

Book Reviews

Klaus F. Riegel

Psychology of Development and History
New York: Plenum, 1976. Pp. ix + 263.
\$US22.75

Reviewed by John A. Codd

In the twenty years since Chomsky (1959) published his critical review of Skinner's *Verbal Behaviour* there has been a major paradigm shift that has penetrated to the very core of psychological enquiry. This now historic review, which drew attention to the explanatory inadequacy of a mechanistic and associationist theory of language acquisition, coincided with the awakening interest amongst Anglo-American psychologists in the work of Piaget and the possibilities of cognitive-structuralism as an alternative paradigm to the S-R reductionism that had become increasingly predominant since the advent of Watsonian behaviourism in the 1920's. Coincidentally, as behaviourism was losing some of its claims to the centre-stage of what might later have been called *normal* psychological science, Thomas Kuhn (1962) published *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* — an analysis of the history of science that was to completely transform our understanding of the nature of scientific enquiry. In psychology, no less than in any other area of scientific endeavour, traditional paradigms can no longer be held sacrosanct and for some time the way has been open for the investigation of new theoretical frameworks and the advancement of alternative explanatory models. Psychology has reached the limits to which naive empiricism can take it without a renewed quest for more adequate philosophical foundations upon which to build its theories and develop its methodologies. It is as a contribution to just such a quest within the field of developmental psychology, that Klaus Riegel has directed his book.

Riegel's experimental and clinical research in the relatively neglected area of gerontology suggested that developmental psychology has been labouring under three particular limitations: (1) a lack of explanations as to why organisms grow and change, (2) the uncritical application of physical time scales, (3) the confounding of individual and cultural changes. In essence, according to Riegel, most developmental theories assume a stability in the environment that may not exist — particularly over the complete developmental history of an individual. They neglect the important interdependence between the growth of the individual and changes in society. The structuralism of Piaget and Chomsky has partly

remedied these problems by emphasizing the transactional character of psychological operations; but, in Riegel's view, both Chomsky and Piaget "have failed to assign an appropriate role to the cultural-historical conditions into which an individual is born and within which he grows. The environment is regarded as passive" (p. 139).

It is the Soviet psychologist Rubinstein, building on the earlier work of Vygotsky, who has presented a dialectical model of human development that not only rejects the Cartesian dualism of much Western psychology, but allows for the environment and organism to be explained as mutually interactive systems. Where Piaget has based his theorising on the paradigm of a dialectical interdependence within the organism between the processes of accommodation (of the subject to the object) and assimilation (of the object to the subject) leading to continuous adaptations, Vygotsky and Rubinstein have extended the dialectic beyond the organism alone, such that both the organism and the environment become active participants in the process of developmental change. Instead of positing an active individual in a passive environment, a true dialectical psychology will take account of an active individual in an active environment — a shift which, in Riegel's view, not only has a number of practical implications for education (Ch. 6) but is also reflected in much wider ideological differences of a social, economic and political nature (Ch. 7).

Riegel's central thesis then, is that Hegel's dialectical idealism, as it comes through the writings of Marx, Engels and Lenin, provides a theoretical rationale that embraces both the study of history and the study of individual development, making possible the theoretical convergence of ontogenetic and phylogenetic progressions. It is a claim that requires much more support however than the author has been able to assemble in this volume.

Nowhere does Riegel acknowledge the inconsistencies that have been shown to exist (Acton, 1962) between the idealism of Hegel and the positivism of Marx and his followers. Furthermore, he fails to make explicit the highly contentious assumptions that lie behind the dialectical model. For instance, one of the central metaphysical assumptions in dialectical materialism concerns the perfectibility of man. Human and historical development are considered to move towards a future of unbounded possibilities for the advancement, improvement and enjoyment of social life. This is what Marx had in mind, it would seem, when he said that hitherto man had

lived only in pre-history, and that his real history was yet to begin.

If one takes a dialectical view of history, as Riegel does, then one should be prepared to argue for the historicism that such a view entails. One of the strongest opponents of the historicist view has been Popper (1957) who has held that we cannot explain history in terms of any objectively identifiable causes or historical laws, we can only interpret history from our own particular point-of-view. Popper's argument receives no mention in Riegel's book — an omission which belies the author's emphatic assertion that the dialectical model is the most adequate rationale for both the psychology of development and history.

Another surprising omission is any reference to or acknowledgment of the ideas of the recently rediscovered eighteenth century Italian philosopher, Giambattista Vico (Berlin, 1976; Tagliacozzo & Verene, 1976). There are striking affinities between Vico's thought and the developmental psychology of Piaget, especially the idea that the same concepts and operations that emerge sequentially in the growing individual (ontogenesis) have their parallel in the intellectual growth of society (phylogenesis). Riegel's case for a convergence of developmental psychology and history might have been considerably enhanced by a recognition that such claims go back even further than the ideas of Hegel.

Although this book contains some excellent passages — especially those in which the author indulges in flights of imaginative generality concerning the socio-historical and ideological contexts of various psychological movements — it generates an overall effect of considerable dissatisfaction. In structure, it is fragmented, repetitive and comprises a set of variations on a theme rather than a carefully woven argument. Most of the chapters have been published as separate articles in various journals and volumes over a period of some ten years. One gains the impression that the author has never been called upon to provide a rigorous and systematic defence of his fundamental and far-reaching assertions. In a series of articles, such deficiencies of logic and philosophical justification can be concealed; in a book of this length however, they become conspicuous shortcomings.

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R. W. Mackie (Ed.)

Vigilance: Theory, Operational Performance, and Physiological Correlates
 New York: Plenum Press, 1977. Pp. x + 862.
 \$US59.00.

Reviewed by Paul N. Russell.

This volume reports the proceedings of a 1976 conference held in Italy and sponsored by NATO and the U.S. Navy. Traditionally, vigilance research concerned itself with laboratory studies involving the detection of rare, weak, signals over prolonged periods in the hopes that the findings would have operational relevance for military watch and surveillance tasks of the type common during World War II. However, as Jerison's keynote address indicates, vigilance has widened to mean research aimed at clarifying the nature of sustained attention generally.

Apart from a useful integrating introduction by the editor, papers follow in their order of conference presentation, but fortunately tend to be grouped according to topic. The first, on vehicle control, contains several reports from Europe and the U.S. of driver performance (lane drifts, control movement, etc.) during all night sessions and relates performance to physiological measures of arousal (e.g. EEG, and heart-rate) and circadian cycle.

Not surprisingly, these indicate that the combination of prolonged driving, sleep loss, and biological sleep-time in the small hours of the morning produce a particularly hazardous mix. Predictions from these studies are borne out by the finding from a statistical analysis of accidents in which long-haul truck drivers fell asleep at the wheel, that such accidents have greater likelihood when the end of a long journey coincides with biological sleep-time. The implication is obvious. If you must have a long journey, commence it in the small hours so that fatigue from prolonged driving coincides with the period of greatest biological wakefulness in the afternoon or early evening.

Generally, physiological measures proved unhelpful in identifying alertness and attention. The vision, expressed by some, of the long-haul truck driver being saved from his early morning nap at the wheel by a bio-feedback device capable of monitoring EEG theta or whatever and delivering a suitably arousing electronegative jab to the seat

of consciousness at the opportune moment, remains a hope at this stage. Nevertheless, a West German study used a modern semi-automatic train equipped with EEG and computer to demonstrate that many drivers were actually asleep (according to the EEG) and incapable of responding to an emergency although they continued to depress a button every 30 seconds. The button pressing in response to a light flash supposedly served to indicate their task relevant wakefulness. The train would grind to an automatic halt if they delayed a response by a mere five seconds.

A comprehensive series of studies reviewed by Klein and colleagues, also from West Germany, assessed the disrupting effects of transmeridian flight on circadian rhythm and level of performance of pilots using simulation tasks. Resynchronization of circadian rhythm to the night-day sleep-wake cycle is apparently some 30 — 50% faster following Westbound than Eastbound travel.

The next sections deal in turn with monitoring, and physiological correlates of performance in traditional laboratory tasks, even including a study of vigilance by split brains. One paper suggests the need for a taxonomy of vigilance tasks and a full multichannel analysis of EEG data if the confusion and disagreement that abounds is to be clarified.

A section on stressors includes a comprehensive review by Poulton on the effects of noise, heat, and vibration on performance in traditional tasks. Alluisi and colleagues reanalyze and summarize their extensive research using synthetic work on the multiple task battery originally devised to arrive at an optimum work-rest schedule for manned space travel. Nearer to home, monitoring of displays from a life support system in a realistic simulation by anaesthetists indicated that ones chances of survival during surgery could be somewhat enhanced if the anaesthetist was not sleep deprived from a night on emergency duty.

The section on individual differences explored the usual introversion-extraversion relations and added field articulation as determinants of performance in laboratory vigilance situations but did little to remove uncertainties about the usefulness of such measures.

The final section dealt with theory as applied to the traditional laboratory tasks. Some consideration is given to the applications of signal detection theory, including a critical appraisal by Swets himself who also deals with industrial inspection. Warm presents a stage analysis of laboratory tasks and argues that existing theories are not so much in disagreement but deal with different stages. Loeb and Alluisi have the final word in a comprehensive review and report that while no theoretical

developments of significance have been forthcoming in recent years, no existing theory accounts for a majority of the findings. Two studies raise the question of motivation in laboratory and simulation situations. Ware and Baker found that more targets were detected when subjects expected a challenging, not a boring task, and when permitted to mutter aloud, but not silently, to themselves (the content matters little). Nachreiner found that the usual decrement in detection with time at the task did not occur in a group of students believing the vigil to be part of the selection procedure for a well paid job as a research assistant although decrement did occur in a group performing the same task and believing they were subjects in a vigilance experiment. Theories of vigilance have not considered motivational variables.

Shirley Weitz

Sex Roles: Biological, Psychological and Social foundations. New York: OUP, 1977. Pp. xi + 283. \$7.30.

Reviewed by Aloma Colgan.

Shirley Weitz begins her survey of the foundations of sex roles with a rather pessimistic view of sex role changes over time. ...“the lesson of history is that women’s roles do not change, and neither do men’s. Except for a few technological innovations, women and men are performing just about the same functions within the family and society as they were in the middle ages, or in pre-history, for that matter. ...For the most part, the private, familial domain is female, while the public, social one is male. This pattern has been largely unbroken by history or geography.” Although female roles have become more flexible, *male* roles have changed very little, although more individual latitude is tolerated. However, as Weitz points out, if an individual deviates from a sex role, the *individual* is seen as deviant, not the sex role standard. Gender remains an important predictor of human behaviour. Weitz comments “If we can sum up the purpose of this book in one sentence it would be to discover why we can predict so much about peoples lives just by knowing one fact about them: their sex.”

She rejects “conspiracy theories” of history, which imply that men have deliberately kept women down over the centuries, as not worthy of serious consideration. Any system that has remained stable across time and space for so long, she feels, deserves a more coherent explanation. Her thesis is that the three systems of biology, psychology and society have conspired to main-

tain sex roles in their current form, and it is at these three targets that she directs her attention. "We must understand the sources of the system and the nature of its tenacity before changes can be effectively planned."

These three systems she sees as operating simultaneously, and highly interactive. She therefore avoids accepting an explanation at any one level, preferring to treat sex roles as a product of all three systems. She claims a feminist viewpoint, but emphasises both male and female roles since they too operate as a system, and one cannot be fully understood (or changed) without reference to the other. Her perspective is wideranging; cross-cultural, historical and futuristic, as she searches for evidence of change and analyzes possible avenues for creating changes.

Weitz focusses first at the biological bases of sex role differences, since she feels it is highly unlikely that roles would have evolved and endured that are at variance with our biological dispositions. She places particular emphasis on aggression and sexuality. Aggression first, because she considers that almost all sex-role-specific behaviours can be seen as related to aggression in some way. For example, differences in achievement and personality she attributes to a substrate of differential aggressiveness between males and females, citing in support studies showing a relationship between androgen, in normal males and in females with the adrenogenital syndrome (involving an excess of prenatal androgen) and aggression and higher activity levels. However, she finds little evidence for chromosome/aggression links.

She then briefly looks at the biological contribution of sexual response to sex roles. In this chapter, as in others, much interesting information is detailed, but implications for behaviour are not clearly spelled out. No firm conclusions are reached, largely because of her emphasis on the interaction of the biological/psychological/social systems. While I appreciate the utility of such an approach, I found it rather unsatisfying and frustrating. Evidence is presented and a point clearly made, then, just as you grasp it, she modifies it with caveats from the other systems; rather like sand running through your fingers. In looking at the "maternal instinct," for example, she suggests that the nature of the family system and the structure of sex roles would be more than enough to explain human maternal behaviour without the intervention of hormones. But, as she previously notes in her introduction, the very existence of these stable patterns and roles across space and time suggests *some* biological basis. However, she does concede "some hormonal undercurrent as a concession to adaptive plausi-

bility, accompanied with a heavy dose of societal conditioning."

Reviewing studies of the relationship between menstruation and mood in women, she dismisses evidence of hormonal factors in pre-menstrual depression, for reasons that appear largely political, plumping instead for an attribution theory model. She suggests that depression or irritability may pass unnoticed at other times of the month but be attributed to hormonal factors when they occur during the premenstrum. However, a hormonal factor, if found, would only be one factor in behaviour, and would not necessarily exclude women from positions of responsibility. There is no reason to suppose that women are totally at the mercy of their hormones any more than are men, with their biological adrenal propensity for aggression.

The chapter on sex-role socialization contains a critical but sympathetic exposition and analysis of Freud's theory of sexual development, and a brief outline of social learning and cognitive-developmental models. Parental figures, the school environment, peer groups and media influence on sex role socialization are examined. Sex differences in spatial abilities, verbal abilities creativity are briefly covered, concluding that differences found are likely to be dependant on conditioning or on the masculine trait of aggression, stimulating competitiveness. Internalization of sex role standards, the development of different motivations and skills, differential treatment of male and female children are explored, with emphasis on the processes of identification and modelling which Weitz considers form the core of sex role identity.

Chapter three includes a detailed look at the history and function of the family, since she feels that this plays an important part in shaping roles and role expectations. The traditional division of labour into domestic and occupational roles, according to sex role, is examined in historical and modern contexts. She concludes that greater participation by women in the work force has not automatically changed their domestic responsibilities.

the real problems of child care and house-keeping will not be solved until they become men's problems as well, for otherwise women assume a dual burden.

The chapter on symbolism looks at the effects of myth and ritual, taboo, theories of creation, witchcraft, language literature and the arts, uncovering some fascinating material which is generally supportive of the themes already uncovered. In the final chapter, she examines sex role change through time and space. She looks at changes wrought in the social structure of the

Soviet Union, China, Israel and Sweden, looking particularly at areas of resistance to changes in sex roles. Finally she presents a history of the feminist movement in America spanning nearly two hundred years. Changes she feels have been less than dramatic. Present-day America, she submits perpetuates the traditional sex role system, but permits questioning of the system and suggestions of alternatives.

The prevailing theme seems to be that no *one* system, biological, psychological or social, is primarily involved in the maintenance of sex roles. She presents a wealth of well-researched data, bringing together information from many fields in support of her thesis. However, as previously noted, her eclectic approach makes firm conclusions very difficult.

And after all this analysis, what of the future? Alas, she concludes as pessimistically as she began: "What the future holds is uncertain, although it is likely that if societal pressures continue, some evolution in sex roles will occur, though probably over generations rather than years. Whether complete revolution, that is, a life plan and a society not patterned on sex at all, is likely is much more debatable. The inputs of the biological psychological and sociological maintenance systems have created a set of values and societal structures that are very resistant to change."

G. A. Foulds

The Hierarchical Nature of Personal Illness.

London: Academic Press, 1976. Pp. x + 158.

Reviewed by Alan R. Forbes

This is the second, and because of his death, the last book in which Graham Foulds presents an account of development and testing of his model of the organisation of the symptoms and signs of personal illness, on the one hand, and the relationship of these to personality traits and attitudes, on the other. The first book, *Personality and personal illness*, was published in 1965. In a nutshell, in it was entered a plea for and there was ably defended a logically- (as opposed to committee-) based classification of disordered experience and behaviour which was held to be conceptually and empirically distinguishable from the traits and attitudes used to describe normal experience and behaviour, with the ability to establish and maintain mutually satisfying personal relationships as the principal criterion for gauging personal adjustment. The bulk of the book, however, was occupied with descriptions of the devices developed (the Runwell Symptom-Sign Inventory,

the Hysteroid-Obsessoid Questionnaire and the Hostility and Direction-of-Hostility Questionnaire) to test predictions, with a consistently high level of success, from the model. *Personality and personal illness* was reviewed with respect but given a curiously lukewarm reception by most clinical practitioners for, I think, two reasons: first, because of the resistance of many to the very idea of classification, as strong then as it is now and, second, because Foulds offered no extensive prescriptions for bringing about therapeutic change.

Will *The Hierarchical nature of personal illness* fare any better? It would be pleasant to think so, if only because of the thought and careful collaborative empirical work which has gone into it. The studies it reports are concerned with personal illness almost entirely. As the title states, the model of dysfunction adopted is a hierarchical one, and four levels or classes of disorder are posited. Paralleled by increasing degrees of failure to establish and maintain mutually satisfying personal relationships these are: disorders of mood (e.g. depressive affect), "neurotic" disorders (e.g. phobic symptom-complexes), integrated delusional states (e.g. delusions of persecution), and non-integrated delusional states (e.g. disorders of perception and thought). Persons are held to be members of these classes, operationally, on the basis of their scores on an obviously content-valid self-report device, the Delusions-Symptoms-States Inventory (DSSI). The hierarchical model holds that patients who are allocated to membership of a given class should also be members of each of the classes below it, but membership of a given class does not imply membership of a class reflecting a greater degree of pathology. An unremarkable position, and one which is implicit in conventional psychiatric nosology although not always adhered to in practice, but on the other hand, Foulds' demonstration that 448 of 480 functionally ill patients presented symptoms and signs strictly in accordance with expectation is remarkable. (This finding has been replicated by McPherson and others (1977), but not so well with manic and hypomanic patients by Bagshaw and McPherson, 1978.) Further, Foulds' data show that when patients are allocated to classes by means of the DSSI, the percentage of cases showing only one syndrome within a class is 58%, whereas if the hierarchy model is *not* used it is only 13%. The implication of this is that such a model goes far to meet the valid criticism of conventional nosology that it fails through having classes which are not mutually exclusive. Another test of the hierarchical model is that as patients improve they ought to move down the hierarchy, shedding symptoms from the highest level they attained

first. The data also support this expectation of the mode of class change. An implication of that is that mode of treatment may require change as a patient improves, but this is not examined in detail. As a final example of the findings, it was shown that the greater the degree of personal illness, the greater the degree of personality disturbance, as defined by performance on another purpose-build device, the Personality Deviance Scales (PDS), and also that "personality" features change more slowly than do those of illness.

So ... how will this book fare? Foulds was a very clear thinker and both the exposition of his model and the elegant simplicity of the means whereby he tests its validity show it. With Alan Bedford as his principal collaborator, his analysis of the data is exhaustive enough to satisfy the severest procedural critic. No conclusions which are not supported adequately by the data are advanced. The arguments are tight and, especially when data-related, demand close attention from the reader.

On the other hand, it may be argued that this book need not have been produced since much of the content had already appeared (e.g. Foulds, 1971; Foulds and Bedford, 1975 or was awaiting publication (e.g. Bedford and Foulds, 1977) when *The Hierarchical nature of personal illness* was published, and included content beyond that in the book, e.g. the entire item-set of the DSSI in the third one of these references. The weight given to this objection will depend on personal circumstances, but more serious is the possibility that the book has appeared at the wrong time in another way. The heroic age of interest in ordering patients in terms of the traditional clinical symptoms and signs has almost passed away, at least for a large number of practising clinical psychologists. In that sense Foulds' work is behind the times. On the other hand a taxonomy of persons and their behaviours in terms of variables demonstrably related to treatment and outcome remains an issue not of great contemporary concern. By the time that it does become one, as it must, Foulds' work will be even further removed from the action, and may appear downright antique. If it is so perceived, it were a pity, for *The Hierarchical nature of personal illness* demonstrates, if nothing else, that logical and informed thinking is an excellent substitute for hopeful but blind empiricism in the ordering of even intractable clinical data.

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J. Older

The Pakeha Papers. Dunedin: John McIndoe, 1978. Pp. 100.

Reviewed by John Raeburn

I must say at the outset that I thoroughly enjoyed this book. It has all the elements of first class fiction — the forces of good and evil are clearly drawn, it has great highs and lows of emotional intensity, the hero gets gunned down by the baddies only to rise again, and it races along with wit and sparkle. But it ain't fiction. And astonishingly, right at the centre of the cobweb are no less than the (sometime) editors of the *New Zealand Psychologist*. Oh how the fallen have become mighty!

Probably the most interesting aspect of this book for psychologists is that it actually elevates New Zealand psychology to a level of notoriety that it never knew it could have. I mean, we are all ready to believe in the shortcomings of the medical profession, who also come under the gun in this book, but surely not psychology ...

The book starts by telling us that its author, a psychologist who teaches Behavioural Science to medical students at Otago, is a refugee from the horrors, racial and otherwise, of American society. He and his family came to this much vaunted egalitarian paradise, only to find that it is in fact, a kind of Watts in the making.

The author presents an array of statistics to show how unequal Pakehas and Polynesians are, especially in terms of education and occupation. Unlike many social critics, however, Jules Older has some constructive suggestions to make, and these centre around recruiting more Maoris into the professions, especially psychology and medicine. However, the real interest of the book is not so much in its ideas for upgrading the status of Maoridom — one could argue their pros and cons for ever — but in the reception that these ideas got when they were presented in papers to the professions concerned.

Older's real target was the medical profession, the ultimate in Pakeha dominated elitism. However, as a dummy run, he decided to try out his ideas at a rather less illustrious level, viz., on psychologists. He thus presented a paper at the 1975 NZPsS conference in Wellington. This was greeted with enthusiastic acclaim from a room modestly described as "filled and overfilled," and led to a statement of policy by the NZPsS to promote a national scheme for recruiting Maoris and other Polynesians into psychology. The same paper was then submitted to the *New Zealand Psychologist*, and that's where the fun starts. It was rejected out of hand, and was accompanied by referee's comments such as "A Mickey Mouse scheme, verging on the raspberry jam approach," "hoary sentimental claptrap" and "unethical and manipulative." The editor added that he agreed, and wanted to "protect the Society from criticisms" by not publishing it! Older gives us the full text of the rejected paper, so it is clearly up to the reader to judge the justice of the editorial comments. Certainly, the paper is no hardnosed research treatise, and one may disagree with it (as I do). But by no stretch of the imagination does the paper seem to justify these extraordinary reviews. One can only conclude that in one hit, the paper touches two tender places: one, our kiwi paranoia about being criticized by foreigners, and two, psychologists' deep seated academic bigotries. Hell hath no sarcasm like that of the hardheaded New Zealand psychological academician faced with "soft" psychology, and Jules Older's book brings this home.

There is more to the book than the psychological parts. Older next tries on the medical profession for size. Again, initial acceptance then rejection, this time of a paper submitted to the *New Zealand Medical Journal*. A fine war of words proceeds, from which the editors of the *NZMJ* come out looking like illiterate, right wing milkshops.

Finally, another medical paper, written with Bruce Gregory, a Maori GP from Kaitiaki, is rejected by the *NZMJ*, and Older concludes that we are witnessing the latest manifestations of a long-standing "Kiwi Conspiracy" of denying and suppressing information about the low status of our racial situation. There are some glimmers of hope (such as the Polynesian Preference scheme at Auckland Medical School), but all the signs are there for some city burning in the future.

All told, a serious and important topic tackled with élan, and certainly a book to be read by all New Zealand psychologists.

Books Received and Available for Review

The following books have been received by the *New Zealand Psychologist* and have as yet not been allotted to reviewers. Members may request them for review, by writing to the Book Review Editor, M. J. White, Department of Psychology, Victoria University of Wellington.

- Bee, Helen. *The developing child* (2nd ed.). New York: Harper and Row, 1978. Pp. xii + 420. No price given.
- Berscheid, Ellen, and Walster, Elaine Hatfield. *Interpersonal attraction* (2nd ed.). Reading (Mass.): Addison-Wesley, 1978. Pp. xviii + 231. \$8.35.
- Cartwright, Rosalind Dymond. *A primer on sleep and dreaming*. Reading (Mass.): Addison-Wesley, 1978. Pp. xiii + 160. \$6.95.
- Chess, Stella, and Hassibi, Mahin. *Principles and practice of child psychiatry*. New York: Plenum, 1978. Pp. xii + 500. \$US 24.00.
- Foss, B. M. (Ed.) *Psychology survey No. 1*. London: Allen and Unwin, 1978. Pp. 221. £5.50 (hard), £2.50 (soft).
- Friedmann, Lawrence, W. *Psychological rehabilitation of the amputee*. Springfield (Ill.): Charles C. Thomas. Pp. xi + 157. No price given.
- Knepler, Georg. *Geschichte als weg zum musikverstaendnis*. Leipzig: Verlag Philipp Reclam jun., 1977. Pp. 663. No price given.
- Lanyon, Richard I., and Lanyon, Barbara, P. *Behavior therapy: A clinical introduction*. Reading (Mass.): Addison-Wesley, 1978. Pp. xii + 192. \$6.95.
- Lesgold, Alan, M., Pellegrino, James, W., Fokkema, Sipke, D., and Glaser, Robert (Eds.) *Cognitive psychology and instruction*. New York: Plenum, 1978. Pp. xiv + 525. \$US 33.00.
- LoPiccolo, Joseph, and LoPiccolo, Leslie (Eds.) *Handbook of sex therapy*. New York: Plenum, 1978. Pp. xx + 531. \$US 35.40.
- Pincus, Lily, and Dare, Christopher. *Secrets in the family*. London: Faber and Faber, 1978. Pp. 159. \$12.75.
- Schulz, Richard. *Psychology of death, dying, and bereavement*. Reading (Mass.): Addison-Wesley, 1978. Pp. 197. \$10.50.
- Stacey, Barrie. *Political socialization in Western society*. London: Edward Arnold, 1978. Pp. 176. No price given.
- Steinhauer, Paul, D., and Rae-Grant, Quentin (Eds.) *Psychological problems of the child and his family*. Ontario: Macmillan, 1977. Pp. xiv + 459. \$26.95.