New Zealand were left shaken following the terrorist attack against two Muslim mosques in Christchurch on March 15, 2019. However, historical records and expert assessments warned of a far-right anti-Muslim act of violence for some time. Our study examined people’s reported anxiety about the possibility of a terrorist attack in New Zealand using data from the 2017/2018 New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study (N = 17,072). Although anxiety regarding a potential terrorist attack was low, warmth toward Muslims correlated negatively with terrorism anxiety. Numerous other socio-demographic and attitudinal variables (e.g., age, gender, political orientation, nationalism, and aspects of personality) also correlated with terrorism anxiety. Collectively, our results reveal a relatively strong association between terrorism anxiety and attitudes toward Muslims. It remains an open question as to whether this association will endure over time, despite growing evidence of terrorism stemming from the far-right.

Keywords: terrorism, terrorism anxiety, Muslim attitudes, Christchurch, New Zealand

Introduction

On March 15, 2019, a sole gunman with professed connections to white nationalism and supremacy attacked two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand (Coaston, 2019; Koziol, 2019). The terrorist attack (George, Berlinger, Whitman, Kaur, Westcott, & Wagner, 2019), which killed 50 Muslims and injured 50 more, left the city of Christchurch—and the rest of the world—in a state of shock (Savage, 2019). However, within days of the incident, news articles and opinion pieces emerged that described the growing presence of white supremacy in Christchurch as early as the 1970s (Ainge Roy & McGowan, 2019; Wright, 2019). Moreover, this was not the first time the Muslim community in New Zealand had been attacked over the years (Kabir, 2016; Shaver, Troughton, Sibley, & Bulbulia, 2016). Nevertheless, immediately after this latest attack, academics and experts highlighted the spread of white supremacist and nationalist groups that were left uninvestigated and under the radar while “New Zealand’s security agencies investigated and infiltrated the Muslim community, animal rights groups and environmental organisations” (Ainge Roy & McGowan, 2019).

Outside of New Zealand, research has also found connections between white supremacy and violence, particularly against minority religious and ethnic groups (e.g., Blazak, 2001; Freilich, Chermak, & Caspi, 2009). While Freilich et al. (2009) acknowledge the threat of international terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, their work also draws attention to the danger and threat that homegrown far-right groups pose (see also Bonilla-Silva, 2007). In a survey of 37 states in the United States (US), far-right groups like Neo-Nazis, skinheads, and militias each outnumbered Islamic Jihadist extremists (Freilich, Chermak, & Simone, 2009). In fact, the number of violent attacks or threats from the far-right in the US had increased between 2007 and 2012 (i.e., the time of publication), while Muslim-American terrorism declined precipitously over a similar timespan (i.e., between 2001 and 2012; Perliger, 2012).

Relatedly, fatalities from far-right groups have outnumbered those from Muslim extremist groups between 2001 (right after the 9/11 attacks) and 2012 (Kurzman, 2013). Finally, according to FBI reports, more suspected far-right domestic terrorists have been arrested than those “inspired by international terrorist groups” (Barrett, 2019), and most far-right extremist suspects have been white men (Gruenewald, 2011).

The purpose of this study is to address two questions: First, to what extent did New Zealanders worry about a terrorist attack occurring in their country prior to the terrorism incident in Christchurch? According to most media reports, New Zealanders were not deeply concerned about mass shootings or terror attacks happening in the country (Campbell, 2019). Indeed, given that New Zealand was ranked as the second safest country in the world and the 114th impacted by terrorism (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2018), such a sense of security was understandable. Moreover, the last mass killing in New Zealand occurred 22 years ago (Leask, 2017). Therefore, we would expect that only a small percentage of non-Muslim New Zealanders would be worried about terrorism occurring in New Zealand.

Second, the present study aims to identify the group(s) that New Zealanders associate with terrorism, and specifically whether attitudes toward Muslims predicts anxiety about terrorist attacks. Although the March 15 Mosque attacks were carried out by a white male who publicly expressed support for white supremacy, and historical records suggest that there is a growing threat of far-right terrorism led by whites (at the global level; Perliger, 2012; Wright, 2019), it is unclear whether New Zealanders could have imagined a white terrorist in their midst.2 Despite the growing evidence to the contrary, past research on media and prejudice would suggest that most people

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1 However, this may not be the case for Muslims, who have suffered a number of attacks against their community and mosques for over two decades (Kabir, 2016) and have warned

2 Given that most group-based violence in New Zealand has been targeted against (rather than perpetrated by) Muslims (Kabir, 2016, Shaver et al., 2016), the possibility of a white terrorist is objectively more plausible. But this is not to say that the public’s perceptions reflect this likelihood.
would picture a terrorist with a Muslim (rather than a New Zealand European) background (Kabir, 2006; Pedersen, Watt, & Griffiths, 2007; Shaver, Sibley, Osborne, & Bulbulia, 2017).

Although far-right white supremacist violence (i.e., terrorism) is on the rise, the public and state-level reaction has seemingly failed to take notice (Bouie, 2019). Unfortunately, media coverage has similarly downplayed the threat of terrorism from far-right white nationalists (Aly, 2007). One study found that “attacks by Muslims received significantly more coverage than attacks by non-Muslims” (Kearns, Betus, & Lemieux, 2019, p.10). Another study on New Zealand mainstream newspapers found that hard news tended to portray Muslims as “dangerous others” (Kabir & Bourk, 2012). Indeed, the media – in its various types – has perpetuated, if not created, a stereotypical link between Arabs and/or Muslims and terrorism (Karium, 2003; Saleem & Anderson, 2013; Shaheen, 2009). Moreover, previous research from the New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study has found a link between media exposure and anti-Muslim attitudes in New Zealand (Shaver et al., 2017).

To what extent, then, do attitudes toward Muslims predict fear of terrorist attacks in New Zealand? According to various studies across the world, the perception of an association between terrorism and Muslim or Middle Eastern groups is quite robust (Park, Felix, & Lee, 2007; Saleem & Anderson, 2013) and intensified after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the US (Harmon-Jones, Greenberg, Solomon, & Simon, 1996; Hitlan, Carillo, Zárate, & Aikman, 2007; Hutchison & Rosenthal, 2011). Numerous studies have also demonstrated a strong relationship between anxiety and intergroup attitudes (e.g., Hutchison & Rosenthal, 2011; Stephan & Stephan, 1985). For instance, one study found that Australian media fostered associations between “Muslims with the threat of terrorism” (Ally, 2007).

An experimental study showed similar effects, whereby participants who played video games with a terrorist theme later reported higher anti-Arab attitudes than did those who played a nonviolent game, even when those games contained no Arab characters (Saleem & Anderson, 2013).

Other research has also found a link between attitudes toward Muslims and a fear of terrorism (e.g., Kabir, 2007). In one study, individuals who viewed Muslims more negatively, particularly when it came to “warmth” stereotypes (e.g., violence and trustworthiness), were more likely to support the “War on Terror” (Sides & Gross, 2013). Similarly, German participants implicitly perceived Muslims to be more aggressive and supportive of terrorism than Christians (Fischer, Greitemeyer, & Kastenmüller, 2007). Another study that examined data from five major Western countries similarly found that participants perceived Muslims as violent and supportive of terrorist groups (Ciftci, 2012; Shaver et al., 2017).

Based on the recent reports and evidence on New Zealand, we predicted that only a small portion of New Zealand participants would be highly worried over a terrorist attack occurring in their country in 2017/2018 (when our data was collected). Despite the hypothesized low levels of concern over a terrorist attack, lower warmth toward Muslims should still predict terrorism anxiety among our sample. Finally, to demonstrate the robustness of our results, we also include a number of demographic and attitudinal covariates.

**METHOD**

**Sampling Procedure**

Data for this study came from Time 9 (2017) of the New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study (NZAVS) – a multi-year study based on a national probability sample of New Zealand adults. Sample recruitment is based on the New Zealand electoral roll, which represents all citizens and permanent residents over 18 years of age who are eligible to vote. The Time 9 sample contained responses from 17,072 participants. Participants were mailed a copy of the questionnaire, with a reminder posted to non-respondents after two months. Participants who provided an email address were also emailed and offered the option to complete an online version of the survey. All respondents were posted a Season’s Greetings card from the NZAVS research team and were offered a prize draw for a grocery voucher in exchange for their participation (see Sibley, 2018, for details). Full details for the NZAVS sampling procedure for this and other waves of the study are available at: www.nzavs.auckland.ac.nz.

**Participants**

Of the 17,072 participants included in Time 9 of the NZAVS, 16,328 (i.e., 95.6% of the full sample) completed the relevant measures for the analysis. The mean age of the sample was 51.27 (SD = 13.73), where 63.4% of the sample were women (36.6% were men), 81.6% identified as primarily New Zealand European, 11.6% identified as primarily Māori, 2.7% identified as primarily Pacific Islander, and 4.1% identified as primarily Asian. In addition, 63.9% of the sample did not identify with any religion or spiritual group, 31.5% identified as Christian, while the rest identified with other religious or spiritual groups, including 0.2% who identified as Muslim.

**Materials**

**Feeling Thermometer**

To measure our focal predictor, participants were asked to indicate how warm they felt toward a number of groups using a “feeling/affective thermometer” for each group. The groups included here were Muslims, Indians, Chinese, Immigrants (in general), Refugees, Pacific Islanders, Asians, Māori, and New Zealand Europeans. Responses were rated on a scale ranging from 1 (“feel LEAST WARM toward this group”) to 7 (“feel MOST WARM toward this group”).

**Covariates**

To better identify the specific role of warmth toward Muslims in predicting Terrorism anxiety, our statistical model adjusted for demographic variables such as: age, gender (0=female, 1=male), household income, and ethnicity (Maori, Pacific Islander, and Asian, relative to NZ European), as well as whether they are religious, employed (0=unemployed, 1=employed), born in New Zealand, have children, are in a romantic relationship, and live in a rural or urban area (0=rural, 1=urban). Deprivation was measured using the 2013 New Zealand Deprivation Index, which uses census information to assign a decile-rank index from 1 (least deprived) to 10 (most deprived) to each meshblock unit (Atkinson, Salmond, & Crampton, 2014). Socioeconomic status (SES) was measured using the New Zealand socio-economic index, with a score ranging from 10 to 90, where 90 indicates high socio-economic status (Milne, Byun, & Lee, 2013). Education was coded into an eleven-level ordinal variable (0 = no qualification, 10 = doctorate).

To adjust for other variables that might also explain terrorism anxiety, a number of attitudinal covariates were also included in the model, such as the Big-Six personality factors, measured through the
Mini-IPIP6 (Sibley et al., 2011). Each trait is measured using 4 items rated from 1 (very inaccurate) to 7 (very accurate) and averaged to give scale scores for Extraversion ($\alpha = .76$), Agreeableness ($\alpha = .72$), Conscientiousness ($\alpha = .69$), Neuroticism ($\alpha = .74$), Openness to Experience ($\alpha = .71$), and Honesty/Humility ($\alpha = .77$). Since neuroticism can measure anxiety tendencies (e.g., “Am relaxed most of the time”), we expected a relatively stronger relationship between that trait and terrorism anxiety.

In addition, two separate political orientation items were included as relevant control variables for this study. These were measured by asking participants to “rate how politically liberal versus conservative [they see themselves] as being” (from 1 = “Extremely conservative” to 7 = “Extremely liberal”) and to “rate how politically left-wing versus right-wing [they see themselves] as being” (from 1 = “Extremely left-wing” to 7 = “Extremely right-wing”). Finally, two national identity measures, Patriotism ($r = .32$) and Nationalism ($r = .57$), were also entered into the model. Patriotism was assessed using two items from Kosterman and Feshbach (1989): “I feel great pride in the land that is our New Zealand” and “Although at times I may not agree with the government, my commitment to New Zealand always remains strong.” Nationalism was assessed using two items from Kosterman and Feshbach (1989): “Generally, the more influence New Zealand has on other nations, the better off they are” and “Foreign nations have done some very fine things but they are still not as good as New Zealand.”

Responses to these items ranged from 1 (“Strongly Disagree”) to 7 (“Strongly Agree”).

**Terrorism Anxiety**

To measure anxiety about terrorism, participants were asked to rate a single item, “I often worry about terrorist attacks happening in New Zealand”, on a scale ranging from 1 (“Strongly Disagree”) to 7 (“Strongly Disagree”). This item was developed specifically for use in the NZAVS.

**RESULTS**

### The Extent of Terrorism Anxiety

Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations for terrorism anxiety and all predictors included in the regression model are presented in Table 1. The first purpose of this paper is to estimate New Zealanders’ concern about a terrorist attack happening in their country. At the time the data for this paper was collected (i.e., 2017), the average mean score for terrorism anxiety was 2.64 ($SD = 1.61$; with mode and median = 2). Further analysis confirms that this mean score is significantly lower than the midpoint of the scale, $t(16327) = -107.66, p < .001$, indicating that terrorism anxiety in New Zealand was relatively low. Indeed, 30.1% of participants “strongly disagreed” with the statement and thus reported no anxiety. Nevertheless, a considerable percentage of participants expressed some concern over terrorist attacks, as a total of 16.1% of the sample agreed somewhat (9.7%), moderately (4.3%), or strongly (2.1%) that they worried about a terrorist attack happening in New Zealand.

**Terrorism Anxiety Predicted by Warmth toward Groups**

A multiple regression analysis was conducted, predicting terrorism anxiety from feelings of warmth toward different groups, as well as from various demographic, personality, political, and national identity measures. Missing data for the 34 predictor variables were estimated using Rubin’s (1987) procedure for multiple imputation, by generating 100 datasets (thinned using every 100th iteration). Table 2 displays the results of this analysis.

After adjusting for the effects of various relevant demographic variables and covariates, warmth toward Muslims negatively correlated with terrorism anxiety. Relative to the other groups that participants expressed feelings toward, warmth toward Muslims had the strongest (negative) association with terrorism anxiety, $b = -1.11, SE = .016, p < .001$. Put another way, the less warmth participants felt toward Muslims, the more worried they were about a terrorist attack happening in New Zealand. The effect size for this predictor was more than double that of any other ethnic or religious group assessed (the second strongest was warmth toward refugees, $b = -.050, SE = .016, p = .002$). On the other hand, warmth toward New Zealand Europeans did not significantly predict terrorism anxiety ($b = .007, SE = .012, p = .387$).

For instance, with the exception of Conscientiousness, all personality factors predicted terrorism anxiety. Honesty/Humility ($b = -.174$) and Neuroticism ($b = .127$) were the two strongest personality predictors of terrorism anxiety, revealing that those higher on honesty/humility and those lower on neuroticism worried about terrorist attacks less.

Political orientation and national identification also played a strong role in predicting terrorism anxiety. For instance, the higher their nationalism and the more conservative their political orientation, the higher their terrorism anxiety ($b = .133$ and $b = .105$, respectively). Right-wing political orientation predicted terrorism to a lesser extent ($b = .041$), whereas patriotism was not associated with terrorism anxiety.

When it comes to other demographic variables, higher anxiety about terrorist attacks was predicted by being female, being older, lower income, lower socioeconomic status, being religious, and living in an urban area. There was no significant relationship between neighbourhood deprivation levels, employment, having children or a partner, or being born in New Zealand. Finally, results showed that those who identified as Māori, Pacific, and Asian expressed more anxiety about terrorist attacks than did those who identified as New Zealand European.

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| Variable                        | Mean | SD  | 1    | 2    | 3    | 4    | 5    | 6    | 7    | 8    | 9    | 10   | 11   | 12   | 13   | 14   | 15   | 16   |
|--------------------------------|------|-----|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| 1. Terrorism Anxiety          | 2.64 | 1.61| -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| 2. Warmth toward Muslims      | 4.08 | 1.47| -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| 3. Warmth toward Immigrants   | 4.52 | 1.24| -120 | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| 4. Warmth toward Asians       | 4.53 | 1.28| -120 | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| 5. Warmth toward Chinese      | 4.36 | 1.34| -120 | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| 6. Warmth toward Indians      | 4.28 | 1.37| -110 | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| 7. Warmth toward NZ Europeans | 5.60 | 1.23| -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| 8. Warmth toward Maoris       | 5.05 | 1.26| -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| 9. Warmth toward Pacific Islanders | 4.79 | 1.25| -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| 10. Warmth toward Refugees    | 4.67 | 1.35| -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| 11. Gender (0 female, 1 male) | 57   | 48  | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| 12. Age                       | 51.77| 15.75| -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| 13. Education                | 5.28 | 2.77| -165 | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| 14. Deprivation              | 4.58 | 2.72| -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| 15. Socio-economic Index     | 54.95| 16.14| -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| 16. Maori Ethnicity (0 no, 1 yes) | 0.12 | 0.58| -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| 17. Pacific Ethnicity (0 no, 1 yes) | 0.12 | 0.58| -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| 18. Asian Ethnicity (0 no, 1 yes) | 0.12 | 0.58| -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| 19. Religious (0 no, 1 yes)  | 0.12 | 0.58| -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| 20. Parent (0 no, 1 yes)     | 0.12 | 0.58| -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| 21. Partner (0 no, 1 yes)    | 0.12 | 0.58| -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| 22. Employed (0 no, 1 yes)   | 0.12 | 0.58| -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| 23. Urban (0 rural, 1 urban)  | 0.12 | 0.58| -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| 24. Born in NZ (0 no, 1 yes) | 0.12 | 0.58| -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| 25. Political Orientation (0 liberal, 1 conservative) | 5.57 | 1.56| -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| 26. Political Wing (0 left-wing, 1 right-wing) | 5.57 | 1.56| -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| 27. Patriotism                | 5.91 | 1.01| -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| 28. Nationalism               | 3.77 | 1.22| -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| 29. Household Income (Log)   | 11.57| 3.56| -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| 30. Extraversion              | 3.88 | 1.18| -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| 31. Agreeableness            | 5.35 | 1.96| -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| 32. Conscientiousness        | 5.11 | 1.92| -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| 33. Neuroticism               | 3.44 | 1.10| -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| 34. Openness                 | 4.93 | 1.17| -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| 35. Honesty/Humidity         | 5.43 | 1.17| -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
Table 1 (continued). Descriptive statistics and correlations for all variables

|   | 17. | 18. | 19. | 20. | 21. | 22. | 23. | 24. | 25. | 26. | 27. | 28. | 29. | 30. | 31. | 32. | 33. | 34. | 35. |
|---|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| 17. Pacific Ethnicity (0 no, 1 yes) | -   |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 18. Asian Ethnicity (0 no, 1 yes)   | .004| -   |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 19. Religious (0 no, 1 yes)         | .081| .060| -   |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 20. Parent (0 no, 1 yes)            | -.024|.085| .080| -   |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 21. Partner (0 no, 1 yes)           | -.059|.021| .021| .272| -   |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 22. Employed (0 no, 1 yes)          | -.006|.004| -.054|.075| .079| -   |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 23. Urban (0 rural, 1 urban)        | .044|.099| -.022| -.085| -.163| -.010| -   |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 24. Born in NZ (0 no, 1 yes)        | -.025|.250| -.034| .004| -.060| .008| -.017| -   |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 25. Political Orientation (0 liberal, 7 conservative) | .059| .012| .244| .148| .048| -.058| -.057| .047| -   |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 26. Political Wing (0 left-wing, 7 right-wing) | -.002| .013| .154| .134| .075| -.016| -.071| .030| .661| -   |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 27. Patriotism                      | .008| -.015| .085| .156| .058| -.018| -.042| .056| .128| .150| -   |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 28. Nationalism                     | .042| .030| .091| .051| -.099| -.031| -.001| .082| .139| .125| .278| -   |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 29. Household Income (Log)          | -.032| -.018| -.071| .048| .343| .348| .026| -.028| -.037| .041| .047| -.052| -   |     |     |     |     |     |
| 30. Extraversion                    | .017| -.026| .02| .072| .070| .047| .001| .003| -.053| .001| .129| .026| .094| -   |     |     |     |     |
| 31. Agreeableness                  | -.022| -.019| .073| .042| .090| -.099| -.014| -.019| -.111| -.151| .164| -.045| .020| .206| -   |     |     |
| 32. Conscientiousness               | .022| .005| .043| .079| .078| .088| .005| -.020| .141| .144| .154| .005| .072| .054| .140| -   |     |
| 33. Neuroticism                     | .003| .027| -.026| -.122| -.062| .008| .010| .003| -.054| -.086| -.159| .027| .058| -.144| .015| -.190| -   |
| 34. Openness                        | -.001| .001| -.056| -.079| -.001| .061| .020| -.067| -.233| -.235| -.005| -.055| .075| .186| .250| -.027| -.042| -   |
| 35. Honesty/Humility                | -.042| .070| .024| .066| .032| -.084| -.049| -.032| -.078| -.121| .058| -.186| .027| .061| .207| .098| -.175| .062| -   |

**Note.** Correlations above .025 are significant at p < .001; correlations above .015 are significant at p < .05
Table 2. Multiple regression with demographic predictors for the dependent variable of terrorism anxiety (N=16,328)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>se</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>95% CI</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>3.487</td>
<td>.254</td>
<td>13.717</td>
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<td>3.069</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-6.914</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>-.137</td>
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<tr>
<td>Warmth toward Immigrants</td>
<td>-.017</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td>-.840</td>
<td>.401</td>
<td>-.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warmth toward Asians</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>.021</td>
<td>1.162</td>
<td>.245</td>
<td>-.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warmth toward Chinese</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.021</td>
<td>0.201</td>
<td>.841</td>
<td>-.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warmth toward Indians</td>
<td>.040</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>2.189</td>
<td>.029</td>
<td>.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warmth toward NZ Europeans</td>
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<td>.012</td>
<td>0.543</td>
<td>.587</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.017</td>
<td>2.815</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warmth toward Pacific Islanders</td>
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<td>.019</td>
<td>-.888</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warmth toward Refugees</td>
<td>-.050</td>
<td>.016</td>
<td>-3.156</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>-.076</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender (0 female, 1 male)</td>
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<td>-10.813</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>8.480</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>.007</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<td>.006</td>
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<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>-.040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Income (Log)</td>
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<td>-6.871</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>-.148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deprivation</td>
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<td>.005</td>
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<td>-.015</td>
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<tr>
<td>Socio-economic Index</td>
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<td>-2.775</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>-.004</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maori Ethnicity (0 no, 1 yes)</td>
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<td>.061</td>
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<td>.295</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asian Ethnicity (0 no, 1 yes)</td>
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<td>4.987</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.027</td>
<td>2.934</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent (0 no, 1 yes)</td>
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<td>.031</td>
<td>1.932</td>
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<td>.009</td>
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<tr>
<td>Partner (0 no, 1 yes)</td>
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<td>.032</td>
<td>1.365</td>
<td>.172</td>
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<tr>
<td>Employed (0 no, 1 yes)</td>
<td>-.063</td>
<td>.032</td>
<td>-1.928</td>
<td>.054</td>
<td>-.116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban (0 rural, 1 urban)</td>
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<td>.031</td>
<td>4.272</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in NZ (0 no, 1 yes)</td>
<td>.039</td>
<td>.031</td>
<td>1.271</td>
<td>.204</td>
<td>-.012</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>.012</td>
<td>-3.716</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>-.067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honesty-Humility</td>
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<td>.012</td>
<td>-14.327</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>-.194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Orientation (0 Liberal, 7 Conservative)</td>
<td>.104</td>
<td>.013</td>
<td>7.927</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Wing (0 left-wing, 7 right-wing)</td>
<td>.041</td>
<td>.013</td>
<td>3.069</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotism</td>
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<td>.013</td>
<td>-0.195</td>
<td>.845</td>
<td>-.025</td>
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<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>.133</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>11.626</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>.114</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DISCUSSION**

The purpose of this paper was two-fold. First, we set out to examine how worried people in New Zealand were about a terrorist attack occurring in New Zealand in 2017. After identifying the mean level of concern within the population, we sought to investigate the factors associated with terrorism anxiety in New Zealand. Accordingly, descriptive analyses showed that anxiety over a terrorist attack was relatively low and that only a small proportion of the sample was worried about a potential terrorist attack in New Zealand in 2017/2018.
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mind that only .2% of the sample identified as Muslims (a population that may have expressed some concern due to past incidents of violence directed toward them), such low levels of anxiety were seemingly well-justified, as New Zealand was the second safest country in the world and ranked low on terrorism impact (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2018). The relative absence of concern helps to partly explain the shock over the terror attacks of March 15, 2019. However, it also demonstrates a potential disconnect between the information that members of the community had versus the warnings that came from experts, scholars, and members of the Muslim community who stated that this sort of attack was “inevitable” (e.g., Ainge Roy & McGowan, 2019; Campbell, 2019; Shaver et al., 2017).

Next, and despite the non-Muslim public’s relatively low levels of concern about terrorism in New Zealand, we nevertheless found that anxiety toward terrorist attacks were strongly predicted by (the absence of) warmth toward Muslims. Indeed, compared to warmth toward eight other groups including immigrants, refugees, Asians, and other major ethnic groups in New Zealand, warmth toward Muslims was more than twice as strong of a predictor of terrorism anxiety. This implies that the association between Muslims and terrorists remains quite strong—even when the perceived threat of terrorism is low. The next strongest group to be associated with terrorism anxiety was refugees, whereas feelings toward immigrants did not seem to be associated with this anxiety. It is possible that participants distinguish between immigrants and refugees, whereby the latter group is more likely perceived to come from Middle Eastern/Muslim countries (Pedersen, Watt and Hansen 2006). Indeed, the latest statistics show that over half the refugees arriving in New Zealand between 2015-2017 came from predominantly Muslim countries (New Zealand Immigration, 2019). A recent study in New Zealand has also found that anti-Muslim sentiment is relatively higher than anti-immigrant sentiment (Shaver et al., 2016). Finally, it is worth noting that feelings toward New Zealand Europeans did not significantly predict terrorism anxiety. This suggests that respondents’ feelings toward New Zealand Europeans are independent from their anxiety over terrorism.

Analyses also show that terrorism anxiety correlated with several other predictors. As expected, socio-political beliefs correlated with anxiety over a potential terrorist attack. Specifically, conservatism, nationalism, and (to a lesser extent) right-wing orientation positively predicted terrorism anxiety, even after adjusting for our key predictors and other covariates. This is consistent with previous studies showing that perceived threat from terrorism correlates with political ideology (left/right-wing or liberal/conservative; Cohrs, Kielman, Maes, & Moschner, 2005; Crowson, Debacker, & Thoma, 2006; De Zavala, Cislak, & Wesolowska, 2010) and national identity (Sekerdej & Kossowska, 2011).

Our results also demonstrated that personality predicted terrorism anxiety. Specifically, honesty/humility (and to a lesser extent, open-mindedness and extraversion) correlated negatively, whereas neuroticism (and to a lesser extent, agreeableness) correlated positively, with anxiety toward terrorism. The strong association between terrorism anxiety and neuroticism was expected since this trait is typically considered to be closely related to anxiety in a number of domains (Muris, Reolofs, Rassin, Franken, & Mayer, 2005; Twenge, 2000). The strong negative association between honesty/humility and terrorism anxiety was less expected in this context, but research reveals that honesty/humility correlates negatively with conservatism and right-wing political orientation (Chirumbolo & Leone, 2010). Moreover, other work has found that humility in general buffers anxiety over death (Kesebir, 2014).

A number of other demographic variables also predicted terrorism anxiety. For instance, women and older participants reported more anxiety than did men and younger participants. Those with lower income, lower education, and lower socio-economic status also worried more about the possibility of a terrorist attack. Living in an urban area also correlated with terrorism anxiety, perhaps because of the higher likelihood of terrorist attacks happening in more densely populated areas (Beall, 2007). Finally, those who identified with a religion and/or religious group expressed more worry about terrorist attacks.

Limitations
Although our study makes multiple contributions to the literature, it is important to note that our analyses utilize cross-sectional data and cannot speak to the causal direction of these relations. Indeed, anxiety about terrorism may either decrease warmth toward Muslim or refugee groups (Navarrete, Kurzbahn, Fessler, & Kirkpatrick, 2004; Ward & Magore, 2006) or foster conservative attitudes (Echebarria-Echabe & Fernandez-Guede, 2006; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). As such, future research will be needed to investigate the causal direction of the associations identified here.

Another limitation to the current study is that it does not include other reference groups in the feeling thermometer scale. Specifically, if “Muslim” is considered to be a religious identity, we did not ask participants to report their warmth toward other religious groups like Christians (i.e., the religion endorsed by most far-right or white nationalist groups; see Fletcher, 2017; McDaniel, Nooruddin, & Faith Shortle, 2011). Future research could examine first whether Muslims are perceived as a religious or ethnic group, and second, whether attitudes shift as a function of how the reference group is perceived (e.g., Muslim vs. Muslim fundamentalists, White vs. White supremacist, Christian vs. Christian nationalist).

Implications
A news piece by Time, published the day after the March 15 attack, quotes a bystander near the Al Noor Mosque as saying, “I thought it would be the other way around, the Muslims attacking, that’s what everyone was waiting for” (Campbell, 2019). Yet, the latest data on violence stemming from extremist ideology would argue otherwise, whereby violence stemming from whites against minorities such as Muslims has been on the rise, particularly in Western countries. Despite these statistics, a data-based review by the Intercept found that, although approximately 268 right-wing extremists met the legal definition of terrorism, only 34 were treated under anti-terrorism laws by the U.S. Justice Department. Notably, this is a number far less than that of alleged international

3 However, if Muslims are perceived as an ethnic identity, then the comparison group would be “New Zealand Europeans”.

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terrorists (Aaronson, 2019). Even when examining responses from the FBI and other counterterrorism groups, terrorist acts perpetrated by white supremacists are treated as local incidents rather than part of a larger threat of violent extremism—a downplaying of terrorism that is also reflected among the public (Ackerman, Woodruff, & Banco, 2019). Accordingly, while multiple scholars have critiqued the media’s role in perpetuating the perception of Muslim threat (e.g., Kearns et al., 2019; Saeed, 2007) including New Zealand (Shaver et al, 2019), other scholars note that systematic investigations into far-right criminal activities remain neglected and selectively biased (e.g., see Chermak, Freilich, Parkin, & Lynch, 2012; Simi, 2010).

Therefore, unless the media actively ends its selective coverage and unless formal investigations begin to give other extremist/violent groups their share of attention, terrorism anxiety may continue to correlate negatively with warmth toward Muslims. Although the associations identified here are relatively small, it is worth noting that they remain significant in a model of 34 predictors and covariates—a point that speaks to the strength of the (seemingly implicit) association between Islam and terrorism (Fischer et al., 2007; Park et al., 2007). The current data also indicate that participants do not associate New Zealand Europeans with terrorism, which could partially be due to the fact that the majority of participants identify as European and, thus, may be displaying a form of ingroup favoritism (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). By itself, the fact that Europeans are not stereotyped as violent extremists should be viewed positively. However, when juxtaposed with the (unfounded) association between warmth toward Muslims and terrorism anxiety, it becomes problematic. Therefore, our goal as researchers should not be to foster a fear of all “Whites”, but rather, to find ways to reduce the fear of all “Muslims”.

It is also notable that those who scored high on nationalism were more likely to worry about terrorist attacks, despite the fact that the terrorist attacker of March 15, 2019, was a white nationalist himself. This finding, however, does not imply that all nationalists are violent, but rather, that some of those who subscribe to a nationalist ideology may ignore or discount the violent and extreme tendencies that can be entangled with this ideology (Srenshaw, 1988).

Conclusion

Research has consistently shown that the association drawn between Islam and terrorism, whether by the media or other figures, implies that Muslims continue to be perceived as a threat. Moreover, when Muslims are seen to pose a terrorist threat or support terrorism, they are more likely to be discriminated against, both personally and institutionally (Doosje, Zimmerman, Kümper, Zick, & Meertens, 2009; Fischer et al., 2007). Ironically, this may provide the needed justification or endorsement that white nationalist or supremacist groups need to plot violent attacks against Muslim communities, the very groups that are perceived as violent. The bigger threat is when it leads to a vicious cycle of animosity between Muslims (or Middle Easterners) and predominantly “Christian Whites” through a self-fulfilling prophecy that is marked by ongoing violence. Hope can be found, though, within the Muslim community’s response of forgiveness and fraternity, despite the provocation and insecurity threatening their existence. Hope can also be found in the response of New Zealand as a whole. Starting with the media, the government, and New Zealanders at large, the horrific hate-filled attack that took the lives of 50 Muslims on March 15th has unified the community and foiled—at least for now—any long-term intentions to spread hatred and violence in the country. Perhaps there is a lesson to be learned here on how we can escape the perceptions that cripple our communities.

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References


0069936.pdf.


In the present investigation, we sought to examine the association between threats to belonging and intergroup discrimination in private and public contexts. To this end, participants (men) received either inclusion or ostracism feedback via a Cyberball game, and then were given the opportunity to differentially evaluate ingroup (i.e., men) and outgroup (i.e., women) members whilst believing these evaluations were to remain private or be shared publicly with other ingroup members. It was found that ostracised men whose evaluations were to be shared publicly and included men whose evaluations were to remain private evaluated the ingroup significantly more positively than the outgroup. Ostracised men whose evaluations were to be shared publicly and included men whose evaluations were to remain private evaluated the ingroup and the outgroup fairly. The ramifications of these findings are discussed.

**Keywords:** belonging; ostracism; inclusion; intergroup discrimination; ingroup favouritism; intergroup evaluations

**Introduction**

On Friday the 15th of March 2019, at 1:40 in the afternoon, a lone gunman entered the Masjid Al Noor Mosque in Christchurch, New Zealand. He carried a semi-automatic weapon, and opened fire on the Muslims holding Jumu'ah (Friday Prayer) inside. By the time he was arrested, just 36 minutes after the attacks began, the gunman had killed 50 Muslims at two separate Mosques and injured at least 50 more. This makes the shooter, to date, the perpetrator of the deadliest mass killing in modern New Zealand history.

The aftermath of such an attack was devastating and widespread. What could have possibly motivated such hate? How could one man kill another so heartlessly, simply because of differing religious beliefs or skin colour? One important way to begin to understand such occurrences is through research carried out on group behaviour. Groups are regularly bound by common or shared beliefs like religion and political ideology. When members from one group encounter members of a group with differing beliefs and values, conflict is a likely outcome. A vast body of research investigating the hostility and violence observed between groups, posit such intergroup discrimination arises from the intergroup dynamics of, and between, the conflicting groups.

Social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986) has guided much of the research on intergroup relations over the past 40 years, providing an account of how individual psychology is influenced by group membership. The meta-theoretical basis of SIT lies in the distinction between personal identity and social identity. Personal identity is active and drives behaviour in interpersonal contexts. Social identity (the component of an individual’s self-concept that is derived from their group memberships together with their associated emotional significance) drives behaviour in intergroup contexts (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; see also Hewstone & Cairns, 2001). A further assumption of SIT is that people are motivated to evaluate the self positively in the drive to attain positive social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986; but see Turner, 1999). One way to accomplish this goal is by engaging in favourable intergroup comparisons (Turner et al., 1987). Successful intergroup comparisons are possible through ingroup bias (e.g., bias favouring the ingroup), outgroup derogation (e.g., discriminating against an outgroup), or a combination of both (e.g., intergroup discrimination). SIT, therefore, proposes that intergroup discrimination can be construed as a behavioural outcome of an individual’s attempt to attain or maintain a positive social identity.

Whilst much research has sought to investigate links between social identity and intergroup discrimination, a vast amount of research attended to the latterly developed self-esteem hypothesis (SEH; Abrams & Hogg, 1988). Though SIT directly addresses the need for positive social identity, much of the research investigating intergroup behaviour in the discipline of social psychology has since focused on the need for self-esteem, as posited by the SEH. The shift in focus to self-esteem stems from conceptualization problems with social identity and a study by Oakes and Turner (1980) that first stressed the role of self-esteem under the framework of SIT. The conceptual problem with social identity stems from its vague definition. Moscovici and Paicheler (1978, p. 256) point out that “identity is as indispensable as it is unclear”. The lack of clarity of the concept of social identity has led to some contention and disagreement about the meaning and implications of social identity, none more prominent than the emergence of the concept of self-esteem (see Turner, 1999). Oakes and Turner’s (1980) focus on self-esteem as a component of SIT, with their repeated reference to the need for self-esteem as a motivation, led to a plethora of further studies formulating, investigating, and refining self-esteem’s role within intergroup discrimination.

To provide clarity regarding self-esteem within a SIT framework, Abrams and Hogg (1988) formulated the self-esteem hypothesis (SEH). The SEH contains two specific corollaries. The first is that acts or displays of intergroup discrimination will enhance social identity and thus self-esteem. The second, based on the assumption that people are motivated to achieve and
maintain a positive sense of self-esteem, is that low or threatened self-esteem will enhance intergroup discrimination.

Multiple studies have since explored one or the other of the corollaries of SEH. The findings outlined in subsequent reviews (e.g., Rubin & Hewstone, 1998) together with research emerging afterwards (e.g., Aberson, Healy & Romero, 2000; Fein & Spencer, 1997; Gramzow & Gaertner, 2005; Houston & Andreopoulou, 2003; Hunter et al., 2004; Long & Spears, 1997; Verkuyten & Hagendoorn, 2002) are largely inconsistent and contradictory. Though a few studies provide support for the SEH in its entirety (e.g., Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Fein & Spencer, 1997; Hunter et al., 2004, expt 2; Hunter et al., 2005), the bulk of the evidence reveals merely moderate support for the first corollary, and much less support for the second.

To overcome such inconsistencies, researchers have generally taken one of two routes. Some have attempted to overcome conceptual and methodological flaws of the SEH (see Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Hunter et al., 1996; Rubin & Hewstone, 1988; Turner, 1999; Hunter et al., 2004; Hunter et al., 2005; Long & Spears, 1998; Scheepers, Spears, Manstead & Doosje, 2009). Others suggest the motivational role of self-esteem has been over-stated with respect to intergroup discrimination and argue that other motives may provide greater (at the very least, additional) explanatory value (Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Hogg & Abrams, 1993).

Research assessing the contribution of motives other than self-esteem to our understanding of intergroup discrimination have so far tended to emphasize uncertainty reduction (e.g., Grieve & Hogg, 1999), control (Hayhurst, Iverson, Ruffman, Stringer, & Hunter, 2014), fear of death (Solomon, Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 2001), group-based dominance (Duckitt, 2001), or distinctiveness and inclusion (Brewer, 1991). The importance of distinctiveness and inclusion is captured by the optimal distinctiveness theory (ODT; Brewer, 1991). ODT is, to date, the only view we are aware of that promotes a central role of belonging.

Given that belonging is generally considered fundamental to the human condition and a core motive in social psychology (e.g., Fiske, 2004; Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Williams, 2009), this lack of focus on belonging as a motivational construct of intergroup discrimination is somewhat unexpected. When fulfilled, a sense of belonging is associated with a range of psychological benefits, including lower rates of anxiety and depression, an enhanced sense of self-worth and self-confidence, and heightened feelings of self-esteem, control, and meaningful existence (amongst others; see Cruwys, Haslam, Dingle, Haslam, & Jetten, 2014; Fiske, 2004). Conversely, a dissatisfied sense of belonging is associated with a wealth of negative psychological, behavioural and physical outcomes (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Williams, 2009). Given the clear implications of a fulfilled or thwarted sense of belonging (see Baumeister & Leary 1995 for an in-depth discussion), the trifling number of studies investigating the relation between this and intergroup discrimination is especially surprising.

The studies that have examined the effect of threats to belonging (either via social exclusion or social ostracism), however, have found mixed results. Some studies have found rejection by an ingroup to increase aggression. For example, in one study, ostracised (compared to included) participants allocated more hot sauce to a stranger even though they knew that the stranger strongly disliked hot and spicy foods (Warburton, et al., 2006). Other research, however, has found that ostracism leads to pro-social behaviour such as increased conformity (Williams et al., 2000) and increased social mimicry (Lakin & Chartrand, 2005, 2008). In fact, ostracised participants have been shown to work harder on a group task even when their efforts would benefit the very group that ostracised them (Williams & Sommer, 1997).

These divergent results may be clarified by examining how rejected group members may strategically utilise intergroup discrimination to restore their position within the group. Indeed, some research suggests that the display of ingroup favouritism following some form of exclusion from the ingroup serves as a kind of identity management strategy, a way to enhance or restore inclusion within the ingroup (Noel et al., 1995). As such, perhaps ingroup favouritism will only increase following ostracism feedback if such behaviour could potentially restore ingroup inclusion. Biased behaviour may be utilised by ostracised group members to reinforce their commitment to, and shared values with, the ingroup.

Noel et al. (1995) examined strategic responding in peripheral group members by looking at differences in public versus private outgroup derogation. The findings showed peripheral group members derogated a relevant outgroup only when their opinions were to be made public to fellow ingroup members. Peripheral group members showed no such derogating behaviour when these opinions were to remain private. This suggests that rather than reflecting personal opinions and beliefs, publicly displayed intergroup bias may instead reflect the drive or desire to increase inclusionary status (or re-inclusion in the case of ostracism) with the ingroup (see also Branscombe et al., 1999). This is supported by the lack of bias shown by peripheral group members when their opinions were to remain private, as it would be of little benefit in terms of solidifying inclusion with the ingroup (Noel et al., 1995). Indeed, it seems that displays of intergroup discrimination may be utilised strategically by peripheral group members, in order to demonstrate they are worthy and good group members and solidify their acceptance or inclusion in the ingroup.

Similarly, other researchers have found that when peripheral group members anticipated future ostracism by the group, they showed less loyalty and identification with the group. When peripheral group members expected increased future acceptance, those who highly identified with the group demonstrated more loyalty (Jetten, Branscombe, Spears, & McKimmie, 2003). Therefore, current group behaviour depends on what group members expect might happen in the future. This again supports the idea of strategic responding by peripheral group members, in so far as they will show intergroup bias if they believe this may lead to greater ingroup inclusion in the future.

These studies look at the behaviour of peripheral group members. Noel et al. (1995) utilised a realistic group in terms of sorority pledges, whereas Jetten et al. (2003) manipulated peripheral status via bogus personality test feedback. Whilst peripheral group members have not received an explicit belonging threat per se, they are marginal group members and are motivated to enhance connectedness to the group, as ostracised members may be motivated to do. Therefore, we might expect a similar pattern of strategic responding in participants who have
received a threat to belonging via ostracism feedback: reporting bias decisions publicly in front of the other ingroup members may influence ostracised participants to show increased bias. This display of bias would theoretically function to demonstrate loyalty to the group and potentially increase the perceived likelihood of reconnecting with the group. In keeping with such theorising, ostracised participants have been shown to work harder on a group task even when their efforts would benefit the very group that ostracised them, perhaps to prove their loyalty and worth to the group (Williams & Sommer, 1997).

Therefore, the present study aims to investigate the role of self-presentation concerns relating to displays of ingroup favouritism following belonging threat. To this end, participants received inclusion or ostracism feedback via a Cyberball game. Following the threat to belonging, participants evaluated ingroup and outgroup members whilst believing that these evaluations were to remain private or to be shared publicly with other members of the ingroup.

It was hypothesised that, due to self-presentation concerns and a wish to increase their belonging within the ingroup (Noel et al., 1995), participants who received ostracism feedback and believed that their intergroup evaluations would be shared publicly with members of the ingroup would display ingroup favouritism (i.e., evaluate the ingroup more positively than the outgroup). Displays of ingroup favouritism privately would be of little benefit in terms of solidifying inclusion (Noel et al., 1995), and so it was anticipated that ostracised participants who expected their intergroup evaluations to remain private, would not evaluate the ingroup and the outgroup differently. Participants who received inclusion feedback should have felt secure with their status within the ingroup and thus no self-presentation concerns were anticipated (Noel et al., 1995). Therefore, participants who received inclusion feedback were not expected to rate the ingroup and the outgroup differently whether they believed their evaluations would remain private or be shared publicly with the ingroup.

In other words, it was hypothesised that only participants who wished to increase their inclusionary status within the group (i.e., ostracised participants), and who believed there was a reasonable chance to do so (i.e., such that any displays of ingroup favouritism were to be shared publicly with the ingroup), would evaluate the ingroup significantly higher than the outgroup.

METHOD
Participants
Participants were recruited through the website, https://app.prolific.ac, in return for a £3.50 payment. The only inclusion criteria were that participants identified as men. The final pool of participants included 207 men with an age range of 16 to 57 years ($M = 26.70$, $SD = 7.58$). In terms of participants’ highest level of education, 2.4% of the participants had not completed high school, 40.8% had completed high school (or equivalent secondary education), 37.4% had completed an undergraduate degree (or other tertiary education), and 19.4% had completed some form of postgraduate degree. Fifty-one participants currently lived in the USA, 32 in Canada, 21 in Portugal, 16 in each of Mexico and the UK, 11 in Spain, 10 in Australia, eight in each of Chile and Poland, six in Greece, four in England, three in each of Germany and Hungary, two in each of the Czech Republic, Japan, and New Zealand, and one in each of Estonia, Finland, Israel, Italy, Norway, Sweden, and Wales. Five participants declined to state the country they currently lived in.

Design
Our study utilised a mixed-model design. The target-group of evaluations (i.e., ingroup vs outgroup) was within groups. Belonging feedback (i.e., inclusion vs ostracism) and the nature of favouritism (i.e., public vs private) were between subjects. Allocation of participants to each condition was random. The number of participants allocated to each condition is presented in Table 1.

Procedure
Following a procedure similar to Williams et al. (2000), participants were told they would be playing a Cyberball game with other members of the all-male group. It was made clear that performance in the game was not important; rather, the game was a chance to practice their visualisation skills. Participants were encouraged to visualise themselves, the environment, and other players. It was emphasised that the results of the game were of no importance, but it was paramount they participate in the game and focus on their visualisation skills. The game was ostensibly played with other members of the men group, however in reality the participant was the only person playing the game. The other ‘players’ were avatars pre-programmed to either include or ostracise the participant. The participant’s avatar was labelled Man 2 (me), whilst the computer-controlled avatars were labelled Man 1, Man 3, and Man 4. See Figure 1 for a screenshot of the Cyberball game as seen from the participants point of view.

Inclusion/ostracism
The computer-programmed players (or virtual confederates) were scripted to either include or ostracise the participant. Upon receiving a ball toss, the participant clicked on one of the three other players they wished to throw the ball to, and the computer animated the pass. The computer then dictated the throws of the digital avatars, depending on the condition the participant was assigned to. The game was scripted so that participants assigned to the inclusion condition received a fair share (approximately a quarter) of all ball tosses. Those in the ostracism condition received two throws at the beginning of the game to become familiar with gameplay and to supplement its realism. Ostracised participants were then denied the ball for the remainder of the game. All games consisted of 30 throws.

Belonging
Following the Cyberball game, participants were presented with a scale of belonging devised by Sheldon and Bettencourt (2002). This scale (adapted slightly to become specific to the men group of interest in the current study) was comprised of three items; ‘I feel that other men have included me’, ‘I feel well integrated with other men’, and ‘I feel a sense of belongingness with other men’ (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.95). Participants’ responses were scored using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly agree, 7 = strongly disagree), and were specific to how participants felt ‘right now’.

Public/private bias task:
Evaluations
Following the belonging scale, all participants were given the opportunity to differentially evaluate ingroup (i.e., men) and outgroup members (i.e., women) using 20 pairs of 11-point trait rating scales. Participants assigned to the private condition were told that their evaluations of ingroup and outgroup members would remain private. Those assigned to the public condition were informed their evaluations would be made public and
were to be shared with other men during a group discussion, ostensibly occurring later in the experiment.

The 20 pairs of evaluative traits were taken from Platow, McClintock, and Liebrand (1990; cooperative-competitive, helpful-unhelpful, selfish-unselfish, intelligent-int unintelligent, strong-weak, warm-cold, flexible-rigid, manipulative-collusive, fair-unfair, honest-dishonest, friendly-unfriendly, trustworthy-untrustworthy, consistent-inconsistent), and Oakes et al. (1994; pushy-reticent, humble-arrogant, confident-shy, aggressive-non-aggressive, ignorant-well informed, straight forward-hypocritical). Counterbalancing was used to rule out ordering effects, and reverse scoring was employed where necessary such that higher scores indicated more positive ratings.

Manipulation checks
In the final step of the experiment, participants were presented with a series of manipulation checks and demographic questions. Participants were asked (a) what they thought the study was about, (b) if they noticed anything odd or unusual about the study, (c) if they had taken part in similar studies before, (d) if they took the study seriously, and (e) if they normally consider themselves to be men. Information was also gathered on participants’ age, highest level of education, and current country of residence. Finally, participants were fully debriefed, thanked for their time and interest in the study, and paid.

Table 1. Number of men per condition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of Favouritism</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inclusion</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ostracism</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1. Screenshot of Cyberball game as seen from the participant’s point of view.

RESULTS
Belonging
In order to assess the effectiveness of the Cyberball paradigm to manipulate levels of belonging in participants, a 2 (nature of favouritism: private vs public) between groups’ analysis of variance (ANOVA) (analysis of variance) as a function of belonging was conducted. A main effect was found for feedback type, F(1, 203) = 154.18, p < .001, η² = .432. Participants who received ostracism feedback had lower belonging scores than participants who received inclusion feedback (M = 7.95, SD = 4.83 vs M = 15.36, SD = 3.71). No other significant main or interaction effects were found.

Table 2. Evaluations of ingroup (i.e., men) and outgroup (i.e., women) members that were to remain private or be shared publicly for participants who received either inclusion or ostracism feedback.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feedback Type</th>
<th>Nature of Favouritism</th>
<th>Ingroup Evaluations</th>
<th>Outgroup Evaluations</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusion</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>158.68 (22.09)**</td>
<td>147.87 (22.29)</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>153.70 (17.36)</td>
<td>147.94 (21.09)</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ostracism</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>147.50 (21.29)</td>
<td>146.76 (21.97)</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>151.02 (20.25)**</td>
<td>132.43 (24.03)</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td></td>
<td>152.82 (20.57)**</td>
<td>143.82 (23.14)</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Higher scores indicate more positive evaluations.
Note. ** p < .005, significantly higher evaluations of ingroup than outgroup.
Ingroup favouritism

To assess the extent to which men who received either inclusion or ostracism feedback differentially evaluated members of the ingroup (i.e., men) and outgroup (i.e., women) either publicly or privately, a 2 (feedback type: inclusion vs ostracism) x 2 (nature of favouritism: private vs public) x 2 (target group: ingroup vs outgroup) mixed model ANOVA was conducted. The first two variables were between groups. The third variable was within groups. Cell means are presented in Table 2.

A significant main effect was found for target group, F(1, 203) = 18.27, p < .001, \( \eta^2 = .083 \). Overall, participants evaluated ingroup members (i.e., men) more positively than outgroup members (i.e., women; \( M = 152.82, SD = 20.57 \) vs \( M = 143.82, SD = 23.14 \)). A significant main effect was also found for Cyberball feedback, F(1, 203) = 13.15, p < .001, \( \eta^2 = .061 \). Included participants gave evaluations that were overall more positive than evaluations given by ostracised participants (\( M = 152.05, SD = 17.13 \) vs \( M = 144.43, SD = 12.83 \)).

A significant 3-way interaction effect was found between feedback type, nature of favouritism, and target group, F(1, 203) = 7.441, p = .007, \( \eta^2 = .035 \). Planned comparisons using repeated measures t-tests (and incorporating the Bonferroni-Holm correction) revealed that included participants whose evaluations remained private (\( M = 158.68, SD = 22.09 \) vs \( M = 147.87, SD = 22.29 \)), t(52) = 3.49, p = .004, and ostracised participants whose evaluations were to be shared publicly (\( M = 151.02, SD = 20.25 \) vs \( M = 132.43, SD = 24.03 \)), t(50) = 3.25, p = .006, evaluated the ingroup significantly more positively than the outgroup. No significant differences were found between evaluations for the ingroup versus the outgroup were found for included participants whose evaluations were to be shared publicly (\( M = 153.70, SD = 17.36 \) vs \( M = 147.94, SD = 21.09 \)), t(52) = 1.72, p = .184, nor for ostracised participants whose evaluations were to remain private (\( M = 147.50, SD = 21.29 \) vs \( M = 146.76, SD = 21.97 \)), t(49) = .175, p = .862. No other significant main or interaction effects were found.

DISCUSSION

This study tested one hypothesis; that only participants who wish to increase their inclusionary status within the group (i.e., ostracised participants), and believe there is a reasonable chance to do so (i.e., any displays of ingroup favouritism will be shared with the ingroup), will evaluate the ingroup significantly higher than the outgroup. This hypothesis was not supported. Men who received ostracism feedback and shared their ingroup evaluations publicly did evaluate the ingroup significantly more positively than the outgroup, as expected. Men who received inclusion feedback and shared their evaluations publicly, and men who received ostracism feedback and their evaluations remained private, did not significantly differentiate between the ingroup and the outgroup in their ingroup evaluations, also as expected. Somewhat unexpected, however, was the fact that men whose evaluations remained private and who received inclusion feedback did evaluate the ingroup more positively than the outgroup.

With respect to men who received ostracism feedback, the ostracised men in the private bias task condition did not discriminate, whilst the ostracised men in the public condition did. This supports theories of intergroup discrimination outlined by Leary (2005; Leary et al., 1995) and Noel et al. (1995). Leary and his colleagues argue that people who are motivated to increase their inclusionary status (e.g., people whose acceptance by the group has been threatened) will try to increase their value to the group (Leary, 2005; Leary et al., 1995). One way this might be achieved is through intergroup differentiation where the ingroup is favoured over the outgroup. Noel et al. (1995) suggests that showing intergroup bias publicly demonstrates that one is working in the best interests of the group. Conceivably, therefore, publicly displaying ingroup favouritism following ostracism feedback may function to demonstrate one’s value to the ingroup and therefore increase their inclusionary status.

The current study reinforces this proposition. Indeed, following ostracism feedback from the ingroup, these men have a threatened sense of belonging. When their intergroup evaluations are to be shared publicly, they have an opportunity to show other ingroup members that they are worthy and deserve to be accepted into the group. They favour the ingroup as an attempt to demonstrate their commitment and loyalty to the ingroup, and therefore convince other group members to accept them. The public context of their evaluations offers hope for a chance of acceptance in the future (Jetten et al., 2003). When their evaluations are not to be shared publicly and are to remain private, the ingroup remains unaware of any displays of favouritism. As such these responses have no chance of increasing their acceptance status within the group and thus we do not see the same levels of ingroup favouritism.

Men who receive inclusion feedback show a different pattern of results than men who received ostracism feedback. Privately, included men unexpectedly show significant levels of ingroup favouritism. It may be that the inclusion feedback fosters feelings of respect, reassurance, and satisfaction with respect to one’s position in the group. Such feelings may have, in turn, resulted in group members acting in accordance with group norms (Smith & Tyler, 2007), being supportive of other in-group members (Schmitt & Branscombe, 2001), and showing in-group favouritism (Leonardelli & Brewer, 2001; Spears, Ellemers, Doosje, & Branscombe, 2006).

This ingroup favouritism is not present, however, when included men were to share their evaluations publicly with other men. It may well be that in public settings these men fall back on a general social norm of fairness. This tendency to discriminate when evaluations were to remain private may have been restrained by a reluctance to behave in a way potentially construed as discriminatory (in this case, sexist). Whilst the social norm of fairness in a public context may be overridden by the need to belong in certain circumstances (as evidenced by significant levels of ingroup favouritism in public by ostracised males), included men have no motivation to act in any way incongruent with the fairness norm. These men have received inclusion feedback such that their position within the group is secure, and therefore they are not motivated to publicly display their loyalty to the ingroup through ingroup favouritism. Their belonging needs are fulfilled, and any public displays of bias offer no benefit.

Clearly the behavioural outcomes examined in this study (intergroup evaluations) are vastly different from those that occurred in Christchurch on March 15. It is key to note that the present study examines how men might publicly favour the ingroup following belonging threat, opposed to the public violence exhibited against an outgroup on March 15. Comparatively, favouring an ingroup via intergroup evaluations is fairly mild. Previous research has suggested that such intergroup evaluations may be unrelated
to more negative forms of discrimination (e.g., blasts of white noise, or the allocation of hot sauce; Struch & Schwartz, 1989). It has also been suggested that explanatory constructs (e.g., group identity, self-esteem) that are associated with milder forms of intergroup discrimination may be unrelated to more negative forms of discrimination (Amoït & Bourhis, 2005; Hodson, Dovidio, & Esses, 2003). As this is true for some constructs, it may potentially be true for belonging also. Therefore, we must be extremely careful when drawing any conclusions that a threat to belonging may have been a contributing factor to what motivated the events of March 15.

Nevertheless, the present findings do contribute to a growing body of research suggesting that a threatened sense of belonging may indeed motivate displays of intergroup discrimination (or at least ingroup favouritism). By no means is this the only possible motivation of such behaviour, nor that this was necessarily related to what motivated the events of March 15. But the present findings point to threatened belonging as a potential explanation of why intergroup discrimination might occur in some contexts. If we can begin to understand why something is happening, there is a possibility we can work together to prevent its reoccurrence in the future.

References


They Are Us? The mediating effects of compatibility-based trust on the relationship between discrimination and overall trust

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The tragic Christchurch massacre brought the dangers of social ‘othering’ to the forefront of public attention. While the extreme nature of the attack shocked majority and minority groups alike, overt and latent discrimination are common experiences for many minorities in Aotearoa. Focusing on the impact of discrimination, this research examines the mechanism through which discrimination negatively affects intergroup trust, utilizing the multidimensional Intergroup Trust Model. We investigate trust through a study of police-minority relations, comparing the Aotearoa Māori perspective with the Black American perspective. Mediation analysis, based on a multidimensional approach to trust, suggests a similar mechanism across both groups: Perceived discrimination's impact on trust is mediated by a lack of compatibility-based trust, the perception that they are ‘others’ to the police. Taken together, the results provide insight on how discrimination erodes intergroup relations and indicate that its damaging impact can be repaired by strengthening groups’ perceived compatibility with one another and highlighting shared parallel similarities.

Keywords: discrimination; trust; Intergroup Trust Model; minority perception; police relations; Otherness

With modern societies seeing a dramatic increase in heterogeneity, questions around social equality and cohesion become increasingly pressing. Perceptions of unfairness and inequality in the treatment of different groups in society erode trust and threaten social cohesion and stability. Such perceptions are typically held by minorities groups, who are more likely to inhabit a space of social ‘otherness’.

Otherness is an abstract social condition that implies difference and/or categorical separation. Its social connotations suggest a contrast against an accepted standard and often results in the devaluation of individuals and groups that do not meet the parameters for ‘standard’ membership in society. To inhabit a space of social otherness is to be relegated to social isolation and vulnerability. Therefore, the act of ‘othering’ is fundamentally dangerous.

The Christchurch Shooting highlights the devastating result of social othering and otherness. Systemically and culturally, Muslim residents of Aotearoa suffered from being made ‘other’ prior to the tragedy. In the aftermath, their place in society, though sentimentally reaffirmed by widespread and repeated declarations of inclusion, remains functionally on the outskirts of ‘standard’. Bias and discrimination are part of the lived experiences of many minorities in Aotearoa, including Muslim Kiwis, refugees, and visitors (Harris et al., 2012; Rahman, 2018). Recent influxes of East and Southeast Asia immigrants have resulted in increasingly visible instances of ‘benign’ anti-Asian racism (Ng, 2017). Within academic discourse surrounding immigration and refugee intake in Auckland and other major cities throughout Aotearoa, Muslim immigration raises questions about security, terrorism, and foreign religion (see Stephens, 2018), while resettlement intake of white South Africans prompts questions about ‘finding home’ (eg. Winbush & Selby, 2015). Meanwhile, other minority group members are marginalized and/or entirely ignored in Kiwi social categorization.

The bias and discrimination faced by minority groups, like the Muslim, Māori, and Pasifika communities in Aotearoa, are often used to explain their lower levels of trust (e.g., Born et al., 2009; Dovidio et al, 2008). The trust minority groups have in their society and institutions is negatively linked to their perceptions of bias and discrimination. Douds and Wu (2018) reported a negative relationship between perceived racial discrimination and generalized trust in Texas, such that individuals who had experienced more racial discrimination reported lower levels of generalized trust, or “a general belief in the trustworthiness of most people” than individuals who experienced less (p. 567). Similarly, Bowling, Parmar, and Phillips (2003) concluded that discriminatory policing practices, such as excessive use of stop and search, negatively impact trust of minority communities in the police.

Although causality between perceived discrimination and bias and trust is difficult to establish, longitudinal research indicates that perceived discrimination may breed lower trust. Gordon, Street, Kelly, and Souchek (2006) found that while there was no difference in the level of trust displayed by Black and White patients in their physician before their initial visit, Black patients reported less trust after the visit. The difference in trust between Black and White patients was predicted by Black patients’ perceptions that their physician displayed less supportiveness, less partnership, and less information during the visit.

Taken together, current research suggests that when individuals participate in a society or institution as a minority, how they are treated can shape the trust they have for those around them. When they encounter bias and discrimination, their trust decreases, negatively affecting social cohesion, social capital, and general intergroup
relations (Hooghe, Reeskens, & Stolle, 2007). As the literature on the relationship between perceived discrimination and bias and trust has grown, our understanding of trust has been evolving. While most of the research on this link captures trust using unidimensional scales with a few general items, the field has come to understand trust as a complex, multidimensional construct that requires context-specific measures (Balliet & Van Lange, 2013; Bhattacherjee, 2002; Roy, Eshghi, & Shekhar, 2011). The present research seeks to use the Intergroup Trust Model to bring these recent developments in trust literature to the study of the relationship between perceived discrimination and bias and trust (Kappmeier & Guenoun, 2018).

**Introduction to the Intergroup Trust Model**

The Intergroup Trust Model unifies the existing literature on the multidimensionality of trust to provide a common foundation in the context of intergroup conflict or tension (Kappmeier, 2016). The model posits that intergroup trust is the aggregate of the five dimensions of competence, integrity, compassion, compatibility, and security. (refer to Figure 1 for descriptions of each of the dimensions). These dimensions are interdependent such that one may correlate with another. For instance, a decrease in competence-based trust may be associated with a decrease in integrity-based trust. Additionally, trust along each of these dimensions is conceptualized as a continuum such that groups can have varying levels of trust along each of the dimensions.

**Figure 1. Dimensions of the Intergroup Trust Model.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Competence</td>
<td>The outgroup does things well</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrity</td>
<td>The outgroup is honest and acts morally toward the ingroup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compassion</td>
<td>The outgroup is helpful and compassionate towards the ingroup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compatibility</td>
<td>The outgroup shares the ingroup’s background, values, interests, and/or beliefs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>The outgroup will not hurt the ingroup physically or emotionally</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Minority Trust in the Police**

The current research used trust relations between the police and minority communities in Aotearoa and the United States as case studies through which to examine the relationship between perceived discrimination and bias and trust. The police as an institution is a relevant context in which to investigate minority trust. They have many interactions across different groups in a society but they represent the beliefs and power of the more dominant groups (Sidanius, Liu, Shaw & Pratto, 1994).

Trust in the police is integral to the stability and security of a society. Minority trust in the police is particularly important to the development of a sense of belonging in the wider society. International research on the interactions between police and minority communities reveal the police as a polarizing institution. Some view the police as peacekeepers and a helpful fixture of a secure society. Others, particularly minorities, view the police and their modes of operation with suspicion or contempt (Tyler, 2005). Minorities consistently report less trust in police than majorities, and they are less likely to view the police a legitimate institution (Tyler, 2010; 2011). Minority lack of trust in the police often stems from historical antagonism between the police as an oppressive force and minorities as victims of violence and/or prejudice. In societies with a history of group-based law enforcement discrimination, the police can be perceived by minorities as heavy-handed agents of existing, unjust power dynamics rather than as peacekeepers. Past and present experiences of brutality, harassment, and bias create perceptions of the police as racially and/or culturally discriminatory, procedurally prejudiced, and ultimately untrustworthy (Schuck, Rosenbaum & Hawkins, 2008). Repeated experiences of police prejudice, discrimination or violence (or vicarious experiences shared among members of a community) negatively impact trust in the police as well as the belief that a particular group belongs within the policed society (Rosenbaum, Schuck, Costello, Hawkins, & Ring, 2005). While a great deal of research and media attention has been devoted to strained police-minority relations in the USA, a similar pattern is evident in Aotearoa: Māori communities are less likely than Pākehā communities to report that they trust the police (e.g. Panditharatne, et al., 2018). Furthermore, Te Whati and Roguski (1998) highlights the negative consequences of the police’s bias and discrimination towards Māori communities on Māori trust.

This article centers on the relationship between perceived discrimination and bias and intergroup trust. Through two studies, we conceptualized intergroup trust as trust in the police to tap into minority perceptions of their relationship with their broader society. We explored the relationship between perceived discrimination and bias and trust using working scales based on the Intergroup

---

1 The original article, using qualitative research speaks of seven dimensions, however quantitative follow-up work indicate a stronger support for the five dimensional model.
Trust Model. Study 1 was conducted in Aotearoa and Study 2 was conducted in the United States.

While we expected to replicate the established finding that there is a negative association between perceived discrimination and bias and trust, the primary goal of this research was to get a more nuanced understanding of the mechanism through which perceived discrimination and bias lower intergroup trust. Unlike the trust measures used to study the relationship between perceived discrimination and bias and trust in previous studies, the Intergroup Trust Scale (Kappmeier & Guenoun, 2018) can provide an understanding of which of the five dimensions of intergroup trust are most relevant to this relationship. Such insight can be utilized to guide future research into the link between discrimination and bias and trust. Additionally, this research can support the development of trust-building interventions between the police and their communities, given our context of police trust relations.

STUDY 1

Study 1 investigated minority trust in the police in the context of Aotearoa by examining the relevance of the five trust dimensions in face of discrimination and bias.

METHOD

Participants

Study 1 was conducted in Aotearoa through an online Qualtrics survey and exclusively recruited participants from a minority group: Māori (n = 320).

Measures

Perceived discrimination was measured with three items, including “People who share my racial identity are discriminated against by the police”. Ratings were made on 7-point scales anchored at 1 (‘Strongly disagree’) and 7 (‘Strongly agree’) (α = .78).

Perceived bias was measured via two items which assessed police bias, e.g. “The police consistently apply the same rules to different people.” Ratings were made on 7-point scales anchored at 1 (‘Strongly disagree’) and 7 (‘Strongly agree’). The final scale was reversed coded so that ‘Strongly agree’ corresponded with the perception that the police display bias (α = .71).

Overall trust in the police was measured on a scale from 0 to 100. Participant were asked how much they trust the police, with 0 indicating no trust and 100 signifying complete trust.

Trust dimensions. We used a working version of the revised Intergroup Trust Scale (Kappmeier & Guenoun, 2018) which consisted of 26 items on 7-point scales anchored at 1 (‘Strongly disagree’) and 7 (‘Strongly agree’). The items captured the five dimensions of Intergroup Trust Model: five items measured competence-based trust (α = .83), five items measured integrity-based trust (α = .82), five items measured compassion-based trust (α = .71), seven items measured compatibility-based trust (α = .72), and four items measured security-based trust (α = .72). Items were framed as if-then statements in order to tap into the perceived relevance of the dimensions to trust. The structure of conditional statements allows for a more concrete causal link between the attributes of the outgroup introduced by each item and trust (Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & van Heerden, 2004; Mischel & Shoda, 1995). An example of an item created to assess integrity-based trust is “If the police are honest, then my trust in them will increase”.

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Table 1. Study 1 Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall Trust</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>73.81</td>
<td>21.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevance of:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence-based trust</td>
<td>-.022</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.39</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrity-based trust</td>
<td>-.069</td>
<td>.57**</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.83</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compassion-based trust</td>
<td>.021</td>
<td>.73**</td>
<td>.65**</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.51</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compatibility-based trust</td>
<td>.152**</td>
<td>.37*</td>
<td>.36**</td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>5.04</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security-based trust</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.58**</td>
<td>.7**</td>
<td>.68**</td>
<td>.4**</td>
<td>5.64</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** p < .001

RESULTS

Descriptives and correlations

Overall, the Māori participants reported trusting relationships with the police with M = 73.81 (sd = 21.04), but they also reported perceived bias (M = 4.85; Sd = 1.25) and bias (M = 3.25; Sd = 1.36) to some degree from the police. Before further analysis, we examined correlations between the mediator variables and overall trust. While all five trust dimensions correlated positively with each other (ps < .001), only compatibility-based trust was also significantly associated with overall trust (See Table 1).

Relationships between perceived discrimination, trust, and the five trust dimensions in Aotearoa

First, we examined the relationship between perceived discrimination and overall trust in the police and the role of the five trust dimensions in this relationship.

We conducted a multiple parallel mediation analysis through ordinary least squares regression using perceived discrimination as the predictor, overall trust in the police as the outcome, and the five trust dimensions as mediators. The analysis was conducted in SPSS, using the Haynes process tool 3.3, Model 4. Figure 2 presents the model. The direct
path from perceived discrimination to and overall trust was significant (c’ = -4.8, p = .00, CI [-6.36; -3.25]), indicating that perceived police discrimination negatively impacts overall trust in the police. Additionally, as outlined in Table 2, the direct paths from perceived police discrimination to four dimensions - competence, compatibility, compassion, and integrity - were significant. Only the path to security-based trust was not significant. This suggests that perceived police discrimination increases the relevance of competence-, integrity-, compassion- and compatibility-based trust. However, the only indirect paths from perceived police discrimination to overall trust that were significant were those through integrity- and compatibility-based trust (integrity-based trust: β = -.6253, βse = .36, CI [-.1.46, -.07], compatibility-based trust: β = 1.53, βse = .52, CI [.66, 2.7]). This indicates that of the four trust dimensions relevant to the relationship between perceived police discrimination and overall trust, only integrity- and compatibility-based trust mediate the relationship. In summary, integrity- and compatibility-based trust play primary mediating roles in the relationship between perceived police discrimination and overall trust.

Table 2. Study 2 OLS path analysis for the indirect effects of discrimination on overall trust

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Mediator</th>
<th>a</th>
<th>ase</th>
<th>LCI</th>
<th>UCI</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>bse</th>
<th>LCI</th>
<th>UCI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination</td>
<td>Competence</td>
<td>.1*</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>Overall Trust in the Police</td>
<td>-1.96</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>-.7</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Integrity</td>
<td>.14**</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td></td>
<td>-4.41*</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>-.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Compassion</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Compatibility</td>
<td>.24**</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.36**</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>2.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td></td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.005</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td></td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>-.4</td>
<td>.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** p < .001; * p < .05; 5000 Bootstraps, Seed=190323

Relationship between perceived bias, trust, and the five trust dimensions in Aotearoa

Next, we examined the relationship between perceived bias and overall trust in the police and the role of the five trust dimensions in this relationship.

We again conducted a multiple parallel mediation analysis using ordinary least squares regression with bias as the predictor, overall trust in the police as the outcome, and the five trust dimensions as mediators. The analysis was conducted in SPSS again, using the Haynes process tool 3.3, Model 4. Figure 3 presents the model.

Just as with perceived discrimination, the direct link from bias to overall trust was significant (c’ = -5.63, p = .00, CI [-7.24; -4.03]), indicating that perceived police bias negatively impacts overall trust in the police. However, as seen in Table 3, unlike perceived discrimination, perceived bias was only negatively associated with compatibility- and security-based trust, indicating that perceived bias reveals a higher need for compatibility- and security-based trust. From these two trust dimensions, only the indirect path from perceived bias to overall trust through compatibility-based trust was significant (β = 2.75, βse = 1.27, CI [.26, 5.24]). This suggests that only compatibility-based trust mediates lower trust in the police in the face of perceived bias.

Taken together, the correlation results and analysis, shows that perceived police discrimination or bias predicts lower trust in the police. The data further suggest, that this lower trust is mediated by an increased need for compatibility-based trust— a trust based on the perception that one relates to the police or that police are similar to one’s own group. While integrity-based trust was also relevant for the relationship between perceived discrimination and overall trust, only compatibility-based trust had significant indirect effects for both perceived discrimination and perceived bias. Thus, of the five dimensions of the Intergroup Trust Model, it was compatibility-based trust that gave the most insight into the relationship between perceived discrimination and bias and trust.

Table 3. Study 1 OLS path analysis for the indirect effects of bias on overall trust

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Mediator</th>
<th>a</th>
<th>ase</th>
<th>LCI</th>
<th>UCI</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>bse</th>
<th>LCI</th>
<th>UCI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bias</td>
<td>Competence</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>Overall Trust in the Police</td>
<td>-1.05</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>-5.09</td>
<td>1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Integrity</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.1</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td></td>
<td>-4.33*</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Compassion</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>-.68</td>
<td>7.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Compatibility</td>
<td>-.15**</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.23</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.75**</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>9.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>-.11*</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** p < .001; * p < .05; 5000 Bootstraps, Seed=190323

New Zealand Journal of Psychology Vol. 48, No. 1 April 2019
They are us?

Figure 2. Study 1. Mediation model from discrimination to overall trust

Figure 3. Study 1. Mediation model from bias to overall trust

Figure 4. Study 2. Mediation model from discrimination to overall trust (USA)

Figure 5. Study 2. Mediation model from bias to overall trust (USA)
While the research in the Aotearoa context indicates that compatibility-based trust is relevant in the face of perceived discrimination and bias, there is still the question of whether this is specific to the minority relations in Aotearoa or whether similar pattern would be found in other minority contexts as well.

We collected similar data in the United States, where minority relations tend to be more strained than in Aotearoa (AP-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research, 2015). In the US, the killings of unarmed Black citizens have deteriorating the relationships between minority community and police so much that a presidential task force was formed in 2014 to address the lack of trust in the police (President’s Taskforce on 21st Century Policing, 2015).

Does compatibility-based trust still play a similar role in the relationship between perceived discrimination and bias and in this different context where there is a higher perceived risk to minorities’ physical security?

**STUDY 2**

Study 2 inquired about trust in the police from both the minority and majority group perspective in Boston, USA. Only the responses of the minority participants are reported in the current study as the goal was to compare their experiences with those of minority group members in Aotearoa.

**METHOD**

**Participants**

Study 2 was conducted in in three demographically diverse Boston neighborhoods: Mattapan, South Boston, and Hyde Park. Participants were approached and invited to complete a survey that investigated trust in the police. A total of 136 Black-American residents completed the survey across the three neighborhoods.

**Measures**

Study 2 utilized the same measure for perceived discrimination ($\alpha = .86$), perceived bias ($\alpha = .5$), and overall trust in the police as Study 1.

**Trust dimensions.** We used a simplified working scale based on the Intergroup Trust Model, which consisted of 19 items that capture the five trust dimensions. Three items measured competence-based trust ($\alpha = .53$), five items measured integrity-based trust ($\alpha = .66$), three items measured compassion-based trust ($\alpha = .66$), two items measured compatibility-based trust ($\alpha = .5$), and three items measured security-based trust ($\alpha = .7$). The lower alpha derives from the fact that the scale was developed for both White- and Black-American respondents, but only the data for Black-American participants is retained for the purpose of this paper. The items were displayed on scales with opposite anchors on both sides, and participants indicated where on the continuum their perceptions of the police fall. (E.g. a security statement read, “We have nothing to fear from them” paired with “We have something to fear from them.”) This unusual form was selected for its ability to mitigate multicollinearity between the trust dimensions. Also, unlike Study 1, it allowed the items to assess trust in the police along each of the dimensions.

**RESULTS**

**Descriptives and correlations**

Noticeably, the Black-American sample reported much lower levels of trust in the police compared with the Aotearoa Māori participants sample ($M = 47.62$; $sd = 29.27$). Unsurprisingly, Black-American participants also reported perceived police bias ($M = 5.1$, $sd = 1.8$), but to a greater degree than the Aotearoa Māori participants ($M = 4.89$, $sd = 1.64$). Prior to further analysis, we examined correlations between the mediating variables and overall trust. As seen in Table 4, all five trust dimensions correlated positively with one another and with overall trust.

**Relationship between perceived discrimination, trust and the five trust dimensions, USA context**

As in Study 1, we examined the relationship between perceived discrimination and overall trust in the police and the role of the five trust dimensions by conducting a multiple parallel mediation analysis. Again, we used perceived discrimination as the predictor, overall trust in the police as the outcome, and the five trust dimensions as mediators. The analysis was conducted in SPSS, using the Haynes process tool 3.3, Model 4. Figure 4 presents the model.

Surprisingly, the direct path from bias to overall trust was not significant ($c^2 = .45$, $p = .77$, CI [-2.67; 3.58]). This was unexpected given the evidence of perceived discrimination in this community, and our own prior findings regarding minority–police relations in Aotearoa. However, given that our Black-American sample reported very low levels of trust in the police, there might be a floor effect at play.

As outlined in Table 5, the direct paths from perceived police discrimination to all five trust dimensions were significant. This suggests that perceived police discrimination is negatively associated with competence-, integrity-, compassion-, compatibility- and security-based trust. Additionally, the direct paths from compassion- and compatibility-based trust to overall trust were significant. However, only the indirect path from perceived police discrimination through compassion-based trust was significant ($\beta = -2.23$, $\beta_{pc} = 1.34$, CI [-5.3, -0.85]). The confidence interval for the indirect path via compatibility-based trust included a zero ($\beta = -.91$, $\beta_{pc} = .72$, CI [-2.64, .15]), indicating that compatibility-based trust does not influence overall trust after perceived discrimination.

In conclusion, unlike in the context of Aotearoa, perceived discrimination does not predict lower overall trust. However, perceived discrimination does lower overall trust via compassion-based trust. The role of compatibility-based is less conclusive: even though the two direct paths for compatibility–based trust were significant, its indirect path was not. Thus, while there are relationships between perceived discrimination, overall trust, and compatibility-based trust, it does not appear to mediate the influence of perceived discrimination to overall trust.

**Relationship between perceived bias, trust and the five trust dimensions, USA context**

Next, we examined the relationship between perceived bias and overall trust in the police and the role of the five trust dimensions. Again, we conducted a multiple parallel mediation analysis with bias as the predictor, overall trust in the police as the outcome, and the five trust dimensions as mediators. The analysis was conducted in SPSS, using the Haynes process tool 3.3, Model 4. Figure 5 presents the model.
Table 4. Study 2 Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Overall Trust</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>46.99</td>
<td>29.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Competence</td>
<td>.49**</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.95</td>
<td>1.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Integrity</td>
<td>.52**</td>
<td>.46*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.46</td>
<td>1.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Compassion</td>
<td>.57**</td>
<td>.62**</td>
<td>.68**</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.38</td>
<td>1.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Compatibility</td>
<td>.52**</td>
<td>.42**</td>
<td>.6**</td>
<td>.57**</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>3.49</td>
<td>1.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Security</td>
<td>.37**</td>
<td>.46**</td>
<td>.73**</td>
<td>.7**</td>
<td>.47**</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>1.55</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**p < .001

Table 5. Study 2 OLS path analysis for the indirect effects of discrimination on overall trust

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Mediator</th>
<th>a</th>
<th>ace</th>
<th>LCI</th>
<th>UCI</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>bace</th>
<th>LCI</th>
<th>UCI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>discrimination</td>
<td>Competence</td>
<td>-.18*</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.32</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>Overall Trust</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>-2.67</td>
<td>3.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Integrity</td>
<td>-.18*</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.32</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>in the Police</td>
<td>4.78</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>-1.54</td>
<td>8.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Compassion</td>
<td>-.36**</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.51</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.39</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td>-1.77</td>
<td>11.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Compatibility</td>
<td>-.18*</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>-.36</td>
<td>-.003</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.94</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>12.2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>-.32**</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>-.49</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td></td>
<td>-3.75</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>-9.08</td>
<td>1.58</td>
</tr>
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</table>

** p < .01; * p < 0.05; 5000 Bootstraps, Seed=190323

Again, the USA study differed from the Aotearoa study in that the direct path from bias to overall trust was not significant ($c' = 1.06, p = .54, CI [-2.44; 4.57]). However, as outlined in Table 6, the direct paths from bias to all five trust dimensions were significant. This indicates that perceived police bias is negatively associated with competence, integrity, compassion, compatibility, and security-based trust. Additionally, the direct paths from compassion- and compatibility-based trust to overall trust were significant. With perceived bias as an indicator, both indirect paths through compassion- and compatibility-based trust were also significant and the confidence intervals excluded zero (compatibility-based trust: $\beta = -2.32, \beta_{ac} = 1.28, CI [-5.27, -1.36], compatibility-based trust: $\beta = -1.97, \beta_{ac} = 1.04, CI [-4.38, -1.32]). This suggests that the negative impact of perceived bias on overall trust is mediated by the erosion of compatibility-based trust (the expectation that the police differ from their minority group) and compassion-based trust (the expectation that the police do not care about the well-being of the minority group members). Lastly, while the direct path was not significant, the total effect from perceived discrimination to overall trust, including all five mediators was significant ($\beta = -3.92, se = 1.8; p<.05; CI [-7.55, -2.8]).

In analyzing both studies jointly, compatibility-based trust appears to play an instrumental role in the relationship between perceived discrimination, perceived bias, and trust. The findings indicate a strong need for compatibility-based trust for minority group members in the face of discrimination and bias.

Table 6. Study 2 OLS path analysis for the indirect effects of bias on overall trust

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Mediator</th>
<th>a</th>
<th>ace</th>
<th>LCI</th>
<th>UCI</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>bace</th>
<th>LCI</th>
<th>UCI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bias</td>
<td>Competence</td>
<td>-.18*</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>5.67</td>
<td>Overall Trust</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>-2.44</td>
<td>4.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Integrity</td>
<td>-.38**</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.52</td>
<td>-.24</td>
<td>in the Police</td>
<td>4.74</td>
<td>3.41</td>
<td>-2.05</td>
<td>11.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Compassion</td>
<td>-.34**</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>-.51</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.8*</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Compatibility</td>
<td>-.36**</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>-.55</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.44*</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>9.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>-.37**</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>-.55</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td></td>
<td>-4.28</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>-9.59</td>
<td>1.03</td>
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</table>

** p < .001; * p < 0.05; 5000 Bootstraps, Seed=190323

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DISCUSSION
Consistent with the current literature, we found a negative relationship between perceived discrimination and intergroup trust in the police such that the more an individual believes their group is discriminated against by the police, the less they trust the police. Our results strongly suggest that this relationship is mediated by compatibility-based trust, which indicates that when faced with discrimination and bias, minority members are less likely to report compatibility-based trust.

This exploratory finding provides further insight into how the treatment of minority groups in a society affects their relationships with majority groups and their institutions. Communities and institutions should focus on highlighting how the identities of all community members are compatible with one another. In order to productively acknowledge and appreciate diversity across groups, societies can create a foundation of shared similarities and a common sense of belonging. Such interventions have been proposed previously to mitigate bias and increase intergroup trust. For instance, Gaertner & Dovidio (2000) suggest that a common, superordinate identity can be created across groups using an alternative dimension of identity to reduce bias and foster trust. Kappmeier & Mercy (accepted for publication) propose that the creation of a Shared Collective Memory, which takes into account the different presentation between groups, contributes to social harmony and intergroup trust. Similarly, Hooghe, Reeskens, & Stolle (2007) found that individuals in countries where immigrants are given the most extensive voting rights were more trusting than countries where they were not integrated into the citizenry as smoothly.

While this research uses a unique, multidimensional approach to generate insights into the relationship between perceived discrimination and bias and trust, there were several limitations:

First, these results are correlational. Accordingly, they do not speak to the causal relationship between perceived discrimination, bias and trust. Second, the items used to assess trust along the five dimensions of the Intergroup Trust Model in Study 2 slightly differed from those used in Study 1 and they possessed a slightly different focus. While we do not believe the differences affected the overall conclusions, other results may have been influenced.

Another limitation is that we only explored the relationship between perceived discrimination and bias and trust in one context: minority communities’ relationships with the police. It is possible that different dimensions of the Intergroup Trust Model are important to the relationship between perceived discrimination and bias and trust in different contexts. For example, compassion-based trust may be as important to this relationship as compatibility-based trust in relationships between minority communities and physicians. Similar research must be conducted across various intergroup settings in order to understand whether our findings can be generalized across all contexts where there exists an association between perceived discrimination and bias and trust. However, even if different dimensions prove to be useful in different settings, the results of this research are still noteworthy for two reasons. First, the Intergroup Trust model was used to generate a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between perceived discrimination and bias and trust. Second, even if the importance of compatibility-based trust to this relationship is limited to the context of police-community relations, it can still be used to guide future policing interventions and research.

Conclusion
This rapid response article for the New Zealand Journal of Psychology responds to the senseless horror of the Christchurch mosque massacre. We are hopeful that this tragedy will pass into history as an extremist singularity in Aotearoa, however, as New Zealand society grows increasingly more diverse and shifts to a multicultural intergroup arrangement, issues of positive social integration, intergroup bias and/or discrimination and reduction of ‘otherness’ will only grow in scope and importance.

Our data reveals that the Māori community may have perceptions of dissimilarity between themselves and the police force. The importance of compatibility-based trust formed a consistent pattern of ‘otherness’ displayed by minority difficulty to relate to the police and the belief that the police do not share the same culture or values. Further research can investigate whether police relationships with other minority groups (such as Muslims, Pasifika and/or Asians) are similar. Additionally, future research might also examine the importance of compatibility-based trust in the police from the Pākehā perspective, although prior research in the US did not reveal a similar need for compatibility-based trust among White Americans (Kappmeier, 2017).

Taken together, this and previous works highlights the necessity of strategies that improve intergroup relations and reduce institutional and systemic prejudice; these strategies will be particularly important for government institutions, whose mandate to treat all persons fairly and equally under the law is fundamental to the sense of belonging of a diverse citizenry. The police, as a government institution that reserves the right to use force in order to protect the safety and rights of citizens, must carry an extra burden of duty in the pursuit of social cohesion and equality. Because of this added burden, the police must consistently strive not to endorse or legitimize spheres of ‘otherness’ through differential treatment or attitudes toward minorities.

In Aotearoa, development of these strategies will require a recognition of historical and present spaces of social otherness and of those who have been forced to inhabit them (Sibley & Osbourne, 2016), whether those spaces be overtly endorsed by ideological extremists or latently maintained by unequal/unfair treatment from government institutions. Here lies the value of our research in intergroup trust, perceived bias and discrimination:

Despite the need for more research on this topic, our findings suggest that approaching intergroup trust via the multidimensionality of the Intergroup Trust Model may prove useful for intervention, particularly in creating a greater sense of compatibility between the police and the policed. Otherness is an ever-evolving social category. Overtime, what once was ‘other’ can become the new normative representation and, vice versa, what once was standard may fall from dominant grace, such as racist and oppressive views becoming ‘othered’. However, this does not happen without intentional effort, and strategies to develop a common ingroup identity or shared sense of belonging across group lines need society-wide supported interventions.
Bushra Guenoun and Remaya Campbell contributed equally to this manuscript. Correspondence regarding this manuscript can be directed to Mariska Kappmeier, National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Otago, 462 Leith Walk, Dunedin 9054, New Zealand. Email: Mariska.Kappmeier@otago.ac.nz.

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Taylor & Frances Group.


It has been argued that parent talk about the emotions/wellbeing of others correlates with children’s empathy, at least up to the age of 6 years. The present study used a sticker sharing task to examine the empathy of 51 children (aged 5 to 12 years), and how children’s empathy relates to parenting disciplinary strategies and parents’ general attitudes (empathy, SDO). There was a significant effect indicating that participants feel more empathy for a victim who was seriously hurt than a victim who experienced a minor hurt. Also, there was a significant positive correlation between parent talk about the wellbeing of others and younger children’s empathy, but not in the older age group. In contrast, parents’ general attitudes (empathy, SDO) were not related to children’s empathy.

Keywords: Empathy; Parenting disciplinary strategies; Parent emotion talk; Social dominance orientation (SDO).

Development of empathy

Empathy refers to the ability to understand and share others’ emotion and plays a key role in social behaviour, affecting people’s attitudes toward a target (Batson, 1991). It has previously been concluded that empathy is present at birth (Eisenberg et al., 1991) although such assumptions have recently come under scrutiny given newborns’ uneven performance when listening to different crying stimuli (Ruffman, Lorimer, & Scarf, 2017). In toddlers, empathy is measured via helping behaviour, pupil dilation, or facial responses to the suffering of another. Yet positive findings can be interpreted as surprise or heightened attention (pupil dilation), desire for approval (helping), or aversion (negative affect when listening to suffering) (Ruffman, Then, Cheng, & Imuta, 2019). Consistent with the latter idea, Ruffman, et al. (2019) found that adults responded empathically (with more sadness) when watching a crying infant compared to when watching a neutral infant accompanied by white noise, whereas toddlers responded similarly. Toddlers’ similar response to the two different kinds of stimuli is more parsimoniously interpreted as a response to an aversive stimulus rather than empathy. Moreover, even if empathy is present early in development, it is likely that it evolves throughout childhood. Thus, the aim of the present study was to investigate how children’s empathy develops over age, and whether it is related to general parent attitudes (such as social dominance orientation) or, more specifically, to parent talk (e.g., the things parents say to children when the child transgresses).

Some studies that examine changes in empathy over middle childhood indicate general increases between the ages of 7 and 12 years (Litvack-Miller, McDougall, & Romney, 1997), or increases in neurological markers for empathy (Cheng, Chen, & Decety, 2014). On the other hand, Michalska, Kinzler, and Decety (2013) examined 65 children aged between 4 and 17 years of age, giving them a self-report measure of empathy and measuring their pupil dilation and arousal when viewing videos of another person being hurt either intentionally or unintentionally. Michalska et al.’s findings did not indicate an age-related increase in empathy. Indeed, they found a decrease in participants’ reports of their own sadness for both intentional ($r = -0.20$) and unintentional ($r = -0.25$) harm. Nevertheless, the sample was relatively small for such a broad age range, leaving few children of different ages. Given such considerations, it is important to examine age-related changes in empathy more carefully within the middle childhood period.

Other researchers have also examined empathy for those harmed intentionally versus unintentionally. Decety, Michalska, and Akisuki (2008) found that children aged 7–12 showed brain responses as if they were feeling pain when watching others come to harm. Likewise, Michalska, Zeffiro, and
Decety (2016) found a similar pattern in 9- to 11-year-old children. Explicit ratings of sadness when viewing intentional versus unintentional harm also appeared to indicate greater empathy when viewing intentional harm. Decety, Michalska, and Kinzler (2012) found that children (4 to 12 years) and adult participants tended to rate themselves as feeling more sad when viewing intentional than unintentional harm (see also, Michalska, Kinzler, & Decety, 2013).

These findings are important and interesting, and suggest that children are, by and large, more empathic toward intentionally harmed individuals than those who are accidentally harmed. However, individual differences in empathy remain of interest, such as whether certain kinds of parenting tend to be more clearly linked to empathy. Thus, the present study adopted the intentional/accidental harm paradigm to examine whether and when children feel empathy toward victims who have been hurt, while examining parents’ general attitudes and specific strategies as potential means for facilitating children’s empathy.

**Extent of Harm**

Common sense suggests that empathy will vary positively with the degree of perceived harm. Indeed, when considering the New Zealand public’s response to events in Christchurch, it might be that a combination of an intentional act (deliberately killing unarmed individuals) coupled with massive harm (50 dead, including children), led to the highly salient outpouring of grief and empathy for the Muslim community witnessed in New Zealand. Thus, in addition to examining intentional versus unintentional harm, in the present study we also examined how the severity of harm influenced children’s empathy toward a victim.

**Parent Contributions**

Children tend to adopt the attitudes and cognitive styles of their parents. For example, mothers showing negativity early in their child’s life tend to have less compliant children (Kochanska, Aksan, & Nichols, 2003). Davidov and Grusiec (2006) found that maternal responsiveness to distress predicted children’s empathy and prosocial behavior toward distressed others, with measures of empathy and prosocial behavior including behavioural assessment, child interview, as well as reports from mothers and teachers. Meta-analysis also sheds light on the effect of parenting style on children, indicating that positive parenting (warmth, firm control and clear standards of conduct) is associated with less relational aggression in children. Conversely, harsh parenting, uninvolved parenting and fathers’ controlling parenting are associated with increased relational aggression (Kawabata, Alink, Tseng, van Ijzendoorn, & Crick, 2011).

Yet, children tend to be socialised not only by the general style of parenting, but also by modelling their parents’ attitudes and cognitive styles. For instance, Allport (1954) argued that the home was the most important source of ethnic bias, with children adopting their parents’ views to the extent that they desire affection and approval from their parents. According to a recent meta-analysis examining a broad range of parent and child prejudice, prejudice is learnt, with children’s attitudes closely resembling those of their parents (Degner & Dalege, 2013). To this end, Sinclair, Dunn, and Lowery (2005) examined Allport’s (1954) contention that the extent to which children like their parents, and wish to emulate their parents, would affect the intergenerational transmission of prejudice. Fourth- and fifth-grade children completed measures of implicit and explicit pro-white/anti-black bias, and also filled out a survey about child-parent identification. Meanwhile, parents completed a survey that measured their attitudes toward blacks. As hypothesised, parents’ racially prejudiced attitudes had a positive association with children’s discrimination, with a more substantial correlation among children who were highly identified with their parents compared to less identified children. A study by Ruffman O’Brien, Taumoepeau, Latner, and Hunter (2016) provided evidence that this link between parent and child attitudes begins earlier than was previously thought. They tested 70 mother-child dyads with the children aged between 6 and 34 months. Children were presented with 10 pairs of photos, each pair including an average-weight and an obese individual. Amongst the oldest group of children (aged 31 to 34 months, $M = 2.67$ years), there was a clear bias to look away from the obese individual and towards the average-weight person. Interestingly, they also found a positive association between the anti-fat attitudes of mothers and children; the more prejudiced parents were toward obese individuals, the more likely children were to look towards the average-weight people and away from the obese individuals. Thus it is important to examine how children's empathy relates to their parents’ general attitudes.

One such general attitude measured in adults is social dominance orientation (SDO). SDO is a measure of endorsement for unequal social relationships (Pratto, Sidanius, Stalworth, & Malle, 1994), that is, the belief that inequalities are justified by virtue of advantaged individuals being more deserving (e.g., “Some groups of people are just more worthy than others”). SDO is inversely related to empathy in adults (Pratto et al., 1994). In the present study, we examined parents’ SDO to determine whether it influenced children’s empathy.

Besides basic parenting style and children’s modelling of parent behaviours, different kinds of parental talk can more directly affect outcomes in children. For instance, parents who talk about the wellbeing of a victim when a child transgresses have children with a more advanced theory of mind (Ruffman, Perner, & Parkin, 1999). Also, the degree to which parents discuss the mental states of others is predictive of children’s behaviour. This includes their child’s cooperation with other children, moral development, emotion understanding, and a greater inclination to help others in distress (Ruffman et al., 2006; Hoffman, 1975; Dunn, Brown & Beardsall, 1991; Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow & King, 1979). Denham, Zoller and Couchoud (1994) found that when mothers spontaneously discussed their own mental states, children had increased emotional understanding 15 months later, compared to mothers who did not. Thus, it is clear that maternal talk about mental states is beneficial for the development of emotion understanding, which in turn, likely facilitates empathy. Brownell, Svetlova, Anderson, Nichols, and Drummond (2013) obtained more direct evidence for this idea. Parents read age-appropriate picture books to their children aged between 18- and 30-month-olds, and the content and structure of their emotion-related and internal state discourse were coded. Children who were better at helping in a task requiring complex emotion understanding, had parents who more often asked them to label and explain the emotions depicted in the books, providing evidence that parents’ talk about emotions with their toddlers related to early prosocial behaviour. A similar
study was conducted by Drummond, Paul, Waugh, Hammond and Brownell (2014). They assessed children’s helping behaviour with two tasks: an instrumental helping task and an emotion-based helping task that differed in whether there was a need for children to understand the helpee’s emotional state (emotion-based: yes; instrumental: no). Drummond et al. found that parents’ emotion and mental state discourse only related to children’s emotion-based helping behaviour but not to their instrumental, action-based helping behaviour (Drummond, Paul, Waugh, Hammond and Brownell, 2014). In a second study, a similar pattern of results was obtained with children with aged 3 to 6 years old (Rollo & Sulla, 2016). Nevertheless, what is unclear is whether such talk would be more helpful for children 6 years and under versus those older than 6 years. We examined this question in the present study.

**Present Study**

The current study aimed to determine whether: (a) children show more empathy towards a victim harmed intentionally than a victim hurt accidentally, (b) children show more empathy when the harm was severe versus mild, (c) children’s empathy related to their parent’s self-rated RWA, SDO and empathy, (d) children’s empathy related to the things parents said to children when their child transgressed, and (e) children’s empathy changed over time.

To this end, we varied harm (severe versus mild) and intention (intentional versus accidental), thus resulting in four stories for each child: severe intentional harm, mild intentional harm, severe accidental harm, or mild accidental harm. Four pictures accompanied each story, with the experimenter narrating the storyline. After each story, the experimenter then gave the participant five stickers and, as a measure of empathy, asked her/him to share them with the story character.

**METHOD**

**Participants**

Fifty-one mother-child dyads participated in this study. Children were between the ages of 5 and 12 years. Children were split into two age groups: 5- and 6-year-olds (n = 29, M = 5.76 years, 16 boys) and 7- to 12-year-olds (n = 22, M = 8.73 years, 9 boys). Children were healthy and typically-developing, and recruited from a medium-sized city in New Zealand. As a measure of socio-economic status, mother education was coded on a five-point scale: 1: less than high school, 2: high school or equivalent, 3: technical or vocational training, 4: university degree, and 5: postgraduate degree. Mean mother education in the younger age group was 3.26 (SD = 1.10) and 3.67 (SD = 1.11) in the older age group.

**Materials**

Participants were tested at a table in a small experimental room. The stories were given within subjects. Besides differing in intent and damage severity, each story had a different narrative, varying the way the character was hurt (either by a bat, being kicked, by a bowling ball, or being pushed off a swing). The order in which these four narratives were presented followed the same order, whereas the intention and damage severity were counterbalanced. Each story was accompanied by four pictures, with a text printed below that the experimenter read aloud. For instance, the first drawing showed two story characters pre-event (e.g., two kids playing baseball and looking happy), the second and the third drawings showed the mishap (e.g., showed whether one child pushed the victim (child) on purpose or by accident), and the last drawing showed the victim post-event, that is, showed whether the resulting harm was severe (broken arm/leg) or minor (sore arm/leg but okay).

There were five red floral stickers on the table, and after each story, the experimenter asked participants to share stickers with the story victim. According to Moberly, Waddle and Duff (2005), sticker sharing is one of the most common ways for teachers to provide positive rewards in early childhood classrooms, and is regularly used to measure empathy/prosocial behavior in experiments with children (e.g., Williams, O’Driscoll, & Moore, 2014). We tested parents on their self-rated level of SDO and empathy, and also, on their disciplinary strategies in four hypothetical situations. SDO was measured using the SDO7, a short, 8-item scale, as found in Ho et al. (2015) (M = 5.62, SD = 0.84, α = .733). Responses to the SDO7 were on a 7-point likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly oppose) to 7 (strongly favour). Empathy was measured using the Toronto Empathy Questionnaire (TEQ), which consists of 16 questions (Kourmousi et al., 2017), each rated on a five-point scale (“never”, “rarely”, “sometimes”, “often” and “always”) (M = 5.66, SD = 0.57, α = .632).

**Procedure**

Parents were given an information sheet describing the experiment and a consent form to sign. After parents signed the consent form, the experimenter gave parents the questionnaires on a laptop. The experimenter then explained the task to the child, explaining that they would read a story and then ask the child to give the character stickers. They explained that the stickers would make the character feel better, and the more stickers they gave, the better the character would feel. The experimenter said to the child, “First, I’ll show you four pictures and tell you a story about the pictures. Then, we will play a sharing game after each story”. After each story, the experimenter said, “As you can see, (victim character’s name) is very sad. Now, you have five stickers, I’m wondering if you want to give some of the stickers to (name of the character). The more you like him/her, the more stickers you can give him/her”. The experimenter then placed five floral stickers on the table in front of the child, along with the last picture (e.g., the character’s broken arm/leg). Ethics approval for the study was granted by the University Human Ethics Committee (#817/008), “Interactions Within a Virtual Reality Environment”.

**RESULTS**

Descriptive statistics for the main variables are displayed in Table 1. The data were analysed with a 2 (Age Group: young, older) x 2 (Damage: severe, mild) x 2 (Intention: intentional, accidental) mixed analysis of variance. Age Group was a between-subjects variable, whereas
Damage and Intention were within-subjects variables. The dependent variable was the number of stickers children gave to the story character. Only one effect was significant, the main effect for Damage, $F(1, 49) = 16.72, p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .254$. The interaction between Damage and Age Group approached significance, $F(1, 49) = 2.77, p = .102$, $\eta^2 = .053$. All other effects were not significant (all $F$s < 1.14, all $ps > .29$).

Given a priori interest in whether parent talk would be beneficial for both young and older children, we then split the children into two age groups (young and older) and examined correlations between the main variables in each age group. Tables 2 and 3 include this information. Given the main effect for Damage in the analysis of variance above, we created a sticker difference score (stickers given after severe damage minus stickers given after mild damage). As hypothesised, the correlation between parent talk about the victim’s wellbeing (wellbeing talk) and the sticker difference score was significant in the younger age group, $r = .382$, $p = .041$. In contrast, it was not significant (and was negative rather than positive) in the older age group, $r = -.199$, $p = .387$. These two correlation coefficients were significantly different from each other, $p = .046$, and are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. The only other significant correlations in both age groups were between the parent wellbeing talk variable and the parent discipline variable (uninteresting because these are logically intertwined). In addition, in the older age group, there were two significant correlations. First, the parent discipline variable correlated with and parents’ self-ratings of their empathy, $r = -.461$, $p = .035$, such that parents who said they would discipline their child or tell their child not to do it when the child transgressed, rated themselves as having lower empathy. Second, parent self-ratings of empathy and SDO correlated, $r = .473$, $p = .026$. We discuss this latter correlation further in the Discussion.

Given that the sticker difference score and the parent emotion talk variables correlated differently in the two age groups, we then used linear regression to explore the data further. The dependent variable was the sticker difference score and the predictors were age group, parent wellbeing talk, and the interaction between age group and parent wellbeing talk.

**Table 1. Descriptive statistics for main variables in the study**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Younger Children</th>
<th>Older Children</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean (SD)</td>
<td>Mean (SD)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child Transgressions: Wellbeing</td>
<td>0.43 (0.37)</td>
<td>0.34 (0.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child Transgressions: Discipline</td>
<td>0.43 (0.38)</td>
<td>0.55 (0.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stickers Unintentional Severe</td>
<td>2.97 (1.68)</td>
<td>3.77 (1.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stickers Unintentional Mild</td>
<td>2.69 (1.61)</td>
<td>2.55 (1.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stickers Intentional Severe</td>
<td>3.03 (1.61)</td>
<td>3.59 (1.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stickers Intentional Mild</td>
<td>2.28 (1.60)</td>
<td>2.36 (1.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent Empathy</td>
<td>5.65 (0.56)</td>
<td>5.68 (0.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent SDO</td>
<td>5.53 (0.82)</td>
<td>5.74 (0.87)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2. Correlations between the sticker difference score and main variables in the younger age group**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Parent Education</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Child Sex</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Parent SDO</td>
<td>.085</td>
<td>.066</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Parent Empathy</td>
<td>.091</td>
<td>.041</td>
<td>.220</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Child Transgressions: Wellbeing</td>
<td>.198</td>
<td>-.177</td>
<td>-.132</td>
<td>-.011</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Child Transgressions: Discipline</td>
<td>-.319</td>
<td>.073</td>
<td>.050</td>
<td>-.181</td>
<td>-.819*</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Sticker Difference Score</td>
<td>-.088</td>
<td>-.037</td>
<td>-.097</td>
<td>-.044</td>
<td>.382*</td>
<td>-.386*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. *p < .05, **p < .01.

**Table 3. Correlations between the sticker difference score and main variables in the older age group**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Parent Education</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Child Sex</td>
<td>.533*</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Parent SDO</td>
<td>.356</td>
<td>.487*</td>
<td>.473*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Parent Empathy</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>.262</td>
<td>.437*</td>
<td>.703</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Child Transgressions: Wellbeing</td>
<td>.219</td>
<td>.160</td>
<td>.039</td>
<td>.432</td>
<td>.370</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Child Transgressions: Discipline</td>
<td>-.389</td>
<td>-.320</td>
<td>-.132</td>
<td>-.461*</td>
<td>-.886**</td>
<td>-.499</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Sticker Difference Score</td>
<td>.087</td>
<td>.149</td>
<td>-.175</td>
<td>-.157</td>
<td>-.199</td>
<td>.140</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. *p < .05, **p < .01.
Given the a priori prediction that parent emotion talk would never be more highly related to empathy in the older age group than the younger age group, we used one-tail when evaluating the interaction. With all variables in the prediction equation, age group, $t = 2.83, p = .007, pr = .385,$ and parent wellbeing talk, $t = 2.03, p = .048, pr = .287,$ predicted unique variance in the sticker difference score. Thus, after controlling for parent wellbeing talk, older children showed more empathy by giving more stickers to the severely hurt character than the mildly hurt character. In addition, after controlling for child age, parents who gave more wellbeing talk had more empathic children. In addition, the interaction between child age group and parent wellbeing talk predicted unique variance in the sticker difference score, $t = -1.98, p = .027, pr = -.28,$ in older age group. The interaction shows that the relation between parents’ talk about the wellbeing of the victim and the child’s empathy was significantly larger in the younger than the older age group.

**Figure 1.** Scatterplot showing sticker difference score for younger age group.

**Figure 2.** Scatterplot showing sticker difference score for older age group

**DISCUSSION**

Previous research indicated that parent talk about the emotions/wellbeing of others correlated with children’s empathy, at least up to the age of 6 years. The present study aimed to investigate the way in which empathy develops in middle childhood in an attempt to fill these gaps in the literature. Empathy was investigated by measuring sticker sharing behaviour in response to a character in a story being hurt, with manipulations of damage and intent. We also examined the relation between children’s empathy and their parent’s self-rated SDO and empathy, as well as parenting disciplinary strategies. Our interest was in whether parent talk about the wellbeing/emotions of others correlated with children’s empathy, or whether more general...
parental attitudes (SDO, empathy) took precedence.

We obtained three major findings. First, on the basis of common sense, we expected that participants would feel more empathy for the victim who was seriously hurt than the victim who experienced a minor hurt. The results supported this idea, as participants gave more stickers with greater damage.

Second, based on research by Decety et al. (2012) and Michalska et al. (2013), we predicted that participants would show more empathy for a victim who was hurt intentionally than unintentionally. However, children did not distinguish between intentional and unintentional harm. A reasonable explanation for this finding is that the stickers were given after the last picture, which focused solely on the extent of damage caused. Thus, the intent, which was expressed in the first three pictures, was less salient and may have been forgotten. Future research could aim to investigate empathy for intentional and unintentional harm, without manipulation of other factors to directly examine the role of intent in children’s empathy.

Although it might be that children in our study would have differentiated between intentional and unintentional behaviour had we not also manipulated the severity of damage, it nevertheless remains the case that they did not do so. It is also the case that once we controlled for parent wellbeing talk (in the regression), older children had a larger sticker difference score than younger children (i.e., gave more stickers to the severely hurt character than the mildly hurt character). This suggests that there might be development in empathy over middle childhood and it might be too soon to say that children fully understand empathy, even in middle childhood. Perhaps empathy is a more complex phenomenon than previously hypothesised. The observed effects highlight that children may not yet understand the social and moral processes behind the distinction of intentional and unintentional harm in that they do not integrate intention with damage severity. It is possible that empathy develops gradually, with empathy for physical hurt developing before, and taking precedence over, empathy for moral transgressions such as intentional hurt. Therefore, the present findings provide opportunity for future research in some of the more specific mechanisms of empathy, rather than regarding it as an all-or-none phenomenon.

The third major finding concerns how parent emotion talk relates to children’s empathy. The results (Tables 2 and 3) indicated that the correlation between parent wellbeing talk and empathy (sticker sharing difference score) was significantly larger in the younger age group than the older age group. As such, it can be concluded that younger children’s empathy is more likely to be linked to parents’ talk about a victim’s feelings (Figure 1). Nevertheless, our results are correlational rather than longitudinal or stemming from an intervention. On the face of it, then, it is difficult to discern causality. Does parent talk about the wellbeing of others facilitate children’s empathy, do more empathic children encourage parents to talk about the wellbeing of others, or is a third variable involved?

One result consistent with the idea that parent talk facilitates children’s empathy is that the correlation amongst older children was significantly less than that for younger children. If parents’ wellbeing talk was simply a response to child characteristics, then it should have related to empathy in the older age group too. The results suggest that parent wellbeing talk might have helped younger children to be empathic because they could learn from such talk, but that it wasn’t helpful for older children because they should have known better already. Wellbeing talk (e.g., “How would you feel if he did that to you?”) encourages simulation and follows the golden rule, ‘treat others as you wish to be treated’. Knowing oneself and the way that you normally respond, in conjunction with an understanding of others’ mental states, may aid in simulating how someone else might feel. Thus, introspection contributes to theory of mind understanding, and is related to empathy (Gonzales, Fabricius, & Kupfer, 2018). In addition, longitudinal results are also consistent with the idea that parent wellbeing talk facilitates children’s empathy because such talk at an early time point is related to children’s subsequent cooperation with others (Ruffman et al., 2006).

Finally, a fourth finding was that in the older age group, parent empathy was related to parent SDO. This result is perhaps surprising at first because SDO is inversely related to empathy (Pratto et al., 1994). However, we note that parents’ empathy was measured by self-ratings, so it may not be the true empathy (i.e., empathy toward others). Instead, parents’ SDO could be accompanied by grandiosity in which they have an inflated view of themselves. Consistent with our hypothesis, Chichocka, Dhont, and Makwana (2017) found a relation between narcissistic self-evaluation and SDO, even after controlling for self-esteem.

**Limitations**

We acknowledge some limitations in the current study. First, as mentioned above, the last frame in which the damage was made clear could have overshadowed the intent in the story. This is particularly likely because the participant could have been able to detect the pattern that was arising, as the last pictures of each of the stories were all very similar. They could have noticed that they were asked if they wanted to give any stickers straight after they found out the extent of the damage, and only focused on that aspect of the story.

Further, the sample size was relatively small. We had 51 parent-child pairs in total in this study. Also, the study tested only one ethnic group (Caucasian). It will thus be necessary to extend the results to children from other ethnic groups to assess whether these findings can be generalised across all ethnic groups.

**Conclusion**

The present study investigated empathy development in middle childhood and aimed to determine the way in which it developed over age, as well as its relationship to parent disciplinary strategies. The results suggest that there were connections between parenting disciplinary strategies and younger children’s empathy. In contrast, parents’ general attitudes (empathy, SDO) were not related to children’s empathy. If parents’ emotion talk about a victim’s feelings facilitates children’s empathy, there is an opportunity for future research to examine both how these processes develop, and how we can encourage children to employ them when confronted with a person who has been hurt. For instance, parents could be trained to employ wellbeing responses and children’s empathy could be monitored over time. This possibility opens up a promising area of research into what developmental mechanisms may contribute to the progression of empathy development.

Our results are also important in that they set the standard for future studies with children who exhibit social cognitive
disorders (e.g., antisocial personality disorder, conduct disorder) who are often deficient in experiencing empathy or guilt. Intervening to encourage parents to discuss the wellbeing of others (rather than employing more punishment-oriented strategies) is a relatively simple means of potentially facilitating empathy. Parents helping children to put themselves in the position of another may encourage them to feel more empathy for those who are at the bottom of a hierarchy. The present results suggest that if we want our children to grow into adults who are empathic and treat others as equals, then we should encourage them to think about the feelings of others, and put themselves in their position.

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Parental talk and younger children’s empathy

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Representing Islam: Experiences of women wearing hijab in New Zealand

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An increase in commentary on the hijab, or Muslim headscarf, in Western countries can be attributed to multiple factors, not least among them the current political discourse relating to Islamic terrorism (Green, 2015). Despite Islam being a rapidly expanding religion in New Zealand, there is a dearth of research pertaining to Muslims. Here we aim to understand the everyday experiences of hijabi women in New Zealand. Six women were interviewed, and the data were analysed using an interpretive phenomenological framework. Three themes were identified: explanations for wearing hijab, interpersonal experiences, and the responses to these interpersonal experiences. Research findings point to a complex interplay of individual and socio-cultural factors which influence the everyday experiences of hijabi women.

Keywords: hijab; Muslim; Islam; discrimination; prejudice

Introduction

The intersection of private religious beliefs and practices, and the public appraisal of those beliefs and practices, is a fascinating and at times contentious dynamic. A group who are particularly familiar with this intersection are those who visibly affiliate with religion through identifiable garments such as the Sikh turban, the Catholic nun’s habit, or the Jewish kippah or skullcap (Homberger & Bradley, 2015). Wearing religious symbols signals one’s affiliation and exposes the individual to society’s views and stereotypes about the wearer’s religion (Baerveldt, 2015; Cherney & Murphy, 2016). The intertwining of religion, politics, culture, and humanity, against the backdrop of current public and political discourse, makes the individual experience of this interaction politically and sociologically important.

Within Western countries, the most frequently discussed form of religious dress is the hijab (Fournier, 2013). Hijab is the headscarf covering the head and neck of Muslim women which, within Islam, signifies the upholding of respect between men and women (Hyder, Parrington, & Hussain, 2015). It is an exclusively public symbol of religion that is not worn in private with family members. Modest dress was prescribed for both men and women in the Qur’an, the Muslim holy book, to prevent attraction to anyone other than their spouse.

This is a critical time for hijabi women living in Western countries due to fear of fundamental Islam and of terrorism (Green, 2015). While political opposition often focuses on the more substantive Muslim veils of niqab and burka, all forms of the veil, including hijab, can draw negative attention (Hyder et al., 2015). The United States-led “war on terror” was sparked by the 2001 terror attacks in New York City, known as 9/11. This war inflamed historically tense relations between the “West” and “the East” with various political, media, and popular culture sources creating a dichotomy of “us” and “them”. Misunderstandings, such as non-Muslims failing to distinguish between the behaviours of extremist and mainstream Muslims, have major negative consequences for Muslims, who are often subject to prejudice and discrimination. This is particularly so for veiled Muslim women, due to their overt visual representation of Islam.

Increased focus on hijab-wearing has led to a growing tension between the normalisation of wearing hijab and its marginalisation. The increasing visibility and normalisation of hijab in the Western world was evident at the 2016 New York Fashion Week, which included the first collection incorporating hijab in every outfit (Roberts, 2016). Alongside such progressive events are acts of marginalization. For instance, contentious and widely debated laws concerning Islamic dress have been implemented in parts of Europe (Scott, 2007). In 2004, a ban on wearing any conspicuous signs of religious affiliation within the French public-school system disproportionately affected Muslims (Fredette, 2015). Similar legislation has been passed in Belgium, Bulgaria, and the Netherlands (Bilsky, 2009). As illustrated by these examples, messages relating to wearing hijab in Western countries are at times contradictory and are influencing environments in which hijabi women are visible.

Research consistently documents that hijabi women encounter discrimination, menacing looks, angry shouting, and acts of violence (Cherney & Murphy, 2016; Everett et al., 2015; Fayyaz & Kamal, 2014; Ghumman & Ryan, 2013; Hyder et al., 2015). In addition, hijabi women face discrimination in employment and career development, such as a reduced likelihood of a call back after an interview compared with someone not wearing hijab (Ghumman & Ryan, 2013; Robinson, 2016). Further, a study from the United Kingdom highlighted that Muslims have been treated as a “suspect community” since 9/11 through increased use of counter-terrorism strategies (Bonino, 2013). Hijabi women, who are visibly identifiable as Muslim, are at greater risk of this ethnic profiling and targeting by police.

Additionally, the hijab contradicts what is traditionally viewed as feminist in Western countries (Al Wazni, 2015). This image of feminism has been based on politics and capitalist marketing, and within this hijab has symbolised oppression towards women. The “second-wave” feminism beginning the 1960s advocated for women to reclaim their bodies and their sexuality; including encouraging Muslim women to remove
their hijabs (Al Wazni, 2015, p. 327). This form of feminism became another part of the ever-present dichotomy between Islam and the West (Saadallah, 2004). However, the evolution of Western feminist movements into the “third-wave” allow for non-white feminist ideas, a pluralistic approach that advocates for women’s choice of life paths, rather than a mono-cultural definition of freedom (Snyder-Hall, 2010).

The intersectionality of gender and feminist identity with religious and cultural identity is central to the experience of hijabi women in Western countries. Hopkins and Greenwood (2013) used Self-Categorisation theory to consider the relationship between self-identification and behaviour through analysing interview accounts of hijabi women in Scotland. They identified (among other things) complexity in the performance of the participants’ Muslim identity and other identities such as gender or nationality. For example, a hijabi woman is faced with a contradiction when she anticipates that hijab is seen as national dis-identification or viewed as a mark of oppression which may go against her gender identity. In opposition to this, wearing the hijab may represent values of religious freedom and gender equality (Scott, 2007). For some, hijab also serves as an emblem of resistance when a vocal majority seek to marginalise it.

Theories considering identity and behaviour are central to understanding the experiences of hijabi women in New Zealand. Identity Process Theory views identity as both a structure and a process, focussing on the interaction of psychological and social factors in its production (Jaspal & Breakwell, 2014). Identity is regulated through processes of assimilation-accommodation and evaluation. Assimilation-accommodation refers to responses to new information (e.g. hijabi women being aware of the “Muslim terrorist” stereotype) and how this is adjusted to (e.g. presenting as polite or pious in order to avoid association between their religious practice and Islamic terrorism). This process is followed by evaluation of their own identity (e.g. a Muslim having a more negative or positive view of their own religion due to how Islam is perceived in that context). If this process identifies a threat to identity, a coping strategy is used in response to the social context, such as a deciding to wear, or not wear, hijab.

New Zealand is distinctive from other Western nations in several ways, highlighting the importance of researching women in New Zealand. First, New Zealand is a bicultural nation based on a partnership between indigenous Māori and Pākehā/New Zealand Europeans (Mein Smith, 2011). While, in practice, the national culture remains dominated by the majority Pākehā group, government and public discourse include efforts to create a national narrative that is both Māori and Pākehā. Second, New Zealand has progressive and tolerant social ideals, as evidenced by being the first country to provide women with voting rights, and one of the first countries to legalise gay marriage (Dann, 2015; Henrickson, 2010). Third, New Zealand is strongly secular with religion being neither privileged nor barred (Kolig, 2016). In the 2013 census, 41.9 percent of people reported that they affiliated with no religion (Statistics New Zealand, 2014).

Muslims constitute the fastest expanding religious group in New Zealand with a 27.9 percent increase between 2006 and 2013 (Statistics New Zealand, 2014). Within this group, more than a quarter were born in New Zealand, 27 percent were born in Asia, 23 percent in the Middle East or Africa, and 21 percent in the Pacific Islands. In recent decades, immigration has been a contentious and polarized topic in New Zealand (and other Western countries), as policy changes have meant a rapid rise in immigrants from various ethnic and cultural backgrounds (Johnston, Gendall, Trlin, & Spoonley, 2010). While non-Muslim New Zealanders generally have more positive attitudes towards immigrants than Australian and European citizens, survey research has also found New Zealanders are more biased against immigrants from predominantly Muslim countries than others (Ward & Masgoret, 2008).

Similarly, the discursive literature on racism in New Zealand suggests racist discourse has become increasingly subtle and ambivalent (Tuffin, 2008). Research exploring young adults’ views of immigration and diversity indicate much agreement around the notion of “one” society, dominated by nationalistic discourses affirming the stereotype of New Zealanders as white and English speaking (Lyons, Madden, Chamberlain, & Carr, 2011). The rights of the “other” were diminished through the goal of constructing assimilative goals as positive. Such goals seek to homogenise rather than celebrate cultural diversity.

Despite the growth in the Muslim community, there is little research examining Muslim experiences in New Zealand. While, in a rare counter-example, Dobson (2012) analysed Muslim women’s narratives and found that their context shaped their experience of their faith, with influences including their minority status, migration, and resettlement. Islam served as a structure and support in the face of such challenges.

In this study, we aim to build on this small foundation to deepen our understanding of the experiences of hijabi women living in New Zealand. A cultural context of biculturalism, strong secularism, and a government known for progress and tolerance, makes the experiences of hijabi women in New Zealand interesting. We use Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) of in-depth qualitative interviews to explore the meaning of wearing hijab, how the women feel their hijab-wearing is perceived by non-Muslims, and whether they have experienced prejudice and discrimination. IPA allows in-depth exploration of how the women make sense of their experience wearing hijab in New Zealand (Larkin & Thompson, 2012).

**METHOD**

**Participants**

Participants were recruited through the Facebook page of an Auckland mosque. The six participants were between 20 and 50 years old, spoke English fluently, and were born overseas but now lived permanently in New Zealand. Countries of origin were Fiji, India, Palestine, and Indonesia. Five of the six participants always wore hijab in public, and one on a part-time basis, for example, during the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan. One
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of the participants wore both hijab, and occasionally niqab.

Data collection

In-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted in November and December of 2016 in locations chosen by the women including libraries, cafes, and in one case, the participant’s home. Probe questions, such as “What does wearing hijab represent to you?” were used to facilitate talk, and then follow-up questions encouraged more depth. Interviews were conducted consistent with IPA principles; that is, probing, open-ended questions were aimed at generating detailed descriptions of what it is like to wear hijab in New Zealand (Smith & Eatough, 2012). The mode of interviewing allowed for unexpected issues to arise in the talk, and to be followed up with further questions. The study received ethical approval from the Massey University ethics committee, participants were advised that they could refuse to answer any question, and interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed.

Data Analysis

IPA emphasises the importance of respecting the experience of individuals and the ways in which they make sense of their experiences. This approach also emphasises the importance of talk and interpretive work that accompany individual accounts, while openly acknowledging the extent to which reading of participant experiences is also dependent on the researchers’ interpretation (Shinebourne, 2011). Consistent with this approach, we sought to capture rich and detailed accounts of interpretations of the experiences of a small number of hijabi women.

The stages of analysis followed an IPA framework; the first stage entailed reading and re-reading the transcripts and noting initial thoughts and observations without forcing any adherence to theory, enabling familiarity with each interview and the identification of significant parts of the transcript that may have relevance later (Harper & Thompson, 2012). The second stage was more structured, identifying patterns of meaning or psychological themes in the transcripts, and focusing on more abstract concepts such as power, respect, or difference. The third part of the analysis structured and created an overview of the themes, with specific quotes from each participant noted to ensure the themes remained grounded in the actual words of the commentary (Smith, 2008). The dominant themes are presented with extracts from the interviews to illustrate the themes. Participants are identified by pseudonyms.

Reflectivity

Active consideration of personal assumptions and cultural background is pivotal to sound research. The interview, the first author, is Pākehā (the dominant ethnic group in New Zealand: Statistics New Zealand, 2014). That she is a non-Muslim member of the majority group will have created a different dynamic than if she had been Muslim. For instance, participants may feel less able to be critical of non-Muslim New Zealanders. Such concerns are part of the IPA process of “double hermeneutics” or the dual interpretation process (Pietkiewicz & Smith, 2012, p. 361). While striving for neutrality is not a goal IPA research, it was still a goal to remain grounded in participant accounts.

ANALYSIS

Three themes were identified from the analysis: explanations for wearing hijab, interpersonal experiences, and responses to these interpersonal experiences.

Explanations for wearing hijab

The analysis suggested that religious commitment was the basis on which the women wore hijab. Alongside obligation to God, wearing hijab was also a personal choice. This dual reasoning revealed tension in how the women expressed Western ideas of personal choice and freedom compared with their religious requirement to follow Qur’anic prescription.

Responses to the questions of why they wore hijab and what it represented were consistent in that it was a religious decision as prescribed in the Qur’an for modesty. Lina states:

I say to myself if I want to wear it, I have to make sure that I understand about the meaning of hijab for Muslims and I understand that it is important to me to wear it and I want to wear it because of God alone. Lina stresses her singular reasoning for wearing hijab. The strength of her conviction is represented in such phrases as “I have to make sure”. Her statement “I want to wear it because of God alone” suggests she has encountered suggestions that she also has other reasons for wearing.

Participants also expressed notions of identity relating to religion, in that hijab enabled the inner self to be made public. Amal stated that she wears hijab so “people see you as you are,” providing insight into the function of hijab to express her religious identity.

Despite the sense of hijab being a simple expression of an inner reality, the process to reach this decision was not simple. Lina’s conviction to wearing hijab required deep consideration:

So uh I studied and I also read articles about hijab and things like that. Then after two years of contemplating discussions with my husband, with my sisters, with different people, I decided I want to wear hijab.

While some participants came to the decision after much consultation with family and friends, others reached the decision without the approval of significant others. Dalia said: “Actually, my family didn’t want me to wear it, they weren’t into religion. So my father was against it. I wanted to. It was like a challenge.”

Unequivocally, the women expressed that the act of wearing hijab was personally chosen. Nabila states:

It’s just that it’s personal choice. You know. Some people think that husbands shove it down your wife’s throat – you have to cover, you have to cover.

Nabila’s description highlights how her personal choice and freedom contrasts against the stereotypical (negative) view of Muslim women dominated by overbearing husbands.

This analysis highlighted a tension around women’s reasoning for wearing hijab. On one hand, the women drew upon individualistic Western ideals such as personal choice, while also expressing an obligation to God as outlined in the Qur’an. After being asked why she wears hijab, Farah described an incident of discrimination that illustrates this contradiction:

Farah: We were walking from Countdown to home, there was like some people his hair was like red, green, something like that, yellow, a lot of rainbow colours in his hair, with his girlfriend I guess, with a lot of piercings. Then he said, this is New Zealand, this is not Arab. Take it off! Stuff like that.

Interviewer: But isn’t it ironic, because he’s wearing what he wants to wear, so he’s different to everyone else?

Farah: Yes, yeah, I understand. Then I said your hair is weird. I choose to have this; this is New Zealand; this is free country. Exactly.
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Interviewer: Did he communicate back?
Farah: Yes, He said this is free country I chose whatever I want. Then I said, exactly.

From Farah’s perspective, being free means she can display her religion through her choice dress. Her comments indicate that she was aware of a double standard in that her interrogator views his own unconventional choice of fashion as a manifestation of his freedom, but not her hijab.

Overall, analysis highlighted the decision to wear hijab as both a personal choice and a commitment to God, and complex - to the degree that one participant’s family did not want her to wear hijab. It was clear that the women had experienced others believing hijab was enforced within Islam, and had encountered misunderstandings and double standards.

Interpersonal experiences

As illustrated above, interpersonal experiences played a significant part in much of the talk. With some exceptions, these women identified that there was a largely positive societal response to wearing hijab. They reflected upon a sense of society being unconcerned with their dress choices, being unaccepting of discrimination overall, and the political freedom of religious dress. Despite this, four of the six women described encountering discrimination, while Jasmeen and Lina stated they had never experienced negativity due to wearing hijab.

Analysis showed participants viewed non-Muslim New Zealanders as being unconcerned with their private choices. Half of the women stated that people generally “mind their own business”. There seemed to be high levels of awareness that they were not being subject to judgement from others for wearing hijab. Farah for example explained: “That’s good, I don’t care what they wear as long as you respect me, I will respect you. That’s in New Zealand. In Indonesia, there’s so much judgement.” Farah says this in spite of some experience of hostility for wearing hijab in New Zealand.

Interestingly, Jasmeen referenced post-9/11 as a time when she would expect to experience discrimination, but did not:
I’ve lived here in New Zealand for 13 years running and I came to New Zealand post 9/11 in [a regional city in the North Island]. It’s a beautiful town, lovely people. So, I arrived there, used to wear my headscarf, I wasn’t even driving those days, I lived in [this city] for 4 years. Alhamdulillah, I haven’t faced any kind of racist behaviour, and that was post 9/11, I came in 2002. [...] I had no problems. My kids were very small and I used to, most of the time live on my own, my husband was away on conferences, you know doctors, 2 weeks, 3 weeks. I would be home alone.

Despite concern about wearing hijab after 9/11, she felt safe and unafraid even at times when her husband was travelling overseas. At a time when prejudices were overflowing elsewhere, she experienced provincial New Zealand as a beacon of religious and cultural tolerance.

The women also discussed the experience of being able to wear hijab in a political sense. Two of the women expressed gratitude for this aspect of religious freedom. Lina said:
I think it’s positive, very positive, because I mean the New Zealand environment give me the opportunity to do it freely, unlike Paris for example or in France and I’m really really grateful to be here in this country where the environment – in terms of social environment, political environment - gives me the opportunity, allow me to do this.

Lina is highly aware that in other countries she may be stopped from wearing hijab. This is pertinent considering how deeply she believes in her decision. The contrast between her ability to wear hijab in New Zealand, and legislation in France banning hijab, illustrates that this influences her interpretation of experiences in New Zealand.

There were exceptions to this generally consensual recounting of positive experiences, including accounts of public hostility reflecting negative viewpoints about Muslims as condoning terrorism and as patriarchally oppressive.

Firstly, participants described a number of incidents of discrimination, based on others connecting Islam to terrorism. Nabila owned and worked in a dairy for many years, interacting with a cross-section of people. Nabila describes one specific incident:
One day this truck driver was outside my shop. Rubbish truck. And he tipped my bin over, spilled all over, on the footpath, and I was just outside the shop. And then he yelled abuse at me (laughs). He didn’t know how to use a bin. And then he swore at me, you f-ing Allah-thingy, you’re probably going around blowing people up. And I’m like, ok yeah. I said, “Be careful or I’ll put a bomb under your truck”. And then he swore at me and he told me that I must be terrorist and blah blah blah.

This depicts the presumed association between Islam and acts of terror. Nabila’s laughter is significant and could serve to dispel some of the seriousness of the situation, to position her as other than a victim, or reflect a wariness of exposing her own treatment to a non-Muslim, Pākehā interviewer.

Amal, the youngest of the interviewees, elaborated on her concern for her own safety as well as her mother’s:
Like I have done literally nothing to you, but you come and try to terrorize me for just existing, and then have the gall to call me the terrorist. It makes no sense and it makes me feel like crap, and also sort of scared for my own safety - or mostly my mum’s I guess because she wears the hijab full time, and I can’t help but wonder if or when there will ever be a time when someone tries to get physical with her because of it.

Amal describes the irony of being approached aggressively because the perpetrator believed her religion is violent. This is a defensive comment that describes fear for her own, and female family members’, physical safety. This fear is speculative, although naturally follows the experience of verbal insult inciting violence.

Analysis shows that there are external pressures of wearing hijab. Lina recounts a conversation with her husband about her visibly representing Islam:
He really really respects me as a Muslim woman because I’m out there wearing hijab, people know I’m Muslim on the bus, train, where I walk, everywhere, you know. But maybe no one know he is a Muslim even though they may meet him face to face because he’s not distinguished Muslim. That’s why he said, oh I respect you very much. When you wear hijab. You are brave woman to be out there as a minority you know. You know, you bare yourself, like say to the world that you are Muslim.

Lina’s husband believes she is at risk and wearing it requires courage. An otherwise straightforward extension of public Islamic identity now also requires
Participants described incidents of negative stereotyping based on the belief that hijab signifies patriarchal oppression. Nabila stated:

I think they would probably mean that it’s oppression. That a woman is oppressed and made to do, subjugated to - Probably being treated as a slave. Or yeah. Subservient. I don’t know.

Further, some participants mentioned that non-Muslim New Zealanders saw her as lacking intelligence or agency because she wore hijab. Nabila elaborated:

A lot of times when I was in the shop you know people think you’re covered so you probably don’t have a brain. They think your heads covered, that she probably doesn’t have a brain. So they barely look at you. Then when you speak, you always get a second look.

Nabila’s explanation highlights that being stereotyped as oppressed reflects negatively, depriving her of the human attribute of intelligence or voice.

An overview of the theme of interpersonal experiences indicated a positive response to wearing hijab in everyday life. However, the women encountered two forms of negative stereotyping resulting in public hostility: that Muslims condone terrorism, and that they are oppressed by male members of their family.

Responses to experiences

The women discussed three ways in which they respond to these experiences. The women often implicated media portrayals of negative Muslim stereotypes, and assumed a sense of responsibility regarding the representation of Islam. This manifested in both expressing the motivation to be an ambassador of Islam, and behaving appropriately when wearing hijab. Their religion facilitated how they coped with difficult experiences.

Firstly, media portrayals were implicated in negative stereotyping. Jasmeen described the contradictory violent nature of a specific term jihad as it is used in media, compared to her intrapersonal understanding of it:

Jihad is always referred to by media as the holy war. That’s the term. But that’s not the term, jihad is not a holy war, jihad the Arabic word means striving struggling to live in this world. Jihad can be used even to refer, oh I’m in a bit jihad – why? Because I’m taking care of my old parents. That is the biggest jihad referred to by the Prophet that is the biggest jihad.

Jasmeen’s example of the un-nuanced use of jihad provides insight into everyday contradictions the women experience based on media reports. When news media reports describe violent attacks as jihad, this contrasts starkly with Jasmeen’s religious personal reality of jihad as an internal struggle. While the women implicated media as the primary source behind negative stereotyping and subsequent hostility, some also attributed hostility to individual aggressor’s personal situations. Jasmeen states:

You can’t label everybody to be a racist because it can be situations, like, they must have had a bad day at work, family. I mean, most of us people we’re just like, living life like just going by day to day chores, isn’t it? So sometimes we might get angry at somebody.

Jasmeen is unwilling to view society as prejudiced and prefers to believe that her experience reflects other’s struggles, and their impacts on how they express themselves. In essence, Jasmeen forgives those who express hostility towards her, suggesting that her claim that she has not experienced discrimination in New Zealand may underestimate her experience.

Secondly, the women responded to negative stereotyping with a sense of responsibility to represent Islam through education and communication, and imperatives to behave appropriately when wearing hijab in public. Farah states “I’m using my time in New Zealand to actually tell people this is Islam, it’s not as scary as you think it is”. When Jasmeen was asked what she considered non-Muslim New Zealanders believe hijab means to her, she responded:

They don’t know anything about it, I guess I think they should ask a Muslim lady why she wears the hijab, some do but very rarely. I think if they do ask a Muslim person or anybody why they do what they do, not anything but just religiously why do you do what you do, it breaks so many barriers, and that would be so nice to have a good happy, you know that would be my advice, really they should come forward they should ask if they have a question if they have a doubt, communication can solve a lot of problems.

Jasmeen’s description of barriers provides insight into what it may feel like to wear hijab, when others misunderstand the meaning behind her hijab-wearing. She articulates that open discussion about why she wears hijab is necessary, to address hostility that she sees as reflecting ignorance. She sets aside the possible confrontation involved in such an approach.

Additionally, participants described being compelled to behave appropriately when wearing hijab to represent Islamic ideals. Lina stated:

You have to show other people that you are a good person. So, you have to be kind, you have to be nice, you have to be approachable – that’s the word, because you want to show others that you are a good person, you know, you’re not wearing hijab or something just to be, you know, different to other people.

Further, if one of Lina’s non-Muslim friends encountered prejudice towards Islam, she said they would respond in a way that recognises these prejudices through knowing herself and her husband:

So people who know us, if they encounter another person who said negative things about Muslims, they will say, “oh my friends, I have a number of Muslim friends, I have Muslim acupuncture, or have, you know and his wife”, things like that for example. “But they’re nice so what you said is wrong”.

Here, there is a contradiction between Lina’s religious reasons for wearing hijab, and her focus on being viewed positively. Although being approachable may align with Islamic ideals, encounters with anti-Muslim negativity has meant that she has focussed on her likeability as a person, rather than religious reasons for wearing hijab. Further, Lina’s comment about friends’ defence of her illustrates the extent of Islamophobia in society. That is, even people that are not Muslim, but are friends with Muslims, encounter negativity and misunderstanding, and are therefore prompted to speak up against it.

Thirdly, participants described using their faith to cope with discrimination. In several interviews, the response to discriminatory confrontation was to turn to the Islamic spiritual texts. Farah compared her experience of discrimination with the experience of the Islamic Prophet Muhammad: “What’s actually about Islam they don’t understand. So, I just walk away. It’s not as bad as our Prophet Muhammad. He used to have someone pouring urine from the top floor.” Similarly, Nabila stated:

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To a Muslim, a *jihad* means a struggle of any sort. So wearing a hijab in a say Islamophobic society or country is actually *jihad*. Because you’re doing a battle with your inner self. A lot of people post 9/11 took off their hijabs because they were scared. Some women used to have their scarves pulled off, it happened in buses and things here. Girls got abused. You know. Scarves pulled off and that. But to a Muslim that’s what *jihad* is, trying to battle what others think. So to me, you know, if somebody - because maybe I’m strong like that - if somebody did say something, I do confront them.

Analysis indicates that for Nabila and Farah, negative interpersonal experiences based on wearing hijab are viewed within an Islamic framework. They adaptively cope by making meaning of difficult experiences using the same framework that drives their choice to wear hijab.

To summarise, the women often attributed the blame for negative stereotyping and subsequent hostility from members of the public to the media, and individual’s personal contexts. Further, both positive and negative interpersonal experiences created a sense of responsibility to represent Islam, and this is understandable considering their high visibility as Muslims. However, their visibility was a surface depiction of the women’s faith in God, and they described responding to interpersonal difficulties through this faith.

**DISCUSSION**

Using an IPA framework, analysis of in-depth interviews with six Muslim women provided a snapshot of the experience of wearing hijab in New Zealand. Interviews focussed on whether the women had experienced prejudice and discrimination, how they felt their hijab-wearing is perceived by non-Muslims, and explored the meaning of wearing hijab.

The women’s typically positive experiences are consistent with research suggesting that generally interactions between Muslims and non-Muslims are peaceful (Jasperse et al., 2012; Shaver, Troughton, Sibley, & Bulbuli, 2016), a finding that may be consistent with New Zealand as a generally tolerant and progressive society (Dann, 2015). In contrast with the literature on racist talk in New Zealand, the women’s responses in this research mostly did not reflect experiences of subtle racism (Lyons et al., 2011; Tuffin, 2008).

However, there are factors that could have influenced the women’s choice of whether or not to acknowledge and disclose difficulties, including their sense of gratitude for the political and social freedom to wear hijab, and the ways that they interpreted experiences that might also be considered discriminatory. In addition, a research interview is not a neutral context (Edwards & Potter, 1992). The women will be aware of the negative judgements that are made about Muslim people and about wearing hijab, and they have an interest in presenting themselves and their faith in a positive light. This issue may be particularly salient given the interview’s identity as non-Muslim.

Nonetheless, the positivity of the women’s talk was surprising, given international literature suggesting hijabi women do experience discrimination in Western countries (Ghumman & Ryan, 2013; Hyder et al., 2015). Although this study indicates infrequent subjectively-defined experiences of discrimination, there are clearly challenges: accounts of unprovoked discrimination including verbal insult, indicating New Zealand is not immune to erroneous beliefs about Islam.

The women’s attribution of negative stereotypes to media sources is consistent with often threatening and antagonistic portrayals of Muslims in television, newspaper, cinema, and mainstream news (Rane, Ewart, & Martinkus, 2014). These portrayals allow the connection of the behaviours of extremists to the lives of mainstream Muslims. Further, in terms of the misperception of hijabi women as patriarchally oppressed, many Western media reports highlight oppressive Taliban practices or specific historical movements of veil enforcement (such as Iran in the 1970s) warranting viewers to extend this to *all* hijabi women (Weber, 2012).

Personal accounts of reasons for wearing hijab puncture the stereotype of these women as victims of patriarchal oppression. These women expressed unequivocally that the decision to wear hijab was *personal and voluntary* - a stark contrast between their personal reasons for wearing hijab and the assumption that hijab is enforced by male members of their families. Responses by the hijabi women undoubtedly align with notions of the “third wave”, pluralist form of feminism that does not dictate the terms of female empowerment in Western ways (Al Wazni, 2015). Consistent with responses from the women in this study, Rane, Nathie, Isakhan and Abdalla (2010) reported that Islam and misogynistic attitudes are not positively correlated. Similarly, a study of thousands of Muslims in 35 countries found Islamic religiosity in Muslim men did not correlate positively with the oppression of women (Esposito & Mogahed, 2007).

How participants believe they are seen by others may shape their identity and influence whether they wear hijab or not (Hopkins & Greenwood, 2013). Supporting the idea of a dynamic religious identity, one study found that Muslim women are more likely to wear hijab to affirm their identity in countries in which they are a minority (Wagner, Sen, Permanadeli, & Howarth, 2012). This may be motivated by greater religious commitment in the face of prejudice, or a desire to show greater pride in their beliefs. As this study shows, this requires courage and willingness to stand out in a population where only one percent are Muslim (see also Batuman, 2016). How these women believe they are seen by others influenced their religious identity.

Throughout these interviews, the interaction between intrapersonal and interpersonal experiences is salient. Examples include the women’s sense of obligation to engage in appropriate behaviour while wearing hijab as ambassadors for Islam. Increased attention on the hijab in the West may have shifted the focus for hijabi women from pius behaviour to a more emblematic function. Another example is the articulation of need for education and dialogue, to counter the stereotypical views of hijabi women. Both may be motivated by encountering prejudice or discrimination prompted by misunderstanding, and perhaps a desire to symbolically oppose such prejudice (Wagner et al., 2012). Consistent with this, Identity Process Theory conceptualises that perceived threats to identity are dealt with by modes of social representation (Jaspal & Breakwell, 2014). In many ways, participants’ descriptions suggest they utilise coping mechanisms against threats towards their highly visible religious identity.

Analysis highlighted that the experience of wearing hijab in twenty-first century New Zealand involves contradictions. Much of this relates to the emmeshment of personal religious identity and interpersonal experiences.
affected by both dominant stereotypes and individual understandings of how they are seen by others. The act of wearing hijab has transformed from a peaceful symbol intended to communicate modesty, into what is perceived as threatening political expression involving risk of harm (Ghumman & Ryan, 2013).

Another contradiction is how the women value Western individualism (such as freedom and personal choice) while also espousing what they “should” do as prescribed in the Qur’an. Perhaps they are negotiating the differences between religious prescription and personal choices. On the other hand, perhaps to the hijab-wearer, freedom is the choice to relinquish one’s agency to God. Rather, to them the contradiction may simply be how this is viewed within the confines of individualistic Western thought, particularly considering evidence that many believe that a hijabi woman is coerced into her choice of dress (Abu Bakr, 2014).

While acknowledging these contradictions, this analysis suggests that there are both protective and vulnerability factors associated with wearing hijab in New Zealand. There was mention of the positive psychological effects of wearing hijab, which is likely to be protective in terms of interaction with vulnerability factors (Jasperse et al., 2012). This protective function of hijab makes it increasingly important for Muslim women in Western countries to be supported to maintain this practice. However, doing so renders women vulnerable to risk of stereotyping, discrimination, marginalisation, that are a reflection of the conflation of mainstream Islam with high-profile extremism (Hyder et al., 2015). Experience of discrimination is associated with poor mental health, as well as a wide range of overall indicators of poorer health (Nairn, Pega, McCleanor, Rankine, & Barnes, 2006). It may increase cognitive strength and emotional resilience in the face of difficulty beyond what would be possible without hijab, and provides an important indicator of religious identity. This study contributes to understanding experiences of hijabi women in New Zealand. It is notable that the initial interpersonal reasons to wear hijab were the core from which the women perceived experiences, and dictated how they responded to others. However, their ongoing choice to wear hijab in New Zealand was clearly not a static decision but rather a complex dynamic influenced by external experiences, and in the case of these six women, seemingly strengthened particularly in the face of difficulty.

In relation to understandings of other minority groups in New Zealand, the findings of this study highlight that the experiences of underrepresented and stigmatised groups should be considered alongside their own cultural and religious motivations, political and social context, and their subsequent interpretations of prejudice and discrimination. Without consideration of these aspects, we are left with a deficit, one-dimensional understanding. The risks involved in not taking account of motivations, context, and interpretations of minority group members is perpetuation of covert prejudice and discrimination within a society dominated by New Zealand European culture. This is unacceptable in an increasingly multicultural society, and should inform all psychological practice.

Though the aim of IPA is not to render ‘representative’ or ‘generalisable’ results, this research is somewhat exploratory, and there is opportunity to build upon this work. For example, it would be desirable to understand the experiences of a wider sample of hijabi women (including those who do not have access to the internet and who are not proficient in English). A wider age range would also be valuable as participants were all younger than 50. Additionally, this research does not speak to the experience of Muslim women who choose not to wear hijab. Thirdly, a study on Māori and Pākehā responses to hijab is critical to illustrate where their talk diverges or parallels that of Muslim women, in order to foster better understandings of each other’s experiences. Finally, these findings suggest there are psychological benefits to wearing hijab, and an exploration of how to harness these benefits to support the wellbeing of hijabi women when Islam is under scrutiny, would be valuable. Certainly, the integration of hijab-wearing into New Zealand society in healthy ways is a work in progress. There are multiple avenues for hijabi women to be the focus of future research, and increased understanding will be of benefit to Muslims and enable New Zealand to function as a fair and well-informed country for hijabi women to live in.

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Attitudes to Religion Predict Warmth for Muslims in New Zealand

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Prejudice against Muslims is prevalent in many Western countries. Past research finds that non-Muslim New Zealanders, while generally accepting of all minority groups, nevertheless exhibit relatively lower warmth towards Muslims. Somewhat unexpectedly, previous research in New Zealand has found that high levels of religious identification is associated with greater warmth towards Muslims. However, it is unclear whether a positive orientation to religion, whether or not one is religious, generally predicts warmth toward Muslims. Here, we investigate this question. For comparative purposes we assess warmth to immigrants and Arabs, as well as to Muslims. Our study draws on a large national sample of non-Muslim, non-Arab New Zealand-born residents (N = 17,005) who responded to the 2016 New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study (NZAVS). Our multilevel statistical regression models adjust for a host of demographic variables as well as religious identification and church attendance. Results show that both (1) positive general attitudes towards religion and (2) church attendance are positively correlated with warmth toward immigrants, Arabs, and Muslims. In contrast to past results, religious identification is not reliably associated with warmth toward immigrants, Arabs, or Muslims. Though our data cannot presently establish causation, these preliminary results indicate that acceptance of religion as good in itself might be a powerful source of acceptance for Muslims.

Keywords: Acceptance; Muslim; Prejudice; Religion.

Introduction

Previous research in the United States and Western Europe has identified high levels of prejudice against Muslims (Croucher, 2013; Hutchison & Rosenthal, 2011). New Zealand is not immune to this global trend (Shaver, Troughton, Sibley, & Bulbulia, 2016). Preliminary evidence suggests that media attention to violence in the Middle East may be fueling anti-Muslim prejudice (Shaver et al., 2017). However, the sources of acceptance for Muslims remain unclear. Why do some people express warmth to Muslims whereas others do not? Such a question would appear to be fundamental to enabling Muslims minorities to enjoy the full benefits of living in a liberal and free democracy.

In New Zealand, demographic factors, such as age, education, gender, and socioeconomic deprivation have all been associated with warmth towards Muslims (Shaver et al., 2016; Shaver, Sibley, Osborne, & Bulbulia, 2017). Specifically, those who are younger and/or more educated generally report greater warmth toward Muslims, whereas those who are male and/or socioeconomically deprived report less warmth toward Muslims (Shaver et al., 2017).

Somewhat unexpectedly, Shaver et al. (2016) found that among non-Muslims, strong religious identification and more frequent church attendance are associated with greater warmth toward Muslims. Notably, however, Shaver et al. (2016) found that weakly committed religious people exhibit less tolerance for Muslims than do demographically matched secular people. In this way, religious identification paradoxically appears to be associated with both an increase in acceptance among highly religiously identified non-Muslims and also with lower acceptance among weakly religiously identified non-Muslims. This finding of an ambivalent relationship between religion and prejudice replicates a long tradition of social scientific research (Allport & Ross, 1967; Batson, Schoenrade, & Ventis, 1993; Hunsberger, 2010).

This link between strong religious commitment (religious identification and church attendance) and greater acceptance of Muslims in New Zealand suggests that increasing religious commitment might increase acceptance of Muslims. However, promoting religious identification is clearly impractical. For many religious people, identification with a religious faith is not a quantity that can be externally fostered, it is rather an internal state (Boucher & Kucinskas, 2016). Moreover, many secular people harbor negative attitudes towards religion (DiMaggio, Søtoudeh, Goldberg, & Shepherd, 2018). For these reasons, religious commitment cannot be promoted in the wider, non-religious New Zealand population.

However, other factors relating to religion may prove to be useful in promoting the acceptance of Muslims. A recent study in Australia found that possessing more factual knowledge about Islam is associated with less prejudice against Muslims regardless of demographic factors such as age, gender, education level, political orientation, or religiosity (Mansouri & Vergani, 2018). This finding suggests that fostering a greater knowledge about the religion of Islam itself may lead to greater acceptance of Muslims in New Zealand. Importantly, greater knowledge of a religion is open to both religious and non-religious people. Just as a criminologist can study crime without committing crimes, anyone can understand the facts about a religious faith, whether or not they are themselves religiously committed.

In previous research we found that among religious people, attitudes to religion are strongly associated with dimensions of morality (Bulbulia, Osborne, & Sibley, 2013). Here, we focus on general attitudes toward religion as good might be possible source of
acceptance for Muslims, which holds among religious and non-religious people alike. We draw on a large national sample of religious and non-religiously identified non-Muslim New Zealanders who responded to the 2016 New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study (NZAVS) questionnaire (N = 17,005). We expected that greater general acceptance of religion would be associated with greater warmth towards Muslims, however we do not set out to test a specific theory about strength of this association. Rather, the purpose of the study is to quantify the degree to which attitudes to religion among non-Muslim New Zealanders would predict attitudes to Muslims.

**METHOD**

**Sampling Procedure**

The New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study (NZAVS) is reviewed every three years by the University of Auckland Human Participants Ethics Committee. Our most recent ethics approval statement is as follows: The New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study was approved by The University of Auckland Human Participants Ethics Committee on 03-June-2015 until 03-June-2018, and renewed on 05-September-2017 until 03-June-2021. Reference Number: 014889. Our previous ethics approval statement for the 2009-2015 period is: The New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study was approved by The University of Auckland Human Participants Ethics Committee on 09-September-2009 until 09-September-2012, and renewed on 17-February-2012 until 09-September-2015. Reference Number: 6171. All participants granted informed written consent and The University of Auckland Human Participants Ethics Committee approved all procedures.

The NZAVS is an annual, longitudinal national probability sample of registered New Zealand voters, which was started in 2009. We analyzed data from participants who completed the Time 8 wave of the NZAVS. The Time 8 (2016) wave of the NZAVS contained responses from 21,936 participants (13,779 retained from one or more previous waves and 8,158 new additions from booster sampling and/or unmatched participants or unsolicited opt-ins). The sample retained 3,347 participants from the initial Time 1 (2009) NZAVS of 6,518 participants (a retention rate of 51.35% over seven years), and 11,933 participants from the full Time 7 (2015) sample (a retention rate of 85.59% from the previous year). Participants who provided an email address were also emailed and invited to complete an online version if they preferred. We offered a prize draw for participation, non-respondents were emailed and phoned multiple times, and all participants were mailed a Season’s Greetings card from the NZAVS research team and informed that they had been automatically entered into a bonus seasonal grocery voucher prize draw. We also mailed our yearly pamphlet summarizing key research findings published during the current wave of the study.

**Participants**

The Time 8 (2016) wave of the NZAVS included 21,936 respondents. Of these participants, 53 self-identified as Muslim, 63 as Middle Eastern, and 4,467 as immigrants (i.e. not born in New Zealand). Because we were interested in out-group determinants of acceptance toward Muslims, Arabs, and immigrants, only New Zealand-born non-Muslim participants were included in the analysis. Though not all people of Middle Eastern ancestry identify as Arab (for example Iranians may identify as Persian, and Israelis may identify as Jewish) we excluded those participants who identified as Middle Eastern to avoid unintentionally modeling attitudes among people who identify as Arab. Immigrants were unable to be excluded as questions pertaining to nation of birth were unavailable in Time 8. This resulted in a sample of N = 17,005 participants.

**Measures**

**Acceptance Measure Warmth.**

Affective thermometer ratings were used to assess acceptance of Muslims, Arabs, and immigrants by asking participants to indicate the “warmth” they feel toward Muslims, Arabs, and immigrants on a scale ranging from 1 (least warm) to 7 (most warm), with 4 (neutral) as the midpoint (Muslims: M = 3.91, SD = 1.52; Arabs: M = 3.89, SD = 1.47; Immigrants: M = 4.45, SD = 1.26).

**Theoretical Measures Religious Identification.**

To assess religious identification, we asked people: “Do you identify with a religion and/or spiritual group?” (yes or no). For those who identified with a religion, we asked participants to rate (1 = not important; 7 = very important) “how important is your religion to how you see yourself?” Those individuals who indicated that they did not belong to a religion were coded as a 0 (N = 10,671) on this scale (M = 1.71; SD = 2.56).

**Attitudes Toward Religion.**

To assess attitudes toward religion, we asked people to rate their agreement (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly disagree) with three questions: (1) “I oppose religion in any form” (reverse scored); (2) “All things considered, religion is a force for good in the world”; and (3) “The teachings of traditional religions are still helpful today” (Gibson & Barnes, 2013). Responses to these three questions were averaged (M = 4.29; SD = 1.49).

**Church Attendance.**

Church attendance was assessed by asking participants how many times they attended church or a house of worship in the past month (M = 0.71, SD = 2.83). Those who did not report a religious affiliation were assigned a response of zero. Because church attendance rates varied considerably, we obtained a linear transformation of church attendance using the natural logarithm to yield a log scaled church attendance indicator.

**Age.**

The mean age of the sample was 49.57 (SD = 14.03).

**Education.**

Education level was measured using an 11-point rating developed by the New Zealand government known as the New Zealand Qualification Framework (NZQF; 0 = no qualification, 10 = doctoral degree). The mean education level of the sample was 5.09 (SD = 2.73).

**Employment.**

Employment status was assessed by asking participants if they were currently working, “yes” was coded as “1” (n = 13,322) and “no” was coded as “0” (n = 3,665).

**Gender.**

The sample included 6,205 males (coded as 1) and 10,765 females (coded as 0).

**Ethnic Categories.**

Ethnicity was assessed using four basic categories: (1) New Zealand European/Pakeha (n = 13,863), (2) Maori (n = 2,398), (3) Pacific Islander (n = 315), and (4) Asian (n = 206). Middle Easterners were removed from the sample. All respondents were born in New Zealand. There were 223 missing values.

**Relationship Status.**

Participants were asked if they were in a relationship, “yes” was coded as “1” (n =
We measured the socio-economic status of participants’ immediate (small area) neighborhood using the 2013 New Zealand Deprivation Index (Atkinson, J., Salmond, C., & Crampton, P., 2014). New Zealand is unusual in having rich census information about each area unit/neighborhood of the country that is made available for research purposes. The smallest of these area units are meshblocks. The NZAVS includes the meshblock code for each participant. The geographic size of these meshblock units differs depending on population density. Each unit tends to cover a region containing a median of roughly 81 residents ($M = 95.95, SD = 73.49, range = 0 – 1899$). In 2013 there were a total of 44,211 meshblocks for which data was available. The New Zealand census defines a meshblock as “a defined geographic area, varying in size from part of a city block to large areas of rural land. Each meshblock abuts against another to form a network covering all of New Zealand including coasts and inlets, and extending out to the two hundred mile economic zone. Meshblocks are added together to ‘build up’ larger geographic areas such as area units and urban areas.”

The New Zealand Deprivation Index uses aggregate census information about the residents of each meshblock to assign a decile-rank index from 1 (most affluent) to 10 (most impoverished) to each meshblock unit. Because it is a decile-ranked index, the 10% of meshblocks that are most affluent are given a score of 1, the next 10% a score of 2, and so on. The index is based on a Principal Components Analysis of the following nine variables (in weighted order): proportion of adults who received a means-tested benefit, household income, proportion not owning own home, proportion single-parent families, proportion unemployed, proportion lacking qualifications, proportion household crowding, proportion no telephone access, and proportion no car access.

The New Zealand Deprivation Index thus reflects the average level of deprivation for small neighborhood-type units (or small community areas of about 80–90 people each) across the entire country. The index is a well-validated index of the level of deprivation of small area units, and has been widely used in health and social policy research examining numerous health outcomes, including mortality, rates of hospitalization, smoking, cot death, and access to health care, to name just a few examples ((Hura) & Health Utilisation Research Alliance (HURA), 2006); (Mitchell, Stewart, Crampton, & Salmond, 2000); (C. Salmond & Crampton, 2000); (Crampton, Salmond, Woodward, & Reid, 2000). The index is also widely used in service planning by government and local council, and is a key indicator used to identify high needs areas and allocate resources such as health funding (C. E. Salmond & Crampton, 2012; White, Gunston, Salmond, & Atkinson, 2008). Our sample had a mean deprivation index of 4.74 (SD = 2.76).

**Urban/Rural.**

People were coded as either residing in an urban “1” ($n = 10,537$) or rural “0” ($n = 6,302$) area based on New Zealand census data.

**Statistical Analyses**

Statistical analysis was performed using R version 3.5.2 (2018-12-20) on an Apple Macbook Pro Platform: x86_64-apple-darwin15.6.0 (64-bit), running under: OS X 10.11.4 (El Capitan). Linear Mixed-Effect Models were generated using the lme4 (Douglas Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) package in R. In addition to lme4, we used the following R packages: Amelia (Honaker, King, & Blackwell, 2011a), coeftest2 (Lander, 2018), dplyr (H. Wickham, François, Henry, & Müller, 2018), ggplot2 (Hadley Wickham, 2009), gridExtra (Augie, 2017), merTools (Knowles and Frederick, 2018), and their dependencies (Gelman & Su, 2018), datasets (R Core Team, 2018), graphics (R Core Team, 2018), grDevices (R Core Team, 2018), MASS (Venables & Ripley, 2002), Matrix (D. Bates & Maechler, 2018), methods (R Core Team, 2018), Rcpp (Eddelbuettel & Balamuta, n.d.), stats (R Core Team, 2018), and utils (R Core Team, 2018).

**Imputation.**

Missing data frequencies were relatively low across responses to most variables, with missingness typically observed at less than 4.00% of the sample (Tables 1 and 2). Political conservatism was an exception, with 4.07% missing responses. To account for this missingness, we performed multiple imputation. Performing multiple imputation of missing data allows for existing information to be preserved and for the effects of response biases to be reduced, as the causes of missingness may be predicted from other observed variables (Honaker & King, 2010). We
assumed a missingness at random model (i.e. missingness conditional on the model covariates). We caution that our multiple imputation cannot adjust for biases arising from factors that are not included in the imputation model (Blackwell, Honaker, & King, 2017; Honaker, King, & Blackwell, 2011b).

Missing data were multiply imputed using the Amelia package (Honaker et al., 2011a) in R (R Core Team, 2018). For data imputation, nominal responses (factors): Ethnic Categories, Male Gender, Employment Status, Partner Status, and Urban Location. “Denominations” (a random effect) and “Warmth to Arabs”, “Warmth to Immigrants,” “Warmth to Muslims” (response variables) were not imputed. The remaining missing variables were assumed to be continuous real numbers.

Following Amelia package recommendations, where low frequencies of missing responses are observed, we imputed five missing datasets.

Data centering/scaling.
To facilitate interpretation of our data we transformed several variables in Amelia. Age, education, political conservatism, deprivation, religious identification, attitudes toward religion, social dominance orientation, and right-wing authoritarianism were centered at their respective means and standardized. Additionally, age was converted to 10-year units. Church attendance varied considerably and was therefore put into a log scale using a natural logarithm linear transformation. Finally, To adjust for multi-level dependencies, we modeled denominational intercepts as random-effects, following the method in (Shaver et al., 2016).

Mixed effects regression models.
Fixed effects tables and coefficient plots were generated using the lme4 and merTools packages in R. The merTools package allows for a multilevel model to be applied to a list of dataframes, such as those produced by the Amelia command in the Amelia package in R. Fixed effects and confidence intervals can be analyzed using the modelFixedEff command, as the 95% confidence interval is two standard deviations away from the estimate. These outputs are included in both table (Table 3) and graphical (Figure 1) forms.

RESULTS
The results of linear mixed-effect models predicting warmth toward immigrants, Arabs and Muslims are presented in Figures 1 - 3 and Table 3.

Theoretical Variables
Among the theoretical variables there were two general trends worthy of note. (1) Church attendance was positively correlated with greater reported warmth towards immigrants (95% CI: 0.08, 0.17), Arabs (95% CI: 0.09, 0.20), and Muslims (95% CI: 0.06, 0.16). These trends show that church attendance is positively associated with greater warmth for each group. (2) Positive attitudes toward religion was positively associated with greater reported warmth towards immigrants (95% CI: 0.16, 0.21), Arabs (95% CI: 0.18, 0.23), and Muslims (95% CI: 0.23, 0.29). These trends show that positive attitudes toward religion are positively associated with greater warmth for each group. Religious identification was not associated with warmth toward any group. However, when the attitudes towards religion variable was removed, religious identification showed a positive correlation with warmth toward Muslims (95% CI: 0.02, 0.09).

Demographic and ideological Indicators
Among demographic indicators there were numerous predictors of warmth and lack thereof toward immigrants, Arabs, and Muslims.

Age.
Each year of age was associated with more warmth toward immigrants (95% CI: 0.005, 0.033), but less warmth toward Arabs (95% CI: -0.06, -0.03) and Muslims (95% CI: -0.07, -0.03).

Education.
Educated people were warmer toward immigrants (95% CI: 0.04, 0.08), Arabs (95% CI: 0.05, 0.09), and Muslims (95% CI: 0.06 0.11).

Employment.
Employment was associated with more warmth toward Muslims (95% CI: 0.01, 0.12) and Arabs (95% CI: 0.002, 0.110), but not toward immigrants.

Gender.
Men reported less warmth toward Muslims (95% CI: -0.15, -0.06), but not towards immigrants or Arabs.

Political Conservatism.
Political conservatism (standardized) was associated with less warmth toward immigrants (95% CI: -0.06, -0.01), Arabs (95% CI: -0.13, -0.08), and Muslims (95% CI: -0.15, -0.10). Moreover, conservatism is associated with less warmth toward both Arabs and Muslims than immigrants.

RWA.
Right-wing authoritarianism was associated with less warmth toward immigrants (95% CI: -0.19, -0.13), Arabs (95% CI: -0.22, -0.15) and Muslims (95% CI: -0.27, -0.20).

SDO.
Social dominance orientation was associated with less warmth toward immigrants (95% CI: -0.33, -0.29), Arabs (95% CI: -0.38, -0.34) and Muslims (95% CI: -0.41, -0.36).

Ethnic Categories.
European identification was set as the standard of comparison for other ethnic categories. Comparatively, Maori identification was associated with lower warmth towards immigrants (95% CI: -0.13, -0.02) than European identification, but had no association with warmth towards either Arabs or Muslims. Pacific Islander identification was associated with greater warmth towards immigrants (95% CI: 0.08, 0.35), Arabs (95% CI: 0.16, 0.47), and Muslims (95% CI: 0.19, 0.51) than European identification. Asian identification was not statistically significantly associated with warmth towards immigrants, Arabs, or Muslims.

Relationship Status.
Individuals in a relationship tended to express more warmth toward immigrants (95% CI: 0.01, 0.10), but not towards Arabs or Muslims.

Deprivation.
Greater deprivation (standardized) predicted less warmth toward immigrants (95% CI: -0.06, -0.02), but indicated no association between deprivation and warmth toward Arabs or Muslims.

Urban.
People living in urban areas reported more warmth toward immigrants (95% CI: 0.01, 0.09), but no association was found with warmth for Arabs or Muslims.
**Table 1.** Interval/Ordinal Variables used in Analysis. Numerous variables have been centered and scaled (C/S), age has been put into units of 10 years, and church attendance has been put into logarithmic scale.

<table>
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<tr>
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<td>3.53</td>
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<td>Warmth toward Arabs</td>
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<td>3.86</td>
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<tr>
<td>Warmth toward Muslims</td>
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<td>601</td>
<td>3.53</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age (10 Years, C/S)</td>
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<td>14.03</td>
<td>18 – 97</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education (C/S)</td>
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<td>2.73</td>
<td>1 – 10</td>
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<td>Political Conservatism (C/S)</td>
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<td>1 – 7</td>
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<td>4.07</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1 – 7</td>
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<td>Deprivation (C/S)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Church Attendance (Log)</td>
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<td>0.09</td>
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<td>Attitudes Toward Religion (C/S)</td>
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<td>1.49</td>
<td>1 – 7</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>0.54</td>
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**Figure 1.** Warmth Towards Immigrants (Intercept = 4.33), Arabs (Intercept = 3.73), and Muslims (Intercept = 3.79). The overall warmth for immigrants is 0.60 higher than for Arabs and 0.54 higher than for Muslims.
Table 2. Dichotomous Variables Used in Analysis

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<td>European Descent</td>
<td>0.83</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maori Descent</td>
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<td>Pacific Island Descent</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>In a Relationship</td>
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<tr>
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Table 3. Warmth Confidence Intervals

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<th>Warmth Toward Muslims</th>
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<td>95% Upper Bound</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.03</td>
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<td>Male</td>
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<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<td>0.10</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maori</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Islander</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.08</td>
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<td>Asian</td>
<td>0.07</td>
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<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deproteination</td>
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<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.02</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Orientation</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
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<tr>
<td>Right Wing Authoritarianism</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
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<td>Social Dominance Orientation</td>
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<td>-0.33</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Identification</td>
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<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
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<td>Church Attendance</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attitudes Toward Religion</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.16</td>
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DISCUSSION

Across the Western world, Muslim minorities experience prejudice and discrimination. The purpose of this study was to identify new potential sources of promoting acceptance of Muslims in New Zealand. Through our analysis, we replicated previous research showing that warmth ratings are lower for Muslims compared with other minority groups, such as immigrants. After adjusting for demographic factors, as well as religious identification and church attendance, the expected level of warmth towards Muslims is on average 3.79 on a 1-7 scale. This expected mean is similar to that of Arabs (3.73). This may be in part due to a conflation of Muslims and Arabs. Warmth toward both Muslims and Arabs was below that of immigrants (4.33). As with previous research, people in New Zealand exhibit greater warmth to Immigrants than to Muslims and Arabs. Additionally, females, younger New Zealanders, and better educated New Zealanders report greater warmth toward immigrants, Arabs, and Muslims.

Focusing on our theoretical interest in religion, first, we find that a positive attitude to religion is strongly associated with increased warmth toward Muslims, immigrants, and Arabs. Put another way, viewing religion as good is strongly linked with viewing Muslims in a more favorable light.

Notably, we find that including positive attitudes to religion in our statistical model, removes the association between high religious identification and warmth towards Muslims. This finding is in contrast to the results of Shaver et al. (2016), in which religious identification was observed to predict warmth toward Muslims. Instead of religious identification with a single faith, it is possible that an overall appreciation for religion as a good in life drives the Muslim acceptance among highly religious identified people in New Zealand.
These findings may hold practical importance. They imply that providing accurate information to the public about the positive role of religion in the world may increase acceptance of Muslims. Speculating, it is possible that education about religion may result in increased warmth for other minority groups as well (such as immigrants and Arabs). Likewise, increased church attendance was positively associated with warmth toward Immigrants, Arabs, and Muslims. This suggests that a general appreciation of religion and active participation with a religious community may promote especially powerful acceptance for minority groups among those in New Zealand who practice their faith.

Limitations

Our study is limited in a number of ways. First, there may have been confusion about the meaning of the questions. For example, participants may feel warmth toward Muslims in New Zealand, but not toward Muslims in the Middle East. Moreover, there may have been confusion about Muslims as a group versus Muslims as individuals, as participants may have distinguished between the Muslims and/or Arabs with which they are friends and Muslims and/or Arabs in general. Third, systematic presentation bias may be present. For example, younger, better educated, and more religious people might report higher warmth in order to adhere to perceived societal norms of acceptance, while still privately harboring low levels of warmth. Similar worries might be expressed for positive attitudes to religion as an artifact of social desirability. Against these worries, however, if the study is tracking a norm for inclusion, rather than individual attitudes, attention to a norm for inclusion is arguably an important step towards realizing inclusion. To see this, imagine the effect of norms for exclusion. A deeper worry is that our measures are are unable to clarify the connection between reported warmth and prejudicial behavior. For example, individuals might exhibit lower warmth toward Muslims but still promote fair hiring practices for Muslims. Similarly, those who report greater warmth could engage in more discriminatory practices against Muslims.

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References

Attitudes towards religion predict warmth towards Muslims in New Zealand

International Association for the Psychology of Religion, Lausanne, Switzerland.


### S1 Table 1. Warmth Toward Muslims, Arabs, and immigrants in pairwise deleted dataset

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictors</th>
<th>Warmth Toward Muslims</th>
<th></th>
<th>Warmth Toward Arabs</th>
<th></th>
<th>Warmth Toward Immigrants</th>
<th></th>
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<td>CI</td>
<td>p</td>
<td>Estimates</td>
<td>CI</td>
<td>p</td>
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<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>3.75 – 3.89</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>3.69 – 3.84</td>
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<td>Age (10 Years, C/S)</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.10 – -0.05</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.09 – -0.04</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.17 – -0.07</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>-0.05 – -0.05</td>
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<td>Education (C/S)</td>
<td>0.08</td>
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<td>Religious Identification (C/S)</td>
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<td>-0.10 – -0.03</td>
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<td>-0.08 – -0.01</td>
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<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.11 – 0.22</td>
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New Zealand Journal of Psychology Vol. 48, No. 1 April 2019
**S2 Figure 1.** Warmth Toward Immigrants, Arabs, and Muslims in pairwise deleted dataset. Numerical variables have been centered and scaled (C/S), age has been put into units of 10 years, and church attendance has been put into the logarithmic scale.

**S3 Figure 2.** Predicted Probability of Warmth Toward Immigrants by Attitudes Toward Religion in pairwise deleted dataset when other variables in the regression model are set to zero (recall numerical indicator were centred and scaled). The attitudes to religion co-variate on the x-axis is graphed in standard deviation units.
S4 Figure 3. Predicted Probability of Warmth Toward Arabs by Attitudes Toward Religion in pairwise deleted dataset when other variables in the regression model are set to zero (recall numerical indicator were centred and scaled). The attitudes to religion co-variate on the x-axis is graphed in standard deviation units.

S5 Figure 4. Predicted Probability of Warmth Toward Muslims by Attitudes Toward Religion in pairwise deleted dataset when other variables in the regression model are set to zero (recall numerical indicator were centred and scaled).
A community-based test of the Dual Process Model of Intergroup Relations: Predicting attitudes towards Christians, Muslims, Hindus, Jews, and Atheists

Marc Stewart Wilson
Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand

Research in New Zealand and elsewhere has shown that attitudes towards Muslims has been generally negative. Antipathy towards a variety of outgroups has previously been shown to be predicted by a combination of competitive/dangerous worldview and social dominant and authoritarian attitudes in Duckitt’s (2001) dual-process cognitive-motivational model of ideology and prejudice. In this research, approximately one thousand New Zealanders completed measures of these variables, and their attitudes towards a range of groups: including Atheists, Christians, Hindus, Jews, and Muslims. Muslims were evaluated most negatively of the religion-based groups, and this was predicted by both the social dominance and authoritarianism ‘routes’ described in the dual-process model. This suggests that Muslims are seen as threatening both hierarchical and traditional social relationships.

Keywords: Social dominance orientation (SDO); Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA); Islamophobia.

Introduction

Trying to understand prejudicial attitudes, and discriminatory acts and systems, is something of the bread and butter of social psychology, and a fair chunk of other social science besides (see Allport, 1954; Duckitt, 1992; Sibley & Barlow, 2016, for reviews). The events of March 15th have been popularly characterised, by some, as an extreme manifestation of more ‘everyday’ prejudices and, therefore, it falls to those who’ve dedicated careers to understanding prejudice (and discrimination) to step up and address this position.

In the West, Muslims are not viewed particularly positively. Islamophobia, and anti-Muslim attitudes, appear to be particularly pronounced post-9/11 (Atom, 2014). Velasco Gonzalez, Verkuyten, Weesie and Poppe (2010) reported that half of more than 1,000 Dutch adolescents held negative attitudes towards Muslims (see also Clements, 2012). At the same time, two-thirds of a Swedish sample reported negative attitudes in 1990 (Hvitfelt, 1991, cited in Bevelander & Otterbeck, 2010), a decade before 9/11. Since 9/11, however, threat perceptions appear to be particularly important as predictors of anti-Muslim sentiment (e.g., Wike & Grim, 2010). Anti-Muslim attitudes may be most pronounced among ‘white’ majority group members (e.g., Hewstone & Schmid, 2014) and cross-cultural studies have suggested that Muslims may be viewed no more negatively than immigrants in general (e.g., Strabac, Aalberg, & Valenta, 2014).

In New Zealand? While surveys have asked about New Zealanders’ attitudes towards Muslims, there have been few academic studies. Shortly after 9/11, the New Zealand Election Study survey indicated that just over one in twenty New Zealanders favoured unrestricted immigration from Muslim countries while almost a quarter favoured a complete ban (NZES, 2002). More recently, research has suggested New Zealanders are, at best, ambivalent towards Muslims (Centre for Applied Cross-Cultural Research, 2011).

The problem of explaining prejudice has gone through a variety of phases, including a focus on psychoanalytic foundations in the 1930s and 1940s, personality in the 1950s, social structures in the 1960s, and cognitive process in the 1970s and 1980s (see Sibley & Barlow, 2016). I shall focus here on individual difference perspectives that hark back to the seminal work of Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford (1950), and synthesised by Duckitt (2001; Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum, 2002) into a powerful explanatory framework that is as close to a Grand Theory of prejudice as individual difference researchers have ever had.

While Adorno et al’s (1950) claims that people do unpleasant things because they have unpleasant (specifically authoritarian) personalities has had, and still has, intuitive appeal, it fell from favour in the 1960s for various credible reasons (see Altemeyer, 1981, for a review of these concerns). Thirty years later their notion of an authoritarian personality was resurrected by Altemeyer in the guise of Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA), trimmed of its more esoteric content and without the Freudian trappings (Altemeyer, 1981; 1996). In the mid-1990s, RWA was joined in the pantheon of prejudice-related individual difference constructs by Social Dominance Orientation (Sidanius, Pratto, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), central to tests of Social Dominance Theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) have been introduced already in this volume (see Azeem, Hunter & Ruffman, 2019; Du, Buchanan, Hayhurst & Ruffman, 2019; Osborne, Satherley, Yogeeswaran, Hawi & Sibley, 2019). Briefly, SDO reflects the extent to which individuals endorse hierarchical relationships between groups, with higher-status groups perching above those of increasingly lower status (and
perceived value: Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). RWA, on the other hand, has been conceptualized for almost 40 years as the combination of submission to authority, endorsement of aggression by authorities against transgressors, and a conventional and traditional view of how the world should be (Altemeyer, 1981; 1996). Both RWA and SDO have been shown to uniquely, and additively, predict prejudice (McFarland & Adelson, 1996; Sibley, Robertson & Wilson, 2006). Following the synthesis initially proposed by McFarland and Adelson (1996), Duckitt (2001) proposed a Dual Process Motivational Model of prejudice, in which RWA and SDO are the pointy end of two paths from childhood socialization (specifically punitive versus unfair affectionate parenting) through development of personality (specifically conforming versus tough-minded) informing individual’s worldviews (specifically that the world is a dangerous, or competitive place), and that ultimately manifest in outgroup derogation and ingroup favouritism. The combination of SDO and RWA, including in the context of the DPM, has subsequently been shown to effectively predict attitudes to a numerous ‘outgroups’ including those based on race, sexuality, and dietary preference (e.g., Cantal et al., 2015; Levin, Pratto, Matthews, Sidanius & Kitely, 2013; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008; Judge & Wilson, 2019; Whitley & Ægisdóttir, 2000). Indeed, RWA and SDO combine to explain as much as half of the variation in prejudice towards race-based outgroups (McFarland & Adelson, 1996; Altemeyer, 1998).

Indeed, the idea that prejudices travel together, such that holding one prejudice tends to be associated with others (identified as generalized prejudice; see Bergh & Akrami, 2016, for a review), has been integrated into the DPM. For example, Asbrook, Sibley and Duckitt (2010) showed that attitudes towards a variety of attitude targets may be broken down into three families of dangerous (e.g., criminals, drunk drivers, those who behave ‘immorally’), derogated (e.g., psychiatric patients, obese people, ‘physically unattractive people’) and dissident (e.g., feminists, activists, and atheists), and that these are differentially predicted by the RWA/SDO arms of the DPM. Specifically, SDO longitudinally predicts prejudice towards derogated groups, RWA predicts prejudice toward dangerous groups, and both predict prejudice towards dissident groups, presumably because dissident groups may threaten both security and hierarchy (see also Cantal et al., 2015).

Given that RWA and RWA robustly predict prejudice, we should expect that they do so for specifically anti-Muslim prejudice and policy initiatives. This is generally the case. For example, Choma, Jagayat, Hodson, & Turner (2018) reported moderate negative correlations between SDO and RWA, and attitudes towards Muslims (see also Rowatt, Franklin & Cotton, 2005; Uenal, 2016). Dunwoody and McFarland (2018) have shown that, following the 2015 Paris Terrorist attacks (perpetrated by Islamic extremists), RWA correlated .72 and .65 with perceptions of Muslim threat and support for extreme anti-Muslim policies, while SDO correlated .48 and .40. Beck and Plant (2018) reported that whether or not white non-Muslims were more likely to administer an unpleasant stimulus (hot sauce) to a target identified as Muslim was moderated by RWA. Crowson (2009) found that the SDO arm of the DPM predicted support for restricting human rights following the events of 9/11, RWA was both a stronger predictor of human rights restrictions and military aggression against Iraq. However, SDO-dominance predicts support for torture of Muslim extremists, while RWA may not (Lindén, Björklund, & Bäckström, 2018).

Thomsen, Green and Sidanius (2008) argued, and showed, that authoritarians may be most aggressive towards immigrant groups who don’t assimilate into their new culture of residence (as a rejection of conformity), while social dominants are particularly aggressive towards that do (seen as violation of the dominant social hierarchy). Consistent with this, Perry and Sibley (2013) show that attitudes towards immigration policy are predicted by both arms of the DPM, arguing that immigration represents threats to both symbolic and realistic cultural resources. Indeed, Matthews and Levin (2012) applied the DPM to perceptions of threat from Muslims, reporting that economic threat perceptions were mediated by SDO, and symbolic threat perceptions mediated through RWA.

The aim of this research, then, is to investigate the utility of SDO and RWA, in a limited test of the Dual Process Model (including worldviews, but not personality or childhood experience), in predicting attitudes towards religion-defined groups: Muslims, Hindus, Jews, Christians and Atheists.

**METHOD**

**PARTICIPANTS**

Participants were respondents to an online survey. 5.744 people responded to the survey, of whom 1.025 completed the set of questions relating to groups. 62% were female, 87% explicitly identified as European and 6% as Maori (indigenous New Zealanders), and the mean sample age was 49.74 years (SD=13.34). 359 (35%) responded to the question “If you do have a spiritual ‘faith’, which of the following describes what you believe” by selecting Christianity, 2 people selected Hinduism, 5 people selected Judaism, 90 selected Buddhism or ‘something else’, with 56% indicating that they did not have a particular faith.

**MEASURES**

The survey included a range of measures relating to attitudes to topical social issues, and constructs related to socio-political attitude. The summary below describes only those of interest in the present study.

All participants completed measures of SDO, RWA and Competitive worldviews. SDO was assessed using a reliable (α=.77) balanced set of six items previously used in the NZAVS (see Milfont et al., 2013), and RWA was based on the mean of responses to a reliable (α=.71) balanced set of six items from Altemeyer’s (1996) Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale representing the two highest loading pro- and con-trait items on each of three Authoritarianism factors identified by Mavor, Louis and Sibley (2010). Dangerous Worldview (“Despite what one hears about ’crime in the street,’ there probably isn’t any more now than there ever has been” and “There are many dangerous people in our society who will attack someone out of pure meanness, for no reason at all”) and Competitive Worldview (“It’s a dog-eat-dog world where you have to be ruthless at times” and “Life is not governed by the ’survival of the fittest.’ We should let compassion and moral laws be our guide”) were each assessed using a balanced pair of items drawn from Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, and Birnm’s (2002) and previously adopted by other researchers in the New Zealand context (e.g., Perry & Sibley, 2013).

Attitudes towards groups were solicited by asking participants to respond to 18 target group labels using a 1 (‘Strongly negative’) to 7 (‘Strongly positive’) scale. The groups pertinent to this research were “Christians”, “Muslims”, “Hindus”, “Jews” and “Atheists”, but also included
“Politicians”, “Lawyers”, “Goths”, “Pākehā”, “Maori” and “The Police” among others. The group attitudes section of the survey was one of five randomly presented to each participant along with the main body of measures completed by all.

PROCEDURE
Participation in the online survey (delivered via SurveyMonkey) was solicited through the Sunday Star Times, a national New Zealand newspaper, as an investigation of New Zealanders’ political and social attitudes. The ‘Brainscan’ survey was open for a two-week period, after which the data were collated and summarised for serialisation in the newspaper. Results were summarised and serialised through the Sunday Star Times. Ethical approval was granted by the School of Psychology Human Ethics Committee. Finally, parts of this data set have been previously published in Milfont et al., (2013), Judge and Wilson (2019), and Ruffman et al., (2016).

RESULTS
Table 1 shows means, SDs, and intercorrelations between DPM and religion variables for total sample.

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<td>3. RWA</td>
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<td>6. Muslims</td>
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<td>7. Hindus</td>
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<td>.61**</td>
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<td>8. Jews</td>
<td>-.15**</td>
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<td>-.16**</td>
<td>.41**</td>
<td>.43**</td>
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<td>9. Atheists</td>
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N’s between 1019 and 2015; +=p<.10, *=p<.05, **=p<.001
Figure 1. Composite of five path models predicting attitudes towards Atheists, Muslims, Hindus, Christians and Jews. (All paths shown are significant at p<.05; dotted and dashed lines from different variables for clarity)

Table 2. Means, SDs, and intercorrelations between DPM and religion variables for non-religious (below the diagonal) and Christian (above the diagonal) subsamples.

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<td>b.26**</td>
<td>h.06</td>
<td>i.-01</td>
<td>j.-17**</td>
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<td>3. RWA</td>
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<td>g.42**</td>
<td></td>
<td>i.33**</td>
<td>k.19**</td>
<td>l.-30**</td>
<td>m.-29**</td>
<td>n.-10+</td>
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<td>4. SDO</td>
<td>c.-50**</td>
<td>h.29**</td>
<td>i.49**</td>
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<td>j.17**</td>
<td>k.-29**</td>
<td>l.-30**</td>
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<td>n.-11*</td>
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<td>5. Christians</td>
<td>-11*</td>
<td>-01</td>
<td>-12**</td>
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<td>j.11*</td>
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<td>6. Muslims</td>
<td>a.-24**</td>
<td>-20**</td>
<td>-25**</td>
<td>-32**</td>
<td>k.44**</td>
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<td>m.35**</td>
<td>n.38**</td>
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<td>7. Hindus</td>
<td>-20**</td>
<td>-10*</td>
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<td>l.66**</td>
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<td>8. Jews</td>
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<td>9. Atheists</td>
<td>b.-13*</td>
<td>-11*</td>
<td>-31**</td>
<td>-16**</td>
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<td>j.17**</td>
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Non-Faith subsample N’s between 564 and 569; Christian subsample N’s between 356 and 359

+=p<.10, *=p<.05, **=p<.005; correlations sharing superscripts significantly different at least at p<.05

Table 2 shows the correlations between DPM variables and group attitudes for the non-faith and Christian subsamples. I compared the strength of correlations between SDO and attitudes towards Christians which was stronger among non-religious participants by calculating Fischer’s Z (Christians). Among Christians, Competitive Worldview was uncorrelated with RWA and the same was true for Dangerous Worldview and SDO (Z’s=-4.59 and -3.51, p’s<.001). Correlations were all significantly stronger in the non-religious sample, while correlations between SDO and group attitudes were essentially unchanged (excepting that the correlation between SDO and attitudes towards Christians which was stronger among non-religious participants by calculating Fischer’s Z). Inclusion of faith (Christian versus no faith) as a variable in the path models (allowing paths to worldviews, RWA and SDO, and religion group attitude variables) showed that being Christian was a significant predictor of lower Competitive Worldview, but higher Dangerous Worldview, RWA, but not SDO (p=.07) scores. Inclusion also resulted in poorer model fit for all targets, did not explain additional variance in attitudes towards Muslims, Hindus, or Jews, and did not generally change the...
general pattern of results identified in Figures 1a to 1e. Exceptions were the models for Christians (where being Christian was a strong direct positive predictor of, and explaining an additional 14% of variance in, attitudes towards Christians) and Atheists (where being Christian was a strong direct negative predictor of, and explaining an additional 8% of variance in, attitudes towards Christians).

DISCUSSION

In the total sample, though not as negative as attitudes towards some (non-religious) target groups, attitudes towards Muslims were significantly more negative than the other (religious) group targets and, as the mean score was below the scale midpoint, also negative in absolute terms (consistent with Highland, Troughton, Shaver, Barrett, Sibley, & Bulbulia, 2019, this issue). With the exception of attitudes towards Christians, both SDO and RWA were associated with more negative attitudes to all religion groups. Christians, however, showed an unusual bifurcation in the relationship between SDO and RWA, and attitudes in both bivariate correlation and DPM path models. That is to say, SDO was not correlated with attitudes to Christians and associated with more negative attitudes to Christians in the DPM analyses, while RWA was associated with more positive attitudes towards Christians in both sets of analyses. Generally speaking, where SDO and RWA are both significant predictors of group attitudes in path analyses they both predict more negative attitudes (e.g., Sibley & Duckitt, 2007; Cantal, Milfont, Wilson, & Gouveia, 2015). Path analyses suggested that the SDO arm of the DPM is, on average, a more important predictor of attitudes towards Muslims, Hindus and Jews, compared to the RWA arm. Indeed, Dangerous Worldviews and RWA were stronger predictors only of attitudes towards Christians and Atheists, and statistically unrelated to attitudes towards Jews.

Given the theoretical foundations of the DPM, and the body of research that has distinguished the relative roles of RWA and SDO in prejudice towards different groups, it appears that these religion groups may experience antipathy for different reasons. Duckitt and Sibley (2007) included Arabs, Atheists and Terrorists among the target groups in their test of generalized prejudice, finding that they loaded on separate ‘Derogated’, ‘Dissident Group’, and ‘Dangerous’ factors respectively. Similarly, Cantal and colleagues (2015) similarly found that Atheists loaded with other dissident groups, and both Cantal and colleagues (2015) and Duckitt and Sibley (2007) reported that RWA was a stronger negative predictor of attitudes towards both dangerous and dissident groups, than was SDO.

Working backwards then, maybe Jews are derogated, Atheists are dissident, and Muslims are... what? Given that both SDO and RWA negatively predict attitudes, we can infer that Muslims trigger SDO-based antipathy because their presence threatens the social hierarchy, as well as inspiring RWA-based antipathy through both realistic and symbolic threat to physical and cultural security. Indeed, Obaidi, Kunst, Kteily, Thomsen and Sidanius (2019) have shown that anti-Muslim attitudes are moderately associated with perceived terroristic threat, and strongly associated with both symbolic and realistic (resource-based) threat perceptions. In short, Muslims may be seen to tick all the boxes for outgroup antipathy. Additionally, Ural (2016) has argued that Islamophobia comprises two dimensions – anti-Muslim prejudice and anti-Islam sentiment. A survey of German community participants supported this differentiation and suggested that perceptions of symbolic threat predicted both anti-Muslim and anti-Islam sentiments, realistic threat predicted only anti-Muslim sentiment, and ‘terroristic’ (safety-based) threat predicted only anti-Islam sentiments. The research described here addresses only the ‘face’ of Islam – Muslims – rather than attitudes towards Islam as a belief system.

The aim of this research was not to focus upon any religious influence upon anti-Muslim attitudes, but religion proved to be an important consideration in several ways. Self-identified Christians were notably more authoritarian, threatened, and to a lesser extent, social dominant, than irreligious participants. They showed a pronounced, and un-surprising, in-group bias in their attitudes towards Christians, and outgroup bias against Atheists. While self-identified Christians were not, however, more negative towards Muslims, this should be considered in the context that Muslims were regarded most negatively of all the religion-based targets. It will be cold comfort that only Politicians, Bankers, and Goths were rated more negatively than Muslims. Even Atheists were evaluated equivalently. However, self-identified Christians were also less likely to see the world as competitive than non-religious participants and, importantly, there wasn’t any reason to think that the utility of the DPM in predicting attitudes towards Muslims (or Hindus or Jews) was moderated by Christian identification. This is consistent with the notion that, while religiosity and prejudice are typically found to be correlated in Western populations, this association may be completely mediated by RWA or religious fundamentalism (e.g., Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Johnson, Rowatt, Barnard-Brak, Patock-Peckham, Labouff, & Carlisle, 2011). That is, some authoritarians may be drawn to religion, and particularly fundamentalist positions on their religion, because literal interpretations of the Bible (and other texts) may justify their anti-pathies – it is not the religion per se.

Since the events of March 15th, the world has witnessed two further atrocities committed in places of worship – against Christians in Sri Lanka, and Jews in the United States. The results reported here all illustrate that antipathy towards people on the basis of affiliation with religions other than Islam shares some commonality. RWA predicts negative attitudes towards all but Christians and Jews, while SDO predicts negative attitudes towards all but the irreligious. Perhaps importantly, while RWA predicts more positive attitudes towards Christians, SDO predicts more negativity. One striking result, and one tangential to the purpose of this research, was that among self-identified Christians SDO and RWA were uncorrelated with Dangerous and Competitive Worldviews, respectively. It is common to see that SDO correlates with Dangerous Worldviews, albeit much more weakly than with Competitive Worldview, while RWA frequently correlates with Competitive Worldviews and, again, more weakly than with its theoretical precedent, Dangerous Worldview. Among Christians, in this sample, the DPM components more cleanly reflect their theoretical exemplar. At the same time, it should be acknowledged that these analyses are based on short measures of RWA and SDO (six items each of the full thirty- and sixteen-item scales), extremely short measures of Dangerous and Competitive Worldviews (two versus full scale of ten items) and single items representing attitudes towards groups. Not only is it
impossible to disentangle the dimensionality of attitudes towards these groups to better identify the relationships between BPM variables and their facets (e.g., Uenal, 2016), but the short scales will inevitably under- or over-represent particular facets of these predictors. For example RWA, in particular, is a heavily content-driven scale with explicit mention of particular groups and biblical references. While RWA is theorised to comprise of three related components (Altemeyer, 2981), these are not easily separable into subscales to further determine whether, for example, the strong RWA-related antipathy towards Muslims is driven by one or a combination of authoritarian aggression, submission or conventionalism.

That this sample reported weakly negative attitudes towards Muslims isn’t a surprise as it is consistent with previous research here (e.g., Highland et al., 2019; NZES, 2002) and elsewhere (e.g., Velasco et al., 2010; Clements, 2012). Neither is the finding that SDO and RWA are associated with less negative attitudes. What then, are the implications for improving perceptions of Muslims in New Zealand? First, we may understand a little better the basis for this antipathy – threatening both social order and hierarchy, potentially justifying the craft of dual process-informed interventions. Additionally, as Shaver, Sibley, Osborne and Bulbulia (2017) have shown that increasing news exposure is associated with increasing anti-Muslim prejudice in New Zealand, the media may play an important role in this. At the same time, news exposure predicts slightly more anti-Arab, but not anti-Asian prejudice, which they identify as somewhat paradoxical given that the majority of Muslims in New Zealand are Arabic, rather than Arabic.

While media-propagated images of collapsing towers and bloodied American faces has been associated with increasingly negative attitudes towards Muslims, the events in Christchurch showed Muslim targets of violence. Is it too much to hope that the increased prejudice towards Muslims following atrocity perpetrated by Islamic extremists (e.g., Huddy & Feldman, 2011; Morgan, Wisneski, & Skitka, 2011; Vasilopoulos, Marcus, & Foucault, 2017) might remediate in the face of an event in which atrocity has been perpetrated against Muslims? I anticipate that, thanks to longitudinal research (like the NZAVS) and the continued efforts of researchers, some of whose work is represented in this issue, the answer will be forthcoming.

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the role of intergroup contact. The Political Quarterly, 85(3), 320-325.
Thomsen, L., Green, E. G., & Sidanius, J. (2008). We will hunt them down: How social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism fuel ethnic persecution of immigrants in fundamentally different ways. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44(6), 1455-1464.
This paper is a commentary on some of the responses to the public narrative of the events after the March 15th Christchurch attack. Several colleagues had publicly and privately, offered their views on the Government’s and media outlets use of terms such as ‘unprecedented’, ‘our loss of innocence’ and ‘our darkest day’. A fiery and impassioned exchange of words emerged on social media about the statement: “This is not us”. By exposing the counternarrative to these emotion laden terms, a shady past, and invisible present was revealed. However, the timing of the talk about colonisation also seemed out of step with the need for sensitivity. This paper also explores the role of White supremacy and causal racism in New Zealand. A personal I/we/us narrative style is used throughout the paper to describe how Muslim and Māori lives intersected prior to, and after the attack. The timeline of events is primarily 1 week, and up to 6 weeks post the attack.

March 15th

On the afternoon of the 15th March I was waiting at the Hamilton airport to pick up my daughter and her family. When I received an email from the University alerting staff to the shooting in Christchurch, I checked the new’s webpage and saw images of the ambulance, and police situated at Dean’s Ave. The tall trees of Hagley Park formed a backdrop of serenity that was at odds with the chaos that had happened hours earlier; images of distraught people were prominent. At the same time, the plane disembarked and my family came through the gate – shock on their faces. I felt a terror creep up and be swallowed with relief as I saw that they were all safe. They were on one of the last planes to leave Christchurch that afternoon.

My grandson’s creche backs onto Dean’s Ave, close to the Al Noor Mosque. My daughter should have been at the creche that day but instead she travelled with her family to attend the Annual Regatta in Ngāruawāhia, and my son-in-law’s kapa haka group was set to perform for the Māori King and accompanying visitors. My son-in-law was also scheduled to do a “mataora”, a facial tattoo, or emblemishment for a family friend.

My daughter and I spoke about what might have happened had she or her husband been driving or walking down Dean’s Ave that day. My son-in-law is tall, brown and wears a long bushy beard. We have no doubts about what might have happened had the shooter seen them, or their children. But more than this, our children, like Muslim children, live in a culture that has othered them. The portrayal of Muslim and Māori as savage, misogynistic, undeserving, troublesome and uncultured is a narrative we have lived with since colonisation stepped on to our foreshore (McCreanor, 1997). The words Māori and Foreshore are now synonymous with extreme colonisation. So the question of whether ‘this is not us’, or not, takes Māori to a place where they have been before.

This commentary offers a lens on the social media conversations that occurred immediately after the attack in Christchurch. What was readily apparent was that some were uncomfortable raising the role of racism and colonisation, while others felt that white supremacy had to be talked about because to do so is to call out the institutions and social groups that benefit the most from it. The need to be sensitive and careful, were uppermost my mind, but so too was the need to consider how marginalised peoples feel about racism.

**Being Brown, and Being the Other**

How do Māori experiences have any connection to the attack in Christchurch? The conversation I had with my daughter what could have happened to her was frightening because we do not really ever feel safe in our own country. I have brown siblings, brown children, and brown nephews and nieces. I worry about them: will they get a job with their Māori names and Māori faces? Will they be given a choice of homes they same way that Pakehā are given choices? Will their Māoriness be undervalued? Will they fall through the causal racism gaps in our health system (Came, McCreanor, Manson, Nuku, 2019). Or, will they have to fight for every inch of their rights because the society they live in tells them every-single-day, in some overt and covert way, that they are not good enough? I worry about them because we live in a country that Taika Waititi eloquently described as ‘Racist as f*%K’. He was vilified, and some called to have his award ‘New Zealander of the Year’, taken from him.

If we can be proud of Taika and his achievements, why do we recoil in disgust and anger when he tells us, and the world, that we are not quite the race-relations haven we try to portray to the world, and to ourselves? Was there a collective introspection where the nation asked itself, “what does he mean?” Why did our country have to hit rock bottom and lose 50 lives before we asked ourselves to look inwards at the institutions that enabled racism to thrive? Alongside that introspection, did we look at our own actions, or inactions that foster racism, not only towards Māori, but to anyone who was not Christian and Caucasian?

**When is it ok to talk about colonisation?**

The Prime Minister, Jacinda Ardern, and others used terms like ‘our darkest days’, ‘lost innocence’, and ‘unprecedented’ to describe reactions to the Christchurch attack. At the same time, my colleagues hit back on social media saying that the attack was not unprecedented, and that we were never innocent. We argued that ‘this is not us’, really meant, ‘actually, yes it is’. If it
wasn’t why did the New Zealand Settlement Act (1863) happen? ‘This is not us’, yet the New Zealand Wars (1800s) happened. ‘This is not us’, and the Treaty of Waitangi became a legal nullity (1877). In 2004, Don Brash’s Orewa Speech happened. So if this is not us, how did the rise of the all-right happen? Former Society Bicultural Director, Dr Rose Black commented that ‘We Pākehā sit on the continuum from superiority to white supremacy, and we don’t even know that we are’ (personal communication, 2019).

My own view on the public commentaries was that as tangihanga had not even started, now was not the time to talk about colonisation. While Māori funeral custom is to raise concerns as a way of paying respect to the the deceased, and honouring their family, the funeral had not yet happened. I made, what I thought was a brave decision to challenge my colleagues on social media – ‘Wait, I said. ‘Raise these issues later, at least until after the burials’. This is not to say that I didn’t agree with them. Because I did.

My colleagues disagreed with me. They were angry and they knew that everything they had been saying about land confiscation, decimation of Māori culture and language, enforced poverty, systemic racism and structural violence was everyday, unacknowledged white supremacy in action. Our experiences taught us that we live within concentric circles of racism, and a deeply held belief in white supremacy as an ideology and practice. This is so deeply ingrained in the history of New Zealand that we do not recognise it, or want to know when we are called to account.

The point my colleagues were making is that New Zealanders should know that everyday acts of causal racism towards Māori, Pacific, Asians and Muslims is endemic and often silenced. Māori are not strangers to terrorism, and the commentators wanted to make that fact public. To do otherwise was to silence those who had suffered, and exonerate those who were complicit in institutionalised programmes of eugenics and classicism.

My colleagues also suggested that for our country to heal, we needed to know how this land was colonised, who paid the price for it, and who continues to benefit. Jackson, (2019) commented on the importance of acknowledging the links between the past and present as the massacres and the ideologies of racism and white supremacy, which underpinned them, did not come about in a non-contextualised vacuum. Jackson also argued that the colonisation of New Zealand has a whakapapa – a genealogy, premised on brutality, Christianity, an enduring belief in racial superiority, and a view of Māori as the noble savage (McCreanor, 1997) who cannot attain high intellectual functions, and certainly should not have resources that Pākehā could put to better use. It may seem strange to say this in a learned journal, but I am reminded of the times I watched Thomas the Tank Engine with my son. Each time the character Diesel appeared, (he was the black train) Middle Eastern music played. Diesel always seemed to be dirty, oily and slick. He was also cast as arrogant, untrustworthy, and deceitful. That same language, with its racist connotations, is used to describe Māori and Muslim communities.

Recognising our colonial history
Within a day of the attack, and largely prompted by the media headlines that it was unprecedented - angry commentaries spoke of the massacre at Rangiotu in 1864. These were conversations that felt out of place. Some asked about the relevance of bringing up an event where colonial militia herded men, women and children inside a church in Te Awamutu, which was then set alight? Did we also need to be reminded of how those who escaped were shot in the back as they tried to run away? My colleagues wanted it known that our people were murdered in a Christian church because they had resisted the advance of colonisation.

In the Waikato in the 1860s, Māori refusal to sell land, and the establishment of a King movement, provoked the Colonial government in 1863 to demand that Māori pledge their allegiance to the Crown, or face ejection from their land. Without waiting for a reply, the Waikato was invaded a day later (O’Malley, 2016). Some of us wanted to stay silent, to not compare disasters. I thought it was important to say ‘We cannot sympathise with someone who has lost family by ripping open your own scar and saying, ‘This happened to me too’.

Essentially is it fair for Māori to claim our own colonial trauma, while the recovery response was still in progress? Moon and Derby (2019) argued (in an unrelated article) that modern Māori cannot know what historical trauma is because we were not there to experience it. They further claimed that Māori portray a one-sided, revisionist view of history and colonisation, while ignoring the benefits of being colonised, and seek to blame, and be angry at a specific ethnic group (the British) while conveniently overlooking the trauma at the hands of our own pre-European Māori.

What then about Muslim experiences of trauma? It is convenient to say that trauma does not pass down to future generations simply because we tell ourselves about it? As we were not there (when the trauma happened) how could we be traumatised? This statements show a disregard for human experiences and overlooks the power of narrative history as a tool for healing, and for reconciliation. (see also, Phama, Smith, Evans-Campbell, Kopu-Morgan, et al, (2017) for a nuanced exploration of historical trauma).

Many of us will have a future narrative about the Christchurch attack, and it is important that it is one based on recovery and learning. It is concerning that if we cannot accept that Māori have a collective experience of colonisation and trauma, how are we going to manage what we hear in the future? Anjun Rahman the leader of the Islamic Women’s Council of New Zealand wrote: ‘How does a heart break? Does it shatter into a million pieces? Does it split into two aching, throbbing halves? Does it break with a low keening wail or an earth-shattering scream of pain?’ Pain of this magnitude is always remembered.

Racism and white supremacy
Some of the difficult commentaries I managed was from Māori who had learned to hate Muslims. It is the ‘some of my family and friends are racists’ story that was tough to navigate. Māori values of manaakitanga, and whanaungatanga were clearly not extended to Muslims, and we had to call each other out on that. I was particularly tired of seeing racist, Islamophobic comments from Māori who live in Australia, as if they had never known racism growing up in New Zealand, or the racism towards Indigenous Australians.

Another narrative that we discussed was that Māori, and Muslims were under intense surveillance by State Services while white supremacists were ignored. Despite members of the Muslim communities having told police, the State Service Commission, the Security Intelligence Service, Department of Internal Affairs, Government Ministers and the Human Rights Commission about

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the death threats they had received from the alt-right they did not feel heard, or protected (Rahman, 2019). Was it too unbelievable and unpalatable to scrutinise white supremacists as potential terrorists? Is it white imagination to say that only certain people can commit acts of terror, while white people do not?

Despite the high rates of gun violence in the United States committed by White Americans, they are not collectively held to account like Muslims are. White shooters are described as loners (or a lone wolf), someone not part of an organised unit, or group. But are they really alone? In relegating the ‘lone wolf’ to the position of an unhinged outsider, we are not exposed to the white supremacists’ collective belief in their right to eliminate anyone they see as a threat to their self-idealised supremacy (Jackson, 2019).

This tricky side-step also enables the ‘this is not us’ narrative to float, because that type of person seems too far down the other end of the white supremacist continuum. Māori commentators on the other hand did not see the difference between white supremacy that kills quickly, and white supremacy that is insidious and kills slowly (Kanji & Palumbo-Liu, 2019). The removal of Māori children by Oranga Tamariki, the abuse of children and youth in state care, and in faith-based institutions, and Māori experiences of mental health services (Russell, Levy & Cherrington, 2018) are just a few examples.

The language used to other Muslim experiences was perhaps most telling in the way that the shooter’s background was portrayed in the media. Without a doubt, had the shooter been Muslim, or Māori, the entire ethnic group and culture would have been vilified and portrayed as barbaric, with a primitive nature. However, there is a propensity to assuage potential white fragility by portraying white killers as inherently good – and that they somehow gone bad. Australian and British newspapers shows a photo of a blonde, blue-eyed boy, with his father – the headline read ‘Angelic boy who grew into an evil far-right mass killer’. The killer was also described as ‘a likable and dedicated personal trainer running free athletic programmes for kids’. Other terms used were ‘ordinary, white-man, of Australian, Irish, Scottish and British descent’ and a working class mad-man’.

The descriptions used above are examples of what Ray Nairn (2019) calls narrative fragments. When we hear a narrative fragment: a phrase or brief sentence cueing a well-known story, we fill in the rest of the story. By describing the killer as ‘blonde, blue-eyed and angelic’ we maintain a view, depending on our life experiences, that white culture is normal, natural, ordinary and the standard against which everyone else is measured.

I wondered, did the child-angel fall off the heavenly perch destined for him as a white Australian? Does the narrative of white supremacy also guarantee entry into the celestial kingdom for Christians in the same way the Crusades promised the spoils of the Holy Land? Does having to write about the not-so-good-white-person leave editors a little out of their depth? Jacinda Ardern told the nation:

For those of you who are watching at home tonight and questioning how this could have happened here, we, New Zealand ... We were not chosen for this act of violence because we condone racism, because we’re an enclave for extremism, we were chosen for the very fact that we are none of these things, because we represent diversity, kindness, compassion, a home for those that share our values, a refuge for those who need it. And those values, I can assure you, will not and cannot be shaken by this attack.

Sahar Khumkhor, a reporter for Al Jazeera said that the ‘This is not us’ statement merely showed a ‘comforting conviction’ that extremism and violence are features of backward societies, and not products of western cultures. She went on to say that racism still determines who the ‘we, and they’ are of the world and that ‘this is not us’, ‘... seek[s] to absolve and reject responsibility and shame, and replace them with fragile innocence and even pride.’

The concerns were that by calling the attack unprecedented, or claiming that our innocence is lost, we overlooked the systems that allowed it to happen. Narrative fragments for marginalised peoples highlight racialised concerns and experiences: The Black Lives Matter movement, Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women, Black Deaths in Custody, Pipeline to Prison, At-Risk- Māori and Islamophobia are all examples of inequities that are unattended to. It has become normal to hear about these narratives, to experience them, to despair over them, and to have them etched in our future-past. But let us be clear, what happened in Christchurch, was only a matter of time – we all knew that. Soon after March 15th, Nasr wrote about her experiences as a Muslim in New Zealand.

But, the culmination of my lived experiences, and many others which I can’t bring myself to repeat, rests under the surface of my discomfort with the ‘They Are Us’ solidarity statements.

It feels like negation, not just of my own lived experiences, but also of our own history as a nation. Because, while Friday was a dark day, maybe one of the darkest, Aotearoa’s settler-colonial history is a long white-supremacist storybook. I will not pretend it is new, that it is exceptional, that I didn’t see it coming, I did, and you should have too (Nasr, 2019).

Nasr’s commentary is a painful narrative of discrimination and abuse that has been told to us many, many times. If indeed ‘this is not us’ is actually true how do we reconcile hearing about the abuse of Muslim communities, and doing little to change it?

The role of psychology in assisting with recovery

Within days of the attack, the New Zealand Psychological Society set about preparing a co-ordinated recovery response. Having had some experience following the Christchurch earthquake, we were keen to assist when needed. We updated our webpage, sought relevant material for those affected, either directly or indirectly, and established points of contact in Christchurch, and throughout the branches. I became acutely aware that despite the large amount of resources we had on trauma, we had nothing written specifically for Muslim communities. The Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of Education were in the same situation. This was a major concern, particularly as there were 40 different ethnic groups affected by the attack. None of the resources available talked about how to deal with race-based trauma, or how to work with Muslim children, or distressed Muslim youth. Particular information was also needed for Muslim women who were now widowed, and in the process of iddah; and for Muslim elderly men and women – and importantly, the resources did not offer support to maintain spiritual faith, particularly after the loss of an Imam, and the insidious nature of Islamophobia.

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The Charity Hospital in Christchurch had, quite early, started a counselling roster for people affected by the shooting, and the Ministry of Health set up a telephone counselling line. We reached out to our colleagues around the country to ask to support the telephone lines, the Employee Assistance Programme, Victim Support, schools, tertiary institutions, corrections facilities, and hospitals. In Christchurch, a Hub was established where Muslims could access various agencies (ACC, Immigration) and to be together to meet and talk. Our colleagues were working double shifts in Christchurch where they could. We knew that Christchurch was experiencing an influx of help and that we needed to be careful of not getting in the way. Resources were also developed to support those working beyond their usual capacity. I raised a query about the monocultural nature of the notion of ‘self-care’. ‘Self’ from a collective worldview, is relational and includes care for community and family/whanau. The resources on self-care had to be rewritten to show a relational approach to wellbeing.

By the end of the week of the 22nd of March, after a prolonged wait, the deceased were returned to their families and burials were planned. Jacinda Arden did a fantastic job supporting the Muslim community, and the country through the aftermath of the attack. She become the topic of international interest and was praised for her kindness, and how she had moved swiftly to indicate that the gun-laws needed to change, and a review of the state surveillance agency was going to happen. Over that time, Jacinda Ardern, politician, and breastfeeding mother (because this job is important), supported the country through one of its darkest hours. It must also be said that Jacinda Arden received abuse across a number of platforms for showing solidarity with the Muslim faith.

In talking about the ‘this is not us’, statement, it is also really important to talk about the best parts of society that work hard to show their aroha (compassion and love) for others. Perhaps the most public reminder of how compassionate New Zealand can be was the willingness to connect, and to have a public Muslim funeral, and prayer service on Friday 22nd March. A Muslim call to prayer was to be broadcasted around the country, and an Imam would lead the service. The public backlash by some was fairly swift and predictable. Destiny’s Church leader Brian Tamaki condemned Jacinda Arden, and warned, as did many others, that New Zealand would be converted to Islam if we allowed the call to prayer to happen. This is again where the history of colonisation and cultural amnesia intersect. Māori have already had a religious take-over and the subsequent banning of our religious dieties (See the Tohunga Suppression Act, 1907). So the thought of another religious take-over does not scare some of us as it does for others. At the funeral service, Imam Gamal Fouda called the Government to end hate speech, and the politics of fear:

Islamophobia is real. It is a targeted campaign to influence people to dehumanise and irrationally fear muslims. To fear what we wear, to fear the choice of food we eat, to fear the way we pray and to fear the way we practice our faith. We call upon governments around the world including New Zealand and the neighbouring countries to bring an end to hate speech and the politics of fear. Imam Fouda also showed the world the beauty of faith as a pillar of healing; ‘We are broken-hearted but we are not broken. We are alive. We are together. We are determined to not let anyone divide us’. Fouda, (2019).

The Psychological Society continued to work to co-ordinate a recovery response that was layered and reflective of the Muslim community and their needs. There were multiple requests for Muslim psychologists, counsellors, social workers and those able to work with Muslim communities. At this point the professional bodies needed to work together as we did not know who were practicing Muslim psychologists. The resources from Psychological Societies around the world were sent with messages of support, and resources written in Urdu, Arabic, Somali, Iranian, Indonesia, and other languages. The Society’s connections to the Asia Pacific Psychological Association meant that we could ask colleagues internationally for advice.

The Australian Psychological Society (APS) also provided extremely valuable support, and information, including a paper on how to create stronger communities to prevent racialised violence (APS, 2019). There may have been an email overload for some – but, as it turns out, there is no co-ordinated plan between the Society, the College and the Board to deal with traumatic incidents. At a time like this, the divisions between our professional bodies were a limitation that needed addressing. Also, co-ordination with training programmes and Branches and Institutes is needed to inform the Society about the psychology workforce, and their particular skillset. The Psychologists Board does not collect data on religious affiliations, and this is perhaps a limitation.

During this time, I thought about how to connect with Muslim psychologists. I also thought that perhaps the difficulties Māori experience in psychology with limited cultural content specific to our worldviews also occurred for Muslim students. Do Muslim students face a Western worldview of psychology, devoid of any knowledge of the history of Islam’s contribution to psychology, or Islamic healing theories and methods? Could a Muslim student say that their training prepared them to work within an Islamic perspective? Or do they, like Māori, Pacific, Asian, African students, have to learn the cultural perspectives post-training?

As western psychology in New Zealand is typically taught from a White American, European, or British perspective, the history of psychology’s role in colonisation is rendered invisible. Some exceptions are the APS apology to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander People in 2016 for their role in the erosion of Aboriginal culture (APS, 2016). Would Muslim students be taught that the gold standard of psychology, the American Psychological Association (APA) colluded with the Department of Defence to permit the torture of Muslim prisoners in their detention centers (i.e., Guantanamo) (Hoffman Report, 2015). Or that the APA changed their code of ethics from ‘to do no harm’ to allow psychologists to participate in the development of torture programmes? Are Muslim students taught that in 2015, members of the American Middle Eastern/North African (MENA) Psychological Network (2015) wrote an open letter to the Board of the APA and the psychological community to raise concerns that psychology was mirroring what was happening across the United States. The writers claimed that Muslims and refugees experienced diminishing civil liberties, human rights abuses, discrimination, threatened and actual violence, and racial profiling since 9/11. The MENA group also felt that the APA had aligned itself indirectly ‘with voices

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legitimizing state sponsored violence and oppression against marginalized groups in nations around the world. Recommendations to the APA was to increase the visibility of Muslim psychologists in the APA, and to promote the relevance and trustworthiness of psychology for Muslim communities.

Recently, Awad (et al, 2019) argued that MENA group members continue to experience macro and micro level pressures such as: historical trauma, hypervisibility and invisibility, societal and institutional discrimination, interpersonal and macroaggressions, hostile national context and invasive surveillance. The context is the same for Muslims in New Zealand. Psychological training, research, teaching and professional development will now need to consider a recovery response that is truly reflective of the Muslim community. A starting place is to identify gaps in knowledge, and to uncover the continuum of white supremacy and how it plays out in the room. Speaking of which, it might pay to look around the room and see which culture is reflected, and which culture has the most power.

How relevant is a Māori lens on psychology for Muslims? Marama Davidson, co-leader of the Green Party commented to the media, and on twitter, that her conversations with the victims of the attack showed their preference for therapy that was informed by kaupapa Māori models. In other reports, some Muslim youth said that they mistrusted the mental health service as they had been discriminated against in the past. In my conversations, I was told that the whare tapa wha model by Mason Durie is consistent with a Muslim worldview (Dr. Shaystah Dean, personal communication). Māori models are no doubt useful to begin with. However, a specific psychological perspective drawn from Islamic teachings is more likely to benefit Muslim communities and will enable the profession to expand.

Our ability to be inclusive turns the phrase ‘this is not us’, into ‘but it could be’ if we support our colleagues who continuously strive for diversity across our institutions, and broader society. We need to challenge the epistemological monoculture in psychology training to produce culturally-inclusive, culturally-informed psychologist. A recent analysis of clinical psychology programme enrolments for the period 1994 to 2017 show that with the exception of European females, who are substantially over represented, every other sociodemographic group is notably under represented (Sarf, Waitoki, Macfarlane, Bennett, et al., 2019). As we move towards a recovery approach in psychology, we need to understand the sociodemographic needs of the workforce and our communities.

At this point in time, and even over the next few years, can we realistically prepare for the actual diversity in our country without first focussing on ideologies of racism that exist in the doctrines and practices of white supremacy? And even when the focus, or gaze is turned to the more extreme examples of racism, the everyday practices of racism, particularly at structural levels, are usually ignored by the dominant group to which most psychologists belong.

One other event happened in April that warrants mentioning. A decision by the Titahi Bay Returned Services Association (RSA) to have a Muslim prayer at their dawn ceremony commemoration of ANZAC was met with a major public backlash, and death threats were made. Social media could barely contain itself as cultural amnesia played a familiar tune of how Australians and New Zealanders sacrificed their lives for our Christian freedom and our national identity. Muslims also fought in the World Wars for the British Empire, yet there is seldom any mention of their contributions. The cultural amnesia also meant that few people knew that every year, in Gallipoli, Australians and New Zealanders have a special monument and space for them to remember the fallen.

On the memorial wall at Gallipoli there is an inscription of a quote from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the first leader of the Republic of Turkey:

Those heroes who shed their blood and lost their lives! You are now lying in the soil of a friendly country. Therefore rest in peace. There is no difference between the Johnnies and Melmets to us where they lie side by side here in this country of ours. You, the mothers, who sent their sons from far away countries wipe away your tears; your sons are now lying in our bosom and are in peace. After having lost their lives on this land they have become our sons as well. Atatürk, 1934

If we cannot tolerate prayers to honour those who suffered in Christchurch, and to honour the ethnic diversity of those who also fought in the War, what does that say about our nation? It that really us?

**Mataora and kapa haka: Facial adornment and performing arts**

In the opening I said that my family left Christchurch to perform for the Māori king in Ngāruawāhia at the annual regatta, and for my son-in-law to inscribe a facial tattoo (mataora) for a 60 year old Māori male. Māori came so percievably close to losing their skill and knowledge of performing arts, boat racing, and tattoo (tāmoko) and to be able to practice Māori cultural practices after 175 years of colonisation is a testimony to our ability to survive, and to be inclusive. My family would have been in Christchurch that day but they came home to participate in Māori activities that the majority of New Zealand know nothing about.

Finally, among the many comments and opinions, Anjun Rahman’s comment stood out as gracious and welcoming. She said that the Indigenous peoples needed to be treated with dignity and respect. Here was a community that had been brutally treated, and continue to be, the world over, and they were asking the Government to respect the Treaty of Waitangi. I hear solidarity and I hear pathways for moving forward together.

**Where to from here?**

Using a narrative timeline I have described some of the main discourses that prevailed over social media, and the online newspapers since March 15th. There were many others, Senator Anning and Egg-boy, protests about there being too many memorial services, and Brian Tamaki and the Destiny Church standing for Christianity outside the Al-Noor mosque. My purpose is to show the difficult conversations that happened since March 15th because our histories are ignored, and because White supremacy always appears to get a free pass in life. As long as the lives of marginalised peoples intersect we can be united in our approach to challenging injustice to create a flourishing future.

Rather than leave this paper with a hopeful comment and wish for change, I realised that such sentiments haven’t really worked that well. Goals going forward could instead focus on:

1. Connect with Muslim psychologists: (but don’t be a burden) offer support, based on their right to self-determination, to identify a layered approach to healing from the attack.
2. Prepare for the future: Develop a co-ordinated plan with professional...
organisations, Crown agencies, community groups and NGOs to respond in a culturally appropriate, and timely manner to adverse, and traumatic events.

3. Look around the room: Increase the number of culturally, and ethnically diverse psychologist and academic staff. Use an equity-based approach. Māori make up 15% of the population, Muslims 1%, Pacific 7.4% and so on. However, the level of need in these communities outweigh simple numbers. For example, if Māori are over 50% of the mental health population, Māori should make up 50% of the psychology workforce.

4. Change the way psychology is taught: Psychology programmes need to embed content in their coursework that reflects the sociodemographics of New Zealand. Why wait for a disaster to happen? Be proactive, and ethically responsive.

5. Learn a language: Expand our exposure and knowledge of diverse cultures and their cultural practices. Keep it local – there are close to 40 different Pacific nations in New Zealand. How many do we know about?

6. Do something about racism in psychology: In my experience, racism in psychology bubbles away in the form of epistemic elitism, a fear of change, and reluctance to accept culturally diverse worldviews. Racism is not immutable. But things are still changing too slowly. Learning about another culture requires us to accept our limitations, and lack of knowledge. Be comfortable with discomfort.

7. Do something about racism in everyday workplaces: We know the statistics about the social determinants of health and wellbeing need changing. Demand better services for clients, and better access to psychologists.

8. Be the one to advocate for change: Ask for more culturally diverse learning opportunities and don’t take no for an answer (discrimination may occur however when we are the squeaky wheel).

9. Grow the psychology workforce to be ethically and skillfully prepared to work with culturally diverse peoples. Inclusivity requires a shift in power – pass opportunities to those who can’t rely on white privilege to succeed.

10. Work with our communities as often as possible: Being prepared means that we have already established our connections, and we maintain them – usually with food and sharing resources.

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https://www.meandwhitesupremacybook.com/nobook/