Prejudice is about Collective Values, not a Biased Psychological System

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The study of prejudice has a long and proud history within social psychology. But despite the hundreds if not thousands of empirical papers, we still have not seemed to "crack" the problem. Daily expressions of both subtle and hostile prejudice still occur and, more tragically, violence too, as we have seen in New Zealand (and elsewhere). In the aftermath of the horrific mosque attacks in Christchurch, it is perhaps time to take stock and re-evaluate the collective wisdom our profession has produced in understanding prejudice. In this paper we argue that psychologists' efforts toward this end have unfortunately led to an excessive focus on the psychological failings on the part of individuals. Instead, we believe that a more productive approach is to focus on collective values in the form of social norms, and how these can be used in the service of fighting prejudice.

Indeed, in the aftermath of the Christchurch murders we witnessed the explicit display of such collective values by New Zealanders in their near unanimity in restating their collective values *as New Zealanders*. This was modelled most eloquently by the New Zealand prime minister who effortlessly and genuinely engaged in identity leadership (Haslam, Reicher, & Platow, 2011) by clarifying, reaffirming and modelling the values and norms that define the nation she led. This was also done on a daily level by ordinary Kiwis, with both large scale and public gestures and smaller micro-kindnesses expressed to all people, but particularly the New Zealand Muslim community. So while it may make us feel better simply to point to the perpetrator of this hateful crime and claim he was crazy, or somehow psychologically challenged, this will not help us to solve the problem of prejudice. This is, again, because the problem of prejudice is a problem of collective values and shared norms, that are learned and often institutionalized, and not of individual psychological processes. Ultimately, to understand that which we call prejudice, we must understand how specific intergroup attitudes and behaviours develop and become legitimated within specific groups in specific intergroup and historical contexts.

A further recent example demonstrates what we mean. Following the murders of Charlie Hebdo journalists in January 2015, many Australians, like others around the world, proclaimed "Je suis Charlie" as they showed their solidarity with the journalists. In Australia, however, this was followed by the realization that the Australian Anti-Discrimination Act would censor the journalists' work by identifying it as hate speech, thereby making the work illegal. This posed an intractable dilemma, as aspects of Australian law were now recognized as being consonant with at least one of the murderers' goals. In response to this problem, efforts were renewed to change the Act. Ironically, Australians had only recently rejected similarly proposed changes largely because such changes would allow for more frequent expressions of prejudice. We, therefore, ask: Were the attitudes expressed by the Charlie Hebdo journalists *prejudice*? Prior to the murders, many would have found it easy to identify the journalists' work as prejudiced. However, the anguish and disgust felt as a result of the brutality of the murders meant anything that would distance Australians from the murderers became more important. With this change in context, many no longer saw the journalists as prejudiced.

The key element of the above description of the Charlie Hebdo murders is the remarkable shifting of people's understandings of the very concept of *prejudice*. Identification of attitudes and behaviours as prejudiced or not appears to be tied to, and influenced by, people's current social context and their position within it. Indeed, as we outline in more detail below, identification of an attitude as prejudiced is actually an assertion that the attitude is *counter-normative with regard to one's own contextually salient group membership*. By recognizing this situated usage and understanding of the concept of prejudice, our social-psychological efforts to combat prejudice can, thus, move away from banal (and faulty) claims of "pre-judging" and near tautological claims of faulty or biased cognitive processing. Instead, they refocus our attention to the study of the dynamic processes underlying what precisely it is that we are trying to combat in the first place: that which we understand today as prejudice may well have been seen as an accurate description of reality only just yesterday. A prime example within social psychology itself is, of course, the concept of *modern* racism, which explicitly recognizes the historical dependence of the expression and meaning of prejudice.

We see this analysis to be of value as people who believe their own attitudes are not prejudiced are likely to remain immune to anti-prejudice appeals. In fact, they are unlikely to see their attitudes in need of change, instead seeing them as accurate, truthful, legitimate and even shared among other rational people. In this manner, we heed Billig's (2012, p. 142) claim that, "any analysis of modern racism…should include an analysis of what modern people understand by the very concept of 'prejudice'." Surprisingly, this is an area of empirical and conceptual work to which scant social-psychological attention has been paid. Indeed, Billig (p. 152) continued his call by confirming that, "there is little social scientific work…to demonstrate what people consider to be prototypical examples of prejudice." Undoubtedly, as with many concepts used in daily discourse, most people are likely to have a basic understanding of what prejudice is. Yet no understanding appears to be universally accepted, and each fluctuates with contextual changes, as exemplified above.

Notably, but not surprisingly, people see their own intergroup attitudes as normative, legitimate and correct (e.g.,

Crandall, Eshleman & O'Brien, 2002); at minimum, they typically fail to see them as prejudiced. For example, very low levels of self-reported prejudice were observed among university student samples; it was other people who respondents saw as prejudiced, not themselves (O'Brien, Crandall, Hortsman-Reser, Warner, Alsbrooks, & Blodorn, 2010). Moreover, a prejudice-reduction intervention procedure (Devine, Forscher, Austin, & Cox, 2012) includes the confrontation of participants with their own prejudice as measured with the Implicit Association Test. This intervention assumes people do not know that they are prejudiced. However, if people must be told by experts that they are prejudiced, then appropriate and inappropriate intergroup attitudes become the purview of these experts who impose their normative standards on others. This may well be a political state of affairs that is sought. Psychologically, however, people are likely to have intergroup attitudes as blithely as they have attitudes toward cars or vegemite.

If people truly do not know (or believe) their own attitudes to be prejudiced and need social psychologists to "confront" them, then we can reasonably ask: What is it that people believe are and are not prejudiced attitudes? Under what circumstances will people identify their own and others' attitudes as prejudiced? How will these beliefs fluctuate with dynamic changes in group and intergroup relations? Answering these questions shifts the empirical focus away from the content and nature of people's attitudes about groups, to people's *beliefs about these attitudes*. It becomes an analysis of *lay beliefs about prejudice*.

Psychological analyses of lay beliefs explicitly eschew presuppositions of an association between researchers' understandings of the concepts under examination and those of their respondents. Within this research domain, as we noted above, analyses of lay understandings of prejudice, *per se*, are relatively few. In one early study (Dyer, 1945), however, participants ranked a series of statements about groups and intergroup relations on the "degree of prejudice" (p. 221) exhibited. Intercorrelations of the rankings were interpreted as a degree of consensual understanding about the prejudice concept. Although correlations were observed, they varied between attitude contexts. Higher levels of agreement, for example, were observed in the context of "segregating races and nationalities" than in "attitudes toward occupations" (p. 223). Three broad conclusions can be made from this work: (a) there *are* shared lay understandings of the concept of prejudice, (b) there are also disagreements, and (c) the degree of consensus varies as a function of the context in which it is examined.

More recent work has taken one of two approaches, both of which have revealed similarities between lay and social-psychological understandings of prejudice. One approach is discourse-analytic. This work has revealed that the negative component of prejudice in many (but not all) formal accounts is also held in lay accounts, with people often at pains to preface their intergroup attitudes with "I'm not prejudiced, but…" (Billig, 2012, p. 142). Indeed, Billig describes how people rhetorically separate *intergroup attitudes* from *prejudiced attitudes*. He notes that people have clear expectations about listeners' own views on prejudice, so they work to place themselves in a rhetorically non-taboo position. Such rhetorical distancing occurs for others as well: Condor, Figgou, Abell, Gibson, and Stevenson (2006) showed that people construct and reconstruct close others' intergroup attitudes as non-prejudiced. Other discourse-analytic work reveals how lay understandings of prejudice also include elements of bias and irrationality. For example, Figgou and Condor (2006, p. 238) observed that prejudice was accounted for, in part, as a "problem of rationality" or "a failure to exercise…self control." In a separate paper, Wetherell (2012) demonstrated how, like social scientists, lay speakers consider prejudice to be a human failing emerging from values overriding facts.

In a second approach to examining lay understandings of prejudice, participants were asked to define prejudice and offer potential "solutions" to it (Hodson & Esses, 2005). Most participants (but certainly not all) considered prejudice to "involve group memberships", while a substantive minority (42%) included some form of negativity. Smaller minorities, yet, focused on "prejudgement" (39%) and errors (17%). Participants' proposed "solutions" also mirrored formal social-psychological analyses, highlighting education (69.2%) and other social influence attempts (i.e., "media influence," 23.1%) as well as intergroup contact (23.1%). In a subsequent paper (Sommers & Norton, 2006), participants generated traits of the social category "White racist" instead of "prejudice" *per se*. Generated traits had both similarities to social-psychological understandings (e.g., ignorant, uneducated) but also remarkable differences (e.g., opinionated, American Southern). When a separate set of participants then rated these traits on the degree to which they attributed them to the category "White racist," the ratings factored into evaluative (e.g., morality), psychological (e.g., ignorant), and demographic (e.g., again, American Southern) dimensions.

The Prejudice Census

Our research group has continued this line of work by, among other things, recording instances that people describe as "prejudice". In 2016, we launched our *Prejudice Census*. This is an on-line questionnaire allowing people anywhere and at any time to report instances of prejudice that they have experienced. At its most basic level, our goal is to accumulate people's experiences according to their own subjective understandings of the concept. The data are quite rich, both qualitatively and quantitatively (as we have measured a variety of attitudes). For the current discussion, we simply present some illustrative examples of the instances of prejudice that our respondents report. In presenting these, we note several patterns. First, like previous work, nearly all instances of prejudice report negative intergroup attitudes and behaviours, some of which were directed toward others and some of which were directed toward respondents themselves. Examples include:

Prejudice Example 1:

…[someone] began extolling the reasons that Australia's 'apology' to Indigenous peoples was unnecessary, and that the affirmative action used to close the gap between whites and blacks was in fact favoritism, that Indigenous Australians were simply inherently lazy and needed to stop using their history as an excuse.

Prejudice Example 2:

We were meeting with some other latin american friends at the hostel we were staying in New Zealand. The hostel's owner kicked us out because "you f***

latins speak so bloody loud".

Prejudice Example 3:

I am a muslim female and have recently moved to australia. ... my daughter ... gave my cell no to one of her friends...her friend never called and told my daughter that she cant hang out with her...as her mother said she doesnt like people with head covering...

Prejudice Example 4:

Walking down the street with my girlfriend, and i was yelled at for being gay. ("Fucking Dyke")

In some ways, there is nothing particularly remarkable about these examples, as they are likely to conform to a broadly consensual view about what prejudice is. At the same time, and consistent with Gordon Allport's (1954) original view, we also observed occasional instances of "positive" prejudice.

Prejudice Example 5:

People assumed i was rich and smart because i am chinese.

Example 5, as well as aspects of Example 1, are particularly informative, as respondents seem more to be describing stereotypes than prejudice, per se. There is clearly a conflating in people's minds between the two concepts, a belief that they actually refer to the same process.

Second, while most of the negative intergroup behaviour were hostile, some were more subtle, as shown in the two examples below.

Prejudice Example 6:

...[a] slightly older, white man...refused to acknowledge my presence...directing his questions and complaints to my male colleague....Eventually I managed to get a word in. He was so surprised I actually had something intelligent to say, he stared at me in disbelief before once again turning to my male colleague...

Prejudice Example 7:

I ordered coffee. A much younger more attractive woman also ordered coffee. The barista fawned over her, drawing artwork on her cup, while only giving me the most cursory attention.

Here, overtly negative or hostile ("old fashioned") prejudice is replaced more by behaviours that are somewhat passive, as the instigator ignores the target more than actively derogates the target. Third, although most instances targeted traditional sociological "minorities" (as in the examples above), there were occasional instances where people describe being the target of prejudice – both negative and positive – despite being in a societally high status or powerful group.

Prejudice Example 8:

I am tall, good looking, white professional. ...I needed to take the bus to work ...Multiple times ...the bus will pass with not stopping even in rain and more severe weather and the bus was always driven by a black woman. If the bus was driven by a black man it always stopped.

Prejudice Example 9:

...whenever you go to a developing country everyone thinks you're far more wealthier because of your skin colour and bother you about buying their products or donating.

Prejudice Example 10:

...I was the only white...person [in my job], and I experienced significant favouritism from the (white) manager. This was in the context of subtle but clearly (to me) prejudiced remarks being made about the other [workers]....

These examples are particularly noteworthy, as they demonstrate the breadth with which the prejudice concept is understood. What is striking, too, is that each respondent's own social category was clearly cognitively salient in each instance. Moreover, in Example 8, it is unclear why or how racial/ethnic background was relevant given the instance described; the author seems to suggest that it is only African American women (this was in the United States) – not women in general (presumably, White women), and clearly not African American men. Why this categorization became salient to the respondent (and not, say, the time of day or capacity of the bus) is unclear, but intriguing.

Fourth, responses on a separate question in the *Prejudice Census* revealed that 70% of respondents at least "agreed somewhat" that they personally had been prejudiced at some time in the past. Despite this unexpectedly high percentage (particularly in light of previous research showing the people deny being prejudiced), in nearly every instance the prejudice that was reported was enacted by someone other than the actual respondent. We did, however, observe two exceptions.

Prejudice Example 11:

...there were concerns about people buying large quantities of baby formula and sending it to China. I...found myself becoming instantly suspicious of people of Asian appearance in the [supermarket] aisle with baby products, which also contained a range of other products.

Prejudice Example 12:

... walking up to the train station I was mildly harassed by a group of teenage ...Aboriginal guys. ...I just sat down...and tried to ignore them. ...later an Aboriginal teenage girl...walked up to me. "Oh no!" I thought..."they HAVE followed me over here, I'm still alone on the station, this isn't good ...". But what she said was, "hi, I'm so glad there's another female here. I was scared of those guys so I was waiting down the road. Can I sit with you please?"

Again, these examples seem to be more descriptions of stereotyping than prejudice, particularly Example 11. Finally, we did, of course, observe the "I'm not prejudiced, but…" claim noted by Billig (2012):

Prejudice Example 13:

I have a distinct memory of my mother saying "i'm not racist, but bloody Asians"....

In the *Prejudice Census*, after respondents provide examples of prejudice, we ask them to *explain* why it is prejudice. Some explanations are simply restatements of the actual incident; others consider group-based judgements, in and of themselves, to be prejudice; while still others invoke irrationality, unfairness, lack of education, and simply "prejudging". There was one explanations that simply essentialized prejudice into human biology. Examples explanations are presented in Table 1.

While many of the examples and explanations of prejudice we have observed in our *Prejudice Census* share broad similarities with each other, any consensus among our respondents exists *only* at this broadest level of abstraction.

There is disagreement about how prejudice is expressed and why it is expressed; and, as noted above, many examples were more of stereotypes and stereotyping, while still others were more of group-based discrimination. What consensual view there is suggests that prejudice is about groups and it is bad (and maybe that it is primarily expressed by others and not self). Even the example of "positive" prejudice was reported as unwanted. Worthy of note, however, is that there does seem to be one additional form of consensus by omission: no respondent (thus far, at least) reported institutionally-based prejudice. Either the respondents are unaware of this form of behaviour, or simply do not recognize it.

Table 1. Example Explanations for Observed Prejudice

Explanation	Type of Explanation
Assuming that someone is a thief purely by their race and using derogatory racist terms shows a prejudice by the storekeepers in my opinion.	Restating Incident
Pretty self explanatory really: abusing someone verbally about their race	Restating Incident
The negative attitude towards a whole group of people--he was painting "black people" with a single brush.	Group-Based Judgements
Holding a view of people ... based not on your direct experience of that person, but on an arbitrary characteristic (e.g. Their skin colour or sexuality).	Group-Based Judgements
...Her reasons to worry were not based on any facts but an irrational belief, whose validity she didn't even attempted to check.	Irrationality
Holding a view of people...based not on your direct experience of that person, but on an arbitrary characteristic (e.g. Their skin colour or sexuality).	Irrationality
It was prejudice, as I was unfairly targeted, harassed and threatened in a way that was designed to make me feel unsafe based on my minority status....	Unfairness
It was textbook racial prejudice on my behalf because I pre-judged her based on her race. I assumed she was with the guys because she was Aboriginal. She pre-judged me as safe due to my gender, but at least her assumption was correct, mine was wrong. [From Example 12]	Prejudging
lack of understanding about the capabilities of people from different cultures.	Lack of Education
I think prejudice is an extension of neurological function....	Human biology

Unfortunately, social psychologists, too, seem to have difficulty agreeing precisely what prejudice is. Social psychologists variously define prejudice as an "attitude" (Allport, 1954), or an "attitude or feeling" (Crisp & Turner, 2014), or just "feelings" (Kassin, Fein, & Markus, 2014), or simply an "affective prejudgement" (Sutton & Douglas, 2013). For other researchers, prejudice is an "evaluation" (Smith & Mackie, 1995) or a "negative response" (Baron, Branscombe, & Byrne, 2008). For still other researchers, prejudice is a non-conscious differential association of value-laden attributes with specific targets (Banaji & Greenwald, 1994). And while, for many, prejudiced attitudes, emotions or responses must be *negative*, in Allport's (1954) classic analysis (see also Smith & Mackie), prejudiced attitudes or emotions can also be positive (a view held in at least some lay views, as we saw above).

As for explanations, our respondents seemed to have hit on key processes also considered by social psychologists. Yet variability remains in both the lay views and our profession. Social psychologists typically assume that prejudice is an outcome of bias, error or, alas, prejudgement (Augoustinos, Walker, & Donaghue, 2014), although this view is remarkably absent from many formally stated definitions (as a review of social psychology textbook glossaries will show). But the uniform assumption that prejudice is bad is coupled with suggested means to overcome it – most of which entail some form of "more appropriate" learning, such as explicit education (e.g., Devine et al., 2012) or appropriate contact (e.g., Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008). In this way, social psychologists understand prejudice as, effectively, the *wrong* attitudes/ emotions/responses/associations about groups and group members. Claims of prejudgement presuppose more appropriate or correct forms of

judgement. For attitudes[1] to *become* prejudice, they therefore must diverge from a normative set of standards identifying correct attitudes. Some normative standards, for example, suggest that attitudes about people *should* be determined only with reference to their unique individuality (e.g., Amodio, 2014). Within this latter framework, *any* attitude based upon group membership becomes inappropriate (if not error-driven and biased) – a view that, we should note, is strongly contested among other social psychologists (e.g., Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994).

Our view about prejudice, however, is different. Indeed, we disagree with key features of both formal social psychological analyses and the broadly held lay views exemplified in our *Prejudice Census*. First, let us consider the view that prejudice is, simply, prejudging. Unfortunately, we view the concept of prejudging to be psychologically contentless when interrogated even slightly. Prejudging implies that there is also "judging", and that, somehow, this judging is more appropriate or accurate than judging before one judges (i.e., prejudging). We see this view as flawed, however, given there is no *psychological* process that differentiates judging from judging-before-judging. There is no psychological point at which prejudging simply becomes judging. One might argue, of course, that prejudging ceases once people learn more about others (typically, others as unique individuals and not group members). Although there is an air of lay-logic to this, it falters again because it fails to identify the psychological point where the learning itself ceases. How much do we have to know about someone before prejudging turns into judging? Will 10 minutes do? Ten days? 24/7 for 10 years? The answer is, there is no answer. Of course, as scientists, we could reasonably draw a cut-off when, for example, our views and understandings begin to plateau with each new piece of information. This is completely reasonable – but it remains the value judgement of scientists, and not an actual psychological process: scientists could reasonably place the cut-off elsewhere. In our view, claims of "prejudging" are simply rhetorical claims that others have

not reached the same conclusions that we have.

A second problem with both lay views and formal views of prejudice pertains to the near universal (if not completely universal) agreement that negative intergroup attitudes are prejudiced. In some ways this appears non-contestable. If we were to claim that Aboriginal Australians were dirty and disgusting, there is no question that we would be (rightfully) labelled prejudiced. But if we were to claim that child molesters were dirty and disgusting, we suspect that most others would nod their heads in agreement. Yet both claims express (identical) negative intergroup attitudes. Of course, there is a clear difference in these two examples: child molesters have engaged in specific behaviours that place them into their group, while Aboriginal Australians have done no such thing. But even here the argument runs into difficulty. If we claim it is not prejudice if we express negative intergroup attitudes on the basis of behaviours that have placed people into their respective groups, then we should all be satisfied that claims that Jews or Muslims are dirty and disgusting are, in fact, not prejudiced. After all, people can opt into these latter social categories on the basis of their specific behaviours.

The reply, of course, is that child molesters have actually engaged in reprehensible behaviour, behaviour that we consensually view as illegitimate and warranting our negative intergroup attitude. In this way, we see our negative intergroup attitude as relatively true. While in agreement with the values expressed here, we still have concern *as psychologists*. This is because finding a behaviour to be "reprehensible" is simply a reflection of people's collective values about its relative legitimacy. To the extent that this is true, then prejudice no longer represents a psychological process, per se, but is the outcome of a disjuncture between our (socially shared) values and some form of behaviour (a process which *is*, of course, subject to psychological analysis).

It is worth pausing here to clarify our argument thus far. We do not deny the presence of negative intergroup attitudes and the social harm they can yield: both are unquestionable realities. However, our claim is that not all negative intergroup attitudes are identified as

prejudice. Indeed, negative intergroup attitudes that, in any given (intergroup or historical) context, are seen as truthful rather than prejudiced, can also be seen as prejudiced with changes in the (intergroup or historical) context. Psychology itself is not immune to such changes. For example, Floyd Allport (1924, p. 386) claimed that "the intelligence of the white race is of a more versatile and complex order than that of the black race." Allport undoubtedly spoke truth as he understood it in his historical context, despite our contemporary abhorrence to his blatant prejudice. In contrast, our own historical context allows us to claim as truth differences in intelligence between the prejudiced themselves and the non-prejudiced (Hodson & Busseri, 2012).

Claims of prejudice can thus be made if we collectively believe – as a shared, in-group norm – one or both of the following: (a) attitudes about groups and/or individuals *as* group members *should not* be expressed, and (b) differential attitudes about groups or group members that are otherwise collectively believed to be equal on the attitude dimension *should not* be made. Violations of these *should not* statements incur the label *prejudice*. By labelling a target individual or group as prejudiced, an actor identifies the target as behaving counter-normatively *with regard to the actor's own group membership and, possibly, the group membership of the actor's intended audience*. Prejudice labelling thus becomes a claim of counter-normative behaviour and often includes (or is itself) an attempt to change the target's attitude and/or the criteria (normative or not) against which the target's attitude is formed.

What we are claiming is that prejudice is actually not a psychological concept at all. It is a political/value concept. When I say, "you're prejudiced", I am saying that you are expressing negative (typically) intergroup attitudes that are inconsistent with the norms and values of *my* group. If you're in my group, then I am saying, "Hey, shape up!" If you are not in my group, you are likely to reply, simply, "No I'm not; I'm telling the truth." And if I say to you, "they're prejudiced," then I am trying to reaffirm a shared social identity between you and

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[1]From this point, we will use the term "attitudes" as shorthand for the variable

definitional characterizations.

me. Ultimately, however, what we are experiencing in claims of prejudice is an argument over shared values and what the claimants collectively understand to be truth. In our research program, we demonstrated aspects of this normative component in one of our recent papers (Lee, Platow, Augoustinos, Van Rooy, Spears, & Bar Tal, 2019). Here participants read an anti-fat statement, followed by a subsequent interpretation that it was "truth" or it was "prejudice". First, participants' perceptions of truth and prejudice were strongly negatively correlated, loading negatively on a single factor: the more the statement was seen as true, the less it was seen as prejudice. Second, when the interpretation was made by a medical doctor (an expert), participants saw the claim as relatively prejudiced when it was described as prejudice but as relatively true when it was described as truth. Participants' perceptions of the identical negative intergroup statement varied as a function of this social influence attempt. No such influence occurred, however, when the interpretation was made by a retail (non-expert) worker.

In this way, our analysis has a strong social constructivist element. Our claim, ultimately, is that there is nothing inherent in specific attitudes that make them prejudiced and others not. We realize, of course, that, for some readers, we now simply appear to be apologists for prejudice. We understand such a claim, but we disagree. In fact, we see our analysis as freeing both social psychologists and social change agents alike from the shackles of supposedly inherent biases permeating the psychological system. By recognizing that prejudice *is* about shared values and norms about intergroup attitudes and behaviours, it allows us to work collectively to shape the values and norms we seek and to negotiate with others who disagree. This is the same argument that Oakes et al. (1994, p. 206) made about stereotypes, per se: "When we reject stereotypes…this is a political act…." When we reject negative intergroup attitudes *as prejudice*, this too is a political act. And when we embrace negative intergroup attitudes as not prejudice – as, more likely, true – this, too, is a political act, one that expresses our individual and (more often) collective values.

With this framework, we can now make a number of observations directly relevant to the horrific Christchurch murders of 50 people *because* they were Muslims. First, although a lone gunman, it is clear from his actions (e.g., broadcasting his actions to a real or imagined in-group) that the murderer did have a psychological understanding of himself *as a group member*, that he understood his attitudes and behaviours to be normative for that group, and even that he saw his attitudes and behaviours as worthy of celebration within that group. Second, his attitudes led to murder (as opposed to more "mundane" negative intergroup acts exemplified in our *Prejudice Census*) specifically because they were *delegitimizing*. They implied categorization of others as separate "from the sphere of human groups that act within the limits of acceptable norms and/or values, since this group is viewed as violating basic human norms or values and therefore deserves maltreatment" (Bar-Tal & Hammack, 2012, p. 30). This delegitimization served as a rationale for the murders by placing others categorized as an out-group in a position of lesser moral and existential worth (see also Tileaga, 2007). Indeed, the murderer expressed no regret or guilt, instead making hand gestures in court associated with his psychological in-group. In his mind, he performed a desirable act consonant with the norms and values of his psychological in-group. Finally, we note that people are, of course, not born with the supremacist views held by the murderer. As we have argued throughout, the legitimization of negative intergroup attitudes and delegitimization of others are learned and developed in the group and intergroup contexts in which people live (Bar-Tal & Avrahamzon, 2017). The learned content of these attitudes reflect in-group norms, and collective values and beliefs that serve as a positive reference for those who hold them (Bar-Tal, 1990).

Once again, we do not want to be mistaken as providing justification for the horrors witnessed in Christchurch, let alone the daily expressions of negative intergroup attitudes found in our *Prejudice Census* (and beyond). We find these abhorrent, as we *are* members of groups that do have specific norms and collective values that lead us to label these acts as prejudice (if not worse). Although we are psychologists and scientists, we also remain members of the body politic, and so can express –

and will continue to express – political attitudes. But as psychologists and scientists, we need to evaluate and re-evaluate our understandings of (negative) intergroup attitudes and the reasons they are held and expressed. While we may pursue education and contact to change others' negative intergroup attitudes, we must recognize that we are seeking to persuade others that *our* specific understandings of reality are, in fact, truthful. We must recognize that we seek to instil the norms and values of *our* groups. Claiming that "we" have truth while "they" have faulty psychological processes will undoubtedly garner claims of prejudice from the "thems" about whom we so pejoratively speak. And, of course, there will undoubtedly be times when still others will challenge our norms and our truths, and we must be ready and willing to recognize that these challenges may ultimately be forms of positive social change, in and of themselves (Dixon, Levine, Reicher & Durrheim, 2012).

Indeed, we must be willing to have our norms and values challenged by others as we negotiate and re-negotiate our understandings of the social world we inhabit. What we see as truth today may well be challenged as prejudice tomorrow. But if we seek a world of intergroup tolerance and acceptance, we must develop collective values and a shared definition of who *we* are that will enable this to come to fruition. We must seek to instil our groups with the norms and values that will realize our goals. And we must work to ensure that these collective norms and values do not place others outside the sphere of human groups as the Christchurch murder did. As a wise leader recently noted in observing specific intergroup relations, "they are us."

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